One officer commented on the habitability of U. S. Navy ships:
A modern ship, being a complicated machine, requires the most intelligent kind of men to handle and fight her effectively. The more modern the ship, and the greater the need for intelligence of her crew, the more objectionable she seems to become in point of quarters for the men, . . . There is not a new ship built or designed for the Navy that can carry her full complement of men. In the living spaces, the phenomenal heat of modern firerooms, the noise, oily smell, cramped berthing space, bad air, and consequent loss of sleep, means sickness, discomfort and inefficiency of the crew. It is a delusion and a snare to expect to beguile intelligent Americans into accepting, as a profession, life in such sweatboxes.
These observations were made in the 1891 U. S. Naval Institute Prize Essay entitled “The Enlistment, Training, and Organization of Crews for our New Ships.” The author was Ensign (later Vice Admiral) Albert P. Niblack. His words could have been written yesterday.
Prior to 1951, little formalized engineering consideration was given to the design of living and working conditions in Navy ships. The general precepts followed were conventional practices distilled from the experience and knowledge of engineering duty officers and civilian naval architects. The design of living, messing, and service spaces grew from Fleet demands and reviews of Fleet conditions, but authoritative standards were nonexistent. Recognition of a need for such standards finally evolved.
Contributing to this recognition was a rising interest in the field of human engineering, but the telling factor was the encroachment on habitability spaces by new weapon and electronic systems which were put on board out of military necessity regardless of their impact on living and messing spaces and passageways. The penalty of such encroachment was the more severe because, not only were accommodations reduced, but also more men were put on board to operate and maintain the new systems.
These intolerable conditions had generated sufficient pressure to force an exhaustive review of shipboard habitability in 1951. Commander Operational Development Force (ComOpDevFor) began a two-year study of habitability conditions. Habitability standards were spread throughout many diverse technical documents. Standards were found to be vague, entirely lacking in key areas, and often grossly inadequate. Worse, there was no force behind any of the standards. They were intended simply as design aids.
In 1953, ComOpDevFor’s Manual of Habitability Standards recommended that CNO promulgate a set of standards for use throughout the Navy, that they be obligatory, and that administrative procedures be established to ensure compliance during construction and life of the ship.
In 1957, CNO provided the Bureau of Ships with habitability standards for planning and guidance, pending review by the Ship Characteristics Board. The revised standards were published as OpNavInst 9330.5 in 1960. This represented a significant advance in standardization and impetus for implementation. Minimum standards were specified as mandatory for new construction, desirable for conversions, and goals for active ships. In 1964, A Report on Habitability Control by Raymond Loewy/William Snaith, Inc., pointed out that the “minimum” standards were, in practice, used as “maximum” standards and design goals. As a result of the Fleet inputs and the Loewy/Snaith study, the effective “Environmental Control Standards” (OpNav Instruction 9330.5A of 30 August 1965) were issued.
The 1965 standards prescribe habitability specifications in considerable detail, ranging from area requirements for commanding officers’ cabins to the allowable number of men per shower. Of equal importance, the standards reiterate key policy concepts originally stated by CNO in the 1960 version. The more important of these concepts are:
► Environmental control is a military characteristic of a ship of equal importance with other military features;
► The goal is a comfortable and pleasant environment, an appropriate degree of privacy, adequate fittings and furniture, proper stowage of personal effects; and adequate services to provide for needs of the individual;
► The Ship Characteristics Board will review arrangement plans at the appropriate stage of design of the ship and the Board of Inspection and Survey will examine the completed ship to ensure compliance with the intent of the standards as well as their specific requirements.
In shipboard habitability matters, as in other realms of endeavor, determination of objectives is often simpler than is their successful and universal implementation. The basic questions, then, are whether these objectives have been met and whether the present objectives are altogether adequate for the future. One view of the success achieved is reflected in the current recruiting pamphlet Life in the U. S. Navy as follows:
For the Navymen aboard the newest Navy ships, living conditions are amazingly comfortable. The Navyman sleeps in a spring bunk with a mattress that invites complete rest. Hot showers, spotless washrooms, and clothing lockers help make life a pleasure. Messing facilities and quarters are under inspection constantly, not only by the officers charged with that duty, but by the petty officers who are quick to spot any need for action. The Navy operates on the principle that the health and comfort of its personnel is a matter of the highest priority.
