Within living memory, Germany has been the storm center of two terrible world conflicts. Each time she was reduced in area and each time the concentration of her population increased. Her drive for Lebensraum has gone in reverse. She suffered almost complete collapse in 1945, but there remain elements of strength which make her most important.
Despite the manpower losses suffered in World Wars I and II, her population has increased: in 1910, it was over 64 million: in 1938, it was over 67 million; and in 1952, it was about 69 million.* Meanwhile, the population per square mile increased from 311 in 1910, to 372 in 1938, to 503 in 1952. Germany now approaches the highly industrialized United Kingdom with its 533 population per square mile. Germany’s present concentration is largely the result of provisional transference of territory to Poland and the dumping of over thirteen million refugees and expellees into what remains of the Reich. The concentration is of course greatest in Western Germany because that area is more industrialized and because of the flight of many Germans from East to West.
One who studies the history of Germany is impressed by the progressive consolidation which has taken place. A few centuries ago there were some 300 political entities, varying greatly in size and population. They ranged from large states such as Austria, Brandenburg, and Saxony down to tiny principalities. The German Confederation of 1815 was consolidated into only 39 states. When Bismarck founded the German Empire in 1871, it was composed of 25 provinces, while in the Weimar Republic there were only 17 states. Finally, Hitler proclaimed his “Thousand Year Reich” “one and indivisible.” One may also note a trend in the political consciousness of the people; in World War I, they fought as Prussians, Bavarians, etc., while in World War II, they thought of themselves primarily as Germans. True, they were not so much “one and indivisible” as Hitler had hoped and expected; nevertheless, the unmistakable trend is there to be seen.
It may safely be said that today’s Germans are less provincial and more solidly German than ever before. The current division between East and West may tend in the opposite direction and may produce a permanent cleavage if long continued. Today, however, the citizens of both zones are aware that they as Germans have had to pay the piper for losing the war; they are aware that they as Germans were expelled from their lands east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers; and they are aware that they as Germans had to take refuge from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. The trials and tribulations which followed as a result of losing the war have tended to unite them. The Austrians should be definitely excluded in this generalization for there is apparently no desire to renew their association with Germany. Seven years under Hitler have had the opposite effect.
The German Reich was launched in an age of nationalism, and she quickly fell into stride. She went along with other nations in the Triple Alliance and the Anti-Comintern Pact when it appeared to suit her own requirements for development, expansion, and security. Hitler urged her on to her final great drive in nationalism despite a growing awareness amongst the Germans that it was a fatal course. Having pursued nationalism through World Wars I and II and having found it to fail all along the line with a final great collapse, the Germans seem to be convinced that there can be no peace and security for them unless Europe also enjoys similar benefits. This state of mind finds expression in Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic as follows:
(1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.
(2) In order to preserve peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to those limitations of its sovereign powers which will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.
(3) For the settlement of international disputes, the Federation will join a general, comprehensive, obligatory system of international arbitration.
The refugee problem in Germany is one of utmost importance. Let us consider briefly where they came from, what their status is now, and what their prospects are. The following table shows some of the more important German minority groups in eastern Europe before World War II.
Country |
Total Population |
Ethnic Germans |
Czechoslovakia |
14,729,000 |
3,318,000 |
Poland |
32,694,000 |
1,700,000 |
U.S.S.R. |
170,467,000 |
1,495,000 |
Rumania |
17,793,000 |
740,000 |
Yugoslavia |
13,934,000 |
499,000 |
Hungary |
8,684,000 |
479,000 |
Lithuania |
2,220,000 |
71,000 |
Latvia |
1,900,000 |
62,000 |
Many of these sections of population had been German for centuries, as for instance in the Baltic States and Bohemia. They had retained their language, customs, and traditions as Germans, even though they may have been citizens of the state of their residence. Frequently, they lived in communities, so that there was little association, and therefore little intermarriage, with other racial groups. In Bohemia before the war, for example, it was not uncommon to drive through a town where the population was largely German, then a few miles farther one would come to a village predominantly Czech. Generally speaking, these German minority groups got along well with their neighbors but there were trouble areas, such as Sudetenland. The Volga Germans were so strong in numbers (422,000) and influence that they were organized into an autonomous republic in 1918. With the German advance in 1941, the Soviet Government dissolved this republic. Some of the Volga Germans had previously been resettled by Germany in Western Poland after the conquest of 1939; the rest were removed to Siberia following the liquidation of their state.
