As has been the case with every war in which it has participated, the United States entered the present struggle unprepared for the conflict. In so far as the preparedness of the Navy was concerned, Admiral King has stated that failure to institute a progressive building program resulted in such an unfavorable strategic position at the outbreak of the war that, even had the Navy not experienced the serious losses incident to the Pearl Harbor attack, sufficient strength would not have been available to effect the relief of our forces in the Philippines without running the risk of total disaster.
The history of the military policy of our country is an appalling record of failure to observe the most elementary precautions to protect the nation from attack. This glaring neglect to insure the country’s safety is absolutely reprehensible when it is taken into consideration that each succeeding war has forcibly demonstrated the danger of unpreparedness, and it has been only too evident in several instances that failure to take adequate precautions was a contributory factor to the United States being drawn into war.
Practically every war has brought in its wake plans designed to prevent a recurrence of the conditions which existed at its outbreak, only to have the recommendations either completely disregarded or modified into a caricature of the original plan.
In the past the United States has been peculiarly fortunate in emerging from its wars without incurring after-effects which seriously affected the nation’s ability to recuperate. However, modern war is becoming more and more complex in its processes and consequences, and as there is such a thing as a pitcher going to the well once too often, it is imperative that a definite procedure in military matters be adopted which will insure the future safety of our country.
In order to arrive at an understanding of the situation, it seems expedient to explore the fundamental reasons underlying our national antipathy toward a military policy all too plainly dictated by past experience.
It has been said that, as a nation, we are the most undisciplined people on earth. Under the guise of liberty, freedom is all too often translated into personal license. It is unnecessary to dwell on the scant regard for the law that is frequently displayed, and instances of self-interest prevailing at the expense of the common good are matters of public knowledge. Disdain of personal restraint, however necessary or well intended it may be, unfortunately is an inherent trait strongly ingrained in our national character, and to the average American anything that savors of military attributes is a potential means of suppressing his cherished liberty of person and action.
Whence stems this widespread American attitude toward any matter which by any stretch of the imagination can be construed to constitute an infringement of asserted personal rights?
The first settlers of this country were largely people who had sufficient spunk to leave the deplorable conditions which existed in Europe at that time. Many of them, ipso facto, were strong characters, and practically all were malcontents. These were the people who wove a pattern of thought which in a more or less similar form persists to this day. They overcame obstacles, both natural and human, and carved a livelihood for themselves and their descendents from a wilderness, becoming a sturdy and self-sufficient people averse to restraint. There were those who could so little brook the rudimentary controls established incident to the growth of communities, that they pushed on into the wilderness to lead lives which involved no restrictions.
In time the conflict arising from French territorial claims brought British troops to America, and later on the growing resentment of the colonists to conditions imposed on them by the Mother Country resulted in permanent garrisons of troops being stationed in American communities. The impact of the soldiery on public sentiment evoked repercussions which crystallized into an aversion to affairs military that has persisted throughout the history of our nation. In fact, military uniforms have been held in so little esteem that within recent years it was necessary to enact Federal legislation prohibiting discrimination against our soldiers and sailors in public places.
In accordance with the custom of that day there was enforced billeting of the troops, and this invasion of the privacy of homes none too commodious at best, together with the uncouth acts of the rough rank and file, aroused resentment which at times flared into violence. Nor were the officers any too diplomatic in their approach to the colonists. They too often were billeted, but in the homes of the better class, where their supercilious attitude toward conditions which differed from those to which they had been accustomed at home caused indignation among men who frequently wrere the leaders in their communities.
In purely military matters there was friction with the British which did not redound to the credit of the professional soldier. The colonists by trial and error had evolved methods of waging war which were suited to the terrain where hostilities could be expected to occur. The troops brought with them military formations and tactics which, while adapted to European battlefields, were entirely unsuited to conditions found in the New World, and British insistence on following their own methods against the advice of the leaders of the colonial levies brought about disastrous defeats such as the rout experienced by the expedition under General Braddock, and further lowered military prestige in American thought.
With this background established for the attitude of Americans toward military matters in general, it is interesting to develop how it has influenced the military policy of our country throughout its history.