Anyone with recent Fleet exposure might argue that this description fails to “tell it like it is.” Another observer, the President, Board of Inspection and Survey, personally inspects several score ships annually and unquestionably qualifies as an “expert witness” in habitability matters. His recent observations perhaps reflect less euphoria and greater realism, as follows:
The habitability conditions listed are unfortunately representative of the vast majority of ships inspected by the Board since I have been here. I firmly believe that it bears heavily on the shipping-over rate in the Navy today as evidenced by the fact that all the complaints (unsolicited) that come to my attention during these inspections center almost exclusively around the lack of even the most elementary standards of decent living. It is bad enough to share a “bedroom” with 150 men, but when the ventilation is so poor as to be unable to keep the compartment free of body odors of these 150 men, then it becomes intolerable. Second only to this is the appalling and often atrocious conditions existing in and around the food preparation/serving areas.
The Chief of Naval Personnel has recently confirmed that “conditions of service” (including shipboard habitability) represents one of the four major factors contributing to poor re-enlistment rates.
The House of Representatives Seapower Subcommittee investigated all aspects of seapower, including habitability, during late 1968 and early 1969. The Subcommittee Report agrees with the Chief of Naval Personnel’s appraisal of the effect on retention and concludes;
The living quarters on older ships are not satisfactory—neither in the sleeping areas nor in the bathing areas . . . When older ships are modernized, it is frequently at the expense of habitability. Modern equipment requires more men who have to be berthed in less desirable areas.
In the face of mounting evidence concerning shortcomings in living conditions, the Inspector General, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, recently completed an extensive analysis of shipboard habitability. Questionnaires were collected from 71 surface ships and 2,300 crewmen selected at random. To determine the effects of ships’ age, ten ships each were designated “new” and “old.” The new ships were those most recently constructed and averaged three years in commission. The old ships were designated from those World War II-built ships most nearly comparable to the new ships. They averaged 26 years in commission. The crewmen sampled in the new and old ships each represented approximately 20% of the total responding population.
Among the more significant findings were:
Sailors are sensitive to living conditions but not unduly difficult to satisfy. A high degree of acceptance was evident in ships with well conceived living features. Of 71 ships surveyed, 14 showed overall living conditions ratings of "excellent” or "adequate” by at least 90% of their crewmen.
The relative influence of shipboard living conditions upon the individual retention decision is important and is virtually constant, regardless of how good or bad the actual conditions may be. Each of the 2,300 crewmen surveyed was asked the question, “How do you rate the relative importance of shipboard living conditions upon your decision about a Navy Career?” (Answer choices: significant and in significant) Almost precisely two-thirds of the crewmen in new ships, old ships, and all (71) ships answered “significant.”
The most significant single influence relating to habitability is the age of the ship and large numbers of ships have living conditions that are unsatisfactory by any reasonable standard. The overall effects of age are as one would expect. Analysis confirms that every important feature improves from old ships to new ships. This is not to say that new ships are without fault, but it does show the positive gains originating from the advances of the 1950s. A comparison between ship categories, together with overall shortcomings, may be observed from the expressed opinions of inadequacy in nine key particulars.
| Old | All | New |
Overall living conditions | 49% | 28% | 10% |
Personal stowage space | 75% | 67% | 59% |
Berthing ventilation | 67% | 47% | 24% |
Berthing heating | 51% | 42% | 21% |
Ability to sleep | 42% | 34% | 30% |
Reading-writing space | 54% | 46% | 38% |
Mess facilities | 48% | 39% | 25% |
Head facilities | 50% | 39% | 30% |
Fresh water | 32% | 25% | 13% |
The relative priorities of various habitability design features are indicated by the individual responses. One question was designed to cast each man in the role of naval architect insofar as habitability design is concerned. Each man was asked to pick three of ten listed choices as the habitability design features he considered most important. The rankings, with the percentage of men designating each are listed below.
