The lessons of the present war have taught many things. The most significant, beyond any doubt, has been the importance of air power. With air power Poland was conquered, Norway overrun, and France humbled. With air power Britain was saved. Without it Crete was lost, the Bismarck, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk and most of the efforts to stem the vast onslaughts of the Axis Powers have so far been in vain. With air power, true air power, the war will be won.
Air power is a new word in the vocabulary of many. Even strategists oftentimes fail to grasp its true significance. Sea power we are familiar with, thanks to Mahan. It means the domination of sea lanes, for the destruction or protection of commerce and lines of communication. Air power means that and more. It means the domination of sea, of air and of land. It means the destruction or protection of, not just commerce, but industry and agriculture and ways of life.
Air power, as it is presently being exercised in one part of the world or another, is not as yet what it can and will become. To date its development has been hampered by the lack of its essential corollary, air supply. To date, except for the one classic example of Crete, air power has depended on surface transportation for its supply. True air power, the air power of the future, will cast off the shackles of surface transportation, which slow it down and hold it back just as the slowest ship holds back the entire convoy, and supply itself on the wings of its own air carriers.
If air power is to function properly it must be served by air cargo carriers. It must transport its fuel, its ammunition, its spare parts, and its ground crews by air if it is to get them there on time and in sufficient quantities. An air power which depends on surface transportation, particularly over great distances, will ever be too little and too late. It must fly its supplies and its personnel and its ground facilities if it is effectively to destroy the enemies’ commerce and industry and agriculture and way of life, or effectively function for the protection of its own. Otherwise, the enemies’ air power, supported by air-borne supply, will render it impotent through severance of its surface lines of communication.
At the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, the air transport industry of this country was serviced by but approximately 360 air transport planes. These were principally Douglas DC-3s—the equipment which had been found best suited for our air transport needs. Our domestic seaplanes serving commercial transoceanic air transportation amounted to but roughly 38. The planes on order by the domestic air lines in 1939 were for the most part never delivered. They were diverted in the form of bombers to the French and British after the start of the European conflict in September of that year. Later, the demands of our own military and naval forces taxed the manufacturers to capacity. The cry was for pursuit ships and bombers, reconnaissance planes and trainers. Little if any emphasis was placed on air carriers, so that by the time we entered the war we were woefully lacking in that type of equipment.
In an effort to remedy the situation the air lines were called upon this last spring to give up approximately one-third of their equipment for military usage. The manufacturers were ordered to turn their production lines to air carriers. The stress that had been placed on production of long-range bombers was placed on air transport equipment. The lessons of Bataan, of Malay, of Java, and of Burma had been learned. Without air carriers, air fighters and air bombers and air reconnaissance planes could not do their job. Dependent on surface supply lines, they alone do not constitute true air power, no matter what their quality or number.
That air-borne supply is not merely feasible, as was shown at Crete, but is essential, is being demonstrated today. Our supply lines to Alaska, to North Africa, to England and to Australia are increasingly air-borne. With a large portion of their operations devoted to those supply lines, several of our domestic air lines maintain definite schedules for the Army. The delivery of critical supplies essential to our military installations in Alaska is not being held up awaiting construction of a railroad or of the Alaskan Highway. It is not being subjected to the delays and wartime hazards of sea-borne traffic. Arms, ammunition, equipment of all kinds, are flown in. Air carriers cannot carry as much as cargo vessels, but they can travel many times as fast. They can get there “fustest,” and, if in sufficient numbers, with the “mostest,” which has ever been the underlying essential of all military and naval tactics.
The maiden flight summer before last of the Douglas B-19 quickened the pulse of America with thoughts of giant aircraft. But after Pearl Harbor the B-19 came to be considered as a super flying-fortress rather than as a flying freight train. Aerodynamically, it comes far closer being the latter. Actually, it was and is an experiment.
By the same token Glenn Martin’s Mars comes closer to being a flying cargo vessel than a flying battleship. As a battleship, despite any fire power with which it may be equipped, it will still be vulnerable. At best it can but function as a troopship. Like the Zeppelin, it will ever be susceptible to the attack of smaller and faster fighter aircraft. Necessary curtailment of armor plate renders that inevitable.
But if, instead of being thought of as the prototypes of super flying-fortresses and flying battleships, the B-19 and the Mars are thought of as the prototypes of flying freight trains and flying cargo vessels, true air power will the sooner become a reality. Men and munitions, food and clothing, fuel and supplies, can be transported to Africa, to Alaska, to China, to Australia, to the Solomon Islands or anywhere, by the Mars.
