Among the various advantages which command of the sea bestows upon its possessor, one of the most important and certainly the most spectacular is the ability to engage successfully in amphibious operations. In order to insure a clear understanding of just what constitutes an amphibious operation, I think some definitions are in order.
The word amphibious (from the Greek, amphi, double+bios, life), according to the dictionary, means "living both on land and in water." For military purposes, we can ignore the more literal meaning, "living a double life." By long usage in war, amphibious assaults are those in which a combat land force moves by sea directly onto an enemy shore, though not necessarily against immediate opposition. Operations such as our transportation of troops by sea to friendly (French) ports in World War I, for later deployment against the enemy, though exploiting command of the sea, are not labeled amphibious. Also, land combat operations merely supported by naval forces, without troop movement between the two elements, do not lie in the amphibious category. But there can be amphibious retreats as well as assaults, when, as at the Dardanelles, Dunkirk, or Hungnam, troops are withdrawn by sea from hostile territory.
In World War II, it became the practice in some quarters to speak of an amphibious operation in which airpower also participated as "triphibious." The practice was bad, on two counts. In the first place, as I believe Winston Churchill pointed out, "triphibious" is spurious. Correctly coined, the word would be "tribious" (tri, triple+bias, life), there being no such prefix as "triphi." In the second place, "tribious" should apply only to operations in which the same combat force starts out on the sea, takes to the air, then lands on the ground—or transfers among these three elements in some other combination. Even simultaneous airborne and amphibious assaults against the same objective therefore cannot be considered tribious. By the same reasoning, operations in or on a single element are "unibious."
This exercise in military semantics is not presented for the reader's (or even the author's) amusement, but to bring out the most vital fact in amphibious warfare. This is, that the assault troops must initiate their actual advance against the enemy on an element unfamiliar and often in itself unfriendly and in what would be, without extraordinary measures—by other forces, an inert and highly vulnerable state; and must be prepared to commence their engagement from this state in piecemeal fashion rather than in the always desired concentration. We have only to add to this unpromising situation the intricate and unaccustomed admixture of at least two services or types of forces—land and sea—for the difficulties in .assigning and exercising command in such a combination to become quickly apparent.
History is replete with both successes and failures in amphibious warfare. While many factors affect the outcome, such as the strength of opposing forces, types of weapons and equipment, training, morale, choice of landing beaches, the weather, etc.—the prime essential to success is effective coordination. Where adequate force was available to the offense, failures have usually been due to lack of adequate joint planning and training, lack of mutual confidence between services, assumption of too much authority by one service commander, and the unwillingness of one service to take certain risks or to expedite the execution of its tasks when speed was vital to success. Granted sufficient time for thorough joint planning and training, most of the other difficulties mentioned could have been solved by proper command organization, especially by providing true unity of command.
Before proceeding to a study of command arrangements in modern amphibious operations, it might be interesting to reflect upon some examples from earlier days. Douglas Freeman, in his biography of George Washington, gives the following account of the 18th century British attack on Cartagena, in which the usual British principles of coequality and expected cooperation between the senior service commanders brought lamentable results (Lawrence Washington, older brother of George, participated as a Virginia militia officer. His admiration for Admiral Vernon prompted him to name his home "Mount Vernon").
"In July, 1739, when hostilities opened between Britain and Spain, Admiral Vernon's fleet started for the West Indies. By October, when war was declared formally, Vernon was at Port Royal, Jamaica, ready for action. He descended swiftly on the coast of Panama and boldly assailed the defenses of Porto Bello. Finding them feeble, he pressed his attack and within forty-eight hours after his arrival off the town, forced its full surrender. This easy success fired the imagination and fed the pride of Britain.
"The home government then ordered Vernon to return to the Caribbean with overwhelming land and naval forces and 'make an attempt upon some of the most considerable of the Spanish settlements.' Drake had wrung a ransom from Cartagena in 1585; the French expedition of 1697 had taken £1,000,000 from the place; Vernon decided that as the government gave him a free choice of objectives, he would snatch the same rich prize.
