(October 2 to October 1918)
(Continued from the January issue)
The Fourth Day of October
(See Maps H, J, K, L, M, and N.)
THE commanding general of the American 2d Division, Major General Lejeune, ordered the attack for 7:00 a.m., October 4. Before the execution of this order, however, it was to be ascertained by means of reconnaissance flights whether or not the two adjacent divisions had come abreast of the 2d Division. It was found, at dawn, that the American 9th and also the 23d Regiments had had to ward off German counterattacks. Their efforts were crowned with success, but the casualties of the 23d Infantry were high, especially from German machine-gun fire from the rear. At 3:00 p.m. of the third the 1st Battalion was still located in a number of old German training trenches southeast of Etienne while the 3d and elements of the 2d Battalions protected its flanks. On its right flank it did not have contact with the French 67th Division. On the left, however, the fact that the 5th Marine Regiment during the forenoon had moved forward along the Sommepy-Etienne highway north of Blanc Mont, had somewhat relieved the situation of the threatened French neighbor. Here, during the night of October 3 to 4, the French 22d Infantry Division relieved the 21st Division south of Blanc Mont. It launched an attack, with the “Essen Hook’’ as the line of departure, in a westerly direction against the north slope of Helenen Hill, forced the German troops facing south on this hill (these were only outposts) to retreat, and thereafter advanced in a northerly direction.
One can safely say that this fresh French division accomplished little.
On page 14, Monograph No. 9, “Blanc Mont Operation,” has been printed a report of the French 22d Division to the effect that, on October 4, at about 11:00 a.m. a certain battalion of this division had reached the St. Pierre-St. Etienne road while other French troops were at the same time located close to the Arnes brook southwest of St. Pierre. This report sounds very improbable. For, looking further, we find on page 17 the report of the American liaison officer with the French 22d Infantry Division, who states that this division had advanced not earlier than 8:00 a.m., October 5, and had reached St. Pierre at 11:55 a.m. This report tallies also with the daily reports of the French 21st Army Corps of October 6 (see last page of Monograph No. 9).
I have in fact ascertained that the first-named report is entirely false. Throughout October 4, the 3d, 4th, and 5th Jäger Regiments, connecting in the west with the sector of the 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, held their positions. They reported that the enemy, advancing against their own front, had felt their way forward very carefully and slowly. (Compare Maps K and M.) Connecting with the sector of the Jager Brigade, the front-line companies of the 2d Battalion, 56th Infantry Regiment, of the 14th Infantry Division, occupied the Regiment which was located northwest of St. Etienne. (See Map K.)
On October 4, the 14th Infantry Division issued orders that, until 12:00 o’clock midnight, decisive combats were to be engaged in for the possession of the Martin switch position, after which the troops were to re-Martin switch position, while still further west the companies of the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, held Keilberg. In their sector, quiet prevailed through the entire day; they were not even attacked. In addition to that, there existed a flank protection, composed of detachments of the 165th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, and the Cavalry Rifle treat. This same division, in its War Diary report of October 5, states that its withdrawal into the Arnes position was carried out without molestation by the enemy.
The combat activities of the French 22d Division on October 4 consisted solely of attacks launched against the sector of the 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment. Here directly at the west slope of Blanc Mont, this French division at about 7:00 p.m. succeeded in penetrating our lines, with the result that it gained contact with the American 4th Brigade at a point north of Blanc Mont and closed in on elements of the defending Germans on this hill. When the French 22d Division finally advanced on October 5 there were no Germans in front of it as far back as Arnes brook.
The French 67th Infantry Division, advancing at the right of the American 2d Division, halted about noon in the Orfeuil-Chateau of Bémont line. It had contact, it is true, with the 9th Infantry which was located in the rear, near Médéah Ferme, but not with the 23d Infantry, further forward in lines.
At 1:00 p.m. it was decided to designate 3:30 p.m. as the zero hour for the attack of the American 2d Division, which had been planned during the forenoon of the same day.
From its wedge-like position the division was to break through in a northerly direction. This operation was doomed to fail. The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, advanced from a protruding position southeast of Etienne against the hill northeast of the village. This proved to be an isolated thrust since the French 67th Division, engaged in action south of the Chateau of Bémont, was too far away and the American 4th Brigade did not attack at all. The attack waves of the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, were at once subjected to a withering German machine-gun and rifle fire. Having suffered extremely heavy losses—even the battalion commander was killed in action—the battalion, after an advance of not more than three hundred meters, drew back to its original position. The 9th Infantry was ordered to assist the attack. But when the 2d Battalion of this regiment observed that the 23d Infantry had discontinued the attack, it likewise ceased to advance. The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, advanced and reached the Etienne-Orfeuil road, but at 9:00 p.m. was again withdrawn to its position at the Médéah Ferme.
Why was it that the 4th Brigade was not put in action? The brigade commander, Brigadier General Neville, ordered at 3:00 p.m. that the 5th Marines, followed by the 6th Marines, was to carry out the attack. When they received their orders, the battalions of the 5th Marines were just in the act of advancing in the attack which, as we have seen, had been ordered to be launched by them in the evening of October 3. In its endeavor to comply with these earlier orders, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had even reached a small strip of woods southeast of Etienne, but had got no further forward. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had to swerve to the west to intercept a German counterattack. It crossed the Blanc Mont- St. Etienne road, then turned to the north, moving along both sides of the road, and reached a point about 150 meters beyond the woods, where its advance was blocked. Both battalions (3d and 1st of the 5th Marines) later on withdrew.
The commanding officer of the 5th Marines reported at 3:20 p.m. that his men were being badly shot up; artillery fire would have to be placed on the north slope of Blanc Mont. There followed the report at 3:40 p.m. of the brigade adjutant in which he stated that the attack was being intercepted by fire from the east slope of Blanc Mont, and soon thereafter the intelligence officer stated that the brigade was suffering heavy losses from machine-gun fire from the west slope of Blanc Mont.
This situation led the divisional commander to report at 4:00 p.m. to the French 21st Army Corps that the attack of the division was doomed to failure, because the two adjacent French divisions lagged far behind and because the French 22d Division had attacked in a westerly, instead of a northerly, direction. He further declared that the 2d Division would be unable to hold its position north of Blanc Mont and Médéah Hill unless its flanks were protected. But, by 6:00 p.m., the 6th Marines, with the assistance of the French 17th Infantry Regiment, had captured the machine-gun strong points on the west slope of Blanc Mont. The American intelligence officer with the French 22d Infantry Division reported at 6:40 p.m. that contact had been established with the adjacent troops at a point four hundred meters north of Blanc Mont, called the Pioneer Park. This statement was subsequently corrected by a report of the regimental commander, 6th Marines, to the effect that there still existed a gap of some 450 meters between his own sector and that of the French 22d Infantry Division.