The Policy As It Has Applied To The Army
The Revolutionary War was largely fought by raw militia that functioned under an ill- advised military system which, during the eight years of conflict, called some 395,000 men to the colors in recurring levies of short-term enlistments. The largest force of combatant troops under General Washington’s command at any one time was about 17,000. At Trenton he had less than 4,000.
In the over-all result it was unfortunate that at Bunker Hill the patriots attained any measure of success, as the militia fetish was afforded undue support through the initial defeat of the British which was attributable more to the ill-advised use of European battlefield tactics than to the military effectiveness of undisciplined militia secure behind breastworks until their ammunition ran out, and commanded by officers who had obtained their training during the French and Indian Wars.
Throughout the Revolution there was intense opposition to forming a regular army, and as a result no large number of Continentals was ever at the disposal of General Washington. What there were of these troops rendered an excellent account of themselves. Through the defection of supporting militia, who all too often broke and fled under fire or at the sight of oncoming bayonets, the Continentals narrowly missed attaining several victories which might have radically altered the course of the war.
Despite the lesson taught by the inability of nearly 400,000 militia to eject around 40,000 British troops from the Colonies, the Congress on June 2, 1784, went on record as follows:
And whereas, standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism; It is therefore resolved . . .
and the act then went on to direct the discharge of all United States troops except 25 privates to guard stores at Fort Pitt, and 55 for similar duty at West Point, together with a proportionable number of officers.
This legislation was contrary to the opinion expressed by General Washington, who had said:
Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous.
In a few years Congress, despite its fear of the regular soldier, found it necessary to create a small force for service against the Indians, but for many years this army was a political football, being augmented or reduced in number according to the fancied needs of the moment.
At the outbreak of the War of 1812 the strength of the Regular Army was 6,744. This war was a farce which vividly demonstrated the fallacy of relying on untrained militia. On land, aside from the Battle of New Orleans, the war was a succession of blunders and defeats that were aggravations of similar errors committed during the Revolution. Washington was invaded by the British, and the public buildings were put to the torch.
The recollection of this fiasco and other equally stinging defeats prevented a complete disbanding of the Regular Army when peace was sought by Great Britain because it had more urgent matters nearer home to absorb its energies, and a force not to exceed 10,000 was authorized. However, the fact that over 500,000 so-called American soldiers had been unable to cope with some 5,000 British regulars and 11,000 militia, soon faded from the public’s memory and the Army dwindled away to a few thousand men.
Indian troubles from 1835 to 1842 caused a temporary increase to 12,539, but at the outbreak of the Mexican War the strength had fallen to 5,300. Following this war there was an authorized strength of 10,320 which in subsequent years underwent a modest increase due to calls for protection against the Indians in the west.
At the outbreak of the Civil War the authorized strength of the Army was 18,093, but the actual strength was 16,367 of which all but 15 companies were stationed west of the Mississippi.
Bull Run was participated in (we can hardly say fought) by a Union Army consisting of 800 regulars, some of whom were marines, and about 28,000 raw levies. The presence of 10,000 regulars would have saved the day for the Union cause, and obviated years of bloody fratricide.
The entire history of the military policy of the United States during the Civil War is a dismal story of politically motivated reliance on the militia system that resulted in a war which should have been snuffed out in less than six months, being dragged out over a period of four years.
Despite the lesson taught by this exhausting war, its close found the deep-seated popular dislike of maintaining a military establishment still ascendant, and the strength of the Regular Army was set at 38,500. By 1878, neglect to provide for its needs had reduced the effective strength of the Army to less than 20,000, most of which led a rough life on the frontier.
The Spanish-American War in 1898 found an Army of some 28,000 officers and men scattered throughout the length and breadth of the country in politically supported small posts. In this opera bouffe war an amateur American Army, equipped with obsolete weapons, was pitted against an inefficient professional foe. We emerged victorious because our Navy secured control of the seas, and our Army had a nucleus of trained officers and men to leaven the volunteer forces called to the colors. This war, and the subsequent troubles in the Philippines, had the result of providing the Regular Army an authorized strength of 65,000.
