Introduction.—The Navy of our country lately has come in for much discussion in the press. Some of the comments have been of a constructive nature; many have been destructive. It is a question whether the Navy has lost or won support throughout the country by the controversies. Some of the methods of attack made by supposed friends of the Navy are of a character to arouse public resentment against the methods used, and the Navy suffers consequently, although naval personnel is not itself implicated, and does not approve of abuse when argument is the proper course. On the other hand professional pacifists endeavor by every means at their disposal to break down the naval organization and disrupt the morale of our service through propaganda methods against which we are helpless to retaliate. The advocates of the big build now group in their zeal sometimes do us harm; the conscientious disarmament group, from their very honesty and character, have a following, even though the arguments they present will not stand the light of reason. Students of history, the practical business men of the day, statesmen, all know that it is impossible for a rich nation surrounded by the sea, having many of its vital arteries on the great oceans, to live its full life without an adequate sea police. The emotional enthusiast and those whose purpose is subversive to our country’s interests and to real peace, think otherwise and make common cause. On every count there is need for a clean-cut, definite naval policy; what are the fundamentals upon which it is based; how large ought our naval force to be; what shall it comprise; how should it be built, progressively or speedily; how should it be operated; is there an irreducible minimum beyond which it is not safe or sane to go; is limitation confounded with disarmament; what is parity; these are some of the questions which need settling. The bulk of the American people approve of their Navy; they believe in it and call upon it for duty at all times. It has answered this call from the north pole to the south pole and from east to west the world around. Tripoli, Messina, Smyrna, Yeddo Bay, Hawaii, Samoa, Managua, Tientsin, Peking, Vera Cruz, Manila, Santiago, Brest, Scapa Flow, and many other places have seen our men and ships, going and coming on some errand of duty or of mercy. In peace or in war the Navy has responded to the nation’s need, yet today in some quarters in spite of its past record and its future service it stands on trial. The public, if one may judge by the press comments, is interested in the answer to some of the questions propounded above, and the public is entitled to an honest answer to every straightforward query. It is the writer’s intention to touch upon some of these, hoping perhaps with a background of over forty-five years of naval experience, that by stating facts and analyzing conditions, rather than by expressing opinions, he may shed some light upon naval matters, the place of the Navy in the scheme of limitation of armaments and its position in the life of our country.
The pre-war atmosphere.—Previous to the Washington conference naval armament existed on a basis somewhat different from that upon which it rests today. It was largely a matter of go as you please, each nation for itself. Used as the strong right arm of diplomacy, naval armament, largely through its diplomatic relationship, partook of an aggressive character, and to be strong enough to enforce state policies, constant building was the outcome, resulting in a high degree of competition even when the financial and economic condition of a country did not warrant such expenditure. The inevitable outcome was a state of world tension, and the explosion, war, never was far distant. This was the atmosphere surrounding armaments previous to the late war. Hostilities once declared, all nations regarded armaments in much the same light and that nation which was best prepared usually went farthest.
It is partly the failure to recognize any difference between governing conditions previous to 1914 and the present, and the somewhat lax way of mixing war and peace conditions in the matter of preparation, as well as the very unstable condition of world affairs today, which cause much acrimonious discussion when the subject of limitation of armament is raised, which prevent the stabilization and standardization of armaments through agreement, and thus place barriers in the path of any constructive work tending to insure longer periods of peace.
Two present viewpoints.—There are at present two distinct points of view, looking at the matter broadly, in the relationships of armaments to the state. These are the French point of view and the American, the two progressive extremes. There are of course other viewpoints, varying widely from that held previous to 1914 in which might is right, to that of extreme disarmament, but these are eliminated from the discussion, for if the world is to progress steadily though slowly to a goal which contemplates longer periods of unbroken peace the extreme pre-war view must be eliminated, as must also the extreme pacifist attitude toward armaments. On the one hand the world is striving, even admitting all the difficulties facing it, to readjust itself from the old preconceived notions, and on the other hand the world state of mind in its general ignorance, selfishness, and suspicion is not ripe for the practices which the pacifist would force upon us.
The French viewpoint is the logical consequence of the pre-war atmosphere; it is the natural inheritance of a background of many wars; it demands security based on alliances, or agreements which in turn depend upon the use of force to ensure their being carried out. The American viewpoint, on the other hand, even if not so expressed in plain language, does not stress security but starts with the firm belief that peace should be always the normal state, and, if broken, a return to the normal must be had at the earliest opportunity. The American way in conference of thus accomplishing the purpose of peace has been by the direct method of agreement without relating our agreements always to considerations of security. Our attitude of mind has been much to this effect; that the moral force set loose in the world to work for ultimate good, through the consummation of fairly acceptable treaties limiting armaments, is as potent or even more potent than the technical details of the treaty. In principle this is acceptable, but the difficulty of putting ideals into effect through carefully worked out detail must never be forgotten. The Washington treaty and the Kellogg pact are both the logical outcome of our line of reasoning and endeavor, and the London treaty is the natural sequent of the Washington treaty. In considering naval policy, these two viewpoints, the French and the American, must be given their due weight, as they will affect the size of armaments and the uses to which they will be put; they will affect, in time of peace, the relationship of armaments to other state factors, and will have a distinct reaction on the questions of security and neutrality in time of war. The net result, however, of our attitude towards armaments is that we, of all countries, approach each conference probably with a more altruistic mind than do most other great nations, and in our preparations for war we will, in all likelihood, always be in a more unprepared condition than others who live on the edge of the volcano.
