The 2-2-12-3 Program—two attack carrier wings, two carrier ASW groups, 12 patrol squadrons, and three transport squadrons—entails a dramatic reorganization of the entire Naval Air Reserve.
After World War II, the Naval Air Reserve became primarily a holding organization designed to maintain skills of its tremendous bank of trained pilots, ground officers, and enlisted men. The challenge of the Korean call-up and the response indicated some weaknesses of the holding philosophy and improvements were made. A Ready Reserve was created by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, thus changing the Naval Air Reserve to a training organization. In 1955, the Reserve Forces Act provided a means by which the Ready Reserve would have adequate enlisted manpower through a special enlistment program commonly referred to as the “two by six” enlistment, i.e., two years of active duty plus four years at home in the Naval Reserve, or a total of six years. In 1958, the Selected Air Reserve Program was authorized to ensure the training of reservists to meet the requirements for immediate mobilization. This action tended to bring the Naval Air Reserve in closer contact with the Fleet. Reservists began to participate in Fleet activities such as Submarine Launched Assault Missile Exercises (SLAMEX).
Eighteen Naval Air Reserve antisubmarine warfare squadrons were called to active duty in the Berlin call-up of reservists in 1961. The abilities and dedication of the squadron personnel were outstanding, but discrepancies were apparent. For example, over a hundred aircraft service changes had to be made by the called-up squadrons on their S-2 Trackers to update them for active service. Immediately following their release from this call-up, after a year of active duty, many reservists helped provide support to the Fleet during the Cuban missile crisis. Naval Reserve planners again evaluated the performance of Naval Air Reserve units during these two crises, and again changes were made in the Naval Air Reserve organization and call-up procedures. Because of budget limitations and the war in Southeast Asia, little could be done to upgrade the hardware.
Beginning in 1965, the Naval Air Reserve provided airlift support to our forces in. Vietnam using old C-54 and C-118 aircraft, but it was not until January 1968 that the Naval Air Reserve faced its next real challenge—the Pueblo call-up. The problems encountered in that call-up proved conclusively that the Naval Air Reserve did not have sufficient and proper hardware or training and support equipment to attain and maintain the required readiness for early deployment with the Fleet. Again, the changes which followed the call-up were organizational involving primarily the realignment of personnel. Priority hardware squadrons were formed and placed und the operational control of the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force, a second and new hat for the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training. Neither additional or new hardware, nor training and support equipment were forthcoming owing to the demands of Southeast Asia operations.
In the fall of 1969, the General Accounting Office, guardian of the tax dollar and watchdog for the Congress, concluded two years of in-depth study of the Naval Air Reserve. The GAO reported:
Our review of certain Naval Air Reserve units four Naval Air Stations disclosed serious logistics problems which have had an adverse effect on the readiness posture. In our opinion, these problems keep the Reserve Components from achieving their primary purpose; that is, to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency. We concluded that it would be difficult for the Reserve to mobilize fleet operational squadrons for an emergency.
The GAO report also stated that 37 of the 39 squadrons in the Naval Air Reserve, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff readiness reporting system (C-rating systems were in unsatisfactory readiness status. This meant that 37 of the hardware squadrons were not combat ready while the other two were only marginally combat ready. There was no rebuttal to the GAO report. The Navy acknowledged a lack of hardware and site-support equipment for the Naval Air Reserve with which match sophisticated aircraft equipped with highly complex black boxes and systems. The Navy also knew that the Naval Air Reserve Command needed more than 4 million dollars to purchase and maintain training devices. Worse, Navy planners were aware that there more than $200 million of identifiable military construction deficiencies at Naval Air Reserve Traffic activities which a $2.5 million annual military construction budget could never correct.
Organizational changes could no longer be used to make improvements in the Naval Air Reserve. The patriotic spirit and the dedication of members of the Naval Air Reserve had been stretched to the point reminiscent of the early days of the Naval Reserve. The pattern of challenge, response, evaluation, and attempted improvement could no longer be applied. A dramatic change was needed in the Naval Air Reserve. If the change did not come, the Naval Air Reserve faced extinction in the 1970s.
In the late months of 1969, the Chief of Naval Operations, faced with the proposed loss of one attack carrier and her air wing, suggested that the Navy keep the carrier and decommission two air wings resulting in a force of 15 CVAs and 13 wings. The intent was to make up the difference between carriers and wings by using Marine Corps squadrons on board the carriers and concentrating the released hardware and support equipment into a single air wing of the Naval Air Reserve Force. The assets would be transferred directly from active duty to Naval Air Reserve squadrons. This was a substantial departure from previous Navy practices because it completely integrated the Naval Air Reserve Force squadrons into the Fleet. Thus began the 2-2-12-3 plan for the Naval Air Reserve Force of the 1970s.