About the turn of the century there came an awakened sense of national prestige which brought the first rent in the veil of public ignorance and inability to realize the truth about war and preparedness. The Army promptly took advantage of this opportunity and secured legislation designed to make the National Guard an efficient force, and prepared plans which, implemented by the Mexican border troubles and two years of war in Europe, brought about the 1916 National Defense Act. This law gave the Army a peacetime strength of 175,000, and provided for federalizing National Guard and volunteer units called to the colors, thereby at long last recanting the pernicious militia concept.
Voluntary military service had been an American fetish, and although it proved inadequate during the Civil War, and brought about the Act of 1863 which provided a modified form of conscription, compulsory service was not accepted until after we entered World War I. The enactment of the 1917 Selective Service Law met with intense opposition, and men of national reputation such as William Jennings Bryan went on record as being willing to intrust the defense of the country to the myth of “a million men springing to arms overnight.”
Wiser counsel prevailed, and for the first time in its history the United States was able to have a systematically organized and non- politically influenced army. This desideratum was made possible through the careful study and planning the Army had given the matter of handling such an emergency. Under the protection of our Allies, our military unpreparedness in both personnel and material was eventually translated into a magnificent military effort.
On November 11, 1918, the Army of the United States comprised 3,670,888 officers and men. Demobilization was effected as rapidly as possible, but many of these men carried with them into civil life a firsthand knowledge of the hardships and dangers incident to the national pre-war attitude in military matters. Their influence aroused the public to a temporary realization that unpreparedness was an evil fraught with cataclysmatic potentialities, and was responsible for the National Defense Act of 1920 which provided a peacetime Army of 280,000, a cadre for expansion in time of emergency, and adequate provisions for training the National Guard and Reservists.
Leaving the Army well taken care of for the time being, a correlative review will be made of the impact of our military policy’s effect on the Navy.
The Policy Ax It Has Applied to the Navy
The history of the United States Navy is a narrative of ups and downs, the latter at times coming dangerously close to reducing the forces afloat to the vanishing point. However, the Navy in general has fared somewhat better than the Army due to the realization that with its limited sphere of action ashore, it could never become a military menace to the civilian. Furthermore, the Navy’s exploits during the Barbary Wars caught the public’s fancy, and implemented the doctrine of a first line of defense to keep enemies from our shores.
The Continental Navy was a makeshift collection of ships, supplemented by State forces and privateers, which played no vital role in the war. The small and inefficient Continental Navy was pervaded with Congressional nepotism, and smoldering antagonism and bickering among the newly commissioned captains was rife. Such a sorry showing was made by the Navy that when peace came, the two ships which remained were promptly sold out of service. The same curious belief held against the Army was leveled at the Navy, and as a potential instrument for oppressing the people, it was legislated out of existence.
By 1794 Congress began to realize that American diplomacy was ineffective without power being available to enforce legitimate demands, and when a new outbreak of atrocities by one of the Barbary States shook the country, our initial naval program was launched. However, this legislation which provided 6 ships and 2,024 men, had a limitation attached that required construction to be halted should a peace be concluded with Algiers. Nevertheless, three of the six frigates, including the famous Constitution, were completed despite a peace obtained by bribing the Dey of Algiers and, subsequently, difficulties with France brought about the completion of the original program and other ships as well.
In 1798 the Navy Department was established as an independent activity, relieving the War Department of its responsibility for the Navy, but the latter soon became a political issue, and was saved from extinction only because President Jefferson had more antipathy for the Barbary pirates than for the Navy. Recurrent difficulties with the Barbary Powers had about the same effect on maintaining a navy that Indian troubles exerted on the Army’s existence, and when they were finally overcome, the Navy would have gone out of existence had not a crisis been anticipated in our relations with Great Britain. As it was, the Navy had an authorized personnel of 1,105 and only four ships in commission in 1807 when the Chesapeake-Leopard affair aroused the country to a fighting pitch.
Jefferson’s naval policy stemmed from the politico-economic principles of the back- country agrarians from whom his party derived its strength, and the passive defense measures he adopted blossomed into the coast defense idea which continued to have vigorous supporters until well after the beginning of the present century.
