The proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine represents a point of departure for development in the general area of the Middle East of vast and as yet generally unappreciated importance. Prior to World War II Great Britain was able to maintain stability in the area by stationing forces of reasonable size in key areas; in Iraq, at Aden, in Jordan, advisors in Iran, a moderate sized but most effective naval force based on Trincomalee, supported by outlying bases of importance at Bombay, Karachi, and Aden and others in key positions such as Bahrein Island in the Persian Gulf. Indeed it was this British influence and training that made possible the new and strong nations of India, Pakistan, and Iraq. As Portuguese and later as Turkish influence waned in the Persian Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula, it was the able British political administrator, who, usually buttressed by one or more of H.M. ships, appeared to fill the vacuum created. The British gradually established a system of law and order in an area where piracy, smuggling, and the slave trade were important and often the principal means of livelihood.
The factors which have forced Great Britain to forego her position of dominance in the Middle East area east of Suez are well known. First came the decision on India and Pakistan. There were also requirements that Britain reduce her overseas military commitments for economic reasons. Meanwhile the Moslem nations of the area, beginning to enjoy the wealth derived from their oil, could drink deeply of the strong and heady draught of nationalism for the first time. Why depend upon British garrisons if they could create their own forces? This nationalism was undoubtedly accelerated by the impact of the great influx of Allied personnel into the area in World War II when the British, Americans, and Russians were all pushing great quantities of war goods northward through the Gulf and across Iran, as well as through the great airfields of the area, to support the Russian armies. Twentieth century Western culture and civilization arrived almost overnight in areas where customs of the eighteenth century Moslem world had long prevailed.
British strength and dominance along the shores of the Persian Gulf was of no small benefit in making possible the early development of American oil enterprises in the area.
Since World War II three major developments have occurred which indicated that unless the United States took a stand in the Middle East sooner or later, the Western powers would eventually be forced to withdraw. Most important, of course, is the tremendous increase in the power of the Soviet Union, and hence the force which it can exert from the northward. There is the British pullback, the withdrawal of the policeman from his beat of a century. It was of some importance that, during this same period, the United States for various reasons did not wish to become committed actively in the area except in those instance wherein U. S. influence was demonstrably necessary to maintain the stability of individual nations from time to time. And, finally, there is the almost geometric increase in wealth and means of the Middle East Moslem nations as a result of the prodigious outflow of oil and inflow of dollars and sterling.
The national aspirations of these peoples have been set aflame with the arrival of this great gift from Allah. Some nationalists dream of a rebirth of a reunited and greater Islam stretching from the Persian Gulf to Morocco. Others see for their own countries an opportunity for complete independence from their neighbors and from the foreigners who have ruled or dominated them for centuries.
To our minds not all of the thinking of these Asian peoples is logical. The West can take little heart from the actions of Egypt. Less than three years after the United States used its good offices to get her British ally to reach agreement on its valuable Suez base with Egypt, Nasser has repudiated the fundamental philosophy of the agreement the United States encouraged and further he has turned to the Communists as a source of strength. The Syrians in a fanatic gesture to assist the Egyptians in their military difficulties of the past winter sabotaged the trans-Syrian pipe line of the Iraq Petroleum Company to hurt the British, but in so doing they cut the revenue of neighboring Iraq by thirty per cent. One hears occasionally in Saudi Arabia, when the subject of disagreement with America over certain policies comes up, “Well, we can always close down the oil fields and go back to the desert.” A prominent and wealthy Kuwaiti last year stated that what his country needs is for all foreign assistants, British, U. S., and Palestinian alike, to leave and let the Kuwaiti develop their own resources. When asked who would protect them from any possible tendency for aggrandizement by Kuwait’s powerful neighbors, he contended that Kuwait was the friend of all, that all would enjoy her riches and none of her friends would attack her. He must have forgotten that it has been less than a hundred years ago that only the guns of a British cruiser and a frigate held off the Wahaibi warriors of Ibn Saud from taking Kuwait at a time when most of its wealth and resources were encased in a few pearl and money vaults in the mud buildings of the pearl merchants and smugglers. And now this tiny country has a potential wealth greater than either Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Iran.
The problem facing the West in stablizing the area in the face of such local conflict of thought is infinitely complicated by the Israeli question, which is an emotional issue to the great majority of the Arabs. Whereas the United States committed itself to the creation of Israeli and has generously supported her, it is vital to the United States that Israeli’s Arab neighbors have assurance that Israeli’s activities will not be allowed to transgress against the surrounding countries. But so long as tiny Israeli is beset by emotionally sparked border raiders and by the bombastic statements of Moslem leaders demanding that Israeli must be obliterated, the necessities of survival will demand of her a militaristic attitude. Israeli’s confidence in protection from the UN or the West was not bolstered by the absence of action over a six year period to force Egypt to desist from interdicting the use of the international waters leading to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.
Implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine will give troubled and at times confused nations of the area a chance to settle their differences over a long period on a lasting basis. In the absence of a positive U. S. policy toward the areas as a whole, settlement of many of the basic issues has simply been deferred from year to year. That the Moslem world can provide the enlightened leadership to take advantage of this opportunity to develop a strong modern Islam is demonstrated by the recent, firm yet moderate course followed by King Saud of Saudi Arabia. The United Nations has the machinery and the potentialities to accomplish lasting settlements but only if it has visible and dependable backing from major powers. Whereas the Soviet Union has to date not seen fit to allow the United Nations to operate in the settlement of disputes within its sphere of influence, it is the repeatedly demonstrated intent of the West to give that organization a free rein wherever possible to undertake the mission for which it was founded.
Russia’s entry into the Middle East through her arms deal with Egypt and Syria—a major, if not the dominant, factor in causing the smoldering Suez crisis to flame into open warfare—was the fundamental reason for the American reappraisal. The West in all probability will one day be extremely grateful to Russia for her occasional timely warnings to us: Berlin, 1948; Korea, 1950; Indo-China, 1952; and the Egypt- Syria Russia rapprochement of 1955-1957.
The steps taken by the United States to increase its military position to meet this new threat have been gradual. These steps have been in the main within the province of the U. S. Navy. Quietly, the capabilities of Commander, Middle East Force, who commands the small U. S. Naval Force East of Suez, operating primarily in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea, were increased by the inclusion of a division of destroyers to augment his “force” of one small seaplane tender and an R4D-8 aircraft. The Sixth Fleet’s Amphibious Force with its reinforced Marine battalion, scheduled for redeployment to the United States, was kept on station. As the tension increased, the Sixth Fleet was temporarily reinforced by an entire hunter-killer ASW force, another cruiser, and more destroyers, while the Second Fleet left its East Coast bases and made a visit to Iberian ports. Pacific Fleet units deployed westward from Long Beach and San Diego. At the same time an amphibious group, with a Marine battalion embarked, made a visit of courtesy to India and Pakistan ports. And United States ties with the Baghdad Pact have gradually been tightened.
It will be said that these forces are too small to influence a situation such as the recent Suez crisis, that they would be entirely ineffective against a sudden Soviet thrust from the North, but at least they represent a visible earnestness of intent to our friends of the area. And for a local breakout of hostilities, these forces represent a rather large capability. Within its combat reach, the Sixth Fleet has tremendous power and potentiality to stop a local conflict or to prevent the entry of “volunteers” to bolster the forces of any local aggressor. The air striking power of the Fleet, reinforced by such Air Force help as could be quickly committed, can do much to destroy the major combat elements of any nation of the area that might suddenly embark on a course of aggression. The Sixth Fleet’s amphibious force has a strong capability to seize any position along the Eastern Mediterranean coast required to make a lasting stand to reestablish order in the area.
In event of major aggression or another Korea-type adventure, the geography of the Middle East area is admirably suited to allow the long-range striking power of the United States and its allies to operate with maximum effectiveness. For the foreseeable future the Indian Ocean and its surrounding waters, particularly the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, will represent a strategic asset of infinite value. Should Soviet leaders persist in their efforts to establish a Russian sphere in the Middle East and finally become sufficiently strong at long last to seize the area, it will be a useless prize.
So long as the United States maintains and increases the long-range striking power of its Fleet and its sea-keeping qualities, the Arabian Sea must remain a salient that will be a deterrent to Communist adventure in the area. Of course, northern Iran, and Iraq, and parts of western Turkey could be seized with ease by a determined and powerful aggressor, but such a seizure probably would touch off something greater than another Korea. So long as the Fleet can quickly strike back, then assemble and operate along the entire Southern littoral of such an area of hostilities and can strike far to the northward if necessary, such an adventure would seem unprofitable. On the shores of the Indian Ocean there are several potential sites for major fleet operating bases, for major air bases, for bases from which to stage and support a sustained military effort. The West’s oil from the Persian Gulf may be cut off, but it is quite likely that Soviet fields around the Caspian and Black Seas areas would also cease to flow.
Behind the shield which this potential capability represents, this often displayed mobility by which the Navy provides U. S. forces with the sinew and flexibility for sustained operations, there is hope that there will arise in the Middle East a new and vastly enriched civilization.
We see the challenge.