The two attack carrier air wings, two carrier antisubmarine warfare groups, 12 patrol squadrons, and three transport squadrons (2-2-12-3) are a part of the tactical (flying) portion of the Naval Air Reserve for the 1970s. Many refer to it as the new Naval Air Reserve Force. It is new because it has been totally reorganized and restructured. It is a force because it has been removed from the training phase to a hardware squadron concept duplicating that in the Fleet. ComNavAiResFor reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. He is the only two-star air commander with forces who reports directly to the CNO. As CNaResTra, responsible for the training and support of his non-tactical units, he reports to the Chief of Naval Air Training, who in turn reports to the CNO.
The organization of the Reserve air wings and groups is similar to that of comparable units in the Fleet. Each wing or group is commanded by an air wing or group commander, an officer in the regular Navy who has been screened and selected for bonus command. The Reserve squadrons are commanded by a member of the Selected Air Reserve in the grade of commander. These commanding officers are supported on a daily basis by a complement of active duty reservists, commonly referred to as “Tars,” who serve to train and administer the Naval Reserve. The organization calls for the four wing and group commanders of the carrier type aircraft to report directly to the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force. The patrol VP and transport VR squadron organizations will be similarly designed to reflect active fleet structural make up.
Several assumptions were made in developing the 2-2-12-3 Program. These were: (1) that there would be space available at fleet air stations, (2) that the assets from the decommissioned active wing would be forthcoming, (3) that adequate support equipment and supply priorities would be provided the squadrons, (4) that required Fleet services would be available for training, and (5) that Fleet aircraft use and maintenance
manning factors were also valid for the new Naval Air Reserve Force.
The objectives (based on these assumptions) were to provide the Naval Air Reserve Force with the same opportunity to achieve and maintain readiness of its squadrons as provided the Fleet. In addition, planning provided for the squadrons to use Fleet facilities, services, and other assistance.
One of the Reserve carrier air wings is located on the West Coast and the other on the East Coast. Each wing consists of a total of three attack and two fighter squadrons with appropriate detachments flying a total of 85 deployable aircraft. This organization corrects another deficiency pointed out by the GAO report which stated, “Naval Reserve fleet operational squadrons were not compatible for integration with the active forces.”
The two Reserve antisubmarine warfare groups are located one on each coast. Each group has two helicopter HS and three VS squadrons, plus some detachments, for a total of 45 deployable aircraft. The 12 patrol squadrons are made up of 11 P-2 Neptune squadrons flying 132 deployable aircraft, and one P-3 squadron flying nine deployable Orions. The three transport squadrons will fly a total of about 30 aircraft and will be divided into a number of training units. For the first time in the Naval Air Reserve, the squadron organization will parallel that of the regular Navy. No longer will there be many small training units distributed over several locations which, on mobilization day, would form one regular size squadron. Instead, a complete squadron will be located at one specified location.
While the concept of the new Naval Air Reserve Force appears to have the general support of naval air reservists, the forced base closures that occurred during the early stages of implementing the reorganization have confused the entire reorganization picture to a significant extent. The closures of the naval air stations at Los Alamitos, Twin Cities, Olathe, Seattle, and New York were based on the necessity to reduce overall Department of Defense expenditures. As stated by Secretary Melvin R. Laird at the time they were announced, the overall reductions “were posed by the Congress and agreed to by the President.” The base closures were actions forced upon the naval establishment as part of an overall defense cutback, and had absolutely nothing to do with the 2-2-12-3 Program. As it turned out, unwelcomed as the closures were, they forced the transfer of some Naval Air Reserve squadrons to Fleet air stations, thus immediately testing the assumptions of the 2-2-12-3 Program—with good results.
A closer inspection of the validity of these assumptions will be helpful. First, it was assumed that space would be available at Fleet air stations and this is proving to be true, though it has required Fleet units, already in cramped quarters, to move over. Reserve air squadrons moved into space at naval air stations located at Quonset Point, Patuxent River, Miramar, Whidbey Island, and North Island. Future plans call for units of the Naval Air Reserve to move into Fleet spaces at Point Mugu and Imperial Beach by the summer of 1971.