"The land forces of Admiral Vernon's expedition of 9,000 men had been entrusted to Major General Lord Cathcart, but he had died before the fleet had assembled at Port Royal, Jamaica. Command then passed to the senior Brigadier, Thomas Wentworth, a mediocre, inexperienced officer who clashed from the outset with the realistic, vigorous Vernon. The success the Admiral had achieved at Porto Bello had convinced him that Spaniards in a fixed position should be attacked before they had time to prepare for a siege, in which they traditionally were stubborn adversaries. As soon, therefore, as Vernon arrived off Cartagena on the 3rd of March, 1740, he urged Wentworth to throw troops ashore and to assault immediately. Wentworth disagreed concerning a landing place and then hesitated over the number of troops and the quantity of supplies he would require. It was the afternoon of March 9th when the first boats were grounded, and it was the 13th before Wentworth had on the beaches all his guns and stores.
"Vernon kept warning him that delay meant calamity, because the wet season was close at hand and was certain to bring sickness and death. Wentworth was deaf to all counsel except that of his own caution. He did not open fire until March 23, on the northern fort which covered the channel of the 'Little Mouth' or Boca Chica, at the southern end of the island of Tierra Bomba. After this fort was reduced, the fleet moved in, the sailors cut the boom of the Boca Chica, and the men-of-war entered the harbor.
"The next day, Admiral Vernon was of the opinion that the city still could be captured despite the long delays, and in dispatches home he made the mistake of predicting the early fall of Cartagena. Wentworth, on the other hand, continued to debate where and how he should deliver his final assault, and he did not decide until the alarmed Spaniards, working with all the speed of frenzy, had strengthened greatly their positions. When Wentworth at last threw 6,600 of his troops against the enemy, he met with a paralyzing repulse. His losses appalled even veterans who had known he would have to pay a heavy 'butchers' bill.'
"Soon the rains reenforced the Spanish guns. Sickness mounted. Yellow fever made its dread appearance. Scores died mysteriously every day. As continued exposure would spell the death of virtually all who had gone ashore, the survivors were reembarked on the 17th of April. A few ships were left to complete the destruction of the forts that had been captured. The remainder of the fleet abandoned the siege, sailed away and returned to Jamaica."
Failure in this case was clearly due to a number of causes, including importantly the death of Major General Cathcart. But the command arrangement was defective. While, originally, unified command might have been given to either Lord Cathcart or Admiral Vernon, it should certainly have passed to the admiral upon Cathcart's death. Actually, there was no unified command. Had the able and energetic Vernon, who had already experienced success in combat with the Spanish, enjoyed unified command, he would not have tolerated the delays which were the major cause of defeat.
A surprising example of success achieved in spite of the same arrangement, cooperation between the top service commanders, (and in this case, between forces of different nations as well), is found in the combined British, French, and Turkish attack on Sevastopol in the Crimean War. For its period, this was an operation of ambitious magnitude. The forces to be landed comprised, for the British, 26,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 60 guns; for the French, 30,000 infantry, and 68 guns; and for the Turks, 7,000 infantry. The total, including the men and horses of the field artillery and the mounts of the infantry officers, numbered not less than 65,000 men, 2,000 horses, and 128 pieces of artillery. The expedition was mounted at Varna, Bulgaria, in a motley fleet of steam and sailing ships of many types, sizes and speeds. Some had to tow large flat-bottomed lighters for landing the artillery. The French and Turkish fleets, being short of transports, packed their fighting ships with troops and their equipment. The force had not entirely recovered from a severe epidemic of cholera, which had struck the camp at Varna, and spread to the ships. Many men were still afflicted with it, and there were numerous deaths from this cause, even after the landing.
Modern planners would have been horrified by the nearly complete lack of intelligence regarding the strength of the Russian forces or their state of preparation. Almost as little was known of possible landing points. Conferences to resolve this latter question were held on board ship en route to the objective, but a final choice was not made until after the fleets had anchored at a temporary rendezvous off the Crimean coast.
Fortunately, the enemy fleet did not intervene. In fact, the Russians deliberately sank some of their ships in the harbor of Sevastopol as naval forts. Fortunately, also, there was no immediate opposition from Russian ground forces. The landing was accomplished without losing a man, in spite of heavy surf at times, and by "D plus 4" the entire force, with all guns, equipment and supplies, was ashore. The campaign, designed as an assault, became prolonged into a siege, and a year was to pass before it ended. The operation remained a joint one, however, to its successful conclusion, with much use of the attackers' fleets in action as well as in logistics, and even the employment of naval personnel in battle ashore. But organized unity of command over the entire allied force was completely lacking.