The first step towards parity and stabilization.—The Washington conference started us on the first definite road toward a stabilized, standardized navy, relative to the other great sea powers. Neglecting any discussion of the many good things accomplished by statecraft, the two great naval accomplishments were the limiting of the size of navies by arbitrary agreement and the acknowledgment of our right to parity in naval strength by England as a matter of agreement additional to the theoretical right vested in the sovereign state. The achievements of the Washington treaty were afterwards amplified and given greater weight by the accomplishments of the London treaty. America had set the example and started along a definite path, the ultimate outcome of which was hoped to be prolongation of the period of peace. In our own country, the limitations imposed by the Washington treaty were opposed by those who maintained that America having come of age and possessing the money and ability, should now take the naval lead along the same path other nations had trod before her. If sea power meant so much to the national life of a country as Mahan pictured it, let America now enjoy an era of superior sea power. Laying aside all camouflage, this is the kernel of the difference which causes the war to be waged between the advocates of an unlimited navy and those who have more moderate views. It is the same difference which exists between the two words superiority and parity if we can get a true picture of underlying motives. It is the age-old fight between conservatism and progress. Superiority is a pleasant dream to those who desire American sea power to rule supreme, as the sea strength of other nations has done before, but can this thought be brought to square with the principles and ideals upon which this country is founded? Is not the idea too aggressive? Does it meet with our needs? Does it serve to preserve accord as a more conciliatory attitude might? Will it strengthen or loosen the ties which should exist between peoples of similar origins, with similar laws, traditions, aims, and interests? Is not true parity the object for which we should seek, and in the long run should not this be the solution for America to find if she and those whose civilization have the same roots are to lead helpfully in the solution of many of the world’s problems? On the face of things limitation of armament and parity are only simple technical problems, but the real roots lie deeper.
What is parity?—One point which may not be thoroughly understood is what should be the place of parity in the scheme of limitation. Parity of naval tonnage is an easy thing to understand. It speaks for itself in figures, but true parity has a broader meaning, and as between two peoples who have accepted the principle does not parity carry with it an obligation to be just in all things—to be absolutely fair to that neighbor with whom we agree to maintain parity, and further is it not an obligation upon us to take our share in the solution of those problems which hitherto have been the lot of the greater sea power? It is important to understand these matters since the basis of most modern wars rests upon an economic structure. In the matter of ratios, there is no inherent value or given right, generally speaking, in any particular ratio. What may be appropriate or expedient during one term of years with any particular national group may not fit later, or be what might have been demanded formerly. Each independent nation has a right to build as it sees fit, but when it agrees voluntarily to limit the size of its military establishment, then it is practical common sense to limit it in accordance with the length of its pocket-book and the needs which confront it in the matter of essential national defense. When we view the size of our naval establishments from this angle and remove from the field the elements of mistrust and fear, it becomes a much easier matter to agree upon ratios which will satisfy through agreement than it was in the era of unlimited building to impose ratios of naval establishments by force or through the power of money.
Much could be said on the subject of naval parity. The parity which we must visualize in the future with Great Britain is a different thing from the equality in fleet strength to which Germany was aspiring before the last war. To begin with, the purpose is quite different. In the days before 1914 sea strength was used in three ways: (1) in defense of the realm; (2) as an adjunct and right arm of aggressive diplomacy, and (3) as a powerful war arm. The first is the most important reason of all, but in 1914 when Germany issued her challenge the first reason was subordinate to the other two. The Kellogg pact has attempted to rule out the second reason, that is, the aggressive use of sea strength, and with this decision the great sea powers in principle may be said to be in agreement. Before limitation of naval armament came into the picture equality in sea strength, or tonnage parity, was much like two fighting dogs watching each other through the fence, ready to spring at one another’s throats, but through limitation of naval armament under the guiding impulse of the Kellogg pact, parity becomes a different matter, and with the new conception of the uses of sea power under the limitation of armament scheme, England was willing to come to an agreement with us in the matter of equality in fleet strengths, especially as it was not worth while to fight for it under the old standards, nor had she the power to do so in face of our growing strength without too greatly depleting the resources of the empire. But above this, there was no desire on her part to fight with us over these matters. The outcome of parity working to a logical conclusion means that England must maintain a sea fleet second to none, and first as regards every power in the world except the United States whom she regards as being in a special category. The reasons why she must maintain the first sea fleet are self-evident; they are demanded first in defense of the shores of Great Britain and in the second place in the maintenance of free access to the sources of supply in the dominions and colonies. The fact that she possessed the first sea fleet in the world gave her the balance of power on the continent, and until we appeared in the picture, the balance of power in the world. At any moment England may be drawn into a continental war; we, in all probability, are not so likely to be drawn in until it gets out of hand and takes on the character of a world war. Hence parity to us means something different from what it means to England. To begin with it is as much a matter of sentiment as it was in 1776, but there is a far deeper meaning than this, and one which we must learn to know, because it is all so new. With parity in our hands we become practically the balance of power in any war threatening to become a world war, and as we decide, the war is apt to go. Not that we can stop war when once it has started, for the time taken for our preparation would preclude that, but we can limit its duration and extent, and we might even prevent its starting by throwing our influence one way or the other.
Parity has placed great responsibility upon the shoulders of our country. Do we shirk it or do we not? Regardless of what those may say who do not like to see the truth because it is sometimes extremely unpalatable, inevitably it will change our ideas about many things which we now regard as fixed and stable. For one thing it may change entirely our stand upon neutrality. In the face of a world war, can we afford to be responsible for the destruction of our form of civilization, if the matter comes to that pass, in order to say we preserved our neutrality? With parity in fleet strength we become a first-class world power, a position which, with all of its advantages, carries with it obligations which we must learn to think about in order that we may act intelligently and quickly when the time comes, and not be guided entirely by formulas which have lost their force. Make no mistake, if we wish to avoid war we can in all possibility do so with a sea fleet second to none. Without it we may be forced in against our wishes. The power of parity gives us the power of choice, but the power of choice places great responsibility upon us to choose wisely and correctly. It will demand of our leaders wise heads upon strong shoulders, but above all it will require men to guide us who will turn down immediate expediency, if such a course runs counter to the standard which right sets, for we will have passed out of the realm of the local into the arena of the world. If we face the truth frankly we may have to court war to avoid war. Of course we may refuse to accept our responsibilities, but is this a dignified course for a great world state to take? Can we change the course of our destiny? Parity in sea strength is going to give us much food for thought, for it confers upon us the power of choice in world matters.
