Piscataqua’s Pirates
(See page 241, February, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. E. Gregerson, U. S. Navy.—It was General Joseph Warren who sent Paul Revere to Portsmouth for the purpose of instigating the attack on the fort. His credentials consisted of a short note addressed to the Head of the Committee on Public Safety, and vouchsafing that he (Revere) was the bearer.
This note is now on exhibition at the A. S. Rosenbach Co., of New York. It was found by the merest chance, about three years ago, in a heap of old paper consigned to a crushing mill. I was informed by the firm’s representative that this note was valued at $70,000 in the market.
It can readily be seen that the attack on the fort is held as a highly important event by keen students of American history and collectors of Americana.
Should Poison Gas Be Legalized?
(See page 1013 this issue.)
Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Alley, U. S. Army.—The article, “Should Poison Gas Be Legalized?” appears to be a criticism of the Chemical Warfare Service rather than a discussion of the subject indicated by the title.
A considerable portion of the article is taken up in showing that the use of chemicals in war is a violation of international law. Whether or not this is so, chemicals would be used by any nation, the existence of which was at stake if that nation believed that such use would be to its advantage through its ability to use larger quantities of chemicals or to use them more skillfully than its opponent. Chemicals were used in the World War and their use cannot be prevented by international agreements. History shows that no weapon can be banned if it is effective. That chemicals are effective, is shown by the fact that about one-third of the American casualties in the World War were caused by them.
The author of the article says that the ratio of recoveries to casualties is not a measure of the humanity of a weapon. Of 70,552 Americans hospitalized due to chemicals, 1,221 died, while of 153,537 hospitalized due to other weapons, 12,470 died. If the relation of recoveries to casualties were a measure of the humanity of a weapon, this would show chemicals to be very much more humane than other weapons. If this is not a true measure, what are the other considerations which enter? There appear to be only two: the amount of suffering caused and the effectiveness of the weapon. That is, its use would be justified provided the deaths and the suffering had a sufficient effect in shortening the war. Suffering caused by mustard gas is certainly severe, but is it any worse than being torn to pieces by shell fragments? Besides, the medical men of all countries, after thorough investigation, have come to the conclusion that chemical casualties which recover have practically no after effects, while many men wounded by shell fragments often lose a limb or an eye or are so badly cut up that they are crippled for life. Therefore, the case for chemicals seems to be very strong considering both the effectiveness and the amount of suffering caused, in addition to the ratio of recoveries to casualties.
Time Is Life
(See page 493, April, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant J. J.Hughes, U.S.Navy.—In “Time Is Life,” the need for prompt decision is discussed from the point of view of a commander in chief. Taking Lieutenant (J. G.) Eller’s admirable essay as a starting point, let us assume that we shall have commanding in war a bold, resolute admiral.
The weapon that admiral will wield will be the United States Fleet. Consequently we might find worth while a consideration of ways by which to expedite the various performances which make up the sum total of fleet effectiveness.
De Grasse’s individual vessels may have been equal to corresponding British ships, yet he lacked confidence in the fighting power of his fleet which perhaps contributed to his fatal irresolution. Dewey on the other hand believed his officers and men to be equal to any in the world; he knew he could count upon them.
John Paul Jones achieved victory with inadequate means, but he commanded only a single ship. A great leader can most easily inspire men with whom he is in personal contact. The sword which Nelson found ready to his hand had been forged for him by John Jervis. Owing to Frederick’s training, the fire power of the Prussian infantry was at least twice that of any of their adversaries. Alexander’s army—the best in the ancient world—had been created for him by his father, Philip of Macedon.
As Lieutenant Eller so ably points out, the race is indeed to the swift. The race, however, is not between two commanders in chief—it is between two fleets. The commander who acts swiftly must control a fleet capable of carrying out his wishes—Suffren’s genius was continually frustrated by the incompetence of his captains.
The thought that “time is life” might be passed all the way down the line and applied to all naval activities.