It should be borne in mind, of course, that the airplane is not a magic carpet. Fuel is still essential to its operation. A good deal of recent layman thinking on the subject, prompted by the proposals of Mr. Kaiser and the statements of the press, loses sight of this fact. Taking as a basis the experience of the commercial air lines with the familiar Douglas DC-3, the extreme maximum take off gross weight of which is about 30,000 pounds and the extreme maximum landing gross weight of which is about 25,000 pounds, and assuming the ratio of fuel weight to cargo weight to be about the same for larger ships (which it would be, unless drastically different design is discovered, permitting flight with far less fuel consumption than is presently possible), the fuel weight for a 1000-mile hop would be about 60 per cent of the cargo load. Obviously, only the most essential war material can be carried on long hops under such conditions. Until low speed, low fuel-consuming air transports are developed, short hops with frequently interspersed refueling facilities are essential for movements of any magnitude. That points to seaplanes, which can be fueled at sea, for long-range transoceanic air supply.
The types of planes presently used by the Naval Air Transport Service include the following: JR2S-1 (JR2S-2 and JRK), which is a military transport version of the Sikorsky S-44; R4D-1 (Army C-47), which is a military version of the DC-3, with large cargo door and troop benches; B-314, which is a commercial Boeing 4-engine flying boat of the Atlantic Clipper type; JRM-1, the prototype of which is the Mars, which was constructed as an experimental bomber (XPB2M-1), with as much room in its hull as a 16-room house and capable of carrying 150 fully equipped troops; PB2Y-3, a long-range, 4-engine converted bomber with turrets and armor removed; R5D-1 (Army C54-A), with large door and stripped interior, the commercial version of which is the DC-4; R5C-1 (Army C-46), commercially known as the CW-20 or Commander, which illustrates a recent design tendency toward larger twin- engine aircraft using engines of higher horsepower; PBM-3, the Mariner, which is another combat airplane converted to a transport, and which, like the R5C-1 is a comparatively large craft for the twin- engine class, distinctive by reason of its gull-shaped wings which enable its 15-foot propellers to clear the water; and RB-1, a stainless steel twin-engine monoplane with tricycle landing gear, designed as a workhorse for hauling bulky cargo over short ranges and the underside of the tail of which opens downward to form a ramp into a cabin 25 feet long with an 8'X8' door.
The XPBB-1, originally known as the Boeing Sea Ranger, which was test flown at Seattle July 10, 1942, did not go into quantity production. Designed as a long- range patrol and bombing flying boat, it would have been susceptible to conversion for air transport purposes. However, its type was abandoned and the Navy contract for its quantity production cancelled. In referring to the XPBB-1 as thus having become the “Lone Ranger,” Mr. Phil Johnson, President of Boeing Aircraft Company, was quoted in the press as stating that the plant which had been constructed for its manufacture would be used for the production of land-based planes, since “there is nothing that a seaplane can do that a landplane cannot do better.” It is submitted that if such is now the fact, it was equally true when the XPBB-1 was designed and constructed. Land-based planes still need runways to land on, and for large, heavily loaded cargo planes, well- constructed, fully adequate runways are required. As yet, such are not available all over the world. And they take time to build. Nor, even where available, will weather conditions always permit landing thereon. Seaplanes can go where the seas go, can be refueled at sea and always have an alternative landing place wherever there is water. Tactically, air transport sea planes would be of tremendous advantage in support of engagements like that of the Solomon Islands.
In air combat, land-based planes have the advantage over sea-based planes. Their speed gives them that advantage. Hence, naval air carriers must function not only as an adjunct of the Navy air arm, but as an adjunct of the Army air arm as well. The Navy, through its air transport service, must function to supply the Army air forces, just as through its convoy service it functions to supply the Army ground forces.
To accomplish that kind of Navy air cargo service for the Army air forces the closest co-ordination is necessary. Lack of co-ordination between the Army and Navy air combat forces was largely responsible for Pearl Harbor. Its existence enabled the successes of the Coral Sea and Midway engagements.
Yet co-ordination of the air transport functions of one branch of the service with the air combat functions of another branch of the service is a difficult thing to achieve. The traditions, the methods of training, and the technique of both branches differ. Co-ordination could, of course, be achieved through placing the entire air forces of both services under one head. That was the solution advocated by the late General Mitchell. In time, the differences of tradition, methods of training, and technique would melt away and the air forces of both services would become one homogeneous whole. But war, if nothing else, is highly competitive. In war, one must learn to use what he has at hand, and not wait. War is always a race.
Besides, placing the air forces of both services under one head would not necessarily solve the problem of co-ordination with our allies. That problem may not be so important as regards air combat forces. But it is highly important and essential, as regards air supply. That problem of coordinated United Nations’ air supply can best be solved, it is submitted, by application of the lessons to be learned and the experiences to be gained through co-ordination of our own inter-service air supply.
To prosecute this war successfully, in the shortest possible time, the air transport systems of all the United Nations must be co-ordinated. To have the planes there, ready to go and keep going, our air transport systems and those of the British, the Russians, the Free French, and the systems of all our other allies, must be united. Otherwise, equipment, fueling facilities, spare parts and communications will be inadequate for emergency mass movements. Without co-ordination there is dearth or duplication of ground facilities, equipment, spare parts and personnel.
