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Young men and officers are being increasingly repelled by the stagnation which now exists in the merchant marine—particularly the generally poor working conditions, the indecision on the part of the Federal government, the indifference of employer companies, and the often debilitating activities of labor unions—and they are seeking careers elsewhere.
Unless the factors which attract or alienate seamen are carefully considered and balanced, retention of good men in the U. S. merchant marine becomes the particularly thorny problem it is now, Like mythological sirens, the shore always beckons. While life ashore is often thought to be more hectic, less orderly, and perhaps more confusing, it has the distinct advantage of being modern, more comfortable, and often more stimulating intellectually.
While most merchant mariners can earn more money at sea, an alarming number are abandoning it, particularly the young and the well-trained, those whom the industry needs most to retain. Before a special congressional subcommittee on maritime education and training in April 1966, Milton G. Nottingham, legislative representative and past president of the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy Association, addressed himself to this problem. His words still ring true today.
"The American merchant marine is adrift on the perilous seas of indifference and indecision. Until a merchant marine policy is developed and implemented by the Federal Government, we will continue to decline as a maritime power and our ability to provide merchant shipping for the logistical support of our military forces in periods such as the current emergency situation will steadily diminish. We can preserve ships in the Reserve Fleet for future need but . . . manpower cannot be maintained in Cosmoline for ready employment with that fleet.”
The majority of our ships carry a crew of about 40 men, 11 of whom are officers. Contracts carefully executed between the several unions which represent either the mates, engineers, the radio officer, or crew, meticulously delineate the responsibilities and duties of each man. Particular care is exerted by each union to ascertain that no other union encroaches upon its sphere of interest or overtime potential. The functions of captains and chief engineers are primarily supervisory, although ultimately responsible; the six officer watch- standers are operations personnel in their respective departments; the chief mate and first engineer carry out the maintenance and repair within their departments.
As vessels deteriorate with age, the man-hours required for satisfactory, continued operation increase until, as is often the case now on vintage vessels, the demand in some departments outstrips the capacity of those men who, contractually, may perform the work. Most often the effect is felt first in the engine spaces. The rivalry of the unions, on board ship as well as off, prevents the shifting of available, idle manpower in other departments to those areas where it is seriously needed. Only in emergency situations are shifts permitted, and then often with a weather eye fixed on poten
tial union reactions. Where full crews are unobtainable, the burden upon those on board is greatly increased. Engineers, including chief engineers and watchstand- ers, often must work from 12 to 16 hours a day on repairs to prevent serious breakdowns. The eight engine crewmen are allowed and encouraged to work overtime and reduce the work load, but lack of training and contract restrictions frequently limit their contribution. Far too often, unsafe conditions arise in the engine spaces, but priorities over the limited available manpower prevent their correction.
Most seamen appreciate the opportunity to supplement their base wages with overtime, but when it becomes a practice instead of a privilege, a requirement instead of an option, then the job becomes a burden instead of a profession. When the conscientious employee no longer has free time for his own interests or diversions, the spirit is taxed.
Men at sea place more emphasis on working conditions than men ashore, hence identically deplorable conditions will alienate seamen to an extent greater than their land-based counterpart. This indirectly emphasizes the need of the industry to improve the environment of those men by creating more diversions, improving working conditions, and upgrading living standards. During the Vietnam expansion, manpower shortages, particularly of engineers, allowed a man to quit at almost any time and find another job immediately. Thus, individuals confronted with unpleasant working conditions jumped from ship to ship instead of attempting to solve the problem. This problem remains. "Leave it for the next man” is almost a motto. Responsible men, who are left with the jumper’s burden, are dismayed by such practices and by an industry which refuses to notice. Unless industrial stability is fostered and the dissatisfying forces sharply reduced, the attrition of responsible men will continue. While new ships will help, they will not correct the situation.
Living conditions at sea have changed little from what they were in World War II. While air conditioning, attractive quarters, and modern facilities, such as automatic clothes washers and driers, are standard on new vessels, the majority of the merchant fleet is not so equipped. Drab-colored and ill-painted living spaces, visibly rusting walls, and antique tools confront seamen for all but two or three months a year. Each of these alone is almost insignificant, but cumulatively they become depressing. Young seamen compare these ships with the way of life they knew ashore; the industry and our national security suffer in comparison.