We shall perceive from the German reports the great importance of these combats around Blanc Mont, in which the machinegun strong points were by no means the deciding factor.
As a result of a misunderstanding, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Infantry Regiment, retreated at about 8:00 p.m. But they immediately advanced again into their former positions.
This in a measure explains the fact that, on October 4, the American 2d Division had repulsed all attacks against its flanks, but at midnight was still located generally in the same position it had occupied the day before.
Now how did the situation develop on the German side during October 4?
During the night, the withdrawal of the front of Group Langer and the right flank of Group Py had been carried out on schedule; on Helenen Hill, which was subjected to a severe artillery bombardment, there were, early in the morning, only sentries of the 200th Infantry Division.
At 8:40 p.m. Schlesier Hill was again in the hands of the Germans. With the combined attacks of the elements of the 149th and 369th Infantry Regiments, the 1st Bavarian Regiment and the 7th and 15th Bavarian Infantry Divisions, as well as the assault battalion which had arrived at about 4:00 p.m., the Germans had been able to force the enemy, who had advanced as far as Ludwigs Rücken, back in a southeasterly direction and to take up contact with the 200th Infantry Division on Blanc Mont. In front of the right flank and the center of this division, the enemy had forced our outpost sentries back as far as the Third Main Line of Resistance. From 9:00 a.m. on, an overwhelming artillery bombardment covered the area from Blanc Mont to a point beyond the left boundary of the group; this the enemy followed up with thrusts that were even stronger than those of preceding days and employed a number of divisions which had only recently come up from the rear.
After bitter combats, of frequently changing issue, the enemy succeeded in regaining possession of Schlesier Hill, and later on also of Médéah Hill. (See Map J.) On the other hand, the 200th Infantry Division, fighting with incomparable valor, and the 3d Guard Infantry Division warded off all attacks on a front that extended from Steinberg as far as the eastern boundary of the- Group, and immediately threw the enemy out of their lines wherever he entered. During these mass attacks the enemy suffered tremendous losses.
From the vicinity of Schlesier Hill, the enemy employed strong detachments in attack against the Blanc Mont-Ludwigs Rücken line and Blodnitz Hill. This was the attack of the American 2d Division. I will therefore quote exactly the combat reports of the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment of Group Reiss (consisting of the aforementioned Regiment, the 32d Prussian Assault Battalion, and the combined 24th and 25th Bavarian Pioneer Companies) which give a very vivid picture of what happened around Blodnitz Hill (See Map L):
In the evening of October 3, strong American detachments had forced weak German troops, constantly threatened with envelopment, to evacuate Ludwigs Rücken. The forenoon of October 4, was destined to see the Germans again in possession of this very important point. For this purpose, Group Reiss had planned a counterattack which was to be launched at 4:15 a.m.
In a magnificent forward rush, though suffering considerable casualties, the assault battalions soon recaptured the hill line. However, as reënforcements failed to arrive and strengthen both flanks, it was impossible to maintain this hill against an American counterattack that was launched from a depression south of Ludwigs Rücken. A new attempt to regain the hill was planned by the commanding officer, to be launched at 9:40 a.m. This assault coincided and collided with an American attack against the St. Etienne-Blodnitz Hill line.
As Ludwigs Rücken was wooded only in places, and the cover consisted of low shrubbery, undergrowth, and young trees well separated by clearings of varying width, the different phases of the attack could be followed closely and the most effective counter measures taken. It was to our advantage that the Americans launched their attacks chiefly from the north slope, in other words, the hill slope that faced our own lines.
Undoubtedly, the attack had been carefully and minutely planned. At a designated point, all American assault detachments crossed the hill crest, withdrew to the west into an area apparently designated as their attack objective (later their right flank), and halted. In this manner they established a continuous line of riflemen, close behind which fell in other independent detachments, as reserves. The movements into combat zones were carried out by extremely varied methods: now in lines of riflemen, now in single and double files, then again in columns of platoons or squads, but sometimes also in platoon columns and loose groups. It was no difficult matter to estimate that the attack had been carried out by a battalion of full combat strength.
Even when deploying, the enemy suffered bloody losses. The separate and isolated groups coming in carelessly at first, were at once subjected to a withering concentrated fire of light and heavy machine guns. Everywhere good results were observed. Gaping holes were torn in the lines of riflemen, entire columns being mowed down. Much to our advantage were the light yellow-brown uniforms of the Americans, altogether impractical for this terrain. They were visible at great distances and offered excellent targets. After the enemy had deployed along the entire front, he prepared to descend the north slope of the hill and to debouch from the elevated strip of woods. In this attempt he was everywhere unsuccessful because our machine guns placed such a well-directed fire on the slope that the enemy, after long-continued efforts, finally abandoned his plans. One could plainly observe that the unrest in his ranks grew every minute. Lone individuals, and frequently entire detachments, ran aimlessly about. A great number of dead remained on the field. Already, a few began to escape up the hill; finally the hostile detachments, in wild flight, hastened up the slope. Our own artillery now launched a well-directed fire on the strips of woods and completed the enemy’s confusion. Even during their flight, they were sharply pursued by our machine-gun fire. From about 1:30 p.m. on, the north slope of Ludwigs Rücken was entirely free of enemy troops. His losses must have amounted to no less than 40 per cent.
From 2:00 p.m. on, the enemy again renewed his attacks, employing, as usual, strong forces (estimated at no less than two battalions). The attack, which this time was directed chiefly against Blodnitz Hill, came as a complete surprise, striking our lines with considerable energy. This time, the enemy had wisely concentrated his forces behind the hill crest and the depression east of it. With from three to five attack waves (with from one to two paces interval between each) followed up by closed columns of upwards of platoon strength, he stormed down the hill. Soon our machine guns here, too, found their targets and began to cut down the attacking files, for in this open terrain they could find no suitable protection. Here the losses of the enemy must have been especially heavy. One column received a direct hit from an artillery shell.
A line of riflemen of from thirty to forty men, deceived into using for cover a railway embankment that stretched along the front in a semicircle, found themselves facing the wrong front, and came under our enfilading fire. When darkness fell they were still lying motionless on this same spot, presumably dead.
These and other scenes rolled before our eyes continually. It must be remarked that the enemy, despite his heavy losses, again and again resumed his attacks. Not until the gaps between his lines had become larger and larger did the attacks come to a standstill. Only on his right flank was he able to approach our lines to a distance of from forty to fifty meters, but was soon forced to withdraw. The situation became critical when there arose on our own side a shortage of ammunition. To this was added a lack of oil and water for the machine guns. Instead of oil, our men were forced to use butter. The munition shortage was eased up by designation of a regular carrier service that worked excellently.
Thus this attack was also shattered and, amidst the jubilance of the defenders, the Americans were forced to retreat for the second time this day, the last withdrawals taking place only at darkness. The bloody losses of the enemy, especially of killed, during the second attack, were heavier than in the forenoon and amounted to at least 60 per cent.