The British forces were operating under their usual arrangement in which general and admiral were co-equal and expected to cooperate. The general was Lord Raglan. He was 66 years old at the time the Crimean War started. He had been a brilliant staff officer attached to the Duke of Wellington in the Napoleonic Wars and had lost an arm at Waterloo. For 40 years he had had no command or field experience, his duty having taken him principally into the courts of the Continent.
The British admiral was Vice Admiral Dundas. He was usually in disagreement but did comply with all direct requests made upon him, including the bombardment of Russian fortifications at Sevastopol. This was the opening bombardment on October 17, 1854, the primary object of the fleet's participation being to require the Russians to man their sea batteries, and thus reduce the number of artillerymen available for manning the works facing landwards. Admiral Dundas did not approve of fleet participation in this bombardment, being strongly of the opinion "that it was not the business of wooden walls to pit themselves against stone ones."
After the bombardment, in which the British and French ships suffered far more severely than the forts, both in material damage and personnel casualties, Admiral Dundas wrote to Lord Raglan: "The action of the 17th was a false one, and which I decline to repeat. It is one that I accepted with reluctance, and with which as a naval commander I am dissatisfied."
The British naval second-in-command, Rear Admiral Lyons, was in direct charge of the convoys and landing of the troops. He was also neither over nor under Lord Raglan but maintained close relationships with him.
The French, within their own forces, did have unity of command. Marshal St. Arnaud was commander of the French forces, both Army and Navy. Vice Admiral Hamelin, commanding the French fleet, was directly under the command of St. Arnaud. The Turkish Army contingent was attached to the French Army and therefore also under St. Arnaud's command.
There was no unity of command as between the allies, both British and French governments having instructed their commanders to "act in concert." In general, they did so. In the end, Lord Raglan, strong and very tactful and of high natural ability, was able to influence and dominate St. Arnaud when great decisions were involved. His influence may have been strengthened by the ill health of St. Arnaud, who had to be relieved about 10 days after the landing in the Crimea.
The success of the operation then was very largely due to the strong and persuasive personality of Lord Raglan, who, without actual command authority, succeeded in dominating both his French allies and his British naval partner, though much credit must be given to Admiral Dundas for his willingness to cooperate, even when the part assigned him was one he felt he should not play.
In World War II, joint forces fought in assault on a scale never before dreamed of. For the most part, the geographical position of the United States, combined with the early successes of both Germany and Japan in seizing large land areas, made such operations necessary. American ingenuity and industry, in evolving new tactics and in producing novel types of weapons and · equipment in vast quantity, made them possible.
Albeit with great difficulty, we eventually succeeded in gaining and holding command of the sea wherever we needed it, and command of the air as well, so that it became possible for us to carry the war to the enemy in great strength across broad expanses of water. These conditions imposed upon us weighty problems in joint strategy and joint tactics, and equally difficult and important problems in joint logistics.
So much combined effort called for the highest possible degree of coordination. The first step was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The next was the establishment of a unified command in each theater of war.
Although in all theaters the top command reposed in one officer, the first variation is seen in the composition of the theater commander's staff. In the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz organized a truly joint staff, his assistant chiefs of staff for both intelligence and logistics being Army officers. Numerous Army and Marine officers were included in the lower echelons of the staff.
Neither General MacArthur nor General Eisenhower apparently felt it necessary to organize a joint staff, their staffs being composed exclusively of Army officers, except for a few naval liaison officers or personal aides. Eisenhower's deputy commander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, had some Royal Air Force officers on his own staff.
Below the theater command level, there are two divergent views regarding command of the theater's assigned forces. One is to adhere exclusively to the organic command structure by which in any operation, "unibious" or joint, the component units remain always under the established chain of command in their respective services, the component commanders on all echelons below the top level cooperating as necessary in such operations as require joint effort.
The other system for command of joint operations below the theater level uses the "task force" principle. Here the entire force necessary for the operation is so organized that there is unified command not only in the theater commander, but in the commander of the task force, and even at lower levels in certain circumstances wherein units of different services within the task force execute a joint task.
In general, the British prefer the organic command or component system. So does our Air Force, though they are amenable to the establishment of joint task forces, provided the task force commander, of whatever service, does not also directly command the component force from his own service and provided there is no further disturbance of organic command structure below the task force commander's level. Our Army inclines to the same view but has accepted the establishment of temporary unified command on lower echelons in a large joint force. So has the Marine Corps, though in general also opposing disruption of the organic command chain.