Locker-stowage space | 55% | Lounge facilities | 31% |
Air conditioning | 40% | Head facilities | 27% |
Avoiding overcrowding | 40% | Mess facilities | 21% |
Fresh water | 34% | Lighting | 10% |
Bunks-mattresses | 32% | Soundproofing | 7% |
The major numerical shortcomings in installed facilities, as compared to current standards, are in mess seating and crew sanitary fixtures. The percentage of facilities deficiencies for the three categories of ships is listed below.
| Old | All | New |
Crew mess seats | 100% | 76% | 60% |
CPO mess seats | 90% | 69% | 60% |
Wardroom mess seats | 80% | 58% | 60% |
Crew showers | 100% | 78% | 50% |
Crew urinals | 90% | 49% | 10% |
Crew washbasins | 40% | 28% | 0% |
Crew commodes | 40% | 17% | 0% |
Average (7 facilities) | 77% | 54% | 36% |
In numerical terms of habitability fixtures, the present Fleet is not substantially closer to present standards than the 1953 Fleet was to 1953 standards. This is not to say that no progress has occurred, since the standards have also changed. For the seven facilities listed above, available records allow deficiency comparison in all except CPO and wardroom mess seating. OpDevFor’s 1953 survey of more than 150 ships found an average deficiency rate of 53% in five areas compared to the 1969 rate of 50% in the same areas. While absolute progress has occurred over the years, it has only been at a rate sufficient to maintain a relative pace far behind the modestly improved standards.
While improvements evident in our newer ships are to be applauded, deficiencies remain all too common. There is presently no cause to rejoice with the expectation that habitability problems will vanish as 1970 vintage ships gradually replace weary counterparts. Today’s opinions of “adequacy” are undoubtedly more critical than 1944 opinions of like conditions, but less critical than 1994 opinions will be. Our increasingly affluent society naturally raises overall levels of expectation. Modern bluejackets are taller, better educated, and have more belongings than did their fathers during World War II. These men are likewise less tolerant of needlessly cramped and poorly designed “peacetime” living conditions. This intolerance is passively but vividly reflected in current re-enlistment rates.
The unsatisfactory living conditions found in World War II-construction ships can be understood and accepted, in part by recognizing the conditions surrounding their construction and their limited remaining service. Ships built in the past two decades constitute another category, and it seems evident that remedial measures offer promise of significant relief. A third category is formed by ships being built and designed at present and in the future. It is clear that immediate attention is required in the latter category if tomorrow’s Navy is to benefit from lessons learned.
The new ship discrepancies quantitatively discussed above are vividly amplified by recent Board of Inspection and Survey inspection reports. A spot check of ten new construction reports showed every ship significantly failed to meet current standards, assuming for the moment that the standards are sufficient. Habitability discrepancies averaged 12 pages in length. The frequency, gravity, and repetitious nature of the discrepancies indicts the present system of ship design and construction. Frequent and vocal complaints concerning new ship habitability also originate within the Fleet. As an example, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet took issue with the present product in a 1967 letter to the Chief of Naval Operations. The case in point was the USS Samuel Gompers (AD-37), commissioned in 1967 as the first new destroyer tender in almost a quarter century. Key thoughts from the letter are quoted below:
Habitability has been identified as a military characteristic and various programs have been in effect for over 20 years. In spite of the advent of new products and improvements in design concepts, individual ships have apparently made more progress at the local level than detail designers of new construction.
The need for major modifications by ship's force after commissioning of a new ship indicates a reevaluation of basic design is in order;
The distant location of heads and washrooms from living compartments is functionally impractical and in some ships makes general visiting an awkward affair;
Design improvements in heads and washrooms have been exceptionally slow;
The true concept of habitability must begin with initial design;
This letter takes issue with the entire spectrum of our ship design processes, which permits the construction of a ship in the 1960s with its internal habitability aspects a generation behind the current technological level of the country;
Forces afloat, OpNav, and the Naval Material Command are all involved in the development of a new design and the Samuel Gompers is an example of the apparent ineffectiveness of the cognizant authorities in keeping abreast of needs and abilities to meet those needs.