A change in administration brought a somewhat better attitude toward the Navy, but from this time on it led a checkered career, and 1812 found the Navy a victim of neglect and starved by mistaken economy.
The brilliant single ship actions of this war were in striking contrast to the sorry showing ashore, but by 1820 the post-war reaction had caused most of the larger ships to be laid up, accompanied by a sharp reduction in personnel. In 1822 the authorized strength was 4,000, about half of what it had been in 1815.
The Navy droned along until 1839 when a war scare was instrumental in providing a slight increase in personnel and the first appropriation for new construction in ten years, part of which was applied to building our first steam frigates.
During the Mexican War the Navy saw little action, and although the authorized personnel was increased to 10,000 men and 1,100 officers, it was promptly reduced at the end of the war to the pre-war figure of 7,500. Congress devoted its attention to navy yards and other considerations of interest to its constituencies, and allowed the strength and efficiency of the Navy to wane to such an extent that by 1853 it possessed no vessel capable of measuring blows with the modern ships under the flags of major European nations.
Between 1853 and 1861 a considerable naval building program was authorized, but Congress failed to provide needed personnel, and the outbreak of the Civil War found the Navy with 9,650 men and officers, and 30 per cent of its best ships laid up for want of crews. Ships in commission were so widely scattered throughout the world that a year elapsed before they could be assembled for service at home.
This war resulted in a tremendous increase in both ships and naval personnel, the latter attaining an 1865 peak of 6,759 officers and 51,082 men. During this conflict the Navy, because it was not so subject to political meddling as was the Army, was able to carry out its plan of operations in an orderly manner and gave a good account of itself, the close blockade of southern ports being largely responsible for the downfall of the Confederacy.
Although the Civil War Navy was chiefly composed of jerry-built and converted craft, it included at the end of the war the world’s most formidable fleet of regularly designed naval vessels, either in commission or under construction.
This Navy with its experience and advanced ideas born of actual conflict was allowed to deteriorate in material and personnel until it became a caricature of itself. The 700 ships of March 10, 1865, had by 1882 become a handful of obsolete vessels which were permitted to exist as a medium for maintaining the politically expedient navy yards where money was expended in rebuilding useless ships into others still more useless. In 1882 the Navy did not possess a seagoing ship which did not cause officers and crews humiliation when their wooden vessels carrying smoothbore muzzle-loading guns put into foreign ports. This state of affairs together with the ease with which employment ashore could be obtained, decreased the enlistment of citizens to such an extent that our ships were largely manned by motley crews of foreigners. Meanwhile the myth of “coast defense” grew into full stature.
Various excuses for the neglected condition of the Navy have been offered. In addition to its hereditary dislike for military matters, the country was war-weary and wanted to forget about war and its appurtenances. The great western migration was in full flower, and eyes were turned away from the sea to such an extent that United States shipping was disappearing, thereby removing the demand for naval protection which previously had been used as a strong argument in favor of a navy. The war had piled up a national debt of seemingly huge proportions resulting in a wave of economy in national expenditures. Meanwhile the country was undergoing an industrial development of marked proportions which taxed its financial resources. Despite these alibis, the fact remains that the lessons of the Civil War made no greater impression on public opinion than had those of previous wars.
The renaissance of the United States Navy began in 1883 when authorization was obtained for four comparatively small modern ships. The politics involved in this legislation and the subsequent award of contracts were not devoid of opprobrium, but our modern Navy began its long upward climb. And a long climb it was, as neglect had caused the art of shipbuilding to fall into an apathetic condition. Money had not been available to develop plans for new types of ships and machinery, or to keep pace with the improvement abroad in ordnance and armor. For some years it was necessary to purchase building plans in England, and to send our naval constructors abroad for their education.
By 1898 the authorized personnel had risen to 1,432 officers and 13,750 men, and there was a heterogeneous collection of battleships, cruisers, gunboats, and a sprinkling of small torpedo boats which was able to best the Spaniards at Santiago and Manila, and secure command of the seas. It should be noted that although the battleships of that day had been expressly authorized for coast defense purposes, the designers had produced ships which could keep the sea after a fashion.