Should our naval policy be moderate or extreme?—What then should be our naval policy? Whatsoever course we choose, whatever road we tread in the future, it should be as simple, direct, and undeviating as the path trod by the extreme militarist before the last war, but if we would be strong and at the same time helpful must we not avoid the extreme point of view? Does not our geographical position, and do not our ideals and aims point to us the moderate road as the one to use? It would seem as though nothing could be more appropriate now than to quote an extract from one of Mahan’s letters written in September, 1914. Perhaps from this quotation you may gain an inkling of ' what was in the heart of this great writer, the greatest who ever wrote upon sea power, its influence, and its effect. The quotation reads as follows:
I have no quarrel with any method that will minimize the occurrence of war, but I have quarrel with the charlatanism that ignores facts, and bases statements as confident as they are absurd, upon misrepresentation.... At present, and probably for several years—perhaps a generation—the suffering and social disturbance attending this war will disincline people to a renewal. But the grass will grow over the graves, the troubles be partly forgotten and new causes of offense will cause new wars until the spirits of men undergo a change. The human heart, acting upon sentiments and interests, is the cause of war; no methods can avail except as they deal with the inner man. I agree with you that a Council of Defense is an imminent necessity, corrective of the extremists on either side.
It would seem as though this sentence, written in the stress of a great war, perhaps gives us an inkling of what he would do, how he might feel, if he were faced with some of the problems which confront our Navy today. But even though we advocate moderation, world conditions as we face them now force us to accept that good old New England maxim, handed down to us from the time of the first settlers, who, God fearing men though they were, believed it best “to trust in God, but keep your powder dry.” The times have not changed so much that we can afford to forget this wise precaution.
Subsequent to the Washington conference.—Following the Washington conference, the General Board of the Navy set out to formulate a naval policy which would be adequate for our needs. This policy was approved December 1, 1922, by Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Denby. It was revised and approved by Mr. Wilbur, then Secretary of the Navy, October 6, 1928. A third revision took place and was approved by Secretary Adams June 1, 1931. In all three the statement is made:
Naval policy is the system of principles, and the general terms of their application, governing the development, organization, maintenance, training, and operation of a navy. It is based and is designed to support national policies and national interests. It comprehends the questions of number, size, type, and distribution of naval vessels and stations, the character and number of the personnel, and the character of peace and war operations.
This seems to be a clear, concise statement of naval policy in general, applicable to other navies as well as to our own. It is a brief summary of the case and to those who are ignorant of the reasons how and why navies exist, study of this statement is recommended. In all three the fundamental naval policy of the United States is laid down practically as follows: “The Navy should be maintained in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce and to guard the continental and over-seas possessions of the United States.” The statement of purpose in all three is exactly the same, a change only in the position of the words “of the United States” is noted in the last revision. This statement of fundamental policy is likewise clean-cut, concise, and definite, and gives the reason why our Navy exists, and what it is designed to do. We now come to the third important stage in the evolution of our naval policy. After stating this the remainder need not be discussed as it has little bearing on this article. The Naval Policy of 1922, and its revision of 1928, read practically as follows: “To create, maintain, and operate a navy second to none; and in conformity with the ratios for capital ships established by the Washington treaty limiting naval armament.” These are the exact words of the 1928 revision, but the spirit and purpose are taken from the original, and in no wise differ from the original except in the introduction of the word Washington to indicate what treaty was meant. By this time it was assumed that other treaties limiting armament besides the Washington treaty would in the course of time come into being. In the third draft of 1931 this same clause reads: “To create, maintain, and operate a navy second to none and in conformity with treaty provisions.” It will be noted that the London treaty had now been signed, ratios had been established in all types, and the obligation to build to treaty strength recognized, but no definite time was set in which to accomplish this purpose. The words “ create, maintain, and operate a navy second to none” conform to the spirit of complete parity, a result of the London treaty, exactly to the extent that the person reading those words believes in parity actually as a good thing, or accepts parity but desires superiority. It is a perfectly definite safe statement of naval policy, and viewed liberally can be made to envisage parity, which after all is a more conciliatory and less assertive way of expressing the same thing.
The size of our naval force and how built. —How large should our naval force be? The policy states that it should be in conformity with treaty agreements. How should it be built, progressively and evenly or speedily, and in consequence disjointedly? It should be noted that while our policy states “in conformity with treaty agreements” no time limit is set. The so-called big navy group assume that the time limit set for building to allowed tonnage limits is the date of the expiration of the treaty in question, without taking into account the fact that the Washington treaty preceded the London pact, and that other treaties probably will follow the London. A program based only on treaty dates is apt to be discouraging to those naval men who desire to see a standardized, stabilized navy, built year after year in such manner that the ultimate strength is attained without undue expense and humps in any one limited period, and is kept up year after year at the same rate. That the question of treaty dates must be subordinated to the greater naval needs, is the contention of the writer. As an example of building on a replacement or moderate plan based on treaty agreement: if we are allowed 150,000 tons of destroyers and the size of each ship is 1,500 tons, our allowance will be 100 ships with a life of sixteen years. This means the laying down of approximately seven destroyers each year. If we follow this plan then at the sixteenth year our Navy, in destroyers, will be built, and orderly replacement will be all that is required then. A deviation from this course could be made when the country faces an emergency, then our building should be speeded up, or if a financial depression confronts us, it could be slowed down. This would seem to be the sanest of all building programs for us to adopt, viz., a steady, orderly program stretching over a term of years and based on the laying down of new craft as the old reach the end of their lives of usefulness. In a program of this sort stretching over a term of years, the country, the Navy, and Congress know what to expect. Plans can be laid, contracts made, and an orderly employment schedule provided for, all of which should bring economy and efficiency. If the budget cannot bear the burden for any one year, that year may be advanced without a breakdown of the program. If other arms conferences change the tonnage allotments by treaty agreements, the program takes care of it. A definite program based on the replacement plan, set to treaty limits, is the sanest program which can be offered a country and in the end is the most purposeful and useful. To still the criticism of our friends who favor too speedy construction, it is only necessary to say that the General Board is quite in accord with this scheme of building. A moderate program, however, will in no wise detract from the efforts of those who would see us with no navy at all; theirs is the policy of no building. A scheme such as the even building process enables us to face the future, prepared for what other treaties may bring. On the one hand we are not overbuilt in any one type as we were following the late war and at the time of the Washington conference, when we were called upon to scrap many of our new battleships; and on the other we indicate to the world that we are embarked on a moderate noncompetitive scheme with a definite goal in sight, which we intend to achieve without vacillating. The writer lays no claim to be the first to suggest this method as it was spoken of by the late Senator Dwight Morrow at the London conference, and has the virtue of being applicable to all types of naval craft. It is distasteful to the naval man to contemplate reductions of any kind now. It is natural and right for him to feel this way, for while called upon in time of stress to assume great responsibilities in behalf of his country’s defense, in time of peace he has never felt that he had back of him the support of a definite naval policy pursued undeviatingly from year to year. With such a background to rely upon, his desires, opinions, and beliefs can all be brought into line with the progressive tendencies of the times, and instead of being looked upon as an obstructionist by more liberal men he can, because of his technical training, be a man of high constructive value to his government.
