One of the most significant characteristics of the U. S. Navy 25 years after World War II is its continuing dependence on the “well-rounded,” general-purpose line officer for the operation, maintenance, and tactical employment of the most complex ASW weapons systems ever developed. All else has changed—sensor devices, signal processing, display techniques, fire-control systems, weapons sophistication and capability, ASW vehicles, and above all, the potential magnitude of the submarine threat.
Throughout this period of dynamic change in ASW systems, it is difficult to discover a corresponding change in the training, technical sophistication, career development, and demonstrated capability of ASW officer personnel.
No longer does it seem reasonable or possible to expect the well-rounded, general-purpose line officer to be capable of meeting the demands of modern antisubmarine warfare. A long-term program of specialization by ASW officers would seem to be at least as urgent as the officer specialization programs in naval aviation and the submarine forces. In each of these cases, the minimum acceptable level of proficiency demands fulltime specialization.
If it is granted that the destroyer captain should be an ASW specialist, it is equally clear that the development of his specialized skills and knowledge should begin during the early days of his Navy career. Although there is some evidence that the Navy has taken seriously the need to develop more knowledgeable ASW officers, especially since the advent of systems as complex as the AN/SQS-26, there is yet no clear evidence of a career pattern that could be regarded as leading to the development of an ASW specialist.
For example, the duration of formal training given to prospective ASW officers has increased only two weeks in the last 25 years (from six weeks during World War II to eight weeks in 1969). While present training is comprehensive in scope, it can hardly be regarded as adequate in depth. For example, in the total of 22 hours devoted to the topic of sonar equipment, our young officer is expected to acquire a working knowledge of sonar control/indicating equipment, sonar operating procedures, principles of scanning sonar, sonar performance figures, theory and operation of SQS-29, SQS-23, and SQS-26 sonars, sonar transducers and domes, shipboard training devices, variable depth sonar, and underwater communications.
Assignment to the course is supposed to be contingent on six months’ sea experience on board destroyer-type vessels and completion of the CIC watch officer’s course. These prerequisites are met only in the minority of cases. At the time of this writing (1970), 80% to 90% of the student input had had no sea experience. The instructional staff emphasized that the students lacked such fundamentals as an understanding of relative motion, knowledge of how to interpret a radar plan position indicator (PPI), etc. In addition, many of the students lacked technical backgrounds. Since the inputs come from OCS and ROTC programs, as well as the Naval Academy, a significant percentage of the young officers are letters and arts majors who experience considerable difficulty in making the transition to the technical subject matter of oceanography, sound propagation, electronics, and mechanics.
It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the opportunities for subsequent training with submarine targets in either restricted or free-play exercises have diminished to the point where on-the-job training of the ASW officer can be regarded as a questionable concept. Thus the 8-week course presently given to prospective ASW officers, the majority of whom have had no shipboard experience, must be considered the most comprehensive ASW training they are likely to receive in their career as naval officers. All subsequent training, such as that given to PCOs and PXOs is of shorter duration and necessarily less comprehensive. PCO/PXO training is frequently based on the questionable assumption that these officers know the capabilities and limitations of ships, sensors, and weapons and need only learn how to use them in coordinated ASW tactics.
The training and career pattern of the Royal Navy’s torpedo/antisubmarine officer stands in stark contrast to that of our ASW officer. The TAS officer, who is being prepared as a career specialist in ASW, must successfully complete a 44-week intensive course of instruction. Before being accepted for the course, he must be a fully qualified officer-of-the-watch and will have had between four and six years of sea experience, much of it in escorts. He will hold the rank of lieutenant with between three and five years of seniority. A few candidates for TAS training are also drawn from submarines and ASW helicopter squadrons.
The nearly year-long course includes both technical training on ASW systems and practical experience in their operation. There is extensive study of ASW operations, including lectures by submarine officers who are prepared to discuss their own tactics and associated problems in detail. To provide just one contrasting example, the British TAS course includes 7½ weeks of study of the “enemy submarine” in antishipping and ASW roles. The corresponding U. S. Navy courses average only seven hours on similar topics.
Career development problems appear to be central to much of the dissatisfaction expressed by young naval officers. It seems doubtful that a solid esprit de corps can be built in ASW or any other technical specialty in the absence of stability of assignment and carefully developed career opportunities where advancement is closely tied to demonstrated competence. But this has not been the path to success in a Navy that demands the officer be “well rounded.”
It seems clear that the Navy can no longer delay the development of well-defined career patterns for ASW officer specialists up through the rank of captain, and embracing the air, surface, and subsurface forces. Consideration should be given to the development of a group of interrelated billets so that an officer can remain in ASW assignments whether ashore or afloat.
