In the dim ages of the past warfare was the normal state of man. At first fighting was limited to the land. Then boats were invented and some predecessor of the wily Odysseus conceived the idea of fighting at sea. Probably such sea fighting commenced with the raids of individual ships with no higher object than plundering some defenseless village or trading ship. These trading craft were short, broad, clumsy, and slow. Their motive power was a single square sail. They were poorly adapted for war. The piratical Greeks designed a new type of ship for fighting. It was the galley—long, narrow, and swift. It was propelled with three banks of oars at a speed of some ten knots. At the bow was a heavy iron ram. Trading ships were helpless before this formidable foe.
The state whose ships and coasts were raided by such craft had to build similar ones in self-defense. These vessels did not limit their activities to defending their own coasts and merchant shipping. Attack, then as now, offered more opportunity for success than defense. So they retaliated by raiding the hostile coasts and shipping. It is probable that this trade warfare—as we would call it today—was carried on at first by individual ships. Then, as today, a large ship in individual combat could beat a small one. So a competition arose as to which could build the largest. First the thirty- oared ship was the king of the seas. Then the fifty-oared galley rendered all this type obsolete. Finally the three-banked galley, or trireme, became the standard type.
Then numbers became the measure of naval strength. Some brilliant leader conceived the idea of grouping a number of ships together for cruising and fighting. When this plan met with success, the enemy state formed a still greater number into a squadron. The first state then called in all its allies and combined their squadrons into a fleet. Naval warfare changed from a series of disconnected minor combats between individual ships into carefully planned campaigns and terrific battles between massed fleets on a scale unknown even today. Many more men fought at Salamis than at Jutland or Trafalgar.
Now in war there is always a temptation to win easy successes. A raid against defenseless shipping is less dangerous to officers and crews than a fight against warships. So when the opposing fleets were still quite distant and battle did not appear imminent, it often seemed good policy to detach a squadron to raid the enemy’s coasts and shipping. This plan was particularly attractive when a commander had superior numbers. In addition to giving an opportunity for some cheaply bought material successes, such operations often had a real advantage. It was probable that such a threat would induce the enemy to detach an even greater squadron for defensive purposes. It was for such an object that Xerxes was advised to detach a large squadron for a demonstration against Sparta. However, when such a detachment is made from our fleet, there is always a very strong possiblity that the enemy will let it win its easy victories and advance with his full strength upon our depleted fleet. If he wins a decisive battle over our fleet, he can then turn upon our detachment and its previous victories will count for little. It was for this reason that Xerxes did not accept the suggestion of his adviser, but kept his fleet concentrated for battle. Then, as now, battle was the deciding event of naval warfare. Raiding attacks were of real value only as they induced the enemy to weaken his fleet and increased our chances of winning the decisive battle.
As trading developed people became increasingly dependent for food, clothing, and other necessities on imports from foreign shores. To buy they had to sell; so the marketing of their own products was equally essential. Insular countries or those ill-favored in land transportation were driven more and more to the open highways of the sea.
These conditions gave birth to “sea power,” which is nothing more or less than ability to control the lanes of ocean traffic to one’s own advantage. The use of sea power was as natural and inevitable as trade itself, but not until the coming of Mahan was the vital part it had played in the history of civilization fully realized.
In a war against a people vitally dependent on imports for daily existence sea power alone may be decisive. Indeed under modern conditions of universal trade, the successful prosecution of a major war without adequate sea power would be well nigh hopeless. Man is a land animal. He does not live in the water nor in the air. So in any war that means a fight for existence we can expect to compel victory only by occupying the land that is essential to the enemy’s maintenance. Normally this can be done only by soldiers—infantrymen. Blockade by ships might arrive at the same result by starvation, but as a rule we must fight and occupy the disputed land. Broadly speaking, all weapons—artillery, tanks, chemicals, aviation, battleships, cruisers, submarines, and the rest of it—are but auxiliaries helping the doughboy to occupy that piece of land vital to the enemy.
In war the ultimate mission of the Navy is to exercise the sea power, to control if necessary a world-wide service of supply. The object of a naval battle is to destroy the enemy navy so that we may be free to exercise that control.