The attack was warded off without artillery assistance of any sort. Next to the excellently directed machine-gun fire, the rifle fire of the infantry deserved credit for the success.
It has been ascertained that, on this day, one single machine gun (personally manned and fired by Vice Sergeant Major Kohnle of the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment, 1st Machine-Gun Company) spent no less than 23,000 shots in well-directed fire upon the Americans.
During these combats, the activities of the 4th Company, 31st Infantry Regiment, under the command of First Lieutenant Bock, then located in a gravel pit, were especially noteworthy.
The commanding officer of the 23d Infantry Brigade remarked in regard to all these reports: “The troops have fought brilliantly and deserve unlimited praise.”
The report of Major Reiss, 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment, quoted at length above, tallies with other German daily reports regarding the combats of this day. There is, however, a certain inconsistency between his statement and the description I rendered at first, which was taken from the American Monograph 9, “Blanc Mont.” In his report, mention is made only of the attack that was launched during the afternoon, while during the forenoon the Americans are said to have been on the defensive, warding off German assaults. It is hoped that helpful statements of American participants may clear up this contradiction.
At 12:00 o’clock noon, October 4, the regimental commander of the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, Major Streit, despatched the following carrier-pigeon report to the 203d Infantry Division, which received it at 2:00 p.m. (Headquarters being located in Juniville):
At 9:15 a.m. the enemy launched a severe artillery preparatory fire and at 10:00 a.m. attacked along both sides of Médéah Hill-Semide highway, employing strong forces. Separate penetrations in the sector of the 3d Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, north of Numeral 1352 “f”; front lines of the 1st Battalion, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, at northwest slope of Médéah Hill were avoided and elements of their troops reached the rear lines of the battalion as well as the battalion command station located in map Square 1251. The attack was warded off with heavy losses for the enemy. I have ordered the 2d Battalion, 89th Grenadier Regiment, together with the 1st and 3d Battalions, 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, with one platoon of accompanying artillery, to launch a counterattack against Médéah Hill after an artillery preparation that will begin at 12:00 o’clock noon. The enemy forces are mixed American and French troops. The presence of the French 346th Infantry Regiment has been confirmed. It is desirable that the 24th Bavarian Infantry Regiment be placed in support behind the right flank.
At 2:10 p.m. Major Streit despatched another carrier-pigeon report that arrived at 2.50 p.m. It said that the 2d Battalion, 89th Grenadier Regiment, was already employed at another part of the front, that its men were exhausted and were almost without ammunition. He stated that this had been his reason for requesting the 24th Bavarian Infantry Regiment to place itself in support behind the right flank with its troops echeloned.
During the attacks we have here described, the 89th Grenadier Regiment captured men of the American 9th Infantry Regiment.
At 12:00 o’clock noon the 75th Infantry Regiment placed itself in support in the vicinity of the Bémont Ferme and the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. Two battalions were placed at the disposal of the 51st Reserve Division; one battalion remained with the 203d Infantry Division.
Group Py decided now to pinch off the American 2d Division in its wedge-like position. It therefore ordered at 2:00 p.m. a combined counterattack of the 51st Reserve Division, reënforced by elements of the 17th Infantry Division, in the general direction of Schlesier Hill. (See Map J).
At 2.15 p.m. the 51st Reserve Division forwarded the following order to the 102d Infantry Brigade:
Schlesier Hill must be in our possession by tonight. The 200th Infantry Division will attack from the direction of Petersberg with two battalions. We will place at your disposal one battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment now located in Albrechts-Mulde. Echelon this battalion behind the right flank. The other battalion of this regiment will remain Army reserve and will be moved into the vicinity of the Fourth Main Line of Resistance southwest of the Bémont Ferme.
The operations officer of the 203d Infantry Division telephoned at 3:30 p.m. to the operations officer of the 51st Reserve Division as follows: “You can depend on it that our right flank will not lag behind.”
The attack orders, however, did not get pushed through soon enough and in addition to that the enemy themselves, as we have seen, had also taken up the offensive. Thereby, after fierce fighting east of the highway that leads to Médéah Hill, they gradually won ground until they reached the narrow road that leads from Steinberg to Blodnitz Hill. To oppose this move, the 203d Infantry Division employed the 89th Grenadier Regiment and elements of the 24th Bavarian Infantry Regiment. At 5 :00 the enemy again assaulted our troops on Steinberg. Twice the counterattack of the 409th Infantry Regiment threw him back. By the third attempt he succeeded in pushing the regiment back as far as the north slope of Steinberg.
Among these accounts, the events that took place in the vicinity of Blanc Mont are of special interest to us.
(See Map N). We have learned from descriptions of previous days that the 149th Infantry Regiment, located at Blanc Mont, had been promised assistance in the form of two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment, which, however, could not at first be found. At 1:00 a.m. October 4, the 200th Infantry Division issued an order to the Jäger Brigade:
Two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment with accompanying batteries are moving backward from Helenen Hill into the vicinity north of St. Etienne; they will be placed under the command of the Jäger Brigade and moved to Petersberg. At 6:00 a.m. the battalions will form for an attack against Ludwigs Rücken from a southwesterly direction. After the capture of that hill, the battalions will swerve to the southeast and advance with their right flank in the direction of Blanc Mont, with their left flank upon Schlesier Hill; at the right they will have contact with the 149th, at the left with the 90th Fusilier Regiment. The latter will attack Schlesier Hill. The assault will be prepared with artillery fire, which at 6:00 a.m. will be placed in front of Blanc Mont as a box barrage.
After the 149th Infantry Regiment had been instructed to take charge of reconnaissances in the direction of Ludwigs Rücken, it received at 3:15 a.m. the following order from the Jäger Brigade:
In compliance with orders of the 200th Infantry Division, the 149th Infantry Regiment must under all circumstances hold the flank position from south of Blanc Mont to Ludwigs Rücken. The commanding officer of the regiment will be held personally responsible.
Soon thereafter the Jäger Brigade ordered:
All possible attempts will be made to find the two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment; Major Wild, as was previously stated, will order them to attack. The 14th Reserve Division has promised us to place these two battalions in support not later than 4:00 a.m. If the battalions are not found, the 149th Infantry Regiment will nevertheless hold its own on Blanc Mont as long as is humanly possible and await the result of the attacks of the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division advancing next morning from Etienne against Ludwigs Rücken, and of the 90th Fusilier Regiment against Schlesier Hill. Only when the situation becomes completely untenable, and the expected pressure in the morning from the north fails to materialize, can there be any question of withdrawal into the Petersberg—east edge of St. Etienne line. This withdrawal, if necessary, will be step-by-step, fighting for every foot of ground. Beginning on the left flank it will be carried out by all three regiments. It case the two battalions, 368th Infantry Regiment, make their appearance in the vicinity north of St. Etienne not earlier than the morning of October 4, which is entirely within range of possibilities, they will be immediately concentrated there and employed in lines as the situation demands. According to the statement of an officer of the Telephone Detachment, it appears that last night the portion of Ludwigs Rücken located east of the St. Etienne-Blanc Mont highway was free of the enemy. Consequently, it is possible that the enemy felt too uncomfortable in the sharply pointed wedge which he had driven into our front, and voluntarily evacuated it.