To eliminate the friction which might be caused by a strong minority, the transference of such peoples to their ethnic homeland was suggested. Adolf Hitler was one of the advocates of this policy; “Heim ins Reich” was his slogan, but it was to be a boomerang to Germany. Hitler started the transference of ethnic Germans with the South Tyrolese and Balts, even though these peoples had no connection with Germany except that their forefathers, perhaps centuries ago, came from that country. No doubt Hitler preferred to take into the Reich the homeland of such Volksdeutsche, as was the case in Sudetenland, but this was impracticable in other instances.
South Tyrol, or Alto Adige, is an interesting case history because of the solution and the eventual outcome. Prior to 1919, the boundary of Tyrol extended south to Lake Garda. By the Peace of St. Germain, South Tyrol (south of the Brenner Pass) was transferred from Austria to Italy. Therewith, over 267,000 ethnic Germans were delivered over to Italy.
Hitler agreed that the Brenner was the natural frontier indicated by geography and that the problem of the German settlement of South Tryol should be resolved once and for all. The July, 1939, German-Italian plan provided that the people of German nationality living in South Tyrol were to be transferred as soon as possible to Germany, while the rest were permitted a choice. If they voted to be German, they, too, were to be resettled in the Reich within a period of three years. It was strenuously opposed by the South Tyrolese and the solution was very unpopular in Germany but all to no avail.
In practice, the implementation of the agreement was slowly carried out; it was never fully executed. Some 10,000 German citizens were removed during the latter part of the year. In the subsequent election, the German-speaking South Tyrolese were called upon to vote for Italian citizenship or removal to Germany within three years. Out of 266,985 votes cast, 185,085, or just over two-thirds, chose the second alternative. But the departure did not go according to schedule; only 77,772, or less than one-half, had actually left South Tyrol by September 1, 1943. Many of these were settled in Alsace and Lorraine after the defeat of France in 1940. The Italians pushed the program halfheartedly; they appear to have harbored doubts that it was the right solution. After the fall of Mussolini in 1943, South Tyrol was annexed by Germany. It reverted to Italy, of course, at the end of the war, and the Italians generously offered repatriation to the South Tyrolese who had elected to go to Germany.
A visit to South Tyrol reveals the extent of German culture—German shops, German signs, German spoken everywhere, rarely Italian. It was interesting to get their reaction to the question, “I thought all of you Germans went ‘Heim ins Reich.’” The answer was always about the same. “Yes, many of us did, but all came back. What should we do in Germany? Here our forefathers lived and are buried. Here we had our homes, our land, our relatives and our friends, and our work. It was a snare and a delusion.”
Many of the eight million ethnic Germans listed above reached Germany largely as refugees and expellees; the fate of about three million is unknown. The majority of the latter are said to have perished in the chaos of the collapse, the flight, and the expulsion and in transport. Small numbers are probably living scattered over the vast eastern areas.
