Since World War II, the United States has created and expanded a worldwide base structure manned by air and ground forces designed to support America’s international commitments. The time has come, however, when the capabilities of our allies, the problematic availability of bases, the rising cost—both political and economic—of large forces overseas, and domestic pressures for a shift in government spending priorities, render the continuation of such a policy both unsound and unsupportable. The United States must reorient its defense posture and structure its forces along lines which facilitate the most economical support of its traditional, political, and economic interests.
As has been made clear by President Nixon, the United States is essentially a naval power. For obvious geopolitical reasons, the offensive capability of the United States must be built around balanced forces of a predominantly naval orientation. The Vietnam war demonstrated that elements of combat units may be delivered to a theater by aircraft, contingent upon base and overflight privileges. These forces, however, are unable to conduct sustained operations without major logistic support. The continued support of overseas contingencies depends almost entirely on logistic support furnished by naval forces across sea lines of communication and operating from forward logistic bases.
The continued credibility of U. S. commitments to allies and the control of essential lines of communication for the support of major and minor contingencies will require some forward-deployed ground forces, and substantial forward-deployed air forces. The key element, however, consists of ready naval forces capable of continued forward deployment where and when required, needing only minimal fueling, storage, and maintenance facilities, and capable of controlling the critical sea lines of communication. Naval forces are likewise the critical element in the redeployment and support of major ground forces required in response to an Asian or European war.
The defense of the United States itself must be directed against attack from the sea and from the air. The former requires a capability to maintain control of the sea through the exercise of strong naval power; the latter requires the maintenance of a sufficiency of strategic offensive and defensive forces, based in the United States and at sea.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a Marine Division and Marine Aircraft Wing were deployed in the Pacific (on Okinawa, Japan, and Hawaii) and two divisions, wings, and force troops units were deployed in the continental United States (ConUS). All these forces were prepared to deploy to meet worldwide contingencies and to provide amphibious forces continually afloat in the Mediterranean and/or Caribbean seas. Political and economic realities at home and within allied countries, however, have significantly altered the environment in which Marine forces will be employed in the 1970s. The increased importance of forward-deployed Marine forces accrues from the requirement to continue to support U. S. treaty commitments while reducing the level of forward-deployed land forces. This reduction is the result of required economies and is in anticipation of probable reduction in overseas bases, as well as from the improved ability of many of our allies to accept a greater share of defense responsibilities. In the absence of significant forward-deployed land forces, Navy and Marine forces stand as the only forces capable of demonstrating U. S. resolve to support its defense commitments. The ability to maintain a constant presence of ready, seaborne forces, whether hull down on the horizon or coming ashore against opposition, typifies the Navy/Marine Corps team as the most logical force for providing visible evidence of U. S. support. This support can be projected without physical intervention and can provide immediate reaction to contingency situations of any level or intensity.
The forward, sea-based deployment of Marine forces may appear suspect on the surface, in view of the large Okinawa/Japan base infrastructure required to support the III Marine Amphibious Force since the Korean War.
This is an issue, however, which should be addressed in its proper context. In fact, it would be unrealistic and unworkable to propose the deployment of amphibious forces to the Western Pacific or to the Mediterranean, relying strictly on U. S.-based supply and maintenance facilities for their support. The number of ships alone required to support such a lengthy pipeline makes such a concept infeasible and undesirable. Thus, the reduction in base requirements is not derived from logistic-associated areas. These supply bases, fueling stations, and maintenance facilities would continue to be necessary to support a sea-basing concept.
Further, there would continue to be a need for minimal training areas for amphibious forces. Such areas, however, need not be reserved as exclusively U. S. facilities. Adequate beach and landing sites suitable for amphibious training are plentiful in allied countries throughout the Pacific and could be used periodically on a unilateral or combined basis as are landing areas presently employed by Sixth Fleet amphibious forces. The area where significant base reductions could be achieved is in the category of pure garrison, i.e. billeting/cantonment, and infrastructure.
The United States does not need and cannot afford a large Marine Corps personnel rotation base on Okinawa. It does need—and badly—seaborne, self-sustaining, Marine landing forces embarked on board amphibious assault ships with air support from attack carriers, constantly available in critical areas, not dependent upon a large logistic infrastructure but capable of supporting any contingency ranging from a show of force to high intensity combat. It will be described below how an even higher level of contingency force than has been heretofore employed, can be permanently deployed near potential trouble areas without new base construction at home, or the large overseas garrison base structure of the postwar years.