The Navy subscribes to the task force system and had used it within the Navy before World War II—operating forces of composite nature and of less than fleet size having frequently functioned on command lines which temporarily disregarded administrative command structure. During the war, the principle was exploited by United States naval forces to the utmost. Administrative naval commanders were usually not even in the forward areas.
In general, the Component Command System was followed in the landings at Algiers, Oran, Sicily, Salerno and Normandy; the Task Force System at Casablanca, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Kwajalein, the Marianas, Palau, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Leyte, Lingayen, and the planned Kyushu landing. However, even when the component command system was used, the naval component commander usually commanded the joint naval and landing forces during the amphibious phase of the operation. But the Army Air Force or Royal Air Force component in those operations which were executed under the Component Command System usually functioned separately, its commander being subordinate only to the theater commander. At Sicily the airborne force also so operated, with one distressing result. The naval and ground forces did not even know the route to be followed by this force or the timing of its attack. In darkness, they mistook the troop carriers for enemy planes and shot some of them down.
In view of the vital importance of air support to an amphibious assault, and the need for its close coordination with naval gunfire, artillery and troop movement, there is only one proper place for it in the command organization, and that is directly under the joint amphibious assault task force commander. This commander's authority to exercise complete operational or tactical air control while in the objective area, however, does not in itself imply his control of these aircraft while outside that area, nor his command over the bases, aircraft carriers, or organizations from which they came.
The joint assault task force commander also must control all other air units in the objective area: combat air patrol, antisubmarine patrol, long range sea patrol planes, planes passing through, and spotting planes not organic to ships or to artillery units. He will temporarily detail carrier-based spotting planes to spot for particular gunfire support ships, and may assign combat air patrol fighters to outlying picket ships for fighter direction or, as it is now called, fighter control. But in order to exploit the flexibility of air power to the fullest degree, he will avoid parcelling out on a permanent basis the available air support planes to various subordinate commands.
Admiral Turner in the Pacific amphibious operations devised the system just described. It was generally agreed by all familiar with it to be the best organization possible for tactical air support control in amphibious warfare. No matter whether the supporting aircraft came from his own small "escort carriers," from Admiral Mitscher's fast carrier task force or from a land base, while in the objective area they were under the tactical control of Admiral Turner's "Commander Air Support Control Unit." The latter, a naval aviator himself with a small group of trained officers and men, and the necessary communications and equipment, was embarked in Admiral Turner's own flagship, in close contact with the Admiral himself, his operations officer, the naval gunfire control officer, artillery control officer, and the troop commander's G-3. If the support planes came from Mitscher's Task Force 58, they would report to Turner's "CASCU" when they arrived at a specified point in the objective area, and thereafter until they left the area to return to their carriers, they remained under the tactical control of Turner's CASCU. They were usually assigned as "strike groups" for ground support, or to the Target "CAP" (Combat Air Patrol) for air defense. These planes were relieved on station by others so that the support was constantly and immediately available throughout the entire daylight period. Their "call strikes" were promptly delivered and were closely coordinated with land artillery and naval gunfire support and with troop movement.
Admiral Turner's amphibious force and group commanders were also provided with these air support control units, so that they could handle air support in independent operations, auxiliary landings at points somewhat removed from the main attack, or take over the whole job in emergencies.
This system of air support control of course provided for advance planning to cover the composition of the air units to be provided, their time schedule of arrival on station and departure, routes to be followed, arming, etc. But it also provided the necessary flexibility when required, as regards assignment of tasks in the objective area.
After the war when the Army was overhauling its own tactical doctrines, there were some in that service who did feel that the Navy had been dominating amphibious operations to too great an extent. It was admitted by these objectors that in a naval campaign, where an amphibious operation had as its purpose the seizure of an island base, a naval officer could logically command it. But as the initial phase of an extended campaign for the capture of a large land mass, they contended that the amphibious assault was merely "an extension of a land campaign to seaward," and, as such, should be commanded by an Army officer. The answer, it seems to me, is quite simple.