There is nothing comparable in history to the post-war expulsion of Germans until we go back some 1600 years to the great migrations of the Germanic tribes. In 1945-6 Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and other eastern European states disgorged their German minorities. Russia and Poland expelled the Germans resident in their newly acquired territory east of the Oder-Neisse, and in mass movements they were dumped into what was left of Germany. The Potsdam Agreement sanctioned the expulsion but did specify that it was to take place in an “orderly and humane” manner. It was not done that way to say the least. Moreover, the land which was to receive them had been badly battered in a great war; it had been impoverished and had suffered a 20% total destruction of its housing. Yet it is to their credit that they did what they could for these millions of uprooted people who arrived with little or nothing. The report of the ECA Technical Assistance Commission states, “Germany has faced its herculean task with courage, skill, and compassion.” Since the war UNRRA and IRO (International Refugee Organization) have operated within Germany but their concern was displaced persons; the German refugees, or expellees, were no concern of theirs because they were considered German nationals and therefore the responsibility of Germany. For the same reason, the millions of German refugees did not come under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, the latter contended that the problem facing the displaced persons could not be solved unless all other German refugees were helped. Thus, it was not until September, 1951, that this problem was put squarely before the United Nations. It is not one which can be solved today, or tomorrow; it will require the understanding and aid of the West over a long pull.
The U. S. High Commissioner of Germany estimated the 1952 population of the country as follows:
German Federal Republic |
|
(West. Zones) |
48,371,000 |
Berlin (West. Sectors) |
2,167,000 |
German Democratic Republic |
|
(Soviet Zone) |
17,314,000 |
Berlin (Soviet Sector) |
1,206,000 |
According to the 1951 estimate of the German Minister for Refugees, there were 9,100,000 refugees and expellees in the Western Zones and 4,500,000 in the Soviet Zone.
Since 1951 the flight from East to West has been continuing, increasing the refugee population of the Western Zones and decreasing that of the Soviet Zone, since almost half of them are expellees who lived only temporarily in the Soviet Zone. The flight takes place principally through Berlin, where it is relatively easy to escape from Soviet dominion. Over a thousand refugees a day pour into West Berlin; a newspaper account reported a record high of 5,000 on March 1, 1953. A tribunal passes on each person and, if the latter shows evidence of being a bona- fide political refugee, he is flown out to West Germany. The percentage of acceptance has been averaging somewhat over half. Those rejected usually augment the many thousands of dole-subsisted jobless of West Berlin.
Western Germany has made great effort to find employment for all of her refugees, but the big stumbling block is that a large proportion of them are farmers and there is not sufficient unused arable land. In consequence, large numbers are unemployed and living in wretched conditions. But where the refugees had special skills, factories have been built to put them to use.
The German expellees have their own political organization. In 1952, there were 62 expellees amongst 410 members of the parliament of the Federal Republic; many of the former are, however, members of the major parties established earlier. In the “Charter of the German Expellees, 1950,” it is declared; “1. We, the expellees, renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation. ... 2. We shall support with all our strength every endeavor directed toward the establishment of a united Europe, in which the nations may live in freedom from fear and force. . . . We have lost our homeland. . . . We, therefore, feel called upon to demand that the right to our native land, be recognized and be realized, as one of the basic rights of man, granted him by the grace of God. ...”
Here, then, we have one of the fundamental aims of the Germans. Even though, and for whatever reason, the German Democratic Republic (Soviet Zone) accepted the Oder-Neisse Line as “the final peace frontier” in a treaty signed at Frankfurt-on- Oder on January 27, 1951, there is no doubt where the Germans of the Federal Republic stand. Chancellor Adenauer declared in Berlin on October 6, 1951, “For us, the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Line belongs to Germany.” U. S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in a speech at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, energetically invited attention to the fact that German territories were placed under Polish administration only provisionally and that “the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon.” The Western Allies have not changed their position thereon. What will be the final solution and how it will be realized are big questions.
It is well to remember that the lands in question are under the direct, or indirect, control of the Soviet Union. Some, or all, of the territory can therefore possibly be recovered by the Germans joining forces with the West, or it might be recovered if they linked up with the Soviet Union. Since the latter holds directly only a small section of East Prussia, it is conceivable that she might make a quid pro quo deal with the Germans and sacrifice her satellite Poland.