We have already built and are building airports all over the world—in Australia, in India, in North Africa, in Alaska, in Newfoundland, and elsewhere. We will have to build more. This is a war of aviation and only air power will win it. If those airports are properly and timely to be serviced and maintained, and timely and adequately staffed with pilots, bombardiers, ground crews, overhaul mechanics, props, engines, tools and spare parts, air supply is essential. Otherwise, it will always be the old story of too little and too late. Our enemies are fighting from interior lines of communication.
To conduct that air supply, on call, anywhere and at any time throughout this globular conflict we are engaged in, of necessity will call for united action by all the United Nations. Until one supreme, unified command is achieved and integrated down through the various branches of all the services of all the United Nations, including their surface tanker and air transport services, complete co-ordination is the only key to united action.
In practice, if not in theory, smooth functioning co-ordination requires leadership. It need not be titular but it must be persuasive. In air supply that leadership, it is submitted, can best be achieved by the United States Navy. That service is the only service which has the means by which to establish completely co-ordinated world-wide air transportation. This country is the only country whose manufacturing facilities can build forthwith a fleet of seaplanes, patterned after the Mars or the Sea Ranger, but capable of carrying some 160,000 pounds each. The Navy is the only agency of this country capable of properly operating such equipment and co-ordinating it with the surface ships under its command. Floating refueling stations are essential to long-range air supply.
The means of administration are likewise ready and at hand. The Navy and the Maritime Commission work smoothly and closely together and could readily achieve the establishment of refueling depots at sea. The air transport industry of this country has had some experience with problems of co-ordinated air transportation. The United Air Lines-Western Air Lines Interchange Agreement, entered in-to with the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1939, and in operation up to the equipment curtailments of last May, called for an interchange of equipment. Passengers bound for Los Angeles from New York on sleeper planes went as far as Salt Lake City via United and the rest of the way via Western, without ever arising from their beds. For them it was a continuous journey. Other examples of coordinated service involving engine overhaul, ticketing, communications, dispatching, passenger service and operations are numerous in the air transport industry. Coordination has been and can be achieved.
One of the only industries in this country ever to be designated by Congress as an adjunct of military preparedness is the air transport industry. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 expressly directed the Civil Aeronautics Board to so fix air-mail rates as to permit the development of air transportation “to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the postal service and the national defense.” The compensation which the civil air carriers received for carrying the mail was compensation not just for that carriage but for building up a system of air transportation which would serve the nation’s security as well.
Hence, the air transport industry was given an official status as the backlog of military and naval aviation. That backlog has been used extensively by the Army. Quite a number of leading air-line officials have been commissioned in the Army Air Transport Service and assigned to executive duties of high responsibility. Their knowledge and their judgment have been made available to the Army’s war effort. Nearly every air line in the country serves the Army, on a contract basis, in air supply, in plane modification work, in pilot and mechanics training or in ferrying. But the air lines have not been so extensively used by the Navy.
That air-line backlog is still there, however, on call and ready to discharge the duties imposed upon it by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. It can, it is submitted, discharge those duties best in its own field —air transportation. Its experience in co-ordination is available to the Navy.
As long ago as 1935 the Federal Aviation Commission recognized the advantages to be derived from the temporary attachment of aviation officers of the armed services to the air transport industry. Those same advantages would accrue through the duration attachment of the air transport industry to the air cargo branches of the armed services. While such a wholesale attachment is unnecessary, and would but dislocate the other essential war effort functions of civil aviation, it is submitted that air-line experiences and technique in achieving co-ordinated air travel can be made available to the Navy in the air supply field without any material dislocation of civil aviation. Air-line officials can be called on and assigned to co-ordinating duties, as has been done by the Army.
To accomplish co-ordinated air supply, the present organization of the Naval Air Transport Service might well be scrutinized in the light of commercial air transport experience. Though presently functioning proficiently within its limited jurisdiction, there is patent need for closer co-ordination with other agencies. That can best be achieved, it is submitted, through centralization. Instead of being severally responsible to the local commands, all Navy air transport activities should be placed under one head. That was the solution achieved by the Army. Only in that way can the essential, broader, inter-service and inter-nation co-ordination be fully accomplished.
If we arc to have victory we must have air power. But air power, true air power, requires air supply. That in turn calls for inter-service co-ordination of air carriers with air combat forces. It calls for air carrier co-ordination with other air carriers, civil, military, and foreign. That is a new field, the technique and devices of which are still to be learned. The experience and developments of the air transport industry on the edge of that field should be utilized if we are to beat the Nazis and the Japanese at their own game—air power. They are masters at organization and imitation, respectively—the essentials of co-ordination. So we must hurry. The Navy, it is submitted, should assemble a fleet of super air-carrier seaplanes, give the Naval Air Transport Service complete control and jurisdiction over them and all elements essential to their operation and call upon top-rank air-line officials for assistance in co-ordinating that fleet to effective air supply. For complete co-ordination is essential to world-wide air carriage, and true air power is dependent on effective, on-call, world-wide air supply.