While it is always essential to destroy or contain the enemy fleet, it must not be forgotten that we fight only in order to exercise that ultimate function of the Navy, which is to control the sea so that we may transport our men, our own supplies, and our own trade, and at the same time deny this use to the enemy.
To win a naval battle we must perform two tasks: first, find the hostile fleet; and then beat it. To locate a hostile fleet and keep our commander constantly informed of its position, course, and speed is a task of great difficulty and importance. We have organized the Scouting Fleet to perform it. This fleet also endeavors to prevent the enemy from gaining essential information of our dispositions. Its cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft harass the enemy constantly during the approach to battle to reduce his strength and exhaust his personnel. Once the enemy’s battle fleet is brought to bay, the divisions and squadrons of the Scouting Fleet unite with the Battle Fleet to assist it in decisively beating the enemy. After the battle it leads the pursuit, in case of success, or covers the retreat of the Battle Fleet, in case of defeat. Practically all our combatant ships are assigned to the Battle and Scouting Fleets. This is conclusive testimony to the importance we place on battle in naval warfare.
When one fleet has decisively beaten the enemy or when the enemy fleet is so weak that it cannot fight with any hope of success, trade warfare begins and the shipping of the weaker nation is swept from the sea. Its navy, unable to contend in battle with our stronger fleet, endeavors to attack our trade. We try to defend it by a blockade of enemy ports, the escort of convoys, and patrolling cruisers. The operations of the Civil War are an excellent illustration of this situation. The last two years of the World War saw the Germans giving priority to their submarine war against merchant vessels. But despite the tremendous menace of this attack the British continued to give priority to their Grand Fleet and kept it in constant readiness to locate and destroy the High Sea Fleet whenever it should put to sea.
Other operations in the exercise of control of the sea are the capture and defense of naval bases, the escort of expeditionary forces, and the covering of their landing on hostile coasts. Our Control Force is organized to perform these various secondary naval missions. This force “exercises” the control of the sea, after such control has been “secured” by the combined operations of the Battle and Scouting Fleets. During peace time it contains only a few vessels, but it would be largely augmented after war begins.
To provide a moving base for the fleet, with complete repair and supply facilities, we have the Fleet Base Force. This is composed mostly of auxiliary vessels, with a few small combatant ships for local defense. These two fleets and two forces compose the United States Fleet. In war this fleet would be accompanied by a Marine Expeditionary Force to seize and hold temporary fleet bases.
The United States Fleet is composed of various types of combatant and auxiliary vessels. Each has been developed to perform one definite mission, though it may be used for others with reduced effectiveness. To be most effective in war a fleet must be composed of all necessary types in their proper proportions. It is then said to be balanced. A balanced fleet gives a nation the maximum value in naval security for the money appropriated.
The great 30,000-ton, 21-knot, heavily gunned, strongly protected battleship is still the backbone of the fleet. With the aid of observation planes catapulted from its decks it brings tremendous fire power upon an enemy distant 30,000 yards. It has three lines of defense against projectiles, torpedoes, mines, and aircraft bombs. Lines of cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft provide a screen through which attacking craft must fight their way. Powerful batteries of medium caliber guns mounted on the battleships themselves fire directly on approaching destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. Heavy layers of armor and division of the under-water hull into small watertight compartments provide a third and final means of defense. While the battleship cannot claim to be unsinkable, it is very much better protected than any other naval type and can withstand very heavy punishment from all weapons of attack.
Because battleships fought so seldom in the World War an impression grew that they were useless. This fact actually has an entirely different interpretation. It was because of the immense value of the battleships and the fact that if lost they could not be replaced for three years that naval commanders were so reluctant to throw them into a battle. The loss of six or eight British battleships would have created a tremendous impression in allied countries and throughout the world. The destruction of that number of German ships would have meant the loss of the naval campaign and probably the war. When we remember that an hour’s fighting might have had such results, it is easy to understand why a commander did not lightly throw his battleship column into battle. While it is true that the Grand Fleet was handled in a very cautious manner during the first half of the war, it was always ready to fight whenever the security of British sea communications was menaced. While a more aggressive policy might have won a quicker decision, it must be remembered that the battleships of the Grand Fleet always “secured” the control of the sea for the British. The gold reserve of the United States is seldom used, but just the knowledge that it is available for use secures our national credit. Just so do our battleships constitute a reserve which is ready always to secure our national defense on the seas.