The 149th Infantry Regiment had submitted a request that at least its 1st Battalion be placed at its disposal. In reply to this, it was advised at 6:10 a.m. as follows:
The 149th Infantry Regiment cannot expect to have returned to its command its 1st Battalion, which, for special missions, has been temporarily placed at the disposal of the 165th Infantry Regiment. Moreover, the 149th Infantry Regiment is herewith expressly ordered to hold the lines with its present forces, in order to protect the flank of the 200th Infantry Division. For this the commanding officer will be held responsible. In line east of St. Etienne —east of Petersberg is a reserve force composed of elements of the 1st Army.
However, this order was amended at 9:35 a.m.:
The 1st Battalion 149th, will be placed at the disposal of the regiment. It will be immediately ordered to attack Schwabenkönig via Ludwigs Rücken—Grenadier Hill. Schlesier Hill has been captured by the 90th Fusilier Regiment. The 149th Infantry Regiment will immediately, with all its available forces, advance into the Blanc Mont-Schlesier Hill line. The 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, is likewise at the disposal of the regiment. Major Wild will temporarily place the two other battalions in the Blanc Mont-Schlesier Hill line, leaving them first at the north slope of Blanc Mont. While there, they will be designated Brigade Reserve.
From his command post at the road fork northwest of Blanc Mont, the regimental commander, 149th, at 12:00 noon, despatched a report and situation map (See Map N):
Local situation looks very critical to me; an envelopment by the enemy advancing from the valley of the Arnes brook is not unlikely. Am under the impression that I should not retreat without orders. Please give me instructions.
Signed: Grundel
After false preliminary reports regarding the two battalions of the 368th Infantry Regiment, the 14th Infantry Division at 10:28 a.m. stated that it had issued orders to the 368th Infantry Regiment to remain in Pregel Camp and there to await further orders of the 213th Infantry Division. It was further explained that the 14th Infantry Division was unaware of any orders from the 200th Infantry Division that the 368th Infantry Regiment should return to Petersberg. Thereupon the regimental commander, 368th Infantry, was ordered at 11:05 a.m. to move from Pregel Camp northwest of St. Etienne to Petersberg, with instructions that it was to be placed under the command of the 2d Jäger Brigade. Furthermore, it was ordered to move up the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, which was then in the act of marching in the direction of Ludwigs Rücken, and employ it in the sector of the regiment that lay between Blanc Mont and Schlesier Hill.
To the operations officer of Group Py, the operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division reported at 12:47 p.m. as follows:
At the front, no change. Enemy pressing our outposts. The 15th Bavarian Infantry Division and the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, have captured Ludwigs Rücken; 1st Battalion of the latter regiment has suffered heavy losses. Possible that the 368th Infantry Regiment will arrive on Petersberg around 2:00 p.m. The division requests to be relieved.
For a long time, the reports received by the divisions concerning the situation on Ludwigs Rücken gave no clear picture. This explains the fact that our artillery launched its fire on the Americans located there only after considerable delay.
The 2d Jäger Brigade received at 2:45 p.m. the following report, despatched at 11:45 a.m., from the 149th Infantry Regiment:
Since 8:45 a.m. I have been without communication with the brigade. Telephone connection was impossible by any means. I can now sum up the events of the day: Since dawn repeated attempts of the enemy against my left (northern) flank, frontal attacks from the east, and enveloping attacks from the depression in map Squares 1448 and 1348, all repulsed by our rifle and machine-gun fire. Since 8:45 also, our own artillery, sometimes for hours at a time, has maintained a fire on this very same northern flank, firing from the direction of St. Pierre; we were also gassed. Losses suffered from our own fire, which fell short and could not be stopped by yellow signal flares, are considerable. The 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, arrived here at about 9:00 a.m. and has been employed on Ludwigs Hill at a point approximately five hundred meters east of the St. Etienne-Blanc Mont highway in order to ease the situation of my northern flank which is located in map Square 1448. This battalion arrived here just at a time when we were under a very severe and devastating fire of our own artillery from the north and northwest.
From 10:00 a.m. on, repeated attacks against Blanc Mont, launched from the direction of Sattelberg, have been repulsed by my troops. On all these occasions, our own batteries were a flat failure.
Since 8:00 a.m. we have repeatedly observed that strong hostile detachments, moving along the St. Etienne-Schwabenkönig road, are crossing Ludwigs Rücken in the direction of St. Etienne. The enemy is now attacking my left flank in map Square 1448 from the direction of Grenadier Hill.
As yet, I still hold my own in this line. But if our own artillery does not immediately assist us, instead of inflicting casualties in our ranks, as heretofore, I will not be able to guarantee a prolonged resistance of my troops, already badly depleted by their own artillery.
How is the general situation?
Signed: Grundel
Other troops also complained of having suffered severely from our own artillery, which, no doubt, in the peculiar combat situation then prevailing, must have found it difficult to correctly direct its fire.
The 1st and 2d Battalions, 368th Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Mannkopf, reached Petersberg at about 3:00 p.m. (See Map J). They were at once directed to launch a counterattack to the north against Grenadier Hill in order to fill the gap between the sectors of the 149th, at the right, and the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, at the left, and by an energetic thrust cut off the American troops located on Ludwigs Rücken from their main body of troops. Their attack, which at first went ahead with comparative ease, came to a standstill at the St. Etienne-Schlesier Hill highway just as darkness fell. The Americans were pushed back, but it was not possible to close the gap, several kilometers wide, between the 149th and 368th Infantry Regiments.
At this point the following fact must be inserted: As early as October 3, the Group of Armies, German Crown Prince, had issued the following order:
During the night of October 4 to 5, the main resistance of the 1st Army will be shifted behind the Suippe. Contact with the 3d Army will be established just as the situation demands: either in the Third Main Line Resistance, in the direction of Blanc Mont, or in the Fourth Main Line Resistance behind the Arnes sector. Final orders regarding execution of this order will be issued by 9:30 a.m., October 4.
On October 3, Army Headquarters of the 3d Army had amended its former retreat order (Gudrun Operation) to read as follows:
A systematic withdrawal into the Brunhild position is a question that concerns at present only Groups Py, Perthes, and the right flank of Group Aisnes. From Vaux le Mouron eastward, the lines heretofore ordered established in and around both sides of the Argonne forest will be held as permanent positions. These retreats into the Brunhild position will not be preceded by a certain fixed preparatory period; on the contrary, it may be expected with reasonable assurance that the execution of such orders may be designated to take place immediately after issuance thereof. Destruction of position, constructions, etc., useful to the enemy will be limited to a minimum. Devastation of the country is prohibited.