If the amphibious assault does form part of an extensive land campaign, the overall command of the entire invasion operation, and all forces involved in it, should be assigned to an Army officer. But the amphibious phase, just because it is "an extension of the campaign to sea ward," should be commanded by a naval officer, who, of course, is under the command of the Army invasion or theater commander. A joint amphibious assault task force should be formed under this naval commander. Upon completion of the amphibious phase, the joint task force is dissolved, and further orders provide for disposition of all units. This was the standard practice in World War II.
For instance, General Eisenhower was in over-all command of theN ormandy invasion (and the European Theater of Operations). But note the following extract from the Operation Plan of Admiral Ramsay, R. N., Eisenhower's naval component commander, dated April 10, 1944:
"Until the Army is firmly established ashore, the command of each naval task and assault force of the military formations will be exercised by the naval commanders."
The following joint agreement between Lieutenant General Omar Bradley and Rear Admiral Alan Kirk was drawn up even before Admiral Ramsay's directive was issued. It follows, dated February 10, 1944:
"Unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary once, command of the Navy and Army forces of the Western Task Force, after embarkation, will rest in the Naval Commander Western Task Force under the principle of unity of command until such time as the Commanding General, First United States Army, General Bradley, lands and assumes command."
There is no question about the mission of an amphibious assault operation. Except in the case of a mere raiding expedition, it is to establish the landing force firmly on shore. The mission of the landing force itself may be to seize a beachhead or an island; or it may be to capture and occupy an extensive land area. Particularly in the latter case, it is easy to prove that the landing force has the eventual "dominant interest" in the operation. And in every case, the joint commander must give every consideration to the tactical plan of the landing force commander, conforming in the greatest degree possible to his wishes regarding the point or points of landing, the landing hour, the composition of the various boat waves, their sequence and timing, the priority for destruction of enemy positions threatening the landing and advance, and the priority of landing cargo, which will in turn govern the loading plan for the transports and cargo ships.
But the "dominant interest" of one service must not be permitted to dictate the assignment of an officer from that service to command the joint effort, when the active, mobile, combat forces during the most critical phases of the operation come from another service. If that principle were followed in the operating room of a hospital, the patient, not the surgeon, would control an appendectomy.
During all preliminary phases such as minesweeping, reconnaissance and demolition of enemy underwater defenses, destruction by air and naval bombardment of beach defenses and other enemy installations threatening the landing and the subsequent troop advance, the movement of troops by sea to the objective, protection of the joint force en route and at the objective against air, submarine and naval surface attack, it is only natural that a naval officer should command, since naval forces, except as in some cases assisted by the Air Force, are the only forces in a mobile and combat status. The same condition persists during the ship-to-shore movement. During all these activities, the landing force is in the status of inert passengers and cargo.
When the first assault wave hits the beach, the landing force enters the action, in its own domain, and there begins to be an argument for the landing force commander, who does command his troops from his shipboard headquarters, to be free from naval command. But I am sure that anyone who has been through an amphibious operation in war will agree that this would be the most precarious moment possible for changing the chain of command. The landing craft are passing through surf and encountering natural and man-made obstacles, perhaps including shallow-water and beach mines which may only have been removed in part. Enemy mortar and artillery fire is probably giving trouble, these weapons having been accurately registered on the beach in advance. The attacking units are not yet sufficiently concentrated or coordinated. Communications are not yet established ashore. Heavy ground weapons are not yet in action. Most of the assault force—naval gunfire and air attack—is still necessarily under the (naval) joint assault task force commander. To break up the joint command under these conditions would be unthinkable.
Born of war experience, the accepted American procedure in all theaters by the end of World War II was the same as that quoted above for the Normandy invasion. It was first used by Rear Admiral Turner and Major General Vandegrift in landing the 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal. The command remained unified under the naval commander until the landing force commander landed and reported that he had assumed command ashore.
When multiple and especially separated landing beaches were assaulted, the same principle was sometimes applied to each of the subordinate joint forces. Each attack force or attack group commander (naval officer) remained in command of his combined naval and ground forces until the troop commander in that force or group was ashore and ready to take command independently of his opposite naval number. He then so reported and passed under the command of the next higher troop commander, who in turn was under naval command until ashore. Finally, the senior troop commander got ashore and took command of all troops, and all subordinate levels of joint command were eliminated. The highest troop commander himself then might pass directly under theater command or remain under the (naval) joint amphibious task force commander until the objective was secured.