On occasion battleships may be used for missions other than battle. They may be advanced as a supporting force for the Scouting Fleet, as was the Fifth Battle Squadron at Jutland. Having no battle cruisers, we probably would have to use a division of them for this important mission. They may also be used temporarily to assist the Control Force in its tasks. Thus the British battleship Queen Elizabeth was used to bombard shore fortifications at the Dardanelles and the German battleships were used for a similar purpose in the attack on Oesel Island in the Gulf of Riga. They may be used as escorts for convoys—as was done by divisions of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. Generally battleships are used for such secondary duties only when they will be able to rejoin the fleet in time for a battle or when our fleet is so superior as not to require their services in battle.
To perform some of these secondary duties of the battleship and to supplement the battleship in action Sir John Fisher effected a combination of the battleship and cruiser types—the battle cruiser. This was virtually a fast battleship, armor and armament being reduced somewhat to give the excess speed. This was made about thirty knots. The guns were of the same size as those carried by battleships, but usually two less in number. The armor was several inches thinner.
The battle cruiser has two main functions. The first is to provide a backbone for the Scouting Fleet. The second is to form a “fast wing” ahead of the battleship column in a fleet action. From this favorable position their concentrated gunfire and superior speed allow them to force back the head of the hostile battle line. They can also drive the enemy cruisers out of the area ahead of the fleets. That in turn lets our cruisers
drive out the enemy destroyers, so that our squadrons may launch their torpedo attacks against the enemy battleships. Thus battle cruisers are essential for both scouting and battle. The British made a serious mistake in the design of their battle cruisers. They sacrificed armor too much for speed and armament. The loss of three of their ships at Jutland was the result. The Germans did not fall into the same error. They retained sufficient armor. Their ships gave a remarkably fine account of themselves in the battle and demonstrated conclusively the value of this type.
Battle cruisers often are used temporarily for control force missions. The British sent two to the Falkland Islands to destroy von Spee’s cruiser squadron and then one to the Dardanelles to bombard the Turkish batteries and watch the Goeben. The Germans used the Goeben to attack Black Sea ports and to make sorties against the British forces blockading the Dardanelles. In the Washington conference, battleships and battle cruisers were combined into the general category of “capital ships.”
After the capital ship the cruiser is the most important naval type. As the battleship developed from the old “ship of the line,” so has the cruiser evolved from the fast frigate of a century ago. Recent cruisers displace from 7,000 to 10,000 tons, with a decided preference for the latter figure, the limit imposed by the Washington conference. Guns vary between eight and six inches, with a preference for the former. The armor is thin. Speed is about thirty- two knots.
The importance of the cruiser comes from the fact that it is an all-around ship. It is essential for all three of the main forms of naval warfare—battle, scouting, and control force missions. In battle, cruisers are too weakly protected to engage the hostile capital ships, except that occasionally in poor visibility they may fire torpedoes with effect. They take station in advance of the battle line and fast wing. Under cover of their gunfire the cruiser divisions drive back the hostile cruisers and destroyers. Thus they envelop the hostile battle line and permit our destroyer squadrons to fire their torpedoes from this favorable flanking position. Fleet actions are fought at such long ranges and are so obscured by smoke that it is impossible for a commander in chief to see with his own eyes what the enemy, and even his own, forces are doing. A remarkable instance of this occurred in the Battle of Jutland. The published diagrams of both commanders in chief—issued several years later—demonstrated that neither had the slightest idea of how his opponent had maneuvered during the fight. Had the cruisers been charged with the mission of obtaining this information of the enemy and properly trained in the methods of getting it, the battle would not so have resembled a game of “blind man’s bluff.” The performance of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron shows what might have been accomplished. The scouting planes now carried by cruisers will greatly facilitate their performance of this important battle mission.
