The question of whether to modernize obsolescent ships is one which constantly confronts naval planners. It is not easy to define obsolescence, since a ship may not carry all the latest equipment but still may be capable of useful service. The distinction drawn between the attack carriers in the U. S. Navy and those relegated to ASW support is a case in point. The functions which naval forces are called upon to perform are many and varied but all do not demand ships carrying the most modern types of radar, missiles, sonar, and electronics. Nonetheless, it is in the natural order of things to want to replace outmoded equipment with something better. But, before doing so, it is necessary to compare the cost against the price of a new ship.
Today, the ever-rising cost of warship construction has encouraged modernization, but there comes a time when doubts are raised as to whether such work is really worthwhile—e.g., the modernizations of the 24-year-old carrier USS Midway and the 14-year-old carrier HMS Ark Royal. The cost of the former, originally estimated at $88 million, is reported to have increased to twice that sum, while the $72 million spent on the latter represents one-and-a-half times what the original ship cost.
In the U. S. Navy, with its still-large fleet of reserve ships, the problem is of more consequence than it is in the Royal Navy, where continuing reductions are anticipated. This policy is in distinct contrast to that being pursued in the United States where hundreds of destroyers and escort ships of World War II vintage are retained in reserve. Some of these destroyers have been modernized under the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM I and II) programs by which their capability has been brought up to date. These ships would prove of considerable value for the protection of shipping in the event of a conventional war with Russia.
However, from a statement by the Soviet Commander in Chief, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, it is clear that Russia wishes to give the impression that it would employ nuclear weapons in a major war at sea. “The widespread introduction of missiles, and nuclear weapons, radio electronics and atomic energy has completely modernized the traditional aspect of the fleet” he states, “our submarines are equipped with ballistic missiles and long-range winged missiles as well as homing torpedoes carrying nuclear warheads.” This seems to suggest that ships dating from World War II will not really be of great use in dealing with a Soviet fleet mostly constructed during the last decade.
The great achievements of the last 20 years affecting maritime warfare are the development of atomic energy, gas turbines, nuclear weapons, and missiles. The problem is how best to use these developments.
The advantage of atomic energy for ship propulsion is well known, but the initial cost of installation remains much higher than that of conventional forms of power. Its use in surface ships does not confer the same revolutionary operational superiority as it does in submarines, in which it is mandatory for optimum performance.
Gas turbine propulsion is rapidly gaining favor on account of its instant readiness, light weight per horsepower output, small demands on manpower for operation, and easy maintenance and replacement. It is particularly suitable when high speed is a requirement.
Nuclear weapons have obvious advantages over those of a conventional type and their use at sea would not necessarily have the same calamitous certainty which would follow their use on land. Because the Russians are equipping their ships with them, it is essential that we do likewise. While it is possible to provide airborne weapons and missiles with alternative warheads, it is not so easy to provide guns with two kinds of ammunition.
As compared with an aircraft-borne weapon, the missile has the great disadvantage that, once released it cannot be recalled, though provision can be made for its destruction in flight by radio command. It has the advantage that it can be carried by ships very much smaller than carriers and, by virtue of a homing device in the head, it possesses a very high probability of hitting, which the gun does not have. The Russians have armed many of their new surface ships with surface-to-surface missiles in lieu of guns in order to give their ships operating in areas outside the cover of their shore-based aircraft striking power comparable to that of which carrier-borne aircraft are capable. Obviously, a carrier with a complement of 100 aircraft has a much greater offensive potential than, say, a “Kresta”-class cruiser armed with four Shaddock launchers, even assuming a reload is carried for each launcher. Still, we are comparing a 60,000-ton ship with a ship one-tenth her size, and the Russians might well argue that ten “Krestas” are more valuable than one carrier.
In “The Sea,” in the 1969 Naval Review, Rear Admiral John D. Hayes remarks “The dynamism in commercial navies forms a striking contrast to the static condition of fighting navies. Warship designs have changed little since World War II, the only exceptions being the United States nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines and the Soviet fast seagoing ships of the ‘Kynda’ and ‘Kresta’ classes armed with surface-to-surface missiles and powered by gas turbines.”
Perhaps the Soviet missile-armed fast patrol boats (FPBs) should be included in the exceptions. Taken together, the developments examined above have greatly increased the tempo of maritime warfare, but the only reaction to date in the Western navies has been a greater use of electronics to speed up the transmission and assimilation of intelligence and information as evidenced by the introduction of the Naval Tactical Data System and its variants in the Royal, French, and other navies. Unfortunately, while speed attainable above and below the surface of the sea has greatly increased, on the surface, speed remains much the same as before, due to the limitations imposed on the standard hull form by the sea and the weather. Attempts are being made to overcome these limitations by the use of the hydrofoil, as in the U. S. experimental ships High Point, Plainview, and Tucumcari, and the Canadian ship Bras D’Or, but experience has shown that the foils are very susceptible to damage from any small floating piece of material encountered at high speed. It does not therefore appear that this type of vessel will prove suitable for general employment as a surface warship.