The clear and consistent evidence of new construction habitability deficiencies must be recognized and reflected in future ship designs. Habitability can only deteriorate, on balance, during the life-cycle of a ship. Space encroachments by modernized weapon systems will continue. Ships designed with marginal habitability provisions can only continue to become overwhelmed. Past and present policies, attitudes, and priorities are evidently incapable of arresting these disastrous trends. A solution to existing problems can best be discovered by examining critically the underlying causes. These causes fall fundamentally into the categories of deficient organization, standards, design, and construction procedures, funding, and command attention.
The basic organizational deficiency stems from a general lack of recognition of habitability problems as those of first magnitude. From as early as 1951, various CNO pronouncements have identified ships’ living spaces as military characteristics ranking with armament, propulsion, and stability. Nevertheless, habitability provisions continue to be the last considered and the first sacrificed to satisfy various constraints. All echelons, down to the commanding officer, are vitally involved and must be effectively harnessed to improve future prospects. Although funding austerity tends to beget widespread apathy, it must be recognized that the requisite organizational responsibilities, interrelationships, and planning are of negligible cost. Nevertheless, proper organization and clear assignment of management responsibilities are necessary preludes to any truly effective and durable assault on the problem.
As part of his exhaustive evaluation of shipboard habitability conditions, ComOpDevFor observed in 1953: “There is no single office in the present organization of the Navy which concerns itself with, and is solely responsible for, the maintenance of habitability standards aboard Naval Ships.” The Alford Board reached a similar finding in its report of January 1966. The situation is not substantially different today.
It is certainly debatable whether such “single responsibility” below the CNO level should exist. No corresponding single responsibility exists in the areas of armament, propulsion, or stability. What does exist, however, is a thorough and universal appreciation of these essential characteristics to a ship’s capabilities. There also exists effective coordination between the key triad of OpNav policy makers, Naval Material Command technicians, and Fleet customers. It is precisely the absence of comparable appreciation and coordination that has hampered habitability progress.
At present, the various functions within OpNav are concerned with review, approval, funding, and scheduling of ship improvements to the exclusion of coordination, control, and management of an overall program of habitability improvement. The Ship Characteristics Board (SCB) is charged with recommending to the CNO characteristics for ships in the Navy. This responsibility extends to new construction, conversions, and modernization programs. Habitability features, as ship characteristics, are included. The SCB is vested with responsibility for reviewing and approving ships’ arrangement plans at the appropriate stage of design. Review and revision of Environmental Control Standards is the management responsibility of the Ship Characteristics Division. The previously discussed deficiencies in new construction design, the lack of inclusion of current Environmental Control Standards in new ships, and shortcomings in the Environmental Control Standards themselves are matters under the cognizance of the SCB.
At the technical element of the triad there is no office assigned responsibility in habitability matters within the Headquarters of either the Chief of Naval Material or the Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command. However, at the next echelon, the Naval Ship Engineering Center (NavSEC) is assigned the “primary technical responsibility for developing, applying, and maintaining habitability standards.” The real effort here is in the embryonic stage, having effectively begun only in June 1968 as a delayed outgrowth of the Alford Board recommendations. Past liaison with the Fleet and influence on the SCB have been negligible. Efforts in habitability development toward improving equipment, materials, and facilities have been very limited. No significant long-range, full-time effort has been devoted to “state of the art” improvements. Nevertheless, preliminary indications are that NavSEC has begun attempts to bridge the most prominent habitability chasm—that of technical coordination and management-existing within the Navy. A comprehensive, long-range Habitability Improvement Action Plan has been recently formulated with the dual objectives of advancing the state of the art and upgrading Fleet habitability. It embraces all significant factors affecting and affected by shipboard habitability. Significant and promising pilot projects are currently in progress under NavSEC management. If adequate support is provided, NavSEC has the potential necessary to develop into the “central clearing house” for all technical matters impinging upon habitability. In order to function effectively, this central clearing house must become attuned to the habitability needs and priorities of the Fleet and then continually provide the policy management vested in OpNav, with the necessary technical coordination.
As the customer element of the triad, Fleet operating forces have been too reticent regarding habitability shortcomings in both new construction and older ships. Little routine feedback concerning deficiencies has been provided to the Washington elements. Occasional complaints concerning newly commissioned ships, of the type previously cited, have had insufficient impact.
Regular, timely, and active channels of communication must be established if undesirable installations and standards are to be effectively remedied.