The vital principle in unified command is that it is most necessary at the point of contact with the enemy. Strategic commanders have time to explore and discuss. So do combat commanders in the planning stage, when cooperation calls for mutual deference, and referral of some arguments to higher authority is feasible. In action, when a prompt decision may mean the difference between success and failure, and time may not permit referral to a common superior, one officer, not two, must have authority to decide.
It is axiomatic, of course, that application of the principle of unified command, with consequent disruption of organic command lines, must not extend further, or continue longer, than the essential requirements of joint tasks dictate. This principle requires that there shall be only one joint commander in each integrated assault area. Only in case of a joint advance force or widely separated attack forces should complete joint command be vested in anyone other than the joint amphibious task force commander. Even in cases where multiple, but adjacent, landing beaches are assaulted, requiring several attack forces in the task organization to facilitate landing, naval gunfire support and logistic support, it is generally preferable not to establish these attack forces as complete joint commands. The joint amphibious force commander's orders to the respective attack force commanders (naval flag officers) should be worded, "land and support the landing force" rather than "seize, occupy and defend." Keeping these naval commanders out of the command chain for troop command is particularly important in order to allow the general commanding all the amphibious troops to function properly. If he has to wait until the troop commander of each attack force moves his headquarters ashore before taking that troop commander under his command, he is placed in an anomalous and unenviable position: that of taking tactical command of the landing force at an unpredictable time in an unpredictable situation.
Of course there may be minor exceptions in which forces of less than the usual attack force or even attack group size are placed under a naval officer's joint command, for executing a raid, a reconnaissance, or a seizure of a small outlying island or peninsula simultaneously with the main amphibious assault. The troops in these actions would probably not pass under the command of the Commander Amphibious Troops at all. These minor independent operations therefore have no bearing upon the general principle for task organization of major forces.
Above all, no joint command should be established on a level where physical facilities are lacking to permit its proper exercise. For instance, a naval transport group commander should not be given any control over combat operations ashore, as he does not possess the staff or the flagship facilities to enable him even to keep in touch with these operations intelligently. His job is only to "load, carry and unload."
The assignment of individual naval officers to joint amphibious commands must be done with the utmost care and discretion. Not only must the officer so assigned be one of marked general professional attainments, with thorough specialized training (and preferably, combat experience) in amphibious operations; but his character and personality must be of exceptionally high order. He must be cooperative, understanding and tactful in the highest degree, yet capable of retaining his authority. The worst possible choice is the officer who is vain, contentious, unwilling to yield on any point, constantly conscious of his command position and authority. Such an officer has no place in joint operations, and the assignment of such a one would be a dereliction of duty by the senior making the assignment. While I know of no such assignment as this type in our Navy, it was necessary in the last war to detail naval officers with little or no amphibious experience to important command positions in the amphibious forces, because too few worthwhile officers in peace had become familiar with amphibious warfare. The Navy as a whole had not envisioned the important role, the complex nature, and the great scope which this type of warfare was destined to have in World War II. Neither had the Army. If it had not been for the constant urging of the Marine Corps, the amphibious art would hardly have been developed at all.
After World War II, a hopeless feeling regarding the continuing need for amphibious forces grew up in some quarters. The atomic bomb, it was argued, was going to render large scale amphibious operations, with their great concentrations of shipping off the landing beaches, and large masses of troops moving ashore in close formations of landing craft, entirely too vulnerable to be practicable in the future. Furthermore, airborne invasions were going to replace assaults from the sea. And so they may, for operations in which airbases exist close enough to the objective to permit air transport and air drop of the assault troops. Some day, atomic or other revolutionary forms of energy may replace the relatively inefficient and rapidly consumed chemical fuels used in aircraft today, so that heavy loads can be carried over great distances with reasonable economy. In the interim we may even see the early assault waves going in by air from transports maneuvering in open formations at sea, the heavier equipment and supporting troops following by amphibious craft. Such a procedure might sufficiently thin out the targets for atomic bombs as to make the risk acceptable, when combined with powerful air cover. If atomic weapons do force the assault force to attack in greater dispersal, whatever the exact nature of the transport may be, the need for a task force type of organization will be accentuated.