The types we should build.—What types should we build? So far as can be determined the present building policy of the Navy is sound, and the types in use now and under construction should be continued. From time to time adjustments and changes are made, as in the case of the flying on and off deck on the cruiser type, but in broad terms, there still appears to be need for battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The gravest danger which confronts us is the persistent drive on the part of pacifist groups and those who do not wish to spend the money, to discredit the battleship. The air group is not entirely free from this charge, but nothing that has happened yet leads the thinking men of the navy to say that so far as our country is concerned, the day of the battleship is over. Other nations may wish to give them up, but if the matter is analyzed it will be found the desire is based on economic pressure, not on the lack of usefulness of the type. For our purposes they are invaluable. Modifications and changes may find their way into this class of ships, but the class will remain as the heart of the naval force around which other types cluster. There is a sound reason for this aside from their necessity in the naval battle. The great engagement is spectacular and sometimes it brings the issue of war to an end, but the force which works silently and surely is the pressure of the economic blockade, which may be close in or more distantly located. This is the factor which for sea powers is most likely to determine the ultimate outcome of a war. When blockade lays its pressure upon the resources of another country in war, that grip is felt. The battleship, ponderous, silent and slow, but of great strength and endurance, is the heart of this force; no other type can replace it and do the work. If you wish to break the power of our fleet and reduce it so that it becomes almost impotent to do its work properly overseas, do away with the battleship type. It is a safe assertion to make that all persons not technical naval men, who state that the battleship is obsolete, do so with motives disassociated from naval efficiency in mind, or they do not know what they are talking about.
In order that people interested in navies and the proper types to build may know more about the subject than can be gleaned from casual conversations and opinions formed without a background of analysis and experience, some attempt at an evaluation of types will be made. At the beginning it must be said that these studies can lead only to very general conclusions. It is impossible to state how many of one type are the equivalent of another, for the different types serve different purposes and all have their uses. However, a few figures may be of interest. The building cost per ton per year of treaty life of the various types is as follows: battleships $55, aircraft carriers $80, 8-inch cruisers $81, 6-inch cruisers $85, destroyers $176, submarines $274. The ratios of the defensive life of the various types, that is, their ability to stand up and take blows and still keep on fighting, is figured as follows by the Naval War College: battleships 10, aircraft carriers 5.7, cruisers (8-inch and 6-inch) 2.5, destroyers 0.75, submarines 0.43.
The striking power in pounds per ton in general terms is figured at: battleships 58, aircraft carriers 18, cruisers 35, destroyers 47, submarines 10.
The cost per pound of striking power runs about: battleships $20, aircraft carriers $87, cruisers $48, destroyers $59, submarines $358.
The endurance, that is, radius of action, runs in the following ratios: battleships 10, aircraft carriers 7.5, cruisers 6.0, destroyers 3.0, submarines 5.5.
The maintenance and operation costs including personnel per ton per year are approximately: battleships $64, aircraft carriers $82, cruisers $102, destroyers $190, submarines $155.
The final relative merit of efficiency considering all of the above factors runs about as follows: battleships 100, aircraft carriers 56, cruisers 54, destroyers 37, submarines 24.
A few general lessons can be gleaned from these figures. In the first place they show up the fallacy of the statement that battleships are the most expensive type to maintain, and explode the theory that any other types can compare with them in combat value. When it is recognized that the battleship is the only type, on account of its ruggedness, to which nearly ten added years of life maybe given over and above its twenty-year treaty life, and that an equal amount of tonnage of other types would not only cost much more, but would not produce the same amount of fighting efficiency, it can be seen that the battleship gives more return per dollar spent than any other combatant ship. Also it is seen that for combat value the submarine is far and away the most expensive type to maintain and gives the least return for the money spent. The figures given above have been costs and combat values of the different types. Now there is another rôle that naval ships play in war, which is equally important with the combat rôle, though not as spectacular; it is the ability to lay a heavy hand on an enemy through the agency of blockade. The endurance of the battleship is 1.75 times as much as that of a cruiser and its defensive life is 4 times as much, hence cruisers cannot altogether replace battleships in the total force allotted to the blockade, unless also there are near-by bases for replenishment and there is an excess in cruiser tonnage to replace losses due to their low defensive qualities. As for the submarine, its merit value is so low that it is of little practical value unless it is used as it was in the last war, to lay mine fields surreptitiously and to strike without warning. From its very nature, to do its best work it must act as above indicated, and not in the defensive character for which great claim is laid. It must act as a stealthy, aggressive sea weapon, used against an enemy off his immediate shores, and all technical men know this to be true despite the plea that it is primarily a weapon for defense. The key to any further great advance in the problem of limitation of naval armament, without an undue sacrifice of essential naval power, lies in the abolition of the submarine and not in the abolition of the battleship. Aside from any naval point involved, the abolition of submarines automatically permits of some reduction in the smaller types such as destroyers, but the abolition of the battleship, on the contrary, would tend towards the lifting up of tonnage figures of the smaller types, particularly of the cruiser and aircraft carrier class—an expensive proposition in the end since ton for ton the smaller types cost much more than do the battleship to build and maintain, and the replacement periods are much shorter, especially those of aircraft and submarines which have comparatively very short lives.