The overseas expansion incident to the war with Spain made the American public conscious of its country’s place in world affairs, and the Navy, warmly supported by President Theodore Roosevelt, was allowed a limited program of construction mainly in battleships, from whose authorizations the coast defense restriction was at last deleted, but which left the Fleet unbalanced, due to the lack of cruisers and destroyers.
Japanese restlessness over “loss of face” incident to conditions imposed on that race in the United States resulted in the triumphant cruise around the world of 16 battleships in 1907-1908. Although unaccompanied by cruisers and destroyers, this display of strength quieted Japanese mutterings, and afforded proof that safety lay in preparedness.
The Navy continued an unbalanced growth, devoting the limited funds made available to the construction of battleships and a modest number of destroyers. In 1916 the personnel comprised 3,870 officers and 54,234 men.
The Navy counterpart of the Army’s 1916 National Defense Act was the 1916 Naval Act designed to create “a navy second to none,” which, however, contained a stipulation, inserted to pacify the disgruntled little navy advocates, which ultimately resulted in the disastrous Disarmament Conference of 1921-22. This Act provided for the most stupendous program of battleships and battle cruisers ever undertaken.
Shortly thereafter, our entrance into World War I found the British Navy well supplied with battleships, but lacking in merchant shipping, destroyers, and other anti-submarine craft. Consequently the shipbuilding facilities of our country were utilized to meet the deficiency in these types, and the construction of heavy ships was temporarily postponed.
It should be remarked that the then Administration’s bid for the pacifist and appeasement votes during its first term of office prevented the Navy from undertaking any measures which could be construed as overt preparations for war. No heed was given the Navy’s repeated pleas for additional personnel, the shortage being so acute that until the eve of the declaration of war in 1917, practically all ships were operating on 85 per cent of peacetime complement with no provision made to bring complements to war strength, or to provide crews for the numerous ships in reserve status.
The United States Navy’s part in World War I was not spectacular, as there was little contact with the enemy afloat aside from a few engagements with German submarines. It, however, did put convoys across safely, and filled in whatever chinks existed in the British Navy’s armor. Having fulfilled its mission with credit, the Navy emerged from the war anticipating a place in the sun when the projected giant dreadnoughts and battle cruisers joined the Fleet.
Conditions Subsequent to World War I
Having surveyed the military policy of the United States up to the end of World War I and remarked the conditions which then existed, it would seem that the lesson of unpreparedness had been learned so well that adequate precautions would have been taken to prevent a repetition of previous errors. However, this hope was not realized.
Taking advantage of the fact that republics proverbially have short memories, within two years after the peace was signed, the pacifists and idealists, who could not distinguish between preparations to prevent war and preparations for war, had begun a successful sabotage of preparedness measures.
The influence of well-organized groups of pacifists throughout the country guided by a salaried corps of expert lobbyists in Washington runs like a crimson thread through the conditions affecting military preparedness until well along in the 1930’s, and contributed in a large measure to the predicament in which the country found itself when the shadow of another war of colossal proportions arose.
Utilizing the great American failing of refusing to believe what it does not want to believe, and its susceptibility of being easily beguiled into following the easiest way, the pacifists overran the country with an insidious wave of disarmament propaganda. In addition to harping on the successful issue of the “War to end wars,” catchy slogans were coined to foster the country’s latent aversion to war. “I didn’t raise my boy to be a soldier” found favor in the thoughts of mothers, and a serious and partly successful effort was made to plant the seed of pacifism in the plastic minds of the youth of the country.
In furthering this effort, skillful use was made of school and college teachers who ranged from pink to red in their concepts. These people instilled pacifism in the impressionable minds of their students to such an extent that at one time a “refuse to fight” movement assumed considerable proportions among young men throughout the nation.
Preaching the fallacious doctrine that the possession of arms and the ability to use them are incentives to wage war, the pacifists strongly advocated the abolition of all ROTC units, and for a time succeeded in securing considerable congressional support in favor of such a move.
