In the good old days the only way to wage war at sea was by a surface action, followed perhaps by boarding and capture. The battle, though bloody, was simple. The admiral positioned his ships. The crews, depending on their state of morale and training, won or lost.
With the arrival of the 20th century came the submarine and the aeroplane. So long as these instruments of war remained fairly primitive it was sufficient to devise a means of detecting and disposing of these threats separately so that the antagonists could get on with the main battle between the mighty gunships—not forgetting their torpedoes. Admirals emerged from the ranks of gunnery and torpedo specialists.
As the air and subsurface threats became more than mere nuisances they were tackled with increased vigor, and equipment, techniques, and tactics were developed to counter them.
Indeed, the air and submarine threats soon superseded the surface threat, so even the heavily armored battleships became too vulnerable and were placed in “mothballs.” Antisubmarine warfare and anti-air warfare were here to stay!
This well known story has now taken us to the end of World War II.
It is not surprising that huge, diverging empires were created and funded, including the necessary training schools and specialists, and there is probably little doubt that these were necessary. It was even possible to divide war in certain situations. For example, if your defended fleet was in the middle of the ocean, out of range of enemy airfields, and the enemy had no aircraft carriers, it was safe to assume that the submarine was the sole threat. In other situations it was possible to “gain air superiority” and employ “hunter/killer” forces to “sanitize” an area of submarines. Even today in limited war situations—one immediately thinks of Vietnam—the carrier forces can operate free from the submarine terror; at least, so far!
This is not the real world of today. The modern bomber can reach almost any part of the earth’s surface; submarines, particularly the nuclears, can travel fast, far, and remain undetected for days or weeks. Single surface units and submarines can launch missiles over hundreds of miles, thus posing an air threat at low level and in the middle of the ocean. It is hard to convince people, particularly in an AAW school, that sinking a submarine can be AAW! We can even sink submarines using an AAW missile launcher. More recently, the tiny fast patrol boat with her short-range surface missile struck terror into planning staffs on both sides of the Atlantic ocean. Both empires, ASW and AAW, realized their joint responsibility. In the absence of a surface “empire” it is, by default, the function of the ASW commander to locate the FPB as well as the submarine with his search aircraft before she is able to launch a missile. If this fails, we have an AAW problem.
The modern submarine with her speed and great payload is no longer preoccupied with one primary target. Almost any small, but multimillion-dollar, screen or escort ship, picket or whatever, is worth a well directed torpedo or missile or two, and the submarine is more than a match for the surface vessel. The NATO navies have realized that next to the hunter/killer nuclear submarine the most efficient A/S vehicle is probably the helicopter or hovercraft, which in turn requires accurate advice and control from specialists in Combat Information Center. In the Royal Navy, though not in the U. S. Navy, these air control specialists tend to be the same people whose previous training came from within the AAW empire, and who are not necessarily well trained in ASW. In the U. S. Navy, the A/S air controllers, though trained correctly in the ASW school, are stationed in the CVS where they are insensitive to the confusion caused on the CVA’s AAW picture.
For many years the action within CIC has been divided into air, surface, subsurface, electronic warfare, and weapons (guns or missiles) each with its own decision plot. Ideally, the evaluator was the man to advise the captain on the whole problem, but as soon as the air situation heated up he could not leave it without losing his grasp. Two or more evaluators were needed.
Now that we use helicopters for strike and reconnaissance in addition to ASW, on which plot should they be displayed—air or surface? With the advent of the digital computer systems—the U. S. Naval Tactical Data System, and the Royal Navy’s Action Data Automation System—we now have a rapid and accurate display system capable of presenting all three environments to the evaluator or captain in one place. It is more important than ever to see that the officers concerned are trained to cope with the big picture.
For a number of years now, the conflicting nature of ASW and AAW has been widely appreciated. It is known, for example, that a defensive screen against submarines is unlikely to be the most efficient against air attack, that providing good air cover over the beach requires the aircraft carrier close to land where the air picture is impossible, and defense against submarines difficult. The way that these problems are tackled is often to separate them. We see this in so many ways—the way funding is provided, training is divided, officers specialize, CICs are laid out, exercises are planned and conducted, tactical publications are written, and the way decisions are taken. “Not me, I’m AAW” is a typical cop-out clause.
The nature of the potential war at sea is widely understood, yet, we are fighting this war with a sizeable handicap as a result of our entrenched attitudes and outdated philosophy, using a demarcation system introduced in the late 1940s.
Let us now enlarge on some of the problems:
The Training School. Both the Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy preach AAW and ASW sermons from two separate pulpits in two different churches. Each has its own expensive simulation system for generating synthetically some of the problems encountered at sea.
Indeed, the TACDEW 4 computer simulation system at Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Training Center, San Diego, is undoubtedly one of the finest of its kind in the world, and has few theoretical limitations on the training situations that it can produce. Electronic warfare training—that “Rosemary’s baby” of a decade ago—though usually housed within the AAW establishment, is now a huge and flourishing empire of its own with all its specialists and special training courses. It is hard to keep EW in perspective as simply another sensor and sensor-denier in the total armory.