The development of the hovercraft was hailed by many as pointing the way to a new concept of high speed surface ship, but results to date are disappointing. Experience with the 165-ton Mountbatten-class cross-Channel ferry have shown that the skirt is very susceptible to weather damage and that therefore only comparatively short journeys between terminal points where running repairs can be carried out are feasible at present. Further, the problem of operating these craft in an ocean swell has yet to be solved.
The most encouraging development to date is the “air bubble” craft in which a twin hull of catamaran design is employed, the space between being sealed off by panels and a cushion of air under pressure being created therein. The vessel travels on the bubble which has the effect of reducing surface friction and enables higher speeds to be obtained for a given horsepower. As the craft is continuously waterborne, normal methods of propulsion can be employed. It has been suggested that a speed in the region of 70 knots with a 6,000-ton vessel of this design is possible, and if so, it may provide the solution which we are seeking.
Surface-to-surface weapons. For the last 50 years, the rifled, breech-loading gun has been the principal surface-to-surface weapon. In the battleship era, guns reached calibers of 18.1 inches, and the guns and their mountings weighed several hundred tons. With the advent of carrier-borne aircraft able to deliver explosives at greater ranges than the gun could reach, the battleship went into eclipse but the gun was retained for use in smaller ships which might find themselves dependent on their own resources to defend themselves. In the U. S. Navy, these have been standardized at 5-inch caliber and below and, in the Royal Navy, at 4.5 inches and below. These guns have a maximum range of about 10 miles and, because their chances of hitting with any one shell are small, a high rate of fire is necessary. This means that a large amount of ammunition must be carried.
However, the advent of fast, highly maneuverable, and powerfully armed craft like the Soviet FPBs of the “Komar” and “Osa” classes has reduced the effectiveness of the gun at the long ranges at which it is desirable to engage such targets. This points to the need to develop a surface-to-surface missile which, by virtue of the homing device with which it is fitted, has a very high degree of success in striking its target regardless of range. There is considerable choice in the guidance systems with which these missiles can be fitted, and which influence the size and weight of the missile itself. Generally speaking, the more sophisticated the system fitted to the missile, the larger it will be—but the smaller will be the installation required in the launching ship. If we wish to extend the range of the missile beyond the visual limits imposed by the curvature of the earth, it must carry in addition an inertial guidance system or the control must be taken over in flight by an aircraft. Alternatively the missile can be launched from the aircraft, but we are concerned with the situation when suitably armed aircraft, as may well be the case, are not available. It would seem, therefore, that the time has come to replace the gun with a surface-to-surface missile, the size of which will depend on that of the ship in which it is mounted.
Surface-to-air weapons. Nearly all guns now carried by warships can be used against both surface and aircraft targets. However, as the speed of aircraft rises, the effectiveness of the gun diminishes and today its optimum range is in the order of 3½ miles. Beyond such a range reliance for interception must be placed on missiles up to a slant range of about 20 miles and thereafter on fighter/interceptor aircraft. This postulates a need for all surface ships to be able to direct aircraft even though they do not carry them.
Antisubmarine weapons. Recent improvements in the design of sonar equipment have enabled submarines to be detected at ranges much in excess of those possible 15 years ago. It was therefore necessary to devise a weapons system which would enable full advantage to be taken of this development. At the same time, the much higher speed of which nuclear-powered submarines are capable necessitates cutting the dead time between detection and attack to a minimum. This has resulted in the introduction of weapons such as Asroc Subroc, Malafon, and Ikara in which an air trajectory is used for transit between the firing ship and the target. Surprisingly, these weapons are not yet standard equipment in the navies of Europe. The number of such weapons which can be carried in any one ship is, however, limited, and also because they are costly, there is a natural reluctance to fire them unless the presence of a submarine is reasonably certain. Therefore, ships in which ASW is the primary role have been equipped with a helicopter capable of investigating such reports and of making an attack if confirmed. The indications that submarines may soon be equipped with the means of counter-attacking the very vulnerable helicopter so greater reliance may have to be placed on the use of ship-launched antisubmarine missiles.
Other Equipment. In addition to the weapons discussed above, ships must also carry the appropriate radar, communications, display and data-handling equipment so that in a highly sophisticated ship the cost of the complete armament represents something like 30% of the total.
Table 1 gives details of typical ships, smaller than cruisers, building or projected in various Western navies.