The capability to deploy sizeable forces at sea for extended periods is a relatively recent innovation. The new generation of 20-knot amphibious assault ships, which began entering the Fleet in significant numbers after 1963, provide much more habitable conditions.* These vessels contain large and more comfortable berthing spaces, space for vehicle maintenance, physical exercise and classroom training areas, more spacious and safer wet and dry deck space, and improved heavy loading equipment. Under these improved living and working conditions, Marine units can remain deployed at sea for virtually indefinite periods subject to limitations imposed by periodic major maintenance requirements and yard overhauls.
At this point, let us more closely examine the term “Marine units,” beginning with the previously mentioned 18,000-man Marine Division. A Marine Division contains three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and other command and control and supporting forces necessary for forcible entry into high intensity combat under any conditions. The Marine Aircraft Wing contains the necessary helicopters and high-performance aircraft to support the division in amphibious operations and in the conduct of sustained operations in high intensity conflict. The Division and Wing are melded into air/ground task organizations of varying size depending on the nature of the contingency. The entire Division and Wing operate together as a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) of approximately 46,000 men. For lesser requirements, a regimental landing team and Marine aircraft group can deploy and operate without external support as a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) of about 9,000 men. Of lesser size, but still capable of independent operations against light, unsupported opposition is the Marine Amphibious Unit—a force comprised of a battalion landing team and a provisional air group, numbering some 2,700 men.
It must be acknowledged that the appeal of the concept of seaborne forward deployments is subject to some caveats. First, it is obvious that the present and programmed level of modern amphibious assault ships is inadequate to sustain the necessary level of Marine forces forward-deployed. In view of the size of anticipated reductions in land forces, in Korea, Vietnam, and Okinawa, no less than a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) would be required in the Far East to show the flag and provide initial response to contingencies. The 9,000-man MAB, which is built around an infantry regiment and a composite air group, is the minimum organization considered practical for use in sustained low-range to mid-range combat operations. It is the lowest level of task organization which normally contains its own high-performance, close air support aircraft as well as the necessary organic helicopter assets and supporting artillery and armor, all combined with the necessary command and control facilities sufficient for sustained independent operations. In order to sustain such a level of continuous deployments consistent with required overhaul and in-port time and to provide a surge capability for the deployment of a larger force, amphibious assault shipping sufficient to lift the assault echelon of a Marine Amphibious Force (division/wing team) would be required in the Pacific. Current resources in the Pacific Fleet do not now provide for such a capability.
* See J. B. Soper, “A Marine’s View of the Amphibious Assault Forces;” Naval Review 1966, pp. 24-41.
Amphibious force deployments would also need to be increased in other areas. Our NATO allies can and must assume a greater responsibility for their own defense. For political reasons which govern, however, the United States must continue to demonstrate physically its resolve to prevent a defeat of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact. The U. S. force posture for accomplishing this can be reoriented with significant economy, from reliance on large, costly, land-based, ground forces, to reliance on fewer ground forces, essentially backed by the present level of air power but relying more heavily on redeployable ConUS-based Army forces, and on the responsiveness and flexibility of sea-based amphibious forces. The latter forces, not fixed in position or dependent upon expensive prestocked logistic support, are prepared for operations of varying intensity when and where required, and serve as a continuing deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression of a limited nature. Reinforcement of our NATO allies in the central region would continue to require rapidly deployable ConUS based Army forces.
Should there be a sizeable reduction in Army forces forward-deployed, the ability to continue to show the flag and give visible evidence of U. S. good faith would become much more important. The battalion landing team currently deployed in the Mediterranean is insufficient for this role in the total European/Atlantic context. A force of a least MAB strength would be required. This force could be deployed wherever necessary in the Mediterranean, in the northern region, or in the seaward approach to the central region. If desired, the MAB, broken down into three Marine Amphibious Units could operate at any or all of these areas simultaneously, as well as elsewhere in the Atlantic Command.
For reasons stated above in addressing Far Eastern requirements, amphibious assault shipping sufficient to lift the assault echelon of a full Marine Amphibious Force (division/wing team) would be required in the Atlantic to sustain a continuous MAB deployment. This level, in addition to permitting required upkeep and in-port time, would also permit periodic deployments to the Caribbean and South Atlantic, training of East Coast ConUS units, and a surge capability to deploy the assault echelon of a full Marine Amphibious Force.