The indecision which is destroying the industry lies partially in the hands of employer companies and unions, but the primary fault lies with the Federal
Tho Morohunt Marine—Awash in Manpower Problems 63
government for failing to activate a comprehensive program. It has failed to recognize, for example, the imbalance of bargaining power between the labor unions and companies, thus permitting the industry to develop a new "personality” wherein the members of the working force no longer regard themselves as employees of the companies, but rather as employees of the unions. Loyalties and responsibilities tend to fall away from the job rather than towards it. The Clayton Act exempts unions from the anti-trust law; exclusive- bargaining rights are guaranteed to the unions by the Wagner Act if they win a simple majority of the employees; the Norris-LaGuardia Act denies injunctive relief to employers damaged by union activities. It is not necessary, perhaps, that these acts be abrogated, but they need reappraisal in light of modern developments. The government also has failed responsibly to "referee” contracts made between the unions and companies to ensure that both adhere to their agreed-upon terms. Unions have not been required, nor even expected, to live up to the responsibilities which their position as labor representative would seem to imply. Joseph H. Ball addressed himself to this power imbalance in his book, The Government-Subsidized Union Monopoly.
"Much of the homage paid to collective bargaining today as a method of settling labor disputes overlooks the fact that to be real and meaningful, collective bargaining requires that the economic strength of the two parties doing the bargaining be somewhere near equal ....
"In the maritime industry today, the unions as institutions run absolutely no risk in a strike, however prolonged, while a substantial proportion of the employer companies would be bankrupt by a long strike and probably none of the independent companies could survive a six-months’ strike without disastrous financial consequences. In this situation, the employer representatives can argue and plead with unions, but they cannot bargain in any real sense.”
Another arm of the government, the U. S. Coast Guard, has been hampered in its attempts to maintain safe standards on board ships. Particularly evidenced during the Vietnam expansion and its accompanying manpower shortage, the absence of an adequate ship- replacement program forced past administrations into compelling the Coast Guard to lower its standards, in order to keep as many ships operating as possible. These standards are little better today. Certain minimums are allegedly maintained, but in numerous areas the new standards have significantly increased the burdens and risks placed upon the qualified seamen. If their physical safety has not been thus imperiled, their psychological
safety has. Licensing standards were lowered or relaxed during the expansion, and thus, seamen could sail six months on a given license or certificate, then sail up to five years in the next higher capacity. The normally required examination was waived. While this does not necessarily mean that those who use the waiver are unfit for that higher position, time and time alone is not a sufficient yardstick for gauging a man’s professional competence. The Coast Guard has no procedure for periodically re-evaluating an individual’s qualifications, such as is increasingly being done with automobile
drivers’ licenses. An officer on board ship has under his control many lives and several million dollars’ worth of equipment; he must be competent, and mere time-on-the-job does not provide that requirement. Ashore, most employees have limited mobility within the job field and to be fired would cause them dislocation and loss of income. For this reason, they are motivated to maintain certain minimum standards in their work. In the maritime industry, however, there is no similar check. If fired, an employee merely is routed
through the union hiring hall to another ship. Often a ship finds herself manned with another ship’s rejects.
The Coast Guard is hampered also in its efforts to investigate serious acts of incompetcncy connected with marine casualties or accidents. The Federal Regulations describe the purpose of such investigations:
"The suspension and revocation proceedings are remedial and not penal in nature because they are intended to maintain standards of competence and
conduct essential to . . . promote the safety of life and property at sea by insuring that the licensed or certificated persons continue to be qualified to carry out their duties and responsibilities.”
Generally, however, no investigation is made unless requested by the owner, agent, master, or person in charge of a vessel. Companies, under the pressures of both union and financial matters, arc reluctant to tie up ships or officers for hearings and investigations. Consequently, incompetent men continue to sail. At
The Merchant Marine—Awash in Manpower Problems 65
this point, a brief case study may highlight in this particular problem.