Promotion for Enlisted Men
(See page 15, January, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant G. C. Weldin, U. S. Navy.—This excellent and timely article goes very thoroughly into a subject which is deserving of the utmost consideration. Nothing else, save perhaps whether or not the ship is a “good feeding one,” means so much to the contentment of the crew. It must be admitted that present conditions are extremely unsatisfactory, particularly as regards the advancement of men to chief petty officer rating. An outstanding case of the great unfairness of the present method of selection of men for such advancement came to the writer’s attention this past year in connection with a man “going up” for bandmaster.
It is admitted that the rate involved makes this rather an extreme case, yet it does emphasize the weakest point of the present method, the great difference between standards of examining boards. Another unusual feature of the case under discussion is the fact that the man up for advancement was a drummer—and it is understood that as a general rule drummers do not go up for bandmaster! Be that as it may, the man was considered to be one with outstanding ability in leadership—as to musical ability, the division officer was forced to rely upon the recommendation (a very good one it was) of the ship’s bandmaster.
So in 1930 we had the man examined. The examining board, on another vessel, of course, was very skeptical about a drummer becoming a bandmaster but found this man so well qualified that they passed him as high man out of the four examined (out of which number two failed completely) and recommended him for advancement. He “made” the battle fleet list of those recommended—and failed of the Bureau of Navigation list, it is understood, by one man and several hundredths of a point. (In other words ten men were selected for the list and he would have been the eleventh, if more had been taken. Sad for him that such was not the case, for the ten selected were rated long before the year was out.)
Now we see where the present system is weakest. In 1931 this same man went before a board on a different vessel—and when the examinations were over he was not recommended—as a matter of fact the mark given him was below 2.5! Here we have a case of a man who “barely escaped being rated” by marks given by one board and then was hardly considered qualified to hold the rating next below that for which he was undergoing examination by another board.
As said before, the case of a musician is rather an extreme one. In fact it is considered rather remarkable that officers can be found who, in addition to their many other varied educational requirements, nave been able to acquire sufficient musical ability to be able to examine others as to their qualifications. No disparagement is meant to the members of either of the two boards. As a matter of fact the writer does not even know who the members of the second board were. He does know, however, that the junior member of the first board had a general reputation of being an excellent musician with a knowledge of harmony, arrangement, and the other subjects in which the bureau requires its prospective bandmasters to be examined.
Disregarding the abilities of the respective boards, one wonders as to the nature of the questions asked by each, and the standards each used in marking. Probably the boards were not at the extremes we hear tales of: A man goes before a board, is asked the important question “How do you feel today?” and receives a 4.0; another man before another board has several days of written examination, and receives 2.6 (or maybe 1.5)!
Conscientious officers with a sense of fairness to the men who appear before them have felt forced to “pad” the marks of a man who passed what they considered to be a just examination with what they judged to be a very good mark, say a 3.3, for they know that otherwise he will have no chance in competition with an “easy” board which has possibly given a much inferior man a 3.99.
Another source of dissatisfaction and discouragement is the continual taking of examinations until the man is at last fortunate enough to “make” the bureau’s list.
Another unfortunate case is that of the man who is well known to his officers, and is well thought of by them, a man sure of opportunity for rate on his present vessel, who suddenly, through no fault or effort of his own, is transferred to another command. He must again establish himself and find his chance for rating delayed six months or a year; or perhaps he is a “short-timer” and loses it altogether.
Still another bad feature of the present method of rating is that mentioned in the article on which this present discussion is based; the rapid advancement on some ships, where perhaps personnel shifts more rapidly making vacancies, as compared with the stagnation on another vessel manned by “plank owners.”
The solution of the matter appears to lie in the adoption of either of the constructive programs outlined by Lieutenant Kirkpatrick in his able article. Personally it is believed that the examinations, especially for chief petty officer ratings, should be conducted as are those for candidates for warrant officer, with the same set of questions used for all candidates; all men examined on the same date, say once each quarter; all papers marked by the same board; service, etc., counted in computing the final mark as is done at present; and the best man to be rated.
Finally one word of encouragement to our men who have been held in the same rate over a considerable period of time due to no fault or lack of ability or ambition on their part but to a shortage of vacancies. The United States entered the World War just fifteen years ago on the date this article is being written, one more year and the men with sixteen year’s service will be retiring. Rates should open up!
Up Came McGinty from the Bottom of the Sea!