Between 3:00 and 3 :30 p.m., October 4, 3d Army Headquarters ordered that, during the night of October 4 to 5, the divisions were to retreat into the Fourth Main Line of Resistance, then called the Arnes position. As early as 3:25 p.m., the chief of staff of Group Py had informed the 200th Infantry Division:
Tonight you will withdraw into the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. This movement shall not in any way influence your attack of today. The 213th Infantry Division will then be inserted in lines at the left flank of the 200th Infantry Division.
Further instructions were issued at 5 :50 p.m. by Group Py:
Tonight at 10:00 o’clock the troops now in rear of your sector will begin their retreat; at 12:00 o’clock midnight, your line battalions will retreat. The 200th Infantry Division will take over the sector, occupying the right with its own troops, and the left with those of other units. Tomorrow noon, the 213th Infantry Division will take over this left sector; the 1st and 15th Bavarian Infantry Divisions will be relieved. Southernmost line held occupied by the artillery: Taubenhöhe-Cauroy—north edge of Hohenzollern Hill.
Acting at once upon these new instructions, the 200th Infantry Division immediately ordered the distribution of the regiments within the new sector, from right to left, as follows: 5th, 4th, 3d Jäger Regiments, 149th and 368th Infantry Regiments.
At the same time that all these preparations for the voluntary retreat from the old German positions were going on, fate sealed the doom of the unfortunate 149th Infantry Regiment on Blanc Mont. Of this event, the regimental commander, Major Gründel, gives the following account (See Map N):
When, despite the attack of the Bavarians, the enemy continued to expand further and further westward on Ludwigs Rücken, I was advised during the forenoon of October 4, that the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, would be placed at my disposal. The results of the valiant but vain efforts of this battalion are revealed by its report issued at 4:15 p.m., October 4:
“At about 12:00 o’clock noon, the battalion was attacked by strong infantry masses. Enemy entered the outpost positions of the battalion. It was forced to shift its front line on Ludwigs Rücken to the west side of the St. Etienne-Blanc Mont highway. At my left were located Bavarians who had retreated. As a result of the hostile attack I lost touch with one and one-half companies. The losses of the battalion are considerable. Companies are now being transformed into new units as far as is possible under the heavy bombardment. If I withdraw a single company, it will be impossible to prevent the enemy from taking possession of Ludwigs Rücken. In view of the local situation, I consider the withdrawal of one company at present entirely out of the question.”
With its seriously depleted companies, the 149th Infantry Regiment for the past thirty- six hours has been holding its own in a position 1500 meters long, on which was focused the chief pressure of all hostile attacks. Notwithstanding this, the thought of yielding to the heavy pressure of the enemy on all sides seemed to enter no one’s mind. Reënforced by the 10th Company, the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, held an almost impregnable position in Blanc Mont. The 11th and 12th Companies in their contact positions south thereof had, it is true, during the afternoon yielded a certain extent to renewed hostile attacks. It happened to these companies, on top of their other troubles, that their rolling kitchens had failed to come forward the day before, and the pangs of hunger were felt by all. Into this position the enemy had hammered a dent, but he dared not push through.
At the outset of the fighting I shifted my command post to the road fork immediately northwest of Blanc Mont. I saw no reason, on October 3, to shift it farther to the rear, especially since I would lose thereby my present excellent view of the entire situation. After the bowing in of the lines of the 3d Battalion, however, I saw that I would soon be forced to withdraw my command post to a better protected location. Still I thought best to postpone removal for fear of the effect on the hard-pressed troops, and remained at a point now practically in the foremost line. In the events which quickly followed, the unfavorableness of this location for a command post soon became evident.
As late as 5:00 p.m. I had been on the observation post of Blanc Mont and had seen that on almost all sides the enemy was quite strong, but seemed nowhere inclined to resume his attacks. I found officers and enlisted men of the 2d Battalion maintaining usual coolness and composure. In fact, it seemed to me to be simply another of those situations where, as between the opposing troops, the stronger nerves would decide. My concern as to whether the troops would be able to stick it out through the following night I had made known earlier in the day, sending the report to Headquarters, 200th Infantry Division, for lack of other means of communication, by my last carrier pigeon. I had provided an orderly retreat in the event of an emergency, the focal point of subsequent concentration being St. Etienne and St. Petersberg. This plan I had very carefully worked out, but for good reasons had given no orders revealing it. Thus on the evening of October 4 the troops knew only that they were to hang on, and that military honor pledged them to defense of their position till they had fired away their last round. I felt that I was not authorized, nor as yet sufficiently hard pressed, to order the withdrawal of my troops, imperiled though they were, from positions that seemed to me of especial importance.
Of course, after its last withdrawal into the densely wooded terrain in which observation possibilities were reduced almost to nil, I found that I was unable personally to control the 3d Battalion, 149th, and there was also a question whether it was still held firmly in the hands of its officers. However that might be, just as darkness fell around 6:30 p.m., the battalion commander, 3d Battalion, 149th Infantry, suddenly appeared alone at my command post and reported that his battalion had just yielded before the pressure of a surprise attack, and that the enemy was in sharp pursuit. Almost at once this was confirmed by an uproar of foreign voices and rifle shots, all very close at hand. An attempt to get in touch with the command post of the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry, by telephone, failed as there was no response. So a messenger with news of the situation was hurriedly despatched to Blanc Mont. It could not be confirmed whether this man got through. For the regimental staff, however, it was now high time to fight its way to the rear through the ranks of the sharply pressing enemy. With the aid of our weapons, we succeeded in fighting our way as far as the command post of the 4th Jäger Regiment. Halting here, I repeatedly attempted to obtain communication with my troops on Blanc Mont by way of the communication system of this regiment. But all attempts were in vain. In view of the foregoing, it is likely that the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, never received my information regarding the situation so suddenly changed for the worse. The fact that during the night of October 4 to 5, even as late as 3:30 a.m., separate stragglers of various companies, as well as the bulk of the 10th Company, fought and cut their way to the rear as far as our own command post, shows that the majority of the front-line troops maintained their composure to the last minute. Of the elements that were located on Blanc Mont (10th Company and 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment), the following officers and enlisted men succeeded in getting to the rear: Lieutenant Fink of the 3d Machine-Gun Company, with 7 heavy machine guns; Lieutenant Brohn of the 10th Company with 36 men and 3 light machine guns; 102 officers and men of the 2d Battalion, 149th, with 4 heavy and 4 light machine guns.