In late 1968, a tanker returned from a particularly troublesome five-month voyage which included serious mechanical breakdowns, some of which were caused by the professional negligence of an engineer, extreme inter-union and officer-crew disputes, and the attempted murder of an officer. The ship, which was carrying naval oil products for the Federal government, broke down and was adrift for over 30 hours before completing emergency repairs. The vessel was able to limp to a nearby port where proper repairs were effected, and it was there that the officer was assaulted. No investigation was made by the master. Upon the ship’s return to the United States, the chief engineer diligently brought these matters to the attention of the Coast Guard, but no investigation could be made of any of the issues because the company had failed to supply the requisite "notice.” Furthermore, the company representative spent less than one hour in conference with the officers attempting to determine and resolve the severe difficulties which had arisen.
It is perhaps noteworthy that one officer in that ship, a graduate of the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, N.Y., shortly thereafter spent his own time and money traveling to the company’s home office under the belief that they were inadequately informed about the voyage. As it turned out, they were fully informed, but considered the matter to be beyond their control. That officer is now ashore, and many more are likely to follow unless adequate procedures for redress are established and maintained.
Employer companies’ indifference to the problems and attitudes of their officers, as evidenced in the above example, has contributed to the attrition rate of seamen. Employers have failed to take advantage of the mental attitude found among most new seamen which tends to be favorable toward the company since these relative newcomers are not yet emotionally attached to a union. Companies have dropped virtually all pretense of cooperating with their employees, except with captains and chief engineers, the only two men not supplied by union hiring halls. Were the companies to capitalize on the open-minded attitude of the young crewmen and new officers, they could indirectly improve their own status with unions as those men move up the employment ladder and increase in number.
Few companies make any attempt to distinguish between responsible ami irresponsible employees. Provisions for rewarding deserving men arc lacking; thus, all are relegated to a common position. Attempts are no longer made to elicit suggestions, or to evaluate officers, practices, or policies. It has been suggested that
maritime companies, like some of their shoreside counterparts, might periodically enroll all their officers in relatively short management development courses and seminars. Were this done, it would improve employer- employee relationships and would better equip the officers to understand and handle labor problems which arise at sea. It would also provide the companies with a forum for eliciting opinions and suggestions, and would provide them the opportunity to discover capable candidates for management positions within the company.
Discipline at sea has always been a problem and at present the only adequate means available to the company, aside from persuasion, is to "log” or penalize a recalcitrant employee a day’s wages. This procedure is not favored by the companies since several "logs” for one man may result in union dissatisfaction with the company, and may also compel a Coast Guard hearing. The companies have the option of refusing to accept a man supplied by the union, provided they have good cause, but this option is not used even to weed out alcoholics or known bad risks, their reason allegedly being the lack of adequate replacements. Whatever the cause, qualified individuals thus find themselves expected to shoulder the burdens of another man who, although not doing his job, still makes the same wages and suffers no penalty. A company may fire an employee, but not only must they return him to his port of hiring, they must also replace him, all this at the company’s own expense, regardless of the merit of their action. Because of this, and the politics involved, companies are reluctant to replace a man, even though the harmony of the crew might thus be improved.
Pressure from the monolithic unions measurably reduces much of the flexibility of company policy, but avarice, too, takes its toll. While ostensibly awaiting beneficial changes in governmental programs, companies cut corners on repairs, supplies, tools, and other equipment. Inadequate inventories are permitted, and new crews are often compelled to make inadequate repairs with home-made parts. While in shipyards, the repair gangs are often rushed so much that their work becomes careless, thus depriving the company, crew, and vessel of the potential benefits. Although the work load on deteriorating ships has increased many times, the companies are reluctant to equip crews with timesaving modern equipment, such as impact tools, electric pipe threaders, or electric hacksaws. The companies provide neither additional men to supplement the crew in old ships, nor do they create "task forces” of highly- trained men to accompany a particularly troublesome vessel for a voyage or two. Were either of these steps taken, the crew would be able to catch up on necessary repairs and engage in preventive maintenance.