In addition, detailed study should be made of the knowledge and performance requirements of officers with ASW responsibilities in submarines, surface ships, and aircraft, with the objective of determining the depth of instruction required for their effective performance in all stated responsibilities.
Another highly significant factor influencing the development and retention of ASW operating proficiency during the past 20 years has been the progressive reduction of ASW team training at sea, with friendly submarines as targets, and the corresponding increased dependence on shore-based simulators for team training. All evidence suggests that this trend will continue, since no change is expected in the current shortage of submarine services.
The fact that important operating skills and tactical procedures, increasingly, are going to depend, for their development and retention, upon shore-based trainers, makes the design and methods of using these trainers critical to the ASW effort. The design of many presently operational trainers fails to reflect appropriate emphasis on some of the most important elements of the ASW team training problem. There has been, for example, an almost complete disagreement between trainers designed to train officer personnel in tactical functions and those designed to train sensor operators in search, detection, and classification procedures. In many attack trainers, the detection problem is perfunctory, the classification phase is nonexistent, and the entire localization and attack phase is greatly oversimplified by the continuous input of near-perfect data by the sensor operator. The latter’s task is conveniently simplified by the presentation of target signals with signal-to-noise ratios that minimize most of the problems of maintaining contact encountered at sea. In fact, many attack trainers do not even provide for the presence of the sensor operators, using instead mechanically produced range and bearing data in a form conveniently designed to eliminate virtually all the major sources of variation and error encountered in actual operations.
It is not suggested that important training objectives have not been achieved through the use of many of these tactical trainers, but rather that future trainers will have to be better designed from the standpoint of the total ASW problem if shore-based training is going to replace the majority of sea training.
There is abundant evidence that current training in detection and classification is not adequate for developing or maintaining these critical skills at satisfactory levels. More than one study has shown that sonar operators consistently select equipment control settings that are not optimum for target detection. Tests of the classification performance consistently reveal large individual differences in skill level and a general need for improved performance.
The performance skills of ASW officers and TACCOs have received less attention than that of operators, probably because the critical elements of their jobs art less readily observed, and because of traditional dependence on some general measure of the success of attack (such as miss distance) as a reflection of how well they performed. It is obvious that the performance of ASW officers and TACCOs is heavily dependent upon the capability of sensor operators to detect, classify, track, and localize the target. If all of these functions are performed well, and the ocean is cooperative, the ASW/TACCO officer’s problem will be largely solved by automatic fire-control equipment and weapon capability. Under these circumstances, the tactical decisions can become almost automatic. But, when the data flow is disrupted, when contact is intermittent, when the classification is temporarily incorrect, when communications are imperfect, then the ability of these officers to assess the problem situation and initiate the most appropriate tactical response is a critical, complex skill for which extensive training is required.
As ASW team training depends more and more on shore-based trainers, it will become more and more important to simulate those areas of the problem that cause the sensor operator the most difficulty. Meaningful ASW team training cannot be conducted without the inclusion of false alarms, misclassifications, missed detections when equipment is not operated in optimum fashion, degradation of data resulting from poor sonar conditions, and the requirement to deal simultaneously with multiple targets.
Although we can look forward to increased sophistication in the design of shore-based simulators, it should be recognized that the availability of such trainers will not obviate the need for effective means of training ASW teams afloat and in the air. Nothing quite takes the place of the operating environment and the peculiar characteristics of one’s own vehicle and sensor equipment.
Only a shipboard team trainer that is an integral part of the operational ASW system offers the potential for fully realistic team training in all critical functions. The development of shipboard team trainers offers the capability for many more hours of effective training for the average ASW ship or aircraft than otherwise would be possible. Properly designed, a shipboard trainer would also provide division commanders with the flexibility for scheduling training they do not now have, along with an entirely new capability for systematic evaluation of ASW team readiness.
In the design of such trainers, particular attention should be directed toward the requirements for target simulation. Since the trainer would be a part of an operational system, many of the requirements for simulation could be met by the usage of shipboard components whose operation should be indistinguishable from what it is with actual sonar contacts. But the simulated target signals should be realistically related to the operational parameters of the sonar (e.g., pulse length and type), and must react meaningfully to changes in equipment control settings that affect the display of the signal. Of course, the simulated signal will also have to reflect properly such target variables as size, structure, aspect, depth, speed, and range.