How should the fleet he operated?—Granted that we had in the past (which we did not), or will in the future, adopt some definite building policy which will maintain our Navy up to the standard set by treaty, two very pertinent questions face us: one is, how much is this building program based on the gradual upbuilding or replacement plan going to cost us per year, and the other is, what will be the yearly operating expenses of this Navy? The two guides we have to go by now are the Washington and London treaties. To start to build up to London treaty strength on the basis of a ten-year building program will cost us approximately sixty-two millions of dollars a year. Before we had completed this program, however, the terms of the Washington treaty would be effective, and unless other limitation agreements were arrived at, the annual cost for new construction, or increase of the navy as it is called, under both treaties would be in the neighborhood of ninety-six million dollars a year. These are maximum figures probably, for with a steady building program carried on from year to year, the cost of building should be reduced, and under the most efficient operating system it is very likely that the present life of fighting craft could be raised. The fact that limitation of armament, as a scheme, has been introduced into the naval establishment is in itself an item tending to lengthen the life of the combatant craft. Therefore it is reasonably safe to say that under present treaties, with no further limitation agreements entered into, the figure ninety-six millions a year fairly well represents the maximum sum we will have to devote year by year to building and keeping up our naval establishment in ships. This may seem to be a huge figure, but it is not to be compared with the yearly sum spent under the unlimited competitive system. The next point to consider is how much will it cost us per year to maintain this treaty navy after it is built. There are several points to be discussed now. The naval establishment can be said to be composed of two parts, the sea establishment, consisting of ships and their personnel, and the shore establishment, comprising navy yards, naval bases, recruiting activities, reserve activities, training stations, etc., built and maintained to service the fleet. Limitation of armament strikes directly at the sea combatant group. The reduction of the naval shore establishment, being the result of administrative or legislative action, may or may not keep pace with the reduction of the fighting forces. As a matter of fact the shore establishments have not, generally speaking, suffered the same amount of limitation as has our fighting fleet, and it is in the direction of limiting expenditures on our shore establishment that the greatest economies should be made if efficiency is to be the result and the naval establishment is to continue on in its existence as a well-rounded whole. However, this is a difficult thing to accomplish. The fleet has many friends to be sure, but it is a friendship based on the recognition of the fact that in these days a fleet is still a necessity, and the feeling towards the fleet is somewhat abstract. On the other hand, the feeling towards every little shore establishment of the navy, be it ever so small and unimportant in a technical sense, is a personal matter to those people where the naval activity is located, and the wishes of their constituents are sometimes reflected in the attitude of our legislators when the question comes up of reducing this or that shore activity. This is all accepted as rather normal, and one of the conditions attendant upon our form of government, but it does help to keep the cost up, and when we speak of the costs of maintaining a fleet of treaty strength, it must in fairness be remembered that the total cost of maintenance does not go to the fleet and its personnel alone, but that there are many allied shore activities to help swell the burden, some of which are not entirely a necessity to the naval establishment.
With this preamble, let us consider how the fleet should be operated, granted it be built to treaty strength, and as has been said before, lacking a later standard, the Washington and London treaties are taken as the standards. Bear this in mind also, that as subsequent agreements are reached, they in turn become the standards. There are three ways of operating the treaty navy: (1) all the ships can be kept in commission, fully manned; (2) a part of the ships can be kept in commission, with a somewhat reduced complement, and the remainder put out of commission; (3) a part of the ships can be kept in full commission, the number being somewhat less than under the second method and the remainder can be maintained in a reserve with much reduced crews, rotating with the active ships. The first method is naturally the most efficient from the technical standpoint, but it is also the most expensive, and with a navy built to treaty strength, it would not be justifiable unless an emergency existed. The second method is less expensive than the first, but it has the disadvantage that ships out of commission are never kept up to date materially, and when wanted in a hurry they are not ready. The third method is less expensive than either the other two, and it has this added advantage that the ships operating with reduced complements are ready, almost instantly, and are in a material sense comparable with those in an active status. The cost then of running the entire naval establishment, based on a treaty navy built under plan 1, which is the full complement of 135,492 men, 13,063 officers, line, staff, and warrant, is $439,000,000. Under plan 2, which calls for an 85 per cent complement of enlisted force amounting to 92,559 men, 10,135 officers, the maintenance cost for the entire naval establishment per year is $359,000,000. Under plan 3, which calls for an enlisted force of 91,155 men and ships manned to 85 per cent capacity, 10,026 officers, the maintenance cost for the naval establishment is per year $357,000,000. Plan 3 is the normal operating plan for the Navy now, so to this last figure, $357,000,000, must be added the annual replacement cost of $96,000,000, making the total cash withdrawal for the naval establishment per year amount to about $453,000,000. This is approximately the maximum figure the government would be called upon to spend to build, maintain, and operate a treaty navy based on the Washington and London treaties, since operating on plan 1, the full commission, full complement plan, would only be required when a national emergency is declared. Working on a definite plan and not on the hand-to-mouth method of the past, probably economies could be effected which might reduce the total cash withdrawal from the treasury per year.
With the fleet on a sane, sensible, operating basis, with the replacements coming on year by year in a steady, orderly way, it is now possible to review the shore establishments which support the fleet in being, and curtail and expand along definite lines which promise increased efficiency at much lessened costs. Again it is possible to review from time to time our personnel situation and to standardize it, as it should be standardized, upon the operating fleet, otherwise without this guiding influence, and with no proper direction, determined by careful thought and plan, we work at random, and for fear of never having officers and men enough, we are apt to create an unnecessary overhead, which ultimately must reflect against the sums of money that can be appropriated for the running of the Navy.
Disarmament versus limitation of armament.—It is interesting, and sometimes alarming, to note the careless way in which people use the words disarmament and limitation of armaments as meaning one and the same thing. There is a wide difference between the two which is better appreciated by the paid propagandist than by the average citizen. Disarmament is one of those things which today belongs to the realm of Utopia; limitation of armament, on the contrary, is a practical, progressive way of handling the problem of armaments in the endeavor to eliminate the competitive and aggressive features and to reduce the financial burdens which huge armaments entail. Disarmament merely puts power into the hands of a lawless minority; limitation of armament is the working of the will of the majority through the orderly process of law.