That the deplorable living conditions have not been improved has already been indicated. In addition, many companies provide poor mail service, particularly in unsubsidized companies where vessels follow no scheduled runs and all mail must be routed through the home office. Too frequently the mail takes second place to other company concerns. Most ships have "slop chests” or ship’s stores, where a crewman may obtain toilet articles, clothing, stationery, and other items, but they are usually very small and are poorly equipped. Companies could also improve their image with their employees by providing movie projectors and films, and by compiling lists of shoreside activities available at ports of call. They might organize tours for the crew. Some provision might also be made for beer, strictly rationed, on board. One or two cans might be provided daily, to be consumed at a meal or after the regular work period; proper supervision or disbursing procedures could ensure that there would be no hoarding for a periodic drunk. Not only would this reduce some of the pressures that develop at sea, it might also provide the opportunity for officers and crew to lower some of the unnecessary barriers that exist between them.
Unionism alone cannot be held to be the prime cause of our maritime difficulties, but its frequently selfish motivations and the lack of government regulation has had a disturbing effect upon the industry. It is not contended that unions have outlived their usefulness; far from it, they continually serve the ever-present need in the industry to protect the rights of the individual laborer against overbearing employers. Such a position, however, also carries responsibilities, but not enough unions arc fulfilling them. Their bargaining power has been described, but their lobbying power in Congress is no less significant and increases the advantages of their position vis-a-vis employer companies.
Many of the union’s internal practices are questionable, with power and wealth centralized in the hands of a very few. Instead of actively encouraging new membership, they appear to be trying to retard its progress, particularly now that jobs are scarce. Young men, interested in becoming crew members, for example, are not admitted until they have a Coast Guard certificate; this requires them to find a sponsoring company who will supply the necessary letter ensuring the Coast Guard that the individual will be employed upon proper certification. Many companies are reluctant to issue such letters, as they signify nothing, since the new member must still obtain employment through the hiring halls, and may wind up with some other company. If a young man does obtain his papers, he is often advised that he will gain employ
ment faster if he attends one of the schools operated by the unions. At those schools the recruit finds himself paying for the opportunity to wait on tables at the union cafeteria, to sweep floors, and do other such tasks. While this may well be the work he will do on board ship, it hardly seems necessary to send him to "school” to learn it, much less charge him for the opportunity.
Finally, upon getting a job afloat, the recruit finds himself being charged not only for dues for his current membership, but also for assessments which represent back dues paid since the year the union was founded. The theory is that since the recruit is obtaining the benefits for which the senior members worked, he should pay equal expenses. Thus, by the time the recruit becomes a full book member, he generally has paid more money in dues than the one thousand dollars most new officers pay in initiation dues. This is unreasonable.
Whether the unions are truly "representative” also may be seriously questioned. Meetings are held ashore, with a quorum depending simply upon the number of men present. While it would be difficult to conduct the day-to-day business by any other system, many important, yet less timely, decisions are also made there, but they are brought to the attention of the larger union body only after a decision has been reached. Rarely, if ever, arc attempts made to canvas the seagoing members to determine their attitudes, comments, or suggestions. Far too often, policies arc established by landlubber members who pay their dues, attend meetings regularly, but are less-than-representative of the union body. Added to this condition are the union newspapers which rarely provide a platform for opposing views, especially if directed against the entrenched hierarchy.
Like the companies, the unions provide no means for encouragement of initiative, advancement, or improvement of their members. Perhaps more important, they provide few means for policing their own membership and ensuring that each man they make available is fit and responsible. Discipline of members is virtually non-existent unless a threat to the union itself is perceived. Even where one member violates the rights of another, such as where he fails to cooperate on board with his fellow officers, the unions have no facilities for handling the matter. Unions thus have ensured themselves the right to make the companies answer the complaints of union members, and they have ensured themselves the right to charge members a fee for their representative services, but they have refused to warrant anything to the industry. Their justification is that the Coast Guard issues licenses and certificates, and therefore the Coast Guard should be responsible for any
I
Tho Merchant Marine—Awash in Manpower Problems 67
policing to be done. Companies and unions, especially the latter, have closer relationships with the employees, a vantage point from which evaluations might better be made.