The Russians have every reason to respect the latent power in 69 million Germans. On the one hand, they may strive to hold Germany divided so that the latter cannot contribute largely to the forces of opposition; or if they think this cannot be effectively done, then it may be expedient to accept them as partners. In the end it will probably depend on the long-range national interests of the two countries. Prior to the industrialization of Soviet Russia, a partnership with Germany might have operated to their mutual economic benefit. But now they are competing industrial nations; both must seek raw materials and outlets for their products, with the U.S.S.R. having the advantage of food and raw material resources in her own land. Their national policies have often clashed in the Balkans and in the Baltic area; they clashed even after the two countries had linked up in the pact of 1939. Mussolini had something of this in mind when he wrote to Hitler on December 16, 1939, “ . . . you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of your revolution to the tactical exigencies of a certain political moment. . . . The solution of your Lebensraum problem is in Russia alone. ...”
So it would appear that, even though a partnership might be formed between the Soviet Union and Germany as a temporary expedient agreeable to both parties, in the long run there would be a vital clash of interest. We must give the devil his due, the Russians are very shrewd in their long- range political planning.
Another major objective of the Germans is unity. As was previously noted, this has been a trend for many years and is now stronger than ever. Today, of course, it means something more—the unification of the eastern and western zones is the goal of all Germans, but little progress has been made. The Communist objective is to prevent Germany from joining an integrated western community of nations and contributing military strength to any combination opposing them.
Nominally, for the benefit of the Germans, the Russians have been loud in advocating unification, but all their actions emphasize the separation of Germany into East and West. One must assume that it is their intention to keep it that way.
Recovery of the lost provinces and unity are two strictly German objectives; the other is European integration. There seems little reason to doubt that the Western Germans have been, and still are, in favor of integration in a western community of nations. Having been on the losing end of two world wars, they have been more strongly impressed with the necessity therefore than perhaps other nations. The sweeping victory of Chancellor Adenauer and his party in the recent election (September, 1953), indicates that the Germans of the Western Zones are strongly backing the policy of integration with the West. Nevertheless, one notes a trend of thought that integration, however desirable, may be impracticable.
To combat this trend our policy must be unwavering on the issue and steadfast in backing Western Europe to assure them a prosperous and peaceful life. In the past, our policy has appeared entirely too vacillating to the Germans—one moment it is dismantle and disarm; then, a full turn, and they are told to rebuild and rearm. It was much too sudden; they were not ready for it. Even today, one will meet intelligent Germans who see the necessity of rearming, but all appear to dislike the idea. Will they be left to hold the bag in some future shift of Western policy? The Berliners are the staunch friends of the United States. Their innate common sense and good judgment, fortified by their experience in the Berlin air-lift, tell them they can bank on the Americans. Perhaps we can spread the same trust to all Germans.
Some Germans, like Pastor Martin Niemoeller, are neutralists. They believe that Germany can best serve by not joining either East or West but rather by being a buffer state between them.
More to be feared are those with an Eastern orientation. The avowed Communists are not strong in Western Germany, but there are in addition men of other political faith who favor such a turn. It did occur in the aftermath of World War I. D. H. Lawrence, writing of his visit to Germany in 1924, said: “The great leaning of the German spirit is eastward toward Russia, toward Tartary.” Today, this danger does not appear serious; it is not sponsored by able men. Moreover, it lacks popular support; the Germans have little use for Russians, for they have fared badly at their hands. Still it is a danger which must be reckoned with, especially if the West should falter in its understanding and cooperation.
Such understanding does not thrive in segregation and isolation. We have many thousands of Americans in Germany constantly who ought to be our ambassadors spreading the faith. We are missing a good bet if we do not encourage our Americans stationed in Germany to learn the language, to meet the better type Germans, to enter, and participate in, the various phases of German life.
There is danger if we cannot prevail on the western European nations to put the general welfare in an economical and political unification ahead of their purely selfish interests. The first should be the easiest, and if that cannot be done it is extremely doubtful that the second can in any way be realized. The recent implementation of the Schumann Plan gives us hope that an economical and political unification of Western Europe can yet be realized. In this line-up, we need the Germans and they need us.
* The Saar is not included in these and subsequent figures on Germany.