Disarmament is the method of reduction by example carried to extreme lengths. It is the prohibition of armaments. The proponents of this form of arms reduction are the radical thinkers who believe that because an idea may be theoretically correct, the proper way is to put it into effect at once regardless of the practical difficulties in the road. It has been tried before in matters other than arms reduction and it has proved no more successful there as a practical measure than it will in the matter of military reductions conceived and executed without a basic plan which is fundamentally sound. The reason why in the past we have succeeded in our practice of limitation by example without great harm befalling us is (1) that geographically we have been favored by the gods, while we were building up our national state, and (2) that in our splendid isolation we had comparatively few world commitments. By that is meant more than the possession of territory beyond our own borders. The instant you pass as a nation beyond the state of isolation, disarmament by example resulting in a below-par navy becomes foolish, for it is not practical in a very practical world and gets you just as far in an emergency as words usually do if they are not capable of being backed up by something stronger than words. It may be sad to say so, and moral suasion ought to prevail ideally, but how far would you go if this idea were carried into city government? Not far. The elements not ideally minded would soon take charge. Limitation of armament is the method of reduction of military and naval forces through agreement. The treaties which are the outcome of the various conferences called are the specific legal terms of the agreements reached. They may be long or short term agreements, or they may be continuous unless denounced. They almost always provide for a future meeting where the situation can be rediscussed. By this method the problem is handled in an orderly, scientific manner; a plan can be evolved both for reduction of the armed forces and for the retention of those forces deemed necessary for the particular interests of the countries involved. It eliminates impulse, irrational thinking, and ineffectual methods; it permits the making of orderly plans for the building, organization, and operation of such armed forces as we are allowed to retain. It is a scheme eminently fitted to suit the needs of states which have interests and commitments beyond their own borders, but it does not suit the wishes of those elements who are opposed to the use of force in any form. It is too sane and orderly in its manifest workings. It takes too long to achieve the results desired by the impatient. We as a nation are so assured of the efficacy of example we forget that example, if good, is a wonderful moral force, but unless it be guided and properly directed the practical results may be anything but good. Armaments being a thing some people of this country resent, as they frequently do discipline, armament agreements are rarely lived up to by us in the hope that the force of our example will cause other peoples to do likewise, and thus force a lower standard than the one agreed to. It is the writer’s opinion that only one power can force other countries to adopt a standard lower than the one they think safe and sane, and this is not a moral force, it is the length of the purse. Gradually, little by little, as we understand each other better, and the causes for mistrust are swept aside, the periods of peace will be prolonged, and the standards of military strength will be lowered, but the process will be long. No such slogan as “disarmament now” can be effective except that it bring anarchy in its wake, and revolution and disorder, such as we see in China today. The friends of such a scheme are no real friends of our country or of peace. At best disarmament can be only a dream for the far, far future. As a working plan for the present it is bound to be a failure.
Too much loose talk, too much propaganda has been spread about to the effect that armaments breed wars. The roots of all wars, internal or external, lie in economic soil. How can it be expected that wars will not breed with high tariff walls, mediums of exchange immobile or out of proportion to one another, with prosperous nations on a high standard of living next door to or in touch with others on the bread line, or with all nations in poor health because their life blood in the shape of commodities cannot flow freely through the arteries of trade, with some peoples stifling for want of air to breathe, and others having plenty and to spare. It is the height of folly to expect otherwise. The best results which armament conferences have accomplished are the removal of competition, the allaying of much suspicion and fear of our neighbors, and the reduction of military expenses. Limitation of armament has helped in all of this because nations entering into agreements know where they stand. Disarmament would only reduce costs at first, it would not remove suspicion and fear, and the causes of war would not disappear until more beautiful flowers are grown in the world’s economic garden than are now blossoming. Remove these causes and armaments will automatically take care of themselves.
Is the Navy a paying concern?—Viewed from a purely business standpoint the Navy is not a paying concern in that it produces no direct interest returns on the capital invested. To the average mind, the naval establishment is regarded as all overhead, and frequently as unnecessary overhead, particularly in hard times. Moreover in an established government agency of considerable proportions, like the Navy, it is difficult to reduce the standing expenses during the times of financial depression when available money is scarce, the country at large is on short rations, and when budgets are extremely hard to balance. However the business of government can hardly be compared on the same basis with private business for individual profit, and the Navy is merely one of other government agencies. It is in the matter of indirect returns that the Navy shows a balance on the credit side of the ledger. If the total annual charge against the Navy is less than the minimum interest charge on the capital investment it takes to finance a war, and the Navy through the protection given, either keeps a country out of war or helps bring success if it is forced into war, then the yearly sum it takes to run a navy would seem to be a good investment in the matter of national insurance. A few figures taken from the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury may be of interest, as throwing some light on the subject of the yearly running expenses for the maintenance of the naval and military establishments versus the costs of being involved in a great war. By proclamation the President declared the end of the war with Germany to be July 2, 1921. The total net war cost to the United States figured to June 30, 1921, was $26,361, 096,001. The expenditures for the Navy for the fiscal year 1921 amounted to $647,870,645, while the expenditures for the War Department for the same period were $580,794,891, or a total for the two military services of $1,228,665,536 for the year. The yearly interest on our war debt then at a 4 per cent rate amounted to $1,054,443,840, and at that time the expenditures of the two military services for national defense exceeded the interest on the war debt by the sum of $174,221,696. In these charges against the War Department are included the non-military expenses such as rivers and harbors, etc. The total money cost of the World War to the United States to June 30, 1930, amounted to $37,873,908,499, which is an increase over the war debt as figured to June 30, 1921, of a total of $11,512,812,498, or at the yearly rate of increase of $1,279,201, 389. This increase is due in the main to two continuing cost factors, the interest on the war debt for the period amounting to $7,390,357,640, and the cost chargeable to the Veterans’ Bureau of $4,055,201,462. The average of the total interest on the war debt divided between the nine years from 1921 to 1930, amounts to $821,150,849 per year, while the average charge against the Veterans’ Bureau per year for the same period figures at $450,577,940. The interest on the total money cost of the World War to June 30, 1930, at a 4 per cent rate of interest amounts to $1,514, 956,339. The expenditure charge against the War Department for the fiscal year ending 1930 was $466,284,983, including non-military expenses. The charge against the Navy Department for the same period was $374,052,691, or a total against the two services charged with national defense, for the year, of $840,337,674. Some very interesting facts are developed from a study of these figures. Let us also remember that we are now taking account of stock in a war in which we were one of the victorious parties. The first startling thing which confronts us is the fact that modem war