The second assumption for the 2-2-12-3 was that assets would be forthcoming from decommissioned squadrons. F-8K Crusaders, A-4C/L Skyhawks, E-1B Tracers, RF-8 Photo Crusaders, KA-3 Skywarrior refuelers, and P-3 Orions, all deployable, are becoming available to the new Naval Air Reserve Force. In addition, the Navy has provided a number of F-4 Phantoms so that the Naval Air Reserve Force could begin training in that aircraft.
The third assumption, that support equipment would be provided, has become fact at Fleet sites and supply priorities for the Naval Air Reserve Force have been upgraded. Fourthly, the assumed adequacy of Fleet services has also become a reality. The Reserve HS detachment operating at its new home base at NAS Quonset Point in mid-April 1970 reported that the availability of Fleet services was the best ever encountered. The benefits of a Fleet training environment, more plentiful support personnel and equipment, and easy access to training sites were also evident.
The fifth assumption concerning validity of Fleet aircraft use and maintenance factors for the new Naval Air Reserve Force will not be known until the squadrons have had more experience. Further empirical adjustments of the maintenance work load to aircraft use will be made as experience is gained, and no serious problems are anticipated.
While the assumptions of the 2-2-12-3 appear to be valid, there is concern among the critics of the reorganization that the objectives of the program, to duplicate the organization and manning levels of the Fleet through increased participation by members of the Naval Air Reserve, will not be met. The critics point out that one of the major disadvantages of the 2-2-12-3 is the need for the reservists to travel longer distances to the training site. There may be justified concern that the Naval Air Reserve will suffer large personnel losses because of the refusal of reservists to travel to faraway training locations.
There are also fears that ultimately all of the naval air stations in mid-America will be closed and the Navy will no longer be represented except in cities on the coasts. Further, there is apprehension that the estimated 20,000 non-flying members of the Naval Air Reserve will begin dwindling in number in the years to come and that in the 1980s this number might be drastically reduced, thus depriving the Navy and the country of trained personnel required for rapid Fleet expansion.
Action is being taken to solve the travel problem which was recognized early in the planning of the 2-2-12-3 program. The Navy is trying to procure medium size jet transports and station them at NAS Alameda. One of their primary missions will be airlifting Reserve personnel to training sites. NARTU Lakehurst plans to charter buses to transport reservists from New York City to that air station. Further, the Navy has begun a program of chartering commercial jets to airlift patrol squadron personnel performing their annual active duty for training at Rota, Spain. In the future, the P-2 aircraft will remain at Rota and the Reserve air squadrons will perform back-to-back periods of active duty for training. Much training time will be saved with the new mode of jet travel available to these reservists.
Reservists from the Midwest have voiced fears about the elimination of naval air from the heartland of America. Top Navy leaders were quick to point out that the Naval Air Reserve will continue to train in the Midwest. Olathe is expected to have about 800 non-flying drilling air reservists and Minneapolis about 1,000. The Naval Air Reserve training detachments at these locations are part of the vital non-flying portion of the Naval Air Reserve organization under the leadership, management, and support of the naval air stations at Glenview, Detroit, Dallas, and Memphis.
The Navy can provide the resources, leadership, and management for the new Naval Air Reserve Force and the non-flying members of the Naval Air Reserve for a more active role in the Navy when needed. The early followers of Trubee Davidson’s 1916 Yale Unit paid for their own gas and oil to become proficient in naval aircraft in case their country needed them for service. In 1969—after 50 years in existence—it was clear that in spite of the many organizational improvements made over the years, the Naval Air Reserve was not well equipped or combat ready. In 1970 and 1971, the Navy is implementing the 2-2-12-3 to have available on a moment’s notice a well-equipped combat-ready Naval Air Reserve Force to deploy and fly side-by-side with the active duty squadrons. The Navy is confident that dedicated reservists will continue their tradition of loyal service despite personal inconveniences—especially now, when their country and their Navy have a need for them to continue to be ready in the truest sense of the word.
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Captain Bajak received his Bachelor’s degree from Miami University (Ohio) and his Master’s degree from Yale University. He served as a fighter pilot on carriers during World War II. He was recalled for Korean service and served at the Naval Photographic Center. In 1961, he was again recalled to command Air Anti-Submarine Squadron VS 837. He now serves as a member of the CNAResTra Flag Training and Staff Component and as Chief Staff Officer for Naval Air Reserve Staff R-1, Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn New York. He has been with the National Broadcasting Company for past 15 years and is now serving as Director of Newsfilm, NBC News.