Not more than 150 men probably fell into the hands of the enemy, as up to 4:00 p.m., the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry, had submitted regular reports in which the casualities suffered on October 3 and 4, on Blanc Mont, were stated as amounting to 63 officers and men, exclusive of such losses as were suffered during the approach march to Blanc Mont as a result of hostile artillery fire.
To the above report, the commanding officer of the 37th Reserve Infantry Brigade, Colonel von Götze, added this:
To the sincere words of appreciation for the achievements of the regiment and its officers, already pronounced by the Higher Command, I can only add that the above described episode of the struggle will for all time remain a page of glory in the history of the 149th Regiment.
As in the previously narrated case the local combats around Blanc Mont arouse especial interest, it will perhaps serve our purpose well to insert the somewhat contradictory account which the 213th Infantry Division, of which the 149th Infantry Regiment was originally a member, submitted on the evening of October 4 to Group Py:
With its 1st and 3d Battalions, the 149th Infantry Regiment has reached the Fourth Main Line of Resistance and has occupied it, the 1st Battalion, 149th, with a strength of three, the 3d Battalion, 149th, with a strength of one company. Investigations are under way regarding the fate of the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry. The following is reported to us concerning the engagements of the 149th around Blanc Mont: On the morning of October 3, the regiment by a clever counterattack recaptured Blanc Mont, which previously had been lost to the enemy after a surprise attack and evacuated by our troops. The regiment retook the hill immediately after its arrival, and held it until the evening of October 4, victoriously warding off all hostile attacks despite the fact that the enemy, after the capture of Ludwigs Hill, was directly in its rear and that the regiment, throughout the entire period, suffered considerably under the effect of the fire of its own batteries. On October 4, the 2d Battalion of this regiment, facing an eastern front, repulsed six strong hostile attacks; and the 3d Battalion, facing a southern front, victoriously warded off five major attacks. Toward 7:00 p.m. the enemy again launched an attack against the regiment from southerly, easterly, and northerly directions. He thereby succeeded in entering the sector of the 3d Battalion, 149th, which had been seriously depleted as a result of previous heavy losses, from the south, and it appears that he attacked the 2d Battalion, 149th, which held a front facing east, from the rear. Despite this difficult situation, with the regiment enveloped from three sides, the regimental commander succeeded in leading back to the designated positions the remnants of the regiment that were still able to carry a rifle. As many times before, this regiment on October 3 and 4 again brilliantly upheld its reputation as a fighting unit. Almost encircled, it held recaptured positions against furious blows of the enemy and by its perseverence prevented the enemy from rolling up our entire front to the west after he had attained a local success by penetrating our lines in the northeast. A major share in these honors must be accredited to the distinguished leadership of its regimental commander, Major Gründel, who has constantly held front-line command. In acknowledgment of the distinguished heroism of the regiment and its trusted leader in the Blanc Mont engagement, the 213th Infantry Division requests that an endeavor be made to secure for Major Gründel the award of the Order of Merit. The 200th Infantry Division, under whose command this regiment has been until this noon, has suggested that the proper steps be taken in this direction.
On October 5, the commanding general of the 2d Army wired:
To the commanding officer of the 149th Infantry Regiment I herewith express my special appreciation of the excellent spirit of his regiment, which was proved anew in the valiant perseverance of the 2d Battalion on Blanc Mont, surrounded by the enemy on all sides.
Signed: von Einem
The following was issued on October 6, 1918, by the commanding general of the 200th Infantry Division, General von Below:
During the bitter combats of October 4, the 368th and 149th Infantry Regiments have fought with great distinction. The difficult task of securing the left flank of the 200th Infantry Division in the face of a far superior enemy richly provided with all requirements of warfare, has been achieved by the two regiments after a series of brilliantly directed, daringly executed counterattacks. The recapture of Blanc Mont by the 149th Infantry Regiment, and its complete maintenance against subsequent superior attacks will forever form a page of glory in the history of the regiment. Thanks to the morale of the men in both regiments, far beyond all mere words of praise, and in most loyal cooperation with their brothers-in- arms, the Jäger Regiments, it was possible to retain the position assigned to them by the Higher Command. I beg to express to the two regiments my warmest thanks and fullest appreciation for their incomparable achievements.
In its orders concerning the occupation of the new positions by the Jäger Brigade, the 200th Infantry Division at 7:00 p.m. added the following instructions: “Within the sectors of the 5th and 4th Jäger Regiments decisive combats will be waged in an effort to maintain the possession of Arnes brook.” Group Reiss (the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment of the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division) was now placed under the command of the 200th Infantry Division. At 9:15 p.m. a new order of the group was received regarding the withdrawal of the troops into the Fourth Main Line of Resistance, according to which it was permitted to begin its withdrawal as early as 8:30 p.m. When, however, at 10:45 p.m. the operations officer of Group Py declared that the 200th Infantry Division would be required to transfer the command of the 2d Battalion, 234th Infantry Regiment, to another division, the operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division replied: “We shall soon have no more men available. The 5th Jäger Regiment is now composed of a total of 80 men, the other regiments have quite as few. As I have done on previous occasions, I will again call attention to the fact that it is a question whether our troops will be able to maintain their positions.” Soon thereafter the 51st Reserve Division forwarded a report to the effect that the Americans had occupied Ludwigs Rücken.
The positions which the German troops occupied during the night in compliance with orders of Army Headquarters are shown on Map O.
The Fifth Day of October
(See Maps O and P)
On October 5, the American 2d Field Artillery Brigade subjected the knoll and the east slope of Blanc Mont to an energetic fire. Then, at 7:15 a.m., the 3d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, attacked the German machine-gun strong points it still suspected of being located at these points. This battalion encountered no resistance whatever, and suffered no casualties. The remnants of the defenders, cut off from their main bodies since 6:00 p.m., may have sought shelter in the deep dugouts as soon as the hostile artillery bombardment began and there waited until they were taken prisoners. For these men there was really no other course. Two hundred and nine prisoners, seventy-five machine guns and trench mortars, and much valuable material, loose and utilized in construction of positions, fell here into the hands of the enemy.
From the report of Major Gründel of the 149th, we know that a great many of his men had been wounded by our own artillery fire. It was impossible, by day, to lead these men to safety from the somewhat protruding sector of this regiment. In the evening it was too late as the remnants of the regiment were already surrounded. This proves that a great number of the prisoners must have been wounded. Experience has shown also, especially during major combats, that many machine guns captured have been rendered useless.
That the 149th Infantry Regiment stuck in its critical situation as long as it did is amazing, and this fact justifies the statement of the commanding general of the 200th Infantry Division: “The 149th Infantry Regiment has accomplished a glorious feat.”