is an overwhelming and stupendous affair, even so far as expenses go, without taking into account loss of life and property and the disruption of normal and moral values. We see that war should be avoided if possible and that at best it is only a last resort. We find that as a result of the World War the costs of overhead to the government have been steadily climbing upward from 1921 to 1930, while the expenses of the two military services, the instruments of national defense, have gone down. We find that it is not armaments which cause the burdens we have to carry, but that it is War, which is quite a different story from the one the paid pacifist spreads to the effect that the world is staggering under its load of armaments. It is not true, it is the effects of war we are staggering under, and for us it is practical business to take steps to keep us out of war, except as we deliberately choose it. Compare the average yearly cost of the Veterans’ Bureau, $450,577,940, with the 1930 yearly cost of maintaining the Navy, $374,052,691, or even with that figure $453,000,000, which is the estimated yearly cost of our Navy built to Washington and London treaty strength and maintained and operated. Or compare the figure $821,150,849, which is the average yearly interest on the war debt between the years 1921 and 1930, with the figure $840,337,674, which is the total amount charged to the Army and Navy for 1930. If then you will subtract $123,697,790, chargeable to non-military activities such as rivers and harbors, Panama Canal, from this figure you get $716,639,884, which is the true figure of the combined combatant expenses to be compared with the yearly interest charges on the war debt. These figures tell their own story. Now let us look at the picture from the point of view of our not being one of the victors. If we had had no naval force we would have been forced into the war against our will earlier. It would have stood us small stead, at the day of reckoning to say we were forced in against our will. To our own war cost we would be asked to finance the victor’s expenses so far as it could be done. In order to be conservative let us say that Great Britain, France, and Italy would divide the load with us, which we know to be not so, as we would have had a larger share than one quarter to pay since Russia was out of the picture. As an assumption, our share will be put at one quarter of our own 1921 war debt. This amounts to $6,590,274,000 to be added to our own war debt. In addition to this we would be called upon to destroy or to turn over to the victor such part of our naval establishment as he saw fit. As of 1921 the cash value or property investment of the Navy was as follows: Ships fully equipped $1,469,574,578, shore stations $546,098,289, stores $1,067,135, 131, or a total of $3,082,807,998. By 1930 this total property value of the Navy had been reduced to $2,692,281,638, distributed as follows: ships $1,455,309,860, shore stations $606,999,716, supplies $629,972, 062, but in 1921 we would have been called upon for a sacrifice from our establishment as it stood then, of our ships and stores; a loss which would amount to $2,476,709, 709. This would bring our war indebtedness near to $35,428,709,710, before we had even begun to consider what the War Department, and the other government departments would be called upon to contribute. Suffice it to say the picture is bad enough as it is. It may be interesting to note in the two sets of figures presented of the values of the naval establishment in 1921 and 1930, how in the piping days of peace, the natural tendency seems to be for values in the shore establishments to creep up and values in the fighting sea forces to decline. This is natural but has to be guarded against. Of course the entire argument, based on costs, of the value of the Navy as insurance fails unless it be true that an adequate navy can keep us out of a foreign war if we so desire, and is practically the only power that can, if it so be that others are determined to bring us into a conflict. Whether this be true or not, or whether moral suasion is a sufficient protection against the unscrupulous will of determined law breakers, is a matter for each person to settle for himself, using the simple happenings of everyday life as a criterion, for after all nations are but individuals banded together under some form of directing government, and as individuals think and act, so are nations which comprise them very apt to follow suit.
How far is it safe to go in reduction—the irreducible minimum?—How far is it safe to go in the process of reduction? Here is where we run afoul of the differences existent between the French theory of limitation of armament and our own. The French demand security either in the shape of alliances or guarantees of assistance in case of threatened danger from an aggressor nation. These extra guarantees are, of course, based on the fact that the League of Nations and the Kellogg pact, without the backing of military sanctions, are moral forces only, useful up to a certain limit, but beyond that powerless to effect a remedy in the face of armed resistance. Though it be possible to invoke the power residing in economic sanctions, this in turn, even if expedient and agreed to by all the great producing and trading nations, may have to be supported ultimately by military force. The French have learned their lesson in the hard school of experience. They do not choose to carry their experiment in reduction beyond that which they consider safe, a limit which permits them to be secure even if forced to play almost a lone hand. Yet this is the rôle which America has elected to play, the lone hand. In a practical sense the French and American viewpoints do now meet on a common ground. The essential difference lies here. The French are not willing to discuss limitation of armaments, without guarantees of security, unless their needs in the matter of national defense are considered; we are willing not only to discuss, but to come to agreement limiting armaments, sometimes on the basis that the agreement itself is more important than the consideration of national needs upon which the agreement is supposed to be based. The first American proposal started on the thesis that the agreement was of paramount importance; the discussions during the Washington conference excluded the consideration of national needs as far as possible and the general conference trend with us is somewhat along these lines. While great achievements have been accomplished by this method, viz., the attainment of parity through agreement, a general relaxation in national tension caused by competition in armaments, and a great reduction in expenses, gradually as the whole problem unfolds itself we are more and more drawing instinctively to the French theory and to the idea that there is an irreducible minimum in military and naval force beyond which it is not safe for us to go, secure even as we are from foreign invasion of our soil. What that irreducible limit is, we have not determined in exact terms, but that such a limit exists seems evident. A general definition of an irreducible minimum might be: That relative force equal in size to the greatest other naval force composed of the necessary types sufficient in numbers to permit of essential fleet training during peace in the problems which would confront them in a national emergency, and to afford the adequate combatant nucleus around which all naval forces could rally in case of war. We cannot go on indefinitely with the idea that if other nations reduce we should follow suit always without a limit being set, nor can we set the pace in reduction by example any longer, for with our military force reduced to a minimum, naval strength is all that we have left, except moral suasion, to maintain our national prestige, dignity, and safety against an aggressor. England has served notice already that she has reached the limit of reduction by example. The reason why we must set a limit for ourselves is clear. Let us eliminate from the picture the thought of our initiating a war, or being drawn into one if we can help it, nevertheless that man is not sane who can say with assurance “war has ceased to be.” The actual facts deny this statement, and without the application of some sort of pressure beyond that of moral suasion, how can we prevent other nations from going to war with each other if they choose, and they have a habit of choosing quite frequently. A small war turns into a first-class war; and we are in the position of the great neutral. How much will this neutrality be respected if we have not the strength to defend our rights then? How much would it have been respected in the late war, had we been weak; how about the matter of Dutch neutrality when we seized their cargo-laden ships lying in the North River? No, nations which live on and by the sea, have a limit beyond which they cannot permit, with safety, their sea power to decline.