The opponents of preparedness professed to be convinced that the peace of the world could be maintained through the medium of treaties, those “pieces of paper” which have proved ineffective throughout the recorded history of the world. Nor were they willing to make any concessions when confronted with the sorry spectacle of Britain’s Prime Minister journeying to Munich to make obeisance to a former house painter because his country had neglected preparedness. Or by the subsequent knavish disregard of the agreement which had evoked the hallucination of “peace for our time.”
During the period of pacifist ascendancy, the Army was never allowed its authorized strength. In 1921, before the lessons of the war had been completely obliterated, the enlisted strength was 213,250. The following year this figure was severely cut, and the Army struggled along with 131,994 men. In 1923 another cut brought the strength to 118,282, and from then on until the late 1930’s the Army operated with an average strength of around 123,000.
In the meantime the commissioned strength of the Army was subjected to congressional sniping that was far from beneficial to morale.
A vague premonition that all was not well with the world started the Army on the upgrade in 1936, and permitted limited increases in strength which, however, did not reach 175,000 until after 1939.
In 1939, the mistaken belief that another war was an impossibility was rudely dispelled, and public opinion forced Congress to authorize personnel increases for both the Army and the Navy.
The following year when Germany seemed well on the way to dominate the continent of Europe, the specter of Nazi hegemony in South America and the consequent danger to the United States aroused the country to the long delayed realization that it must prepare to defend itself. An alarmed Congress thereupon enacted the country’s first peacetime compulsory service law known as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
The die-hard opponents of preparedness, however, succeeded in having incorporated restrictions which limited the training to one year, and the number under training at any one time to 900,000. Furthermore, these men could only be used in the Western Hemisphere and the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippines. The crafty opponents of the measure set up a nation-wide propaganda which very nearly succeeded in demobilizing the selective service army, the House of Representatives on August 12, 1941, voting 202 for and 203 against the measure. Within a week after this milestone was passed, Congress removed the limitation on inductions, but the geographical restriction on the use of inducted men remained in force until after a state of war had been declared.
Reactionary influence had so successfully blocked the production of essential war material that when the country at last awakened to the grim possibility of becoming involved in another world-wide war, the training of inducted men was impeded by a tragic lack of arms and equipment. We were treated to the ludicrous spectacle of stovepipe imitations masquerading as various types of artillery, and trucks placarded “tank” being substituted for the real article. At the same time, lack of all kinds of ammunition prevented inducted men being given proper instruction in firing their weapons.
Gradually these deficiencies were overcome and today we have an Army without a peer. But we have had them before, and spurned the advantages incident thereto.
Throughout the vears it was in the dol-drums, the Navy steered a course more or less parallel to that of the Army.
In 1921 the United States was maneuvered into the Washington Disarmament Conference from which it emerged the loser. Superb battleships and battle cruisers well along toward completion were scrapped in exchange for blueprint ships and obsolete vessels, and the wily Japanese predicated their agreement to the 5-5-3 ratio on our refraining from fortifying possessions west of the Hawaiian Group or in the Aleutians. This Treaty in effect was merely a repetition of past refusals of the American people to support a strong navy, and resulted in our losing the opportunity of having a force at our disposal that would have made every nation wary of interfering with the announced policies of the United States.
Not content with this success, the pacifist lobby working hand in glove with the isolationist and economy blocs was instrumental in so limiting appropriations for the Navy that scant provision was made for new construction, and the efficiency of the Fleet was seriously affected by the lack of funds for repairs, operation, and personnel.
The Act of July 1, 1918, gave the Navy an authorized strength of 137,485 men, but Congress, controlling the actual strength by the annual appropriations for pay and subsistence, so limited the number from 1922 to 1936 that it rarely exceeded 85,000 and several times dropped below 80,000.
The Washington Treaty did not adequately cover restrictions on the construction of cruisers and submarines, and while the supporters of disarmament in the United States naively believed that a forward step had been taken to this end, the other signatories, led by Japan, were soon engaged in a mad building scramble. Several subsequent disarmament conferences failed to produce satisfactory results, and although it was an undisputed fact that other nations were rapidly completing extensive building programs which would bring their navies up to allowed strength, the pacifists, et al., used the possibilities of further limitations being in the offing to prevent our Navy from doing likewise.