Major General Lejeune, the commanding general of the American 2d Division, ordered at 5 :00 a.m. a continuation of the attack in the direction of Machault-Cauroy, and stated that the exact hour of launching the attack would be made known later. As a matter of fact, zero hour was never actually ordered but instead the brigades were instructed to keep abreast of the advance of the other divisions. At 6:00 a.m., the right neighbor, the French 73d Infantry Division, launched an attack, reached Wallmüller Camp at 7:10 a.m., but was promptly forced back into its own line of departure. Then the French employed here the 170th Infantry Division, which likewise made a futile attempt. General Naulin, the commanding general of the French 21st Army Corps, at about 1:40 a.m., October 6, informed General Lejeune that the French 73d Infantry Division would be assisted by another French division, but requested him to hold his 2d Division ready to have its reserves likewise advance in this direction.
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||
|
| |||||||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||
|
This explains why, in the evening of October S, the right flank of the American 3d Brigade was still located in the vicinity of Médéah Hill, which it had captured on October 3.
When the left neighbor, the French 22d Division, formed for the attack at 7:00 a.m., it encountered no resistance whatever, for the Germans had evacuated the terrain as far back as the Arnes brook. At 11:55 a.m. this division reached Pierre-a-Arnes and at once expanded its right flank in the direction of St. Etienne to a distance of one kilometer. At 2:45 p.m. contact was established between the two divisions at a point five hundred meters south of St. Etienne; it had taken the left neighbor until this hour to move abreast of the American 2d Division.
During the afternoon the 4th Brigade, at that time still somewhat in rear of the general line, made an advance in the course of which the 6th Marine Regiment, then in the second line, pushed through the lines of the 5th Marine Regiment, with its 2d Battalion leading. When the marines arrived at a point two kilometers south of St. Etienne, they were met with machine-gun fire. They at once threw themselves to the ground and entrenched. The 23d Infantry Regiment had not advanced; its left flank was now protected. To the 3d Brigade, of which the 23d Infantry was a member, was given the 4th Machine-Gun Battalion.
At 4:40 p.m. the American 2d Division received a report to the effect that St. Etienne had been captured by the French. But this report proved to be erroneous. The American 2d Division did not fall in with the suggestion of the French 118th Infantry Regiment, which had encountered no resistance whatever on its own front, when at 5:55 p.m. it asked that the Americans co- operate in a general advance upon St. Etienne. The 2d Division believed that its decision was justified in view of the energetic resistance which the Germans still offered here until finally, on October 8, St. Etienne definitely fell into the hands of the Allies. Just how conditions actually were at St. Etienne, we shall see.
Now we will review the measures that were taken on the German side. The commander in chief of the 3d Army, General Oberst von Einem, on October 5, forwarded to the Group of Armies, German Crown Prince, the following estimate of the situation:
While no doubt the enemy visualizes the wrecking of his great plan of penetration against our tenacious resistance, he has not yet ceased to hammer the fronts west of the Aisne and east of Argonne with continuous attacks. On the Argonne front a pause has occurred which may well be due to the restricted operative movements of the Americans. He attempts now—after his efforts at penetrating our lines have failed—to shatter our front by constant blows without regard to his own losses. An unlimited continuation of attacks must be reckoned with in view of the fact that the enemy has only been strengthened in his desire to gain ground by the withdrawal of the front in the sector of our 1st Army. But, the main pressure of his attacks will be exerted from a northerly, rather than from a northwesterly, direction as during the past few days. It is, moreover, not at all beyond possibility that the enemy, if he reckons on our withdrawal behind the Aisne, will launch his strongest attacks east of the Argonne in order to force the fall of the Brunhild position by a flank thrust. Sufficient forces are at the disposal of the enemy for such purposes.
On the other hand, the combat strength of our own divisions, almost all of whom have fought with outstanding distinction, is now seriously reduced through depleted numbers and lack of rest, as a result of the continuous hostile attacks. On the basis of past experience, we shall have to withdraw at least one division a day from the forces west of the Aisne as unfit for further service.
The supply of fresh forces is at present scanty. The defensive strength of the front must be kept up to the required minimum. In case this last is not possible, it is to be expected that the Army, even with the utmost efforts and self-sacrifice, will soon be unable to carry on the defensive on the scale it has done heretofore.
Combat values of the divisions:
200th Infantry Division: At present incapable of defensive combat.
213th and 17th Infantry Divisions: Still capable of combat.
203d Infantry Division: Fighting value seriously deteriorated, but still capable of combat.
3rd Guard Infantry Division: At present incapable of defensive combat.
15th Bavarian Infantry Division: No longer capable of combat.
195th Infantry Division: Up to full combat strength.
I have here included only the divisions that are of interest for this narrative.
In the War Diary for the Army Headquarters of the 3d Army we find the following entry, dated October 5:
In the sector of Group Py several hostile attacks collapsed under our fire. A penetration southwest of Orfeuil was foiled by the immediate counterattack of elements of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division who, without awaiting orders, hurled themselves against the enemy. Captured enemy documents indicate the American 2d Division as an especially reliable assault division. According to these orders the American 2d Division has been employed here because this portion of the front is considered the point on which the decisive blow of the present offensive will be struck. Strong traffic observed opposite Group Py indicates that fresh troops are being brought forward.
As is shown on Map O, the village of St. Etienne and Blodnitz Hill were not included in the Fourth Main Line of Resistance. Consequently, the units assumed that these two main points were not to be occupied on the morning of October 5. Major Reiss, regimental commander of the 31st Bavarian Infantry, which had heretofore so tenaciously defended and held Blodnitz Hill, communicated at 6:52 a.m. with the 200th Infantry Division:
The 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, has moved in and has completed the relief of the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment. This regiment is now moving to the rear. Up to this hour, we have occupied Blodnitz Hill in front of the Fourth Main Line of Resistance.
The operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division immediately answered by telephone: “Please relay the following order to the 149th Infantry Regiment: Blodnitz Hill will be securely taken possession of.” But at 7:00 a.m. the adjutant of the 31st Infantry Regiment reported that this message could not be put through. Thus, simply as a result of an error or oversight, the hotly contested Blodnitz Hill was for a time voluntarily evacuated.
Yielding to the pressure of the French, the 5th Reserve Jäger Battalion at 6:30 a.m. retreated as far as the north edge of St. Etienne. The other Jäger Battalions had also occupied positions north of St. Etienne. Finally, at 6:57 a.m., the operations officer of Group Py called up the 200th Infantry Division: “You will issue an order that the south edge of St. Etienne be immediately occupied.” Thereupon the 200th Division at 7:02 a.m. gave orders to the Jäger Brigade that the south edge of St. Etienne and Blodnitz Hill were to be held. Corresponding orders were issued also to the right neighbor, the 14th Infantry Division of Group Langer.