In addition to organizational and communications difficulties, the CNO Environmental Control Standards of 1965 represent a significant handicap. The 1965 standards require critical review and updating to eliminate existing deficiencies. All cognizant commands, ashore and afloat, should have an opportunity to contribute. A few of the more prominent shortcomings in the existing standards are as follows:
Crew living area (defined as net walkable area per man in berthing compartments) is conducive to claustrophobia. The 1965 revision reduced the area from 9 to 7 square feet in large surface ships. Amphibious ship troop space and submarine living space were reduced to 5 and 2.5 square feet respectively. By contrast, MSTS ships allow 100 square feet of gross area. The U. S. Bureau of Prisons allows a minimum gross cell area of 45 square feet per prisoner. As an example of the current anomaly, our three newest attack carriers—the Enterprise, America (CVA-66), and Kennedy (CVA-67)—as well as the Nimitz (CVAN-68), under construction, carry specifications of 7 square feet per man. This represents 1.9 square feet (21%) less than the Roosevelt (CVA-42) presently enjoys after a generation of service and manning increases (including 600 additional berths installed in the latest recent overhaul).
The allowed locker volume of 7.5 cubic feet is unreasonable. Previously cited survey results found stowage space to be the most serious problem, by far, in new and old ships. An increase to a relatively generous 10 cubic feet could be accommodated by deepening the underberth locker by less than two inches.
Bunk-mattress size specifications are not included. Increasing heights of the American young men have been ignored. Large numbers of survey complaints expressed dissatisfaction with the short bunks and thin mattresses currently in use.
Air conditioning is not specified for sanitary spaces. These are well documented as having continual humidity, odor, and other comfort abominations.
Troop accommodations are greatly inferior to those of crew members even though amphibious ships are no longer “troop transports,” since long deployments are presently the norm.
It is clear the 1965 standards contain serious shortcomings. Where prescribed, the standards are frequently circumvented to considerable degree by the builder. Some of the deviations are detected during preacceptance inspections, while others are destined to remain for the life of the ship.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the current common practice of building ships to obsolete 1960 standards in the interests of class standardization and economy. The inevitable result is standardized habitability obsolescence. Space design, arrangement, and habitability features are frozen at the time of approval of the specification in order to enter contract negotiations with firm requirements. This freeze occurs at least two years prior to delivery. The freeze is sometimes perpetuated for a decade or longer, involving an entire class of ships. The composite result is newly commissioned ships considerably inferior to current standards and far inferior to the capabilities of modern technology. Specific current examples are as follows:
AOE-4/5, AFS-6/7, and LPH-12 were constructed to 1960 standards for delivery in 1969. The contracts were all let after the 1965 standards became effective; DE-1078 class (20 ships) are repeat designs of DE-1052 (1960 standards) scheduled for delivery through 1972. The contract was let a year after the 1965 standards became effective.
No review of the causes behind habitability problems could be complete without an analysis of funding history, as this represents the ultimate barometer of priority designation. Funding history closely parallels overall habitability progress during the past two decades.
In 1954, as a direct result of ComOpDevFor’s work, a Habitability Improvement Program (HIP) was instituted to provide funds for habitability ship alterations (ShipAlts). A key feature was that designated funds were set aside exclusively for habitability improvement. Priority was given to morale and comfort-enhancing features such as improved ventilation and renovation of crew berthing, messing, and sanitation spaces. During the 1954-1958 period, $40 million was devoted to the HIP. A high water mark was reached in 1956 when 14% of the entire ShipAlt package was devoted to this purpose. This era also produced overall state of the art advances reflected in ships of the 1960s.
Concurrent with the inception of the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) Program in 1959, the HIP virtually ceased, as funds slowed to a trickle. From 1959 to 1966, habitability ShipAlts were routinely administered and funded within the Fleet Modernization Program, competing for funds with all others. In 1965, the Alford Board identified $50 million in incompleted habitability ShipAlts and recommended resumption of the HIP. This recommendation was approved by the Secretary of the Navy and is presently considered “implemented.” Recent examination of subsequent accomplishments indicates otherwise, as only 3% of the Alford Board’s identified ShipAlts were completed during the 1965-1968 period. Current trends are even less encouraging. Habitability ShipAlt expenditures have averaged less than 3% of the ShipAlt budget during 1967-1970.