The employment of shipboard and airborne team trainers, properly designed and including the necessary software, could significantly increase the level of readiness achieved by our ASW forces. Perhaps a not-too-radical suggestion is that the shipboard ASW team trainer should actually be programmed by and, on occasion, operated by a submarine officer. This might greatly increase the amount of communication and understanding between submarine and destroyer officers who often seem to have only a superficial knowledge of the problems faced by their potential adversary, the capabilities and limitations of his sensors, his operating limitations, and the ambiguities in his information systems. It seems possible that the increased collaboration of submarine and destroyer navies in the programming of ASW problems, in training both afloat and ashore, could have effects highly beneficial to all.
In contrast to the limited development of training for sonar operation, training for sonar maintenance historically has received far greater attention as measured by the investments in training time and equipment. Other than the obvious fact that ASW systems must be kept operating if there is to be readiness, the reason for this differential emphasis seems to be that developing a training course for sonar maintenance is a straightforward consequence of the physical and electronic characteristics of the hardware, whereas the method for developing a training course in operating technique, other than routine control manipulations, is by no means obvious. The training courses developed by equipment manufacturers are almost exclusively maintenance-oriented. Moreover, examination of the technical manual for virtually any sonar system reveals that the theory of operation section is limited and perfunctory compared to the information provided for calibration and maintenance.
As sonar systems have grown in complexity, there has been a corresponding increase in the duration of maintenance training courses and the number of maintenance technicians assigned to the system. That the demand for higher level maintenance skills has increased as sonar systems have progressed in complexity from the AN/SQS-4 to the AN/SQS-29, AN/SQS-23, and the AN/SQS-26 is obvious. It is not so obvious that maintenance training has been successful in meeting the demand. The available evidence strongly suggests that the Fleet is confronted with serious sonar maintenance problems.
The operating condition of sonar equipment is uniquely difficult to determine. Unless a casualty has occurred that obviously takes the sonar off the line, no method of casual inspection will reveal whether the system is operating at 50%, 75% or 90% of its rated capability. Assessment of the status of the sonar, including such important indices as range and bearing accuracy, source level, and receiver sensitivity, requires detailed procedures that responsible officer personnel have neither the time nor the background to carry out.
The present philosophy of maintenance assumes, of course, that sonar technicians can accomplish the necessary preventive and corrective maintenance, and that the sonar log accurately reflects the system’s condition. There have been several objective studies that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption. For example, in one study, a measurement routine was developed for assessing the calibrative status of the AN/SQS-23 sonars on board a representative sample of 15 destroyers in both Fleets. A special test of calibration knowledge was also administered to the maintenance technicians on board each ship. Calibration errors that seriously affected target range determination and the quality of information available for target classification were found in the great majority of cases.
From this kind of evidence and the results of the calibration knowledge test on which the average scores were extremely low, it was concluded that the average sonar technician on board these ships had little understanding of the functional effects of various calibrations on the operating characteristics of the sonar. There was no adequate reason for the observed deficiencies other than inconsistent or inadequate performance by the maintenance personnel.
It is clear from these studies that sonar maintenance training could benefit by a much greater emphasis on understanding how sonars function and less emphasis on rote procedures and the analysis of isolated circuits. An important step in this direction was taken through the development of the Generalized Sonar Maintenance Trainer (Device 14E22) that will provide sonar technicians, for the first time, with a convenient means for understanding sonar maintenance requirements in relation to functioning subsystems. It will also provide a much greater opportunity for students with a minimum basic background in electronic theory to actually work with functional sonar subsystems.
In the last few years, “C” School training has become a requirement for all sonar technicians who will be called upon to perform sonar maintenance. This very likely will have a beneficial effect on fleet maintenance capability. Whether or not the extended Class “C” training will enable the technicians to close the gap between maintenance requirements and actual ability to perform maintenance is questionable, however. Sonars such as the AN/SQS-26 and AN/BQS-13 are far more complex than the AN/SQS-23. It is evident that many SQS-26 ships have depended extensively on factory field representatives to keep the equipment on the line. In addition, SQS-26 ships have drawn a disproportionate share of the more qualified sonar technicians. A serious question thus can be raised concerning the predicted status of the average SQS-26 system in the hands of the average sonar technician in the absence of outside services. In view of experience with the SQS-23, we cannot be optimistic about the prospects.
A fundamental problem besetting both sonar operation and maintenance is the absence of performance standards and objective methods of measurement for determining how well sonar technicians meet the practical factor requirements of their rates. It is generally recognized that the graduates of Class “A” and “C” Schools cannot be regarded as accomplished technicians. Rather, it is assumed that on-the-job training will complete the task; that the school’s responsibility ends with the delivery of an apprentice technician who will be capable of absorbing more sophisticated training in the operational environment.