To the question, “where will this force posture revision leave the Marine Corps in the 70s?” The answer must be “Aboard ship—where it belongs.” Instead of, as in the recent past, when one MAU or (BLT) was afloat in WestPac, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, a minimum of two Marine Amphibious Brigades would be afloat at all times. One would be in the western Pacific and one in the Atlantic/Mediterranean, selectively deployed to areas of greatest priority.
While this new posture translates to more than twice the level of afloat deployments considered “normal” in the past, it does not necessarily mean twice the previous amount of family separations. The continuous forward deployment of a MAB in the Atlantic and Pacific could be supported via seven-month deployments with relief on station. Forces could deploy from ConUS and return to ConUS. While deployed, maximum training would be accomplished through the conduct of landings to include combined operations where possible. In addition to showing the flag, port calls would continue to serve their traditional morale-building function. If the final analysis, the career pattern of the average Marine could very well reflect less time away from home than in the past and never for more than seven months at a time. Forces would be “on-station” for six months at a time; the additional month provides for transit to and from station. For example, let us assume that half of each Marine’s career is spent in the Fleet Marine Force. When assigned to the FMF for a three-year tour, 12 six-month deployments would be carried out worldwide; i.e., six cruises in the Pacific and six in the Atlantic. Nine MABs would be available to support these 12 deployments. Each MAB would deploy on one seven-month cruise with a 33% chance of making two during each FMF assignment. Thus, in six years (three FMF, three non-FMF) each Marine could expect to be away from his home station for a maximum of two cruises totaling 14 months. There would undoubtedly be some imbalance in frequency of deployment between occupational specialties initially, until personnel policies could accommodate to the revised force posture. The overriding consideration, however, is that Marines would be doing what Marines are supposed to do—serving as a ready landing force prepared to respond to any contingency at the direction of the President.
Precise definition of comparative costs of continuing the present garrison shore establishment in Okinawa/Japan versus severely reducing these facilities to minimal training area and logistic support requirements, while increasing the level of sea-based deployments, would require detailed study. As a preliminary observation, it is perhaps worthwhile, however, to point out that at present we are unnecessarily maintaining considerable redundancy in sea- and land-based systems for forward deployment.
During the 1960s, the United States maintained amphibious assault shipping sufficient for the deployment of the assault echelons of one-and-a-half MAFs in the active inventory. At the same time, ConUS and Far Eastern bases were maintained, sufficient to house the entire active force structure of three Marine division/ wing teams. Only rarely, and then for only short terms, were more than two brigades deployed at a given moment. Thus, the available shipping was underutilized in its proper role, and Marine landing forces were spending too little time training afloat in their primary mission. Considering the current constraints on defense spending, it would appear reasonable to eliminate redundancy between land- and sea-based forward deployment systems were possible. In fact, the choice may well be forced upon us should the use of Japanese/ Okinawa bases be terminated. Certainly, if this should occur, it would seem that there is no requirement to re-establish a similar garrison infrastructure at some new location.
It is possible to envision the elimination of current Japanese base facilities (less training and logistic support areas) with no necessity for new construction whatever. The Marine Corps now has shore-based facilities in the United States sufficient for the housing and support of two and one-third amphibious forces as follows:
Hawaii | Camp Pendleton/ElToro | Camp Lejeune/Cherry Point |
1/3 | 1 | 1 |
The net shortfall (two-thirds of a MAF), now met by the use of Japanese/Okinawan bases garrison facilities, could be absorbed worldwide by adoption of the concept put forth in this paper, which calls for one-third of a MAF continually afloat in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
It is at this point that strategic planners must give serious study to budget realities. Specifically, assuming that sea-basing represents a desirable objective force posture, it still cannot be adopted unless the funding for necessary new ship construction is programmed or unless funds now programmed for other accounts are diverted.
It is estimated that in order to achieve a two-MAF amphibious assault ship force, additional funding in the approximate amount of $1.4 billion dollars above the amount now programmed for new construction through FY-76, would be required. In addition, the continuing additional operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the larger number of ships is a factor to be considered. This figure for the difference between the cost of operating ships actually programmed versus a two-MAF amphibious lift is currently estimated at $57.9 million. Thus, there are two cost obstacles to overcome, the initial cost of new additional construction, (1.4 billion), and the continuing increased O&M costs (57.9 million annually).