Aside from obtaining authorization for the construction of a few cruisers, submarines, and aircraft carriers, and then being provided with insufficient personnel to man them, the Navy drifted along until 1933, when President Roosevelt, in a forehanded effort to bolster a totally inadequate navy, allotted $237,000,000 of Public Works Administration funds for the construction of a limited program of naval vessels which Congress had authorized without providing the money needed to go ahead with the work. This diversion of funds was bitterly opposed by the pacifist and isolationist adherents, and in 1935 Congress was induced to prohibit further use of PWA money for military purposes unless specific authorizations were obtained.
In 1934 Congress was prevailed upon to authorize two battleships. From the advantage of hindsight we now realize that this decision had far-reaching consequences of grave import. Over a period of years there had been no money for the logical and orderly development of plans for new and improved types of ships. Coming as it did, the authorization permitted the development of plans which were responsible for the six magnificent battleships that came into service at a critical time, and which under other conditions might not yet be ready for use.
When Japan hoisted the danger signal by denouncing the Washington Treaty in 1936, and again when the Nazis began to show their hand, there was no pronounced reaction in public opinion, and the appeasers steered the nation into dangerous waters from which it did not begin to emerge until the latter part of 1942, and then only at a tremendous cost in lives and money. As late as September 1, 1941, one prominent isolationist in Congress went on record with the statement: “We need not fear armed invasion from any nation or combination of nations.”
In 1936 and again in 1939 Congress refused to appropriate $5,000,000 for improving conditions at defenseless Guam on the grounds that such an undertaking would affront Japan, whose war lords even then were occupied with designs on the United States. Doubtless these inane decisions afforded the Japanese additional reasons to believe us so soft that serious resistance would not be offered when it suited Japan’s convenience to launch its attack. These 5 million might have saved some of the billion and a half recently appropriated for bases in the Pacific.
It was not until the sinister shadow of another war of global proportions fell across the United States in 1940 that the pacifists and their ilk were shoved aside, and huge eleventh-hour appropriations were provided for a “two ocean” navy, the benefit from which is now being realized, and none too soon.
The past neglect of the public to assume its share of responsibility for the safety of our country made it necessary for the armed services to carry the torch throughout the years of indifference, and to be subjected to the humiliation of being taunted with “self- interest.” The country owes a debt of gratitude to the unselfish officers of the Army and Navy whose foresight and sound thinking during a long period of adversity persistently built up the morale and professional ability which has carried the United States from the chaotic aftermath of Pearl Harbor to victory on land and sea. It was they who, despite a lamentable lack of funds, succeeded in developing vitally needed projects such as fire-control installations, armament, tanks, radio, radar, high-pressure propulsion units, superheat, planes and aviation material, and above all, tactics and the methods of training personnel in their use.
Future Decision
Permanent peace is the desire of all thinking people, but history has demonstrated that this desideratum is not possible until mankind has undergone a fundamental change in its concept of human relations not only between man and man, but between nations.
Soon after November 11, 1918, Germany began preparing for another war, and other nations, including the United States, showed crass stupidity in giving German warmongers able assistance. Softies fell for German propaganda and implemented the plot which culminated in the Nazi assault on civilization. Hitler was not necessary. He merely happened to come on the scene at a propitious time. Had he not appeared, the Germans would have followed some other equally ruthless leader.
The Nazis are reported to be making plans for another war some 25 years hence; plans which will embody comprehensive and effective measures for preventing repetitions of the errors which are now leading them to defeat. Japan doubtless is also forecasting a future war. A properly imposed peace could destroy such possibilities, but a similar belief in 1918 proved to be a delusion because pacifist doctrines so weakened democratic countries that advocates of totalitarianism were afforded the opportunity to strike. History will repeat itself if pacifism is permitted to ride in the saddle, and we again commit ourselves to the folly of passively watching a designing and unscrupulous nation gird itself for the task of imposing its ideologies on the world through the medium of another horrendous, civilization shattering war.