(See page 67, January, 1932, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Frederick G. Clay, U. S Naval Reserve.—I was much interested in Commander E. S. R. Brandt’s article entitled “Down Went McGinty to the Bottom of the Sea.” Commander Brandt appears to feel that Art. XXII of the London treaty in effect authorizes unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships. It is true his article complains chiefly that the treaty permits specifically the sinking of merchant vessels refusing to stop on being summoned, a thing, he asserts, not heretofore permitted by the rules of international law. But by implication he contends that since merchant vessels are justified in assuming the appearance of a submarine as hostile and immediately fleeing therefrom, this has the effect of making all merchant ships “big game” for the submarines.
This does not appear to me to be the necessary result or fair interpretation of the effect of Art. XXII. As I understand international law it includes rules of conduct for naval and merchant vessels in times of war and peace, such rules being the expression of the accumulated sense of justice and right of the nations subscribing thereto, and depending for their efficacy upon the honor of such nations. It presupposes that the nations will obey the rules.
Now Commander Brandt’s article is based upon the presumption that submarines will not obey the rules. There is absolutely no more right under the treaty for a submarine to seize or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel which stops on being duly summoned, and does not actively resist visit or search, than existed before the treaty.
Commander Brandt maintains that the right to destroy an enemy merchant vessel or a neutral merchant vessel engaged in unneutral service under international law exists, under the following circumstances: (1) unseaworthiness of the captured vessel; (2) existence of an infectious disease; (3) lack of personnel to furnish a prize crew; (4) danger of recapture. But such destruction presupposes that regular visit and search has been made and passengers, crew, ship’s papers, and mails first placed in safety.
That prerequisite still obtains under the treaty, as to those vessels which stop and submit to search, for par. 1 of Art. XXII, provides:
In their action with respect to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
Now Commander Brandt admits that it is the duty of merchant ships to stop on being summoned by a submarine, as by any ship of war, for he says,
The merchant vessel should assume the submarine to be a war vessel and therefore legally entitled to summon her, which should therefore be anticipated. The ship should stop, lie to, and await summons and visit and search.
Therefore, if the merchant vessel obeys the rules and permits search, and the submarine obeys the rules, it will not destroy the merchant ship for it will have no way to provide for the safety of the passengers, crew, ship’s papers, and mails. But Commander Brandt’s argument is that the merchant vessel may presume that the submarine will not obey the rules, and, therefore, it, the merchant vessel, is justified in not obeying the rules and that the treaty is objectionable because it now gives the submarine the right to break the rules because the merchant ship has broken the rules! It is most confusing—a sort of endless chain affair, and it would appear that Commander Brandt has spent more time in setting up a man of straw which he proceeds to knock down than to a consideration of the practical aspects of the matter.
For if a nation is determined that its submarines shall sink all enemy or un-neutral merchant shipping, that fact will soon become known, and stay or fly, merchant ships will know that they are dealing with an enemy who pays no heed to rules of international law, and will not rely upon the paper protection of such rules. Nor will international law sanction and condone the destruction of merchant vessels in flight by a nation which does not respect their rights when they do not offer such resistance. The London treaty, by its natural implication, protects only those who live up to its obligations; the right to sink a merchant vessel in flight is only granted to those submarines who otherwise “conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.” (Art. XXII, par. 13.)
It may be true that, prior to the London treaty, an enemy or belligerent warship had only the right to bring to a fleeing vessel “by forcible means.” A submarine, however, is ill-adapted to merely “bringing to” a heavy, fast passenger vessel. Its “bringing to” will probably result in sending McGinty to the bottom of the sea, as Commander Brandt intimates. But to say that that is a reason for not attempting to bring to a fleeing merchant vessel is like saying a policemen should not fire his pistol at an escaping bank robber because the penalty for robbing is only ten years in the penitentiary! If the subject of inquiry doesn’t attempt to escape, the policeman doesn’t fire his pistol, nor the submarine its torpedo.
The London treaty, instead of being a step backward, would seem to be a common-sense recognition of the fact that the submarine is a weapon of war of peculiar status, and that it must be given such powers as may permit it to accomplish its mission without violating the dictates of humanity.