Table 1
Country & Type | Displacement | Propulsion | Speed (knots) | Armament |
Britain |
|
|
|
|
82 | 5,650 | steam & gas turbine | 32 | 1 twin Seadart A/A |
42 | 3,500 | gas turbine | 30 | 1 twin Seacat C.R. A/A* |
21 | 2,500 | gas turbine | 40 | 1 quad. Seacat C.R. A/A |
Canada |
|
|
|
|
DDH | 3,800 | gas turbine | 27 | Sea Sparrow CR A/A |
France |
|
|
|
|
67 | 5,080 | steam turbine | ? | Malafon A/S |
W. Germany |
|
|
|
|
121 | 3,200 | diesel/gas turbine | 30 | 1 Tartar A/A |
Italy |
|
|
|
|
“Alpino” | 2,000 | diesel/gas turbine | 28 | 6 3-inch guns 6 TT |
United States |
|
|
|
|
DD 963 | 5,200 | gas turbine | 30+ | 1 Sea Sparrow CR |
Knox | 3,010 | steam turbine | 27+ | 1 Sea Sparrow CR A/A |
*CR A/A = close range anti-aircraft
**TT = torpedo tubes
All the above have conventional hull forms and in only one instance, the British Type 21, is an attempt being made to lift the speed above a figure which has been commonplace for destroyers since World War I. The preference for gas turbines should be noted as well as the almost universal retention of the gun as a surface weapon. The cost of these ships has not in all cases been announced, but appears to lie between the $80-million bracket for the U. S. DD-963 class and the $20-million bracket for the British types 42 and 21, though the latter may well prove higher.
When the builder’s design for the Type 21 class was considered by the Ministry of Defence it was for a ship costing only $10 million. But, by the time all the equipment considered essential had been added, the cost, not surprisingly, had doubled. This is evidence of a failure to distinguish between what can be termed a major combat vessel and one designed for the less important tasks which maritime forces are called upon to perform. This fact was brought to the fore during the U. S. Navy’s operations in Vietnam which called for many boats and small ships to be employed in the coastal surveillance, river patrol, and assault forces. Of particular interest are the patrol gunboats of the Asheville class with their aluminum hulls and aluminum and fiber glass superstructures. These 225-ton craft with diesel/gas turbine propulsion can attain a speed in excess of 40 knots and have the acceleration of a motor car. Still, these vessels have a limited function and we need something more versatile and with better seakeeping qualities.
At the French naval exhibition at Le Bourget in October 1969, a consortium of shipbuilders known as GENEMA displayed the model of a fast patrol boat for action against surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, which comes very near to fulfilling the requirement for designed a less sophisticated—and less expensive—type of combat vessel than those listed in Table 1. She will displace 550 tons, have a steel hull and a magnesium alloy superstructure, diesel/gas turbine propulsion—giving her a top speed of 30 knots-plus—and a cruising range at 20 knots of 2,500 miles. Her formidable armament consists of one 76-mm. automatic dual purpose gun, eight surface-to-surface missiles of an unspecified type with a range of 19 miles in four twin-mountings, an octuple launcher for Crotale medium range A/A missiles, two 12-barrelled cannon for close range air defense, and hull sonar.
The Chantiers Navale Franco-Belges have designed a fast patrol vessel known as Type 54 with a displacement of 310 tons, length 177 feet, beam 24½ feet. Propulsion is by combined diesel and gas turbine, the former developing 6,000 h.p. to give a cruising speed of 18 knots and the latter 12,000 h.p. which boosts the speed to 40 knots plus. Four variable-pitch propellers are fitted. The proposed armament comprises four Exocet MM38 surface-to-surface missiles (with a range of 23 miles), which are being developed by France as a counter to the Soviet Styx missiles, and four 30-mm. A/A guns. There are accommodations for a crew of 31.
Italy has already produced a missile known as Sea Killer Mark I, the range of which—five miles—is too small. A Mark II version is under development which will have an improved performance. This missile is incorporated in the design of a fast patrol boat known as the “Tenacity” type, prototypes of which have been built by Vosper Thornycroft in England. The “Tenacity displaces only 200 tons and so is not in the same category as the French designs, but it indicates the lines on which advanced marine architects are thinking.
There is no doubt that far less sophisticated vessels than those being built today are a requirement for coast defense against surface ship and submarine attack. There are many areas where they could be used to advantage such as the Baltic, North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Java and Sulu Seas. It is on improving the design of vessels such as those mentioned above that we need to concentrate in the 1970s.
A serious threat today stems from the missile-armed nuclear-powered submarine and the missile-armed surface ship. Only a small proportion of the former carry ICBMs, so it is against those carrying IRBMs and winged missiles that very quick reaction is needed and which aircraft are unlikely to be able to provide without the assistance of surface craft. For this role the fast patrol boat is eminently suitable, but because there are many hundreds of miles of coastline to be guarded, large numbers are required. The construction of highly sophisticated surface warships should be limited to what is considered necessary for the major operations engaged. Full advantage should be taken of the powerful punch a small ship can now deliver and of the better value which it affords.
__________
A graduate of the Royal Naval Colleges, Osborne and Dartmouth, Admiral Schofield commanded the cruiser Galatea and the battleships Duke of York and King George V during World War II. From 1941 to 1943, he was Director of the Trade Division (Convoy and Routing) of the Admiralty. Subsequently he was Chief of Staff to the Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C. Since his retirement in 1950, he has written the following books: The Royal Navy Today (1960), The Russian Convoys (1964), British Sea Power (1967), and (with L. F. Martyn) The Rescue Ships.