While there would probably be agreement in the Fleet that the obligation of the schools ends with the delivery of apprentices, a systematic program of on-the-job training and technical development of neophyte technicians simply does not occur in most operational environments. There is neither the time nor the talent in the form of thoroughly competent supervisory personnel to ensure that the apprentice technician receives a thorough and comprehensive training experience. The newly arrived technician can expect, for many months, to be restricted to perfunctory tasks where he can harm neither himself nor the equipment.
Only through a program of systematic performance testing can there be some assurance that the apprentice technician will progress through well-defined, increasingly advanced stages of skill and knowledge development. Advancement-in-rating examinations fail completely to measure practical capabilities and, at best, measure knowledge that is necessary background for the performance of operating and maintenance tasks ASW officers, for reasons previously suggested, are unprepared to assess the performance capabilities of sonar technicians, short of the rather loose observation that it appears that they have the system operating satisfactorily.
Confronted with the problems of sonar maintenance, the use of periodic practical performance testing as a routine measurement technique for assessing the competence of technical personnel seems absolutely essential. We are aware of the burden that this would create if placed on already overworked shipboard or squadron personnel. It seems reasonable that the assignment of this responsibility should fall to teams of test specialists who periodically measure the performance capability of all technicians on practical tasks demanded in the operation and maintenance of their ASW system.
When practical performance tests are employed, absolute standards of excellence are a kind of natural by-product of the testing procedure. That is, what the trainee does or does not do, the kinds and numbers of errors he makes, the amount of time he takes to complete the task, are objectively measurable behavior factors that can be regarded either as satisfactory or not, depending upon a realistic assessment of operational requirements. Such standards should be established and rigidly adhered to. The arbitrary technique of translating a particular test score to a minimum passing Navy grade of 2.5 results in a total loss of meaning between the score made and the amount of critical information, or skill, acquired by the student.
It is likely that there is much critical information that should be mastered to a 100% criterion. For other kinds of information, less stringent criteria may be imposed, but the sometimes observed practice in the schools of adjusting the “passing” grade to meet the requirements of the Fleet pipeline leads to mediocrity in the school’s output and a quick recognition on the part of the student that high standards of performance are not really expected of him. To put it bluntly, students should be permitted to fail. A consequence of this practice, undoubtedly, would be the inability of the schools, from time to time, fully to meet the Fleet demands for qualified graduates. But the long-term beneficial effect on the average level of technical competence in the Fleet would more than compensate for this problem.
In summary, realistic reappraisal should be made of the extent to which high school graduates can be transformed into sonar engineers and far more attention should be given to the establishment of realistic performance criteria by which the proficiency of technicians can be objectively determined. It may well be that fundamental changes in sonar design philosophy will be required if the Fleet is to cope with the maintenance problem.
It would appear that, historically, there have been two types of operational frustrations related to the design of ASW systems. The first is that it has rarely proved possible, in practice, to achieve theoretical detection capability or even detection ranges that permit full capitalization on weapons capability. A consequence of this “detection frustration” has been the emphasis on ever larger, more complex, more expensive, and more powerful sonar systems. This is particularly obvious in the case of active systems, but passive systems are not excepted.
The physical factors (sonar conditions) that produce “detection frustration” cannot be controlled. Therefore, it is imperative that every step be taken at the system design stage and during operational training to maximize the probability that the weakest detectable signal will actually be detected. A great deal of time and money has been devoted to the development of new transmission modes, signal processing techniques, and data display methods in an attempt to enhance overall system detection capability. But correspondingly little effort has been devoted to training sonar operators in operating techniques to maximize detection probability. In fact, a more popular suggestion has been to reduce the role of the operator to that of a simple monitor of preprocessed signals to which some detection criterion has been automatically applied. In our view, this is a costly and potentially dangerous approach to system design. The problem is that any automatic detection system that deals effectively with typical sonar signal-to-noise or signal-to-reverberation ratios will have either such a low decision threshold that it will keep the ASW team in a more or less constant state of alarm, or such a high threshold that it will reject a significant portion of targets that represent true threats.
Criticism of the operator as a target detector is not without some justification. Numerous studies have shown that operators occasionally miss detectable targets and that their typical level of vigilance is significantly below that achievable when fully alerted. It is re-emphasized, however, that training in operating technique has not been effectively accomplished in the schools and that at-sea operations have not afforded reasonably frequent opportunities for practice to maintain detection skills. The fact of the matter is that the operator has not been shown to be a poor detector; it has simply been shown that rarely has he had sufficient detection experience.