Consequently we must face the distasteful fact that our national safety can only be preserved by being prepared to defend ourselves against any nation or combination of nations that becomes an actual or potential menace to our welfare. Furthermore, it must be understood that “defense” is not to be taken in the limited sense of keeping an enemy from our shores, but must be accepted in the wider application of being able to meet and defeat a foe in areas so far removed from our continental and insular possessions that these will never be subjected to the horrors attendant an enemy invasion.
Preparedness of this nature involves huge annual expenditure for military purposes. It means peacetime universal military training, a sizable standing army, a comparable navy in commission, an almost unlimited air force, and a subsidized merchant marine; adequate reserves of personnel called to the colors sufficiently often to maintain proficiency; tremendous reserves of war materials currently maintained abreast of new developments in the art of war, and adequate stock piles of critical supplies; maintaining selected war plants and shipyards in standby condition, and providing private business with frequent “educational” orders of war materials. In addition money and facilities must be made available for research and the development of the manifold technical items which play a part in modern war.
Admittedly such a prospect is not a pretty picture, but we have had what is perhaps our last warning and our last opportunity to prepare while shielded by allies. We have seen how Germany, with the advantage derived from being in an advanced state of preparedness, was almost able to impose its will on the entire world. We have ample proof that in all too many instances treaties are flouted when it serves the interest of a nation to adopt such measures. We have seen our country’s effort to lead the world into the ways of peace by setting an example in disarmament and by negotiating arbitration treaties with every power willing to enter into such pacts, result in its being drawn against its will into a worldwide war. We have seen the United States again enter a war, this time a struggle for national existence, unprepared, and the question is have we at long last learned our lesson, or will we lose the presently held perspective of war, taught by the expenditure of irreplaceable lives and countless millions of dollars, and again be lulled into a complacent disregard for our national safety by the siren representations of the ever ready pacifists and isolationists, and the anguished efforts of the penny pinchers to inaugurate another shortsighted cycle of economy in military matters?
In view of past experience it is patent that adequate preparedness cannot be maintained without the sustained interest of the public in military matters, and it is safe to assume that even now the pacifist lobby has its plans made to capitalize the inevitable war weariness following the coming of peace. Aided by militant minorities throughout the country, it will seize with consummate skill upon any pretext that will focus public opinion on an idealistic belief in the impossibility of another war, and will again advocate legislation which will result in military unpreparedness. “Peace now” movements are presently afoot sponsored by the same type of organizations which in the past have been responsible for our unpreparedness, doubtless abetted by new German propaganda.
Those who have the country’s safety at heart are confronted with a major problem in national psychology. It is their responsibility to insure that the lesson of unpreparedness is not forgotten. This requisite can only be attained by systematic education of the public along lines dictated by experts in this subject. There is ample ammunition with which to set up a complete curriculum of this nature.
To begin with, school histories should be thoroughly overhauled so the youth of the country will no longer be provided with a distorted picture of American prowess in past wars.
The great Middle West is the seat of non-militarism and isolationism, perhaps because of the preponderance of native American stock with an inherent aversion to military matters, and its inland location with relatively little contact with foreign relations and their import. It must be brought home to isolationists that 3,000 miles of water no longer afford this country any measure of protection, and that, if persisted in, lack of preparedness eventually will have fatal consequences.
The economic bloc by now should realize that, had a tithe of the billions of dollars this war will cost in direct and indirect expenditures been judiciously invested in preparedness measures during the 20 years prior to 1941, we would not be in this war, and possibly there would have been no war. Japan most certainly would not have struck had our naval strength been adequate to exercise control of the Pacific.
The condition in which our country found itself in 1941 and 1942 should shame everyone who had a hand in the pacifist machinations which brought the United States perilously close to chaos. Dyed-in-the-wool pacifists are not subject to reason, but those who hover on the fringe of pacifism should be made to understand the ineffectiveness of treaties, and the danger involved in our country being the exemplar in disarmament until human will, greed, and intolerance cease to be controlling influences in national ambitions.
Until that time comes, the United States, to insure its citizens a peace free from the menace of another idiotic war, had best resolve to follow President Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”