Although most schools are aware of their interdependence on each other and send guest instructors from one to the other, rivalry, indoctrination, syllabi, and lesson objectives, and sheer human nature all militate against the desired balanced training. The ideas and problems that are spawned in these institutions are at the root of our difficulties today.
Officer Training. In the Royal Navy, line officers are still divided into the specializations of gunnery (includes missiles), navigation, ASW, direction (or AAW) and communications/EW. These officers are highly trained in 6-to-9-month courses, and have provided the fleet with experts, on staffs and in ships, who have contributed much to the development of procedures and tactics. It is said that no one man can be an expert in all these fields, but until we train officers in all aspects we shall never know. Certainly we expect captains of our ships to know everything—without this training. In the computer-assisted CIC no officer can afford not to understand the total picture which is presented to him. The threat of a submarine which can launch a missile is not the problem of any one specialist.
Each specialization is taught at its own training school, which of course has its own esprit de corps, rivalry—or could it now be called narrow-mindedness?
The U. S. Navy line officer is not officially a specialist, but he tends to become one, partly because of the training school organization, by careful appointing, and, in the case of short service officers (who form a high proportion), out of sheer necessity.
Tactical Publications. It is difficult to determine which comes first, the specialist or the publication, but the watertight compartments of the specialist are plain to see in the 1969 NATO tactical publications.
It is hard to believe that the multiple line formations of Nelson’s day are still prominent. Could this be the influence of the Communications Officer?
Too, it is sad to see the subject of “Screening” with its strong ASW input treated separately from that of “Formations” with its AAW bias and “Carrier Operations” with the needs of fleet aviation so clearly stated. Should not the aircraft carrier be within the formation which is protected by a multi-purpose escort? Cannot the joint needs of a three-dimensional war be treated together in the same chapter?
These are just examples, but the proliferation of books with conflicting doctrine is a symptom of this diversity.
Conduct of Sea Training Exercises. In order to obtain maximum use of facilities, the standard fleet exercise is divided up into phases for ASW, AAW, naval gunfire support, strike operations, replenishment, and so on. During any one period, the forces can concentrate their attention (and the observers can concentrate their analysis) on one or perhaps two types of problems. Yet it is simply because these problems conflict that we should exercise our forces to deal with them.
We should not then expect some of the following typical “crimes” to be committed:
Aircraft carriers steaming around without a screen, oblivious of the submarine threat.
Aircraft carriers operating within 50 miles of land to allow good strike operations, at the expense of ASW and the entire AAW picture.
Missile ships concentrating solely on AAW at the expense of ASW.
ASW vessels, oblivious of the air threat, not even manning an air voice net.
Naval gunfire support operations at slow speed and steady course in the presence of submarines.
Ships crews going to General Quarters at predetermined times to cope with a heavy threat of short duration. In a continuing environment of all-around threat, ships would have to be manned in condition two (port/starboard) for long periods, and the wisdom of ever going to General Quarters would be much in question.
Layout and Manning of the CIC. The layout of Combat Information varies considerably between different classes of ships and different navies, ideas are continually changing, and no one would claim to have a monopoly of the best plans. It is interesting here that even with the design of future strike carriers the U. S. Navy is in doubt about whether to employ the modular concept or an all-in-one CIC. Both types are at sea now and have their ardent supporters and detractors. On the one hand the all-in-one seems filled with noise and confusion, while the modular CIC leads to difficulties in exchanging information, separate training, increased personnel, and some of the attitudes that this paper seeks to change.
Surely there is little doubt that at least the decision area should be kept together in one module whence our comprehensively trained officers can fight the ship. The lack of co-ordination between air and surface/ subsurface is plain to see in the alarming number of friendly ASW aircraft “shot down” in Fleet exercises.
Within this Utopia, the command team should have access to real-time presentations of the total environment. In ships without a computer system, this means large-screen, tabletop or scope displays of actual radar with manually identified and tracked targets. Decision-making from a dead transfer plot of any description is no longer necessary, though it is unfortunately still widely practised; for example, the vertical AAW plot and horizontal Dead Reckoning Trace in non-NTDS ships. The command team itself should be in close consultation with one man, ideally the captain or executive officer, in overall charge. In any war situation at all, command should not be exercised from the bridge where all one can see is blue water!
Ship Sensors and Weapons. It would be impossible to do justice to this topic within the scope of this article, but of course the types of weapons carried by ships is directly related to the degree of specialization in the role that the ship plays—e.g., the ASW frigate, the AAW picket, the missile ship—and consequently the training of the ship’s crew.