When airborne and amphibious assaults occur simultaneously, as parts of the same invasion, they will usually occur at points sufficiently separated to require only strategic coordination by the theater or invasion commander. If, however, they should take place in close proximity to each other, one assault force commander should command both forces. A case in point was Operation Portrex, the joint invasion exercise in and against the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, in March, 1950. Vieques was assumed to be a continental peninsula, and the initial assault operations, amphibious and airborne, theoretically launched an extensive land campaign. Actually, Vieques being a rather small island, it was necessary to drop the airborne troops only a short distance from the amphibious landing beaches. Under these circumstances, Lieutenant General Hodge, the joint invasion force commander, placed both operations under Rear Admiral Wright, the joint assault force commander, for coordination.
It was well that in spite of discouraging predictions, the slings and arrows of the Johnson economy drive, and the planning for just one type of war, the Naval Service has kept its amphibious forces alive. For their existence, and the continued training of able officers for joint amphibious command, have certainly been justified in the Korea campaign. There is no better locale for repeated amphibious operations than a peninsula. (I exclude islands, at least small ones, because there the issue is usually determined in short order.) General MacArthur took full advantage of this fact in the brilliant amphibious assault at Inchon, by which he outflanked the North Koreans and in this one attack struck the decisive blow in the original conflict. The flexibility and mobility conferred by command of the sea in a peninsular campaign were further illustrated by the equally efficient if less satisfying withdrawal of ground forces by the Navy from Hungnam.
In the Inchon assault, the same task force principle established in all theaters for World War II amphibious operations was followed in setting up the command organization. Vice Admiral Struble was appointed Commander Task Force 7 directly under General of the Army MacArthur. That joint task force included all naval air and surface forces, and both Army and Marine Corps troops. The troops were the Marine First Division, the Army's Seventh Infantry Division, the Corps Artillery and other elements of the Tenth Corps under Major General Almond. Under Admiral Struble, constituting one of his various subordinate echelons, was Task Force 90, the Attack Force, comprising the Navy's Amphibious Group One, Rear Admiral Doyle commanding, and the First Marine Division, Major General Oliver P. Smith commanding. Following the usual procedure, Admiral Doyle also commanded Task Force 90. When the Marines had landed and General Smith had set up his headquarters ashore and taken command there, he passed from Admiral Doyle's command and, with his division, came under that of Major General Almond. When the remainder of the Tenth Corps had also gone ashore, including General Almond himself, the latter and his corps left Struble's command and passed directly under the command of General MacArthur. Later, after the redeployment from Hungnam, the 10th Corps became part of the 8th Army under Lieutenant General Ridgway, but the 10th Corps was a separate force during the first push into Inchon, Seoul and North Korea.
The withdrawal of United Nations ground forces from Hungnam and their redeployment to Pohang and Pusan were exactly "an amphibious assault in reverse." Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Group One, was assigned as Commander Task Force 90. That force included only naval units when the operation commenced, and these units performed with high efficiency all the tasks which would be expected of them in such an operation: blockade, minesweeping, gunfire support, tactical air control, shore-to-ship movement control, embarkation and loading of troops and equipment in transports, and movement of transports at sea to debarkation ports. Naval and Marine air support was furnished by Commander Seventh Fleet as requested by CTF 90.
Admiral Doyle coordinated his duties in these redeployment operations with those of Major General Almond. When the latter disestablished his command headquarters ashore, Admiral Doyle assumed command of all forces in the embarkation area.
This disengagement by sea, usually looked upon as the most difficult of all war operations, even though air and naval opposition was absent, could only have been performed with such complete success by well-trained forces, with sound organization, and under highly capable and experienced commanders.
The favorite charge of our civilian critics is that generals and admirals are always busily preparing in peace for the last war instead of the next. We must refute this charge, not by words, but by action. New and better weapons, transport and communications are sure to come in the future as they always have come in the past; and we must be always ready to change organization, tactics, and procedures as they require. But we must be slow to change in peace those methods repeatedly found successful in war until such new factors enter the problem. Change is not necessarily progress.
I am as eager as anyone to see our armed forces develop and advance, but I am reluctant to see discarded, on the basis of theoretical argument alone, procedures born and perfected when bombs, big guns, and bullets were doing the talking.
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 1941-43, Admiral Blandy was Commander, Amphibious Group One in 1944-45 and took part in the Kwajalein, Saipan, Palau, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa campaigns. As Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Special Weapons, he planned and commanded the atom bomb tests at Bikini. In 1947-50 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and Atlantic Unified Command. Completing forty years of service in the Navy, Admiral Blandy retired in February, 1950.