Cruisers play a leading part in all scouting operations. For many years the light cruiser was called “scout cruiser’ ’in our service in recognition of this fact. The cruisers are arrayed in one or more scouting lines in advance of our battle fleet; sometimes a screen of cruisers is disposed on the flanks, or even in our rear. Our ships on the scouting line develop the scouting lines or screens of the enemy. They endeavor to push them back or break through to locate the hostile battleships. It is not enough that the enemy should be located once. His position, formation, course, and speed should be reported to our commanders at frequent intervals both before and after battle. To accomplish this task, in spite of the ever-present difficulties imposed by enemy action, darkness, and fog, is one of the most difficult duties in naval warfare. The same cruisers which execute this scouting mission will rally on the fleet for battle. We can’t have too many of them.
The third main function of cruisers is to attack and protect trade. As long as two fleets are face to face, a commander in chief will be loath to detach any of his cruisers for such secondary operations. If his fleet is beaten through lack of cruisers for scouting and battle—and when have there ever been enough ?—it will mean nothing that he has temporarily protected some of his trade or captured some of the enemy’s. Mahan spent his entire life teaching this fact to our Navy. Battle is the decisive event of naval warfare. Woe to us if we ever forget that teaching of the world’s greatest naval authority.
Nevertheless, when a fleet action appears improbable or when we have a considerable margin of superiority, it is permissible to detach a certain number of cruisers, usually the older ones, for secondary operations. These may be used for escorting convoys along the most vital trade routes or for attacking the enemy’s trade by close blockade or distant cruising. As the trade routes cover such wide areas and there are now so few cruisers available for their protection, it is far more profitable to attack the enemy’s trade than to try to defend our own.
There are other control force missions of temporary importance for which cruisers are essential. One of these is the escort of Army expeditionary forces and the covering of their landing on a hostile coast.
If the enemy has no battle fleet or if it has been destroyed, control force missions become immediately of primary importance. Our cruisers and even capital ships may be used for such missions.
The destroyer—or, as it was originally called, the torpedo boat—was designed primarily for firing torpedoes against capital ships. At present the destroyer ranges from about 1,000 to 2,500 tons. It carries six to twelve torpedoes. It mounts 4- to 5-inch guns. Its speed is about thirty-five knots. The larger vessels of this type are called “leaders” by the British; they are used as flagships for destroyer units. The French, Italians, and Japanese are building large destroyers for general service. The French 2,500-ton superdestroyers are virtually small cruisers. It is probable that they would be used as such.
The primary mission of the destroyer is to make massed attacks on the hostile battleships in the height of a fleet action. With the support of their cruisers, they must fight their way in as close as possible to the hostile battle line. In this position they fill the water with dense torpedo salvos. If possible, these salvos are fired simultaneously from different positions. Then they will converge upon the enemy from several directions and make it difficult, if not impossible, for his ships to avoid them by maneuvering. In the World War it was found that the destroyer was an excellent antidote to the submarine.
Destroyers may also be used to make unsupported attacks on battleships under cover of darkness. Such attacks may be made either before or after a fleet action.
While destroyers are poorly designed for long-range and long-continued scouting, they are well fitted to search a small area during a single night.
Destroyers are useful for all forms of control force action. They are invaluable for escorting convoys of merchant ships through areas where the enemy’s submarines are active. They are useful for all kinds of patrol, and for mine laying and sweeping. At Gallipoli they were used for landing troops on a hostile coast. The destroyer, like the cruiser, is a handy all-around ship. It contributes greatly to naval strength.
The submarine is a comparatively new addition to the list of naval types. Its chief advantage is its power of concealing itself by submergence. But this very characteristic imposes two important limitations—low speed and poor communication. Thus the submarine is an individual weapon. It cannot be used effectively in massed divisions or squadrons. Strong reliance, therefore, cannot be placed upon its effect in battle. It is a weapon of opportunity. To a fleet acting aggressively and trying to force battle upon the enemy, it is not of great value. On the other hand, when a defensive action is being fought it may be used with more effect. Then a group of submarines may be placed in a fixed area and the hostile fleet drawn through it. It was this maneuver which Jellicoe feared at Jutland and which the Germans used with some success on August 19, 1916—sinking two British light cruisers.