If one accepts the premise that the modern surface ship should be capable of responding to any situation (because it is no longer possible to parcel things up neatly), it is necessary to provide every escort at least with air and surface radar, good sonar, and balanced weapons. It is probably true to say that most navies are tending now towards the general-purpose escort, with all the extra flexibility that this gives the OTC. The concept of the missile ship will be put into greater perspective as point defense missile systems are fitted in every ship as part of a standard kit. The specialist missile ship will then only be that one with the offensive surface to surface missile.
These trends in ship design require officers in CIC to have a well-rounded training without the restraints imposed on them by specialization. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the modern British DLG fitted with its computer-assisted CIC. The same can no doubt be said of most new small ships.
Many of the above criticisms are frequently heard from today’s CIC officer who feels trapped by the system. The mood for a change is there. What is needed now is further study and decision.
What steps should be taken? There are at least four things that should be done.
First: we should review the training objectives of related training schools (e.g., AAW, ASW). So long as the two tactical empires of AAW and ASW remain separate we shall continue to foster the wrong training and attitudes. Sufficient schools are now available to teach operator training for radarmen and sonar technicians and weapon training. The separate schools are the best place to teach basic picture compilation procedures and target acquisition drills, and the specialized problems associated with AAW, ASW, EW, NGFS, aircraft control, boat control, radar-assisted piloting, amphibious warfare, and so on, but we must bring these problems together in one place for the professional CIC officer and radarman.
What is required is a postgraduate training school for advanced CIC and command and control personnel. The school would be staffed and taught by a carefully picked cross section of experts until, eventually, enough officers have graduated from this joint training. The function of this school would be to train individuals, as well as ships’ teams, up to the level of fighting a ship in any real life situation. Tactics would therefore be considered only as they affect one ship and individual ships’ teams. Tactical schools already exist for higher command training, and these serve that function without becoming involved in detailed procedures.
The CIC school would have no bias towards any one threat, but would give due attention to whatever were the current training needs.
Good facilities already exist at both Portsmouth (England) and San Diego (California). A system identical to the one at San Diego is now being installed at Dam Neck (Virginia). The fact that they are all with AAW schools, however, means that undue bias is given to the air threat and the expertise is not available to provide a good general training.
It is recommended that in order to avoid the difficulties of parochialism, these training systems should be administered separately under a suitable title.
Second, we should re-examine the surface ship officer training schedule. Once a suitable training school has been established the carefully drawn lines of specialization in the Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy duty assignment system would need to be reviewed, and a comprehensive postgraduate course in CIC designed for all long-service surface ship line officers. This would last for at least six months, and rather than reducing the level of expertise would be designed to take the “blinders” off and increase knowledge in command and control. Certain detailed areas of knowledge about weapon systems and sensors may not be deemed necessary, being left to the weapons and sensors technicians, but this is another discussion. Officers would reach this course after their first commissioned sea duty assignment and, upon completion, would be assigned as a small ship’s CIC or operations officer.
Above all, it should be recognized that CIC must be run by professionals; that, in the complete sense, it is a specialization in its own right; and that it is the natural rung on the ladder to command. The concept of employing professional aviators, engineers, and officers of other backgrounds in CIC is an insult to the professional radarmen who work there.
Third, we must plan fleet exercises with a continuous all-around threat. So long as we continue to plan our fleet exercises in detailed phases with known times for the AAW exercise we shall mislead ourselves into a false sense of security. It is said that by doing it this way we can obtain better use of training facilities and a better observed analysis. This is true, but it is essentially a false analysis based on false assumptions. The enemy is unlikely to be so kind.
Beyond a statement of objectives, composition of forces and enemy intelligence, the exercise orders should be brief and to the point.
For example: “Proceed to sea in a state of war. You are required to provide air cover at . . . from 180400 to 191600. Enemy intelligence is as follows. . . .”
And then, of course the OTC would follow this order up with his plans, dispositions and procedures.
Finally we should re-examine the CIC layout concept. This is always a continuous review but the basic philosophy should not vary between two of the same class of ship. One or the other must be right.
Much of the mystery within CIC is caused by remote divisions not communicating properly, which in turn may result from the practice of keeping separate plots of each environment.
The very real control problems involved in dealing with the threats posed by SSM-surface ships, fast patrol boats, and SSM-armed submarines will not be solved by the present divisions within the operations room. In particular, using current plotting techniques, particularly within a missile-armed force, the control of helicopters on reconnaissance and surface strikes is fraught with danger for the helo.
We should now be moving towards a tactical plot and a strategic plot provided with the necessary real-time input from all sensors, with adequate display facilities for the decision talkers and rapid communications of the output decisions to the weapon controller.
Sensors, command and control, and weapons might be more logical division within the ship.
Our technological expertise has kept pace with industry, but our managerial methods and the system itself lag far behind.
The computer will accept and display all information, and even recommend action; man still needs a committee of pooled knowledge to decide. That is a pity!
By the way, that intelligent looking chap on the opposite page—the one in the cocked hat—looks a little like me. Didn’t I tell you? I’m AAW.