The LKA, attack cargo ship, has a very small troop capacity, but carries a great number of medium and light landing craft. The LST-1179’s new bow ramp permits 20-knot speeds and her stem ramp permits amphibian tractors to be launched more safely than through the bow.
In looking for areas from which to obtain funds, we should first consider savings accruing from projects no longer required if “sea-basing” is adopted. As was mentioned earlier, deploying two brigades aboard ship could eliminate the requirement for their housing ashore. For example, if, for whatever reason, Okinawan/Japanese base rights should be discontinued or curtailed, the two brigades now deployed at these locations could be absorbed at existing ConUS/Hawaii facilities and aboard ship if the sea-basing concept were implemented. If new shore facilities were constructed for these forces, the costs are estimated at approximately $1.7 billion. In the area of continuing costs of operating such shore bases, the recent past reflects annual operating costs of Marine Corps facilities on Okinawa and Japan at roughly $6.3 million. In addition however, a major continuing cost of supporting forward deployments ashore is associated with the air and sea transportation of personnel and equipment to these forward bases. In a typical recent year, this transportation cost for personnel and equipment by military air and sea lift was approximately $57.1 million.
Thus, if the two concepts for forward deployments, land- and sea-basing, are compared in terms of cost, sea-basing is the less expensive way.
| Land-basing Costs | Sea-basing Costs |
Construction | $1.7 billion | $1.4 billion (ship- |
O&M Costs | $63.4 million | $57.9 million |
Certainly the difference is a secondary concern in view of the major advantages associated with the sea-basing concept.
In summary, then, the benefits accruing from a shift to a seaborne concept and away from forward land bases, are political and military. Through sea-basing, there would be no large, permanent, objectionable U. S. military presence on foreign soil. (The elimination of this problem area in the post-Vietnam period is a major aim of the Nixon Doctrine.) And yet the capability for rapidly responding to contingencies ranging from show of force to the selective application of appropriately measured combat power is greatly enhanced by having three times our previous level of force afloat, immediately available in the area of operations. As a collateral benefit, the training level of amphibious forces would be maximized, but with less separation of family and the associated degradation of morale. The basic validity of the proposed posture is rooted in the requirement for the Marine Corps to return to a posture which will maximize its effectiveness in fulfilling its primary role assigned in the National Security Act as a seaborne force in readiness.
The Marine Corps was not conceived as a second land Army. It has never been one in the past, is not one now and has no intention of becoming one in the future.
The future, which portends a continuation of the extremely demanding U. S. defense commitments of the 1950s and 1960s, but with fewer overseas bases and fewer forward deployed land forces, offers an opportunity, and indeed a requirement. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious forces must fully restore the capability to carry on U. S. pre-eminence in controlling the seas and in standing ready to project combat power ashore, when and where required in support of the national interest and U. S. commitments. In order to make this possible, Navy and Marine officers at the highest level of government must translate the concept described above into reality by convincing the national command authority to support and approve the shipbuilding programs. It appears that amphibious assault shipping requirements have not been seriously studied and updated since 1964. The program established at that time has been seriously compromised in recent years through a failure by those budgeting available funds, to appreciate the increased importance, effectiveness and economy of seapower in supporting continuing U. S. commitments worldwide. The fundamental requirement for naval supremacy in order to give strength to the foreign policy of a great power has been thoroughly assimilated by the Soviet Union. Their challenge to U. S. naval superiority is well advanced. The response to that challenge will be determined in large part by the continued dedication, capability, readiness, and responsiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps team.
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Major McFarlane graduated from the Naval Academy in 1959 and was commissioned in the Marine Corps. As a Captain, he commanded the artillery battery in the first landing of U. S. combat forces in Vietnam in March 1965. He was then selected as an Olmsted Scholar and received his License (Masters) in International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Returning to Vietnam, he served as Operations Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, along the DMZ. He is currently serving at the Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington. For this article, he would like to acknowledge the particularly valuable influence and suggestions of Colonel James B. Soper, U. S. Marine Corps, which reflected the expertise gained over a span of 30 years as a commander, planner, logistician and analyst of amphibious forces.