In general, submarines are not suited for scouting operations. But once a hostile fleet is located they may be used for trailing it. Such a task, however, is easier to perform on the game board than in actual war. They also may be stationed off hostile naval bases to observe and report enemy vessels passing in and out. The World War did not demonstrate that the submarine was very effective for any of these scouting duties.
The submarine is at its best when assigned control force missions. In the World War it proved an effective weapon against merchant shipping where a great volume passed through a small area and when it could attack without observing the usual rules of visit and search. At the end of the war the efficiency of various counter measures decreased the results of the German submarine campaign. While none will again try to win a war with the submarine, still it remains a serious menace to merchant shipping—even if the rules of visit and search are observed. Against naval vessels the submarine proved less effective, but its mere presence created a strong moral effect and compelled extensive counter measures. It is highly effective for laying mines secretly in enemy waters. It is also excellent for coast defense. Von Hersing in the little U-21 worked wonders at Gallipoli.
The submarine has a moral and harassing effect rather than a decisive one. It compels the enemy to be constantly on the alert —day and night. It causes him to take precautions and make preparations everywhere. Thus the submarine creates a powerful diversion rather than gains the decision. It is an exceedingly valuable weapon, particularly for defense.
The aircraft carrier is the latest thing in naval types. Though it has never been tested in battle much is expected of it. Its development has just commenced. In fact very few ships have been built originally to carry planes. Nearly all of the present carriers have been converted from other types of naval craft. For this reason, many are not entirely satisfactory in design. Further advances may be expected when ships are designed and built exclusively to carry planes.
The carrier is merely a movable floating base for aircraft. Its speed facilitates their take-off and landing. The carrier has some light guns, but it fights unwillingly—and then only in defense. It is used primarily for battle and scouting. In battle its fighting planes endeavor to gain the control of the air above the opposing fleets and clear it of hostile aircraft. Its bombing planes attack the hostile carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and—when conditions are favorable—the battleships. Its torpedo planes attack the battleships from their unengaged side while our destroyers are attacking from the engaged side. The object is to put the enemy between two fires. If he runs away from the torpedoes of the destroyers, he runs into those launched by the planes.
In scouting operations carriers take station in or behind the scouting lines of cruisers. Their planes scout the area a hundred or more miles ahead of the line. When contact is made with the enemy, reconnaissance is made in that area to locate his battleships and determine their formation, course, and speed. This information is made the basis for harassing attacks by destroyers, submarines, and aircraft and is used for bringing our battle fleet into contact with the enemy.
Carriers are useful in attacking and protecting trade mostly for the information they give other naval types. Alone they are not well suited for such operations because of their inability to fight—except with their planes. They are useful in other control force missions, particularly the covering of a landing of troops on a hostile coast. Without the control of the air such an attack would be almost impracticable. Carriers are too expensive a weapon to be used often for bombing attacks on hostile seaports. Their own vulnerability to attack from the air is their greatest limitation.
In addition to these chief types of combatant vessels, there are other minor types, such as mine layers, mine sweepers, sloops, and patrol craft of many kinds.
We have many kinds of auxiliaries which are essential for the supply and repair of the fleet. These form virtually a movable base for the fleet and as such are just as essential for the proper operation of the fleet as the combatant types. The principal types of these craft are: destroyer, submarine, and aircraft tenders, repair ships, hospital ships, transports, store ships, cargo ships, oilers, and colliers. Their numbers will be augmented greatly during war by the conversion of merchant vessels.
In conclusion, we must again emphasize the necessity for a balanced fleet. For each task in naval warfare there is but one type best suited. If that best type is not available in sufficient proportions, the task must be attempted by some other type which is less effective for that particular operation. The enemy may be expected to exploit our weaknesses by using those forms of warfare for which we are least prepared. Also, each type is dependent upon the support and assistance of other types. Thus deficiencies in one kind of ship reduce the effectiveness of all the others. A properly balanced fleet is as effective in war as one which is larger but deficient in several important types. The British and Japanese today have perfectly balanced fleets. They derive from that fact an advantage not tabulated in the articles of any treaty on naval limitations.