Has the effect of the Washington and London conferences been good?—Despite what reactionaries may say, the general effect of those two conferences has been good. It has had the effect of bringing Great Britain and the United States closer together, certainly in matters pertaining to naval armament, and if in that rather tender subject, why not in other ways? Limitation of armament has perhaps pointed the way whereby through ratios, mutual agreements, and compromises other delicate and important matters can be handled satisfactorily. The treaties entered into as a result of these conferences permit us to look forward to putting into effect some day definite plans for the increase, operation, and maintenance of our naval establishment on a standardized basis which will show itself in an increased efficiency of the naval service at reduced expense to the government. There is, however, danger that the good work done in these two conferences, by bringing the idea of sane limitation into the world, may be undone by impulsive zealots who are not satisfied with the slower, more orderly methods of wiser heads, and who may bring the whole method into disrepute by advising hasty and premature action. In this, as sometimes in other matters, the less haste the more speed, and in order to arrive at a practical measure of success, the time of conference meetings must be fitting and the temper of the participants conciliatory.
Other matters affecting our naval policy.—We have just considered a number of questions which affect our naval policy, on the assumption that our state policies will continue in the future along the same general lines as they have in the past, one of the principal being, so far as it affects the Navy, that we will continue to maintain our own independence of action in international affairs. The picture would not be complete, however, did we not attempt to glance at what might happen in case an international sea force were formed as part of the effective machinery of the League of Nations. Without expressing an opinion as to the advisability or inadvisability of participating in such a movement, the fact remains that an undertaking of this character would influence our naval policy, and its success would be affected directly as we were members of this organization or were independent of it. If independence of action of the various naval forces is preserved as at present, and future conferences follow the same general trend as have the Washington and London conferences, it is a fair assumption that the standard of sea strength set by them, viz., parity with the greatest other sea powers, is a safe and sane standard to maintain, and that a higher standard is unnecessary and not conducive to the best of mutual understandings, which is a matter of much importance between states of relatively equal sea strengths. Should we by any chance (which, of course, is entirely out of the question now with our present national attitude of mind) become one of an international sea force working jointly under such an organization as the League of Nations, then it is the writer’s opinion that the same sort of parity then which we have now would suffice and would be to the best interests of all. We could hardly escape gracefully with any less obligation, and still maintain the dignity and prestige of one of the world’s great nations. If, on the other hand, an international sea force were formed, and we were not part of it, it would behoove us to scan most carefully our naval policy and to determine what it should be and what steps it might be necessary to take in order that we have sufficient naval power to maintain our independence of action.
Up to the present we have been dealing with naval policy considered in connection with states or parts of the world whose civilization is on the same comparative level as our own, whose methods and aims are similar, and which may be considered as normally stable in an international sense. A different problem confronts us when we face the complexities arising from questions which cannot always be settled by normal peaceful procedure. As between the great stable powers, the sanctity of treaty agreements is held to rigidly, and only a convulsion should cause the breaking of such arrangements since preceding war there is always the method of the meeting of the minds of the powers concerned to change any arrangement thought unsatisfactory. There are, however, parts of the world still under the tutelage system, minor sections in an unstabilized state, great sections where there is no stability in government, and a large section where the aims and ideals of civilization are quite opposite to our own. These form regional areas, and the question immediately propounds itself: Can these regional areas be handled at all times by the methods which pertain to more stable states? No solution to these problems is suggested. What is apparent, however, is this, that upon our approach to these particular problems, whether independently or jointly, does depend in a manner our naval policy and the actual size of our naval establishment, for it is evident that where a condition of great instability in state affairs exists, and war may be in the making, moral suasion, however powerful it may be, is quite likely to be insufficient.
As the matter stands today, the writer wonders whether we cannot fairly sum up in general terms our naval policy to be:
The right to a navy on a parity with that of any other country, built progressively and evenly to such size as may be determined by treaty agreement, and maintained at strength adequate at all times for the defense of national possessions and rights and for the protection of American life and property wherever unstable conditions require such action on our part.
Afterthought.—Since the above article was started a number of interesting things have happened. First, two bills for building up the Navy have been discussed in Congress, one by Senator Hale in the Senate which is a general authorization scheme, and a more specific ten-year program formulated by Representative Vinson, based on the replacement idea. These bills are not antagonistic but complement each other and are in accord with the general scheme of building as discussed in this paper. These bills have the virtue of being made adjustable to suit the financial conditions of the times, and this flexibility adds to their strength. Second, the Disarmament Conference has met at Geneva. At the start it became evident that the two distinct viewpoints discussed above still exist. Whether the principle of definite limitation will be made applicable to military forces in the same manner as it has to naval forces, or whether a more flexible budgetary system would be better, is still unsettled. To what extent it would be wise to proceed farther along the road of naval limitation is still an undetermined matter. Third, the Shanghai incident following close after Manchuria has happened. All of these incidents show that the question of our naval policy is not an abstract proposition, but a very practical question for us to consider and take appropriate action upon. There is much food for thought in what is going on around us in the world, and, when they have the time to think about matters other than those connected with the present economic depression, many sensible people are probably wondering whither it is all leading.
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Every special calling in life requires peculiar qualifications. War being a province of danger —courage, above all things, is the first quality of a warrior.
War is the province of uncertainty—of chance—hence necessity for a penetrating mind.
Two qualities indispensable—intellect, resolution.
The whole inertia of the mass gradually rests its weight on the will of the commander. His spirit must always rise above to lead.
By the term strength of character, or simply character, is denoted tenacity of conviction. Discernment clear and deep.
A well-balanced mind is essential to strength of character.
Searching rather than inventive minds, comprehensive minds rather than those with a special bent, cool rather than fiery heads, are those to which we prefer to trust the safety of the fatherland in time of war.—Clausewitz.