The second major frustration in ASW systems design has to do with target classification. “Classification frustration” is not as widely recognized as “detection frustration,” but, certainly, it is well known to sonar operators. The seriousness of the classification problem is simply obscured by infrequent detection opportunities. It is doubtful whether the Navy has realistically come to grips with the false alarm rate that would obtain in the event of hostile engagements. Even in free-play exercises, it is not uncommon for false classifications to greatly outnumber the valid ones. Further, there is evidence that, during routine operations, many contacts are made whose origin is unknown and simply remains unknown.
Why is this so? Usually the operator is given the blame for what should be regarded, realistically, as a basic systems design failure. With rare exceptions, ASW system designs have reflected an obvious disregard for the information requirements for target classification. Although there is some recent evidence that more attention is being devoted to this problem, virtually every active sonar system, up to and including the AN/SQS-26, fails to reflect adequate information displays for target classification. The displayed cues that have been found to be usable, usually have been accidental by-products of other systems objectives, particularly in the area of fire-control design requirements.
In the past, there have been some very expensive attempts to automate sonar classification. There appears to be more promise of success in passive systems than active ones. However, a better solution would seem to be that of designing future ASW systems from a truly systems point of view. The information requirements for classification should be properly developed, and design decisions should be based upon the most effective combination of human perceptual skills, signal processing and display techniques, and automatic data processing capability. If this were done, it seems unlikely that the operator would be removed from the system; rather, he would be given display systems that permit effective use to be made of his unique perceptual capabilities in the detection and classification of targets.
Many sonar design deficiencies, from the human factors point of view, reflect a failure, on the part of those responsible for sonar design, to remain in touch with Fleet operating and maintenance problems. In addition, it appears that systematic attention has not been given to those features of older sonar systems that were effective in meeting operational requirements, with the result that new systems frequently have deficiencies not found in the older ones they replaced.
It would seem, therefore, that responsibility should be assigned to one or more Navy agencies (laboratories) for maintaining an historical appraisal of the capabilities and deficiencies of Fleet sonar systems. Particular attention should be devoted to the accumulation of evidence of system capability and failures during operational evaluations, free-play exercises, and data collection exercises conducted under controlled conditions for scientific or systems analysis purposes. Evidence from NATO navies might be accumulated as well. Inputs from this historical data bank should be considered in the development of specific operational requirements and consulted by design review groups concerned with new sonar system specifications.
Higher-grade professional personnel in Navy laboratories and materiel bureaus people who have responsibility for the design and development of shipboard equipment, should be required to take regular tours at sea in appropriate ships or aircraft under operational environmental conditions. Minimum time intervals between such sea tours should be established so that these people do not lose touch with current Fleet capabilities, technical problems, and operating limitations. This practice could have a highly beneficial effect on the design of future ASW systems.
Significant improvement in ASW readiness and systems performance is achievable if we are willing to make an investment in the upgrading of the human element in these systems. The amount of improvement may well be as great or greater than that obtainable through major investments in improved hardware. The cornerstones of such an improvement program are:
► Career billets for ASW officer specialists.
► Better simulation of detection and classification in shore-based trainers.
► Development of dynamic shipboard team trainers.
► Development of and adherence to absolute performance standards for ASW personnel.
► Sonar design decisions based on clearly defined information requirements for both operation and maintenance.
In July 1964, the Proceedings published some strong words by Lieutenant Robert L. Brandenburg: “The combination of a highly specialized hardware subsystem results in an ASW system with performance limited not by hardware capabilities but the human understanding of those capabilities.” His words rang true then; and, sadly, they are just as true today.
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Dr. Mackie was commissioned an Ensign, USNR in January 1945, and served as sonar officer on board the USS Burrows (DE-105). In January 1946, he was assigned to the instructional staff of the Fleet ASW School, San Diego, where he completed his active duty. In 1950, he received his Ph.D. degree in experimental psychology by the University of Southern California and appointed Director of Research for Management and Marketing Research Corporation. In 1959, he was elected President of Human Factors Research, Incorporated, a position he still holds. For the past 20 years, largely under ONR sponsorship, he has performed research on such diverse personnel problems as operator attention and vigilance, design of sonar displays, variables affecting detection probability, methods of target classification, improvement of operational and maintenance training, and the design of training devices. Dr. Mackie has been a U. S. delegate to several tripartite and NATO conferences on target classification and antisubmarine training requirements.