Here again, attention is drawn to the tanker mentioned previously. Shortly before payoff, the representative from the crew’s union came on board to "determine” the cause of the serious disputes on board. Without any formal hearing or even interviewing the officers, he proceeded to declare publicly to the company representative that the union was prepared to strike any ship of the company in which certain officers might again be employed. Ashore, later that same day, the representative privately advised the officers and
company agent that his actions on board had been merely for the "benefit of the crew” and that his union had no intention of carrying out his threat. In fact, he agreed that the majority of the problems had been initiated by crew members. The crew members, however, were then on their way home, undoubtedly impressed by their union’s show of power.
Multiplicity of the maritime unions has also weakened the industry because of their refusal to cooperate and work toward common goals. Symbolic of this is the recent tie-up of the nuclear cargo ship Savannah.
The engineering officers underwent an intensive two- year program of advanced study to prepare them for operating the ship; their union sought and obtained a wage increase as a reward. Although the mates in the Savannah had been required to make no such similar sacrifice, their union struck the ship and demanded that the captain and mate be paid more money than the engineers. It was claimed to be "traditional.” Now, this same specter hangs over the industry as mates’ unions complain that many an engineer’s pay, with overtime, is greater at the voyage’s end than the captain’s. Like the captain, all men are wedded to the ship 24 hours a day and are equally responsible to respond to emergency conditions. It is not disputed that cap-
tains have a much greater responsibility, but on most vessels engineers are required to undergo much more physical exertion than a mate. It would seem reasonable that a point exists where primary responsibility, with a limited amount of physical labor, is counterbalanced by secondary responsibility with excessive labor.
While the differing positions of the several unions are understandable, too often they are unreasonable. In 1965, the Interagency Maritime Task Force recommended to Congress that the nine maritime unions be encouraged to consolidate to provide greater industrial stability, yet today they appear to be no closer to that goal than before.
Unless this nation develops a comprehensive maritime program soon, the industry will soon be faced with a retirement crisis wherein there will be more men ashore on pensions than at sea. In 1966, the reported average age of masters was 55.4 years, mates 48.9 years, and engineers 50.6 years. We need to attract, train, and retain qualified young persons.
Maritime educational facilities should be significantly
increased anil the six state maritime academies placed under the aegis of the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy with similar curriculums.[1] Entrance and graduation dates of the several schools could be staggered so that the industry and unions would not be swamped at any one time with more men than they could adequately handle. Enrollment should be increased where possible. Kings Point, for example, presently trains about one thousand midshipmen, whereas their current facilities and personnel could handle approximately twice that number. Significant financial margins also exist which could provide the Federal government with room to experiment with training procedures. For example, while expenditures per midshipman at Kings Point during his four years total approximately $17,500, the Federal government spends over $40,000 per graduate from West Point and Annapolis, and over $50,000 per Air Force Academy graduate. In recent years, several unions established upgrading schools where crewmen could study for an original license, and officers could prepare for upgrading theirs. This worthwhile step was well-received by the industry and should be actively encouraged by the Federal government. Officials at Kings Point have offered to establish similar.programs at the Academy. It might be possible to involve all major parties to the industry in the educational process, such as teaching basic professional courses at the academies, instructing men in the various technical courses, such as welding or boiler repair, at union facilities, and labor relations and management courses might be taken at company schools. Such programs might engender mutual respect and increase cooperation among them. Other educational improvements might involve the use of on-board instructors or more extensive use of correspondence courses. The Federal government, for example, could extend the presently existing naval correspondence course facilities to all merchant mariners in much the same procedure as it is now offered to naval reservists within the industry.
Lack of adequately trained medical personnel on board ship has created a Janus-faced menace. On one side is the danger that proper diagnosis and treatment is unavailable to those who need it, at least until the ship reaches port. On the other stands the malingerer whose contract provides that he cannot be required to work when "sick.” The chief mate is armed with a medical book and a closet full of pills, but even he is not permitted to make a final determination as to one’s state of health. Too often, irresponsible seamen take advantage of this opportunity. Were medical doctors provided for ships, not only would these problems
The Merchant Marine—Awash in Manpower Problems 69
be reduced, but also a large force of qualified, experienced medical personnel would be created, a force capable of responding in time of national emergency.