In 1966, the Secretary of the Navy also directed implementation of the Alford Board’s recommendation to “provide funds for habitability improvement to the Fleet and Type Commanders.” Records of actual habitability expenditures at these levels are sketchy. However, it is clear that identified habitability budget items have met an increasingly inhospitable reception at the Washington budget review levels. Evidently “habitability” and “luxury” are somehow considered synonomous and thus indefensible. Accordingly, the fiscal year 1969 and 1970 Atlantic Fleet budgets contain no designated habitability funding provisions whatsoever. Expenditures, if any, must therefore be compensated from elsewhere in the Fleet and type commander budgets.
Nevertheless, two Atlantic Fleet type commanders have initiated modest “self help—do it yourself” programs of a continuing nature. These programs recognize that adequate coordinated planning and screening is an essential preliminary to effective and economical action. The programs establish goals by listing the features capable of installation by the forces afloat deemed necessary for adequate shipboard living conditions. They require periodic review and updating of existing deficiencies, accompanied by cost estimates and assigned priorities. The result is that each ship, intermediate echelon, and type commander maintains current “on the shelf” plans awaiting funding authorization. Completed projects and current objectives are readily documented. Actual expenditures have been quite modest, averaging approximately $500,000 per year in each Force during the 1966-1968 period. Evidence indicates that such type commander controlled habitability funds generate a relatively great improvement and “involvement” per dollar expended. Morale is enhanced since the ships realize “somebody cares” and will consider supporting a well-justified and modest improvement plan. Genuine enthusiasm at all levels attests that the concept is sound, if not always spectacular, and affords potential for effective expansion.
One positive example of type commander contribution is a design experiment currently in progress under ComCruDesPac sponsorship. This exceptionally ambitious effort is underway in the USS Tower (DDG-9), commissioned in 1961, under NavSEC design cognizance. The project provides for completely redesigning two berthing compartments, two washroom-water closet areas, and converting a repair locker into a crew lounge. The effort will include such novel features as relocating overhead obstructions to allow for false overheads, installation of flush lighting and ventilation outlets, modular bunks, carpeted decks, and improved ventilation in heads. The major project objective is evaluation of concepts for possible incorporation into new ship designs. NavSEC estimates these significant advances would have added only $15,000 to the ship cost if provided in the original design. The major redesign now required to achieve equivalent results is expected to cost $234,000.
A review of causes for poor habitability in ships of all ages must ultimately focus on the command’s efforts to improve its own lot. Human nature tends to await an external stimulus while blaming “them” for existing problems. Although it is abundantly clear that numerous external, seemingly immutable conditions influence a given ship’s living conditions, many indications point to individual command policy as a key element. InSurv reports, survey questionnaires, congressional inquiries, and other sources reveal numerous noteworthy deviations from the norm. Similar ships often differ widely in habitability features. Some aging ships are exceptionally comfortable while some modern ships are at best mediocre. Many detrimental factors which exist are no-cost or low-cost items such that austere funding is the excuse but not the reason for their existence. Little or no outside assistance is necessary to identify and correct many minor problems having a cumulative major effect. In summary, there is no substitute for command attention.
A pressing requirement now exists for a true renaissance in shipboard habitability. This renaissance, if it is to occur, must be initiated and supported at the highest levels within the Navy. It must also effectively utilize the advisory capabilities of the technical and operating levels. “The true concept of habitability must begin with initial design.” Initial design, in turn, begins in the minds of naval officers. Living conditions in future ships will be precisely what we resolve now that they shall be.
__________
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1954, Commander Byington served in the USS Hickox (DD-673) prior to entering Flight Training in 1955. Following designation as a Naval Aviator, he served in Air Antisubmarine Squadron THIRTY (VS-30) prior to beginning graduate training in 1960. In 1962, he received a Bachelor’s Degree (Aeronautical Engineering) from the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School and, in 1963, the Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineer Degree from the University of Michigan. Subsequent assignments were VS-39, the U. S. Naval Academy Department of Mathematics, USS Yorktown (CVS-10), and the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. He presently serves as Executive Officer of VS-24.