Many new officers find themselves with little in common with their cohorts on board. Often coming from widely divergent environments and having obtained their licenses by different means, these men frequently find themselves ill at east with one another, a situation which does not improve the isolation into which they have been thrust. To change this situation, and create a more favorable retention environment, certain ships or companies might serve as focal points for gathering these new men together. Entire ships might be manned with maritime academy graduates. A similar procedure might be adopted for use in the crew; the administration might provide that military credit could be obtained by sailing in the industry, thus many crewmen might be attracted who otherwise would pursue different courses of action. If this were allowed, the ships might be encouraged to operate in a quasi-military manner or they might be given status as a Naval Reserve ship.
Marriage has long been a conflicting factor with the seagoing profession, especially taking its toll upon the younger men. Many mariners complain because their family life must be limited to a two-montb period while their shore-side counterparts have evenings, weekends, and holidays at home. This problem could be virtually eliminated, especially if modern technology was suitably applied to the new and viable fleet this nation must develop. Voyages no longer involve months at sea between ports, and automation and air-conditioning lias dispelled much of the once-harsh way of life. The merchant marine is not a military service in times of peace, but a civilian industry. For these reasons, the American merchant fleet could follow the example of European fleets and provide accommodations for wives and families. At present, several companies permit the wives of officers to make coastwise passages and at least one company permits one foreign trip per year. In fact, the author’s wife accompanied him for eight months on an around-the-world voyage by a tanker carrying grain to India and returning with oil. There were no unfortunate incidents during the trip, and her memories of being "librarian” are particularly good. Similar changes are being incorporated into design modifications for four new vessels being built for MSTS. These diesel-driven, automated tankers, the last of which was to be delivered in 1970, are being built with facilities for officers’ wives. Such a change would provide a dramatic and beneficial atmosphere for the industry; however, this should not be limited solely to officers but should be provided for the crew as well. Automation can reduce the number of men re
quired per ship, thus little additional space, if any, would be required to accommodate the wives. By improving the working conditions and permitting wives on board, the ship would become more of a home rather than merely an inanimate vehicle; stability in the industry would be fostered and the desire to jump from ship to ship significantly reduced. Equal consideration should be given to the employment of women as merchant mariners as well.
Throughout this paper, problems have been raised which must be met head-on if this nation seeks to maintain its position in the economic world. Congress claims to recognize the crisis, yet has thus far done little. The President’s maritime program has challenged Congress, but they must not stop with his proposals. Before the Annual Institute on Foreign Transportation and Port Operation in March 1969, Rear Admiral Walter Schlech, U. S. Navy, sagely pointed this out.
"Within recent years we have seen the advent and phenomenal growth of containerization, experimental use of nuclear power, the tried and proved use of gas turbine engines for maritime use, roll-on/ roll-off ships, barge carriers, hover crafts, experiments with catamaran hulls, and automation. Make no mistake about it, there is a revolution now going on in the maritime industry. But . . . technological progress must be accompanied by equally revolutionary approaches to our personnel and labor problems. There is no dividing the two. Lack of foresight and cooperation by labor, management, and government alike will diminish and dampen technological progress to the detriment of all.”
Young men and officers are being increasingly repelled by the stagnation which now exists in the industry, thus they seek careers elsewhere. Their excellent education and training, which would be of inestimable value to the profession, is being allowed to return to shore. This should not be—it need not be.
* See W. B. Haylcr, "Our Imperiled State Maritime Academics,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1972, pp. 50-57.
A Rhodes Scholar finalist in 1964, Mr. Miller graduated from the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, N.Y., in 1965 with a degree in marine engineering, a license as third assistant engineer, and a Naval Reserve commission as ensign. During the next three years, he sailed on tankers, cargo ships, and containerized vessels while raising his position from third assistant engineer to first assistant engineer. In early 1969, he enrolled at St. Mary’s University laiw School in San Antonio, Texas, before being accepted at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. A graduate of the Georgetown Law Center in June 1972, he is now working as a law clerk for a U. S. District Court Judge in Houston, Texas.