When, at 7:17 a.m., the 2d Jäger Brigade again received orders that the new line was to be Arnes brook-south edge of St. Etienne-Blodnitz Hill-point of contact with the Fourth Main Line of Resistance, it answered that the 4th Jäger Regiment was within the new line but that the Americans were already closely in front of it. At 7:30 a.m. the commanding officer of the Jäger Brigade, Colonel Lehmann, reported:
The line, south edge of St. Etienne-etc., is getting to be too long and it is impossible to hold it. The 4th and 3d Jäger Regiments have a combined total strength of only 170 men, approximately 100 of whom will be needed for outpost garrison, line battalions, and rest battalions. We are absolutely unable to ward off another attack, and cannot guarantee the outcome.
Thereupon the operations officer answered:
Place only sentries at points south of St. Etienne. Put the rest of the men in the Fourth Main Line of Resistance.
At 8:22 a.m. the operations officer of the 200th Infantry Division again reported to Group Py:
We cannot guarantee the holding of the sector. Here are our strengths: 4th Jägers, 120 men; 3d Jägers, 150 men; 5th Jägers, from 90 to 100 men. Mentally and physically, the troops are worn out. Means of communication and mounted messengers are gone entirely. By 9:15 a.m. Blodnitz Hill had not yet been occupied by the 149th Infantry Regiment, but we are told that the regiment will now ascend the Hill.
At 10:15 a.m. the Jäger Brigade reported that it had relinquished its command over the left sector (149th and 368th Infantry Regiments) to the 37th Infantry Brigade. It stated that the enemy in the sector of the 57th Infantry Regiment, 14th Infantry Division (the right neighbor), had advanced as far as Arnes brook with strong detachments and that barrage fire was requested on this point. In front of its own sector only hostile patrols were feeling their way forward. After receipt of this message, our artillery placed harassing fire on the south bank of Arnes brook, points south of Etienne, and Ludwigs Hill.
At 10:30 a.m. Group Py ordered:
The 8th Jäger Regiment of the 195th Infantry Division will be shifted into the vicinity south of Machault. It is to take up contact with the Jäger Brigade and later on relieve the 200th Infantry Division.
At 11:30 a.m. the right neighboring sector observed that the enemy had entered St. Etienne. The 8th Jäger Regiment was immediately ordered to force the enemy out of this town as soon as possible. At 12:00 o’clock noon, Major von Billow, commanding officer of the 4th Jäger Regiment, reported that his men had completely collapsed. The troops were said to be simply incapable of movement, could not recapture St. Etienne, if it had been taken, and were equally incapable of warding off an attack. The commanding officer requested that the attack be made by the 8th Jäger Regiment.
The chief of staff of Group Py reported at 12:15 p.m.:
The 8th Jäger Regiment is being brought forward by trucks; it has orders to support the 4th Jäger Regiment and to recapture St. Etienne and the northern bank of the Arnes brook.
The 200th Infantry Division therefore requested the 195th Infantry Division to have the trucks drive the 8th Jägers as far as Hohenzollern Hill and order two battalions to be employed in lines immediately behind the sector of the 4th Jägers, with the 3d Battalion, 8th Jägers, following just behind them.
At 2:00 p.m. the 4th Jäger Regiment stated that the alarming reports concerning the capture of St. Etienne by the enemy were false, and that, after investigation, it was found that there were only hostile patrols in the town. The 5th Jäger Regiment reported weak sentries scattered along the St. Etienne-St. Pierre road. In the mean-time the 11th Jäger Battalion, a member of the 4th Jäger Regiment, had despatched Lieutenant of Reserves Frey tag to enter St. Etienne from the east. He dispersed a far stronger hostile patrol, reached the southern section of the village in a well-executed, dashing raid and remained in that position until he was relieved at night. The 4th Reserve Jäger Battalion, arriving first, was shifted to the boundary of the right sector. In this sector, the French 22d Infantry Division at about 4:00 p.m., advancing in several assault waves, attacked the lines of the 56th and 16th Infantry Regiments. At one point the French succeeded in entering the Main Line of Resistance; a counterattack immediately ordered was unsuccessful. The 14th Infantry Division therefore decided not to throw the enemy out until the following morning.
At 1:00 p. m. Group Py had issued orders that, during the night of October 5 to 6, the 8th Jäger Regiment would take over the command in the former sector of the 200th Infantry Division; it was stated that, as early as 1:20 p.m. the 213th Infantry Division had already taken over command in the former left sector of the 149th and 368th Infantry Regiments and in that of the 51st Reserve Division.
Now we hear again from Blanc Mont. Despatched during the forenoon (no hour mentioned), a carrier pigeon arrived at 1:30 p.m. bearing a report from Lieutenant of Reserves Gerch, commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry:
Have been here on Blanc Mont since last night, completely cut off from all contact. Two attacks launched by my men last night to break through the hostile lines toward our rear failed because the enemy is too strong. Please let us have relief, food, and ammunition.
Thereupon, Lieutenant Horn of the 221st Field Aviation Detachment received orders at 1:45 p.m. to fly to Blanc Mont and establish communication with the scattered remnants of the 2d Battalion, 149th Infantry. He was given a sealed order of the division which he was told to drop off, in which it was stated that it was impossible to give relief and that a break through to the rear in the direction of Petersberg was recommended. At 3:45 p.m. Lieutenant Horn returned and reported that his flight had been in vain. He said he encountered strong antiaircraft activities on Blanc Mont; our own troops (2d Battalion, 149th Infantry) were nowhere to be seen. The officer flew his plane at a height of about fifty meters above Blanc Mont, received hostile machine-gun fire, and when he returned had about twenty- five bullet holes scattered over wings and fuselage. Undoubtedly the carrier pigeon had been released from Blanc Mont very early in the morning, was scared out of its wits by the artillery fire, lost its way and consequently reached its loft with several hours’ delay.
How was the situation on October 5 on Blodnitz Hill? This hill had not by any means, as was reported by the 31st Bavarian Infantry Regiment, remained completely unoccupied. During the night, the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, had occupied a substantial portion of Blodnitz Hill and had at the left contact with elements of the 200th Infantry Division. The western slope of the hill, however, remained temporarily unoccupied, for the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, was located with its right flank at the cemetery of St. Etienne, and the 3d Battalion, 149th, located at its left, had been so weakened by its losses on Blanc Mont that at first it was unable to expand its sector as far as Blodnitz Hill. But at 11:00 a.m. this battalion had also sufficiently recovered to enable it to occupy a gap on Blodnitz Hill that was about two hundred meters wide. Thus the hill was again occupied by a continuous front line of our own troops.
The 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, stated:
Around 10:00 a.m. the Americans attempted to advance from Ludwigs Rücken to St. Etienne with great masses of assault detachments but were warded off by machine-gun fire with heavy losses. Stronger elements of his assault detachments continued, however, to lodge within our outpost area, especially from the south exit of Etienne to the depression that extends as far as Ludwigs Rücken.
At about 12:00 o’clock noon, the enemy, with strong forces, moved across the hills located south and southeast of St. Etienne and after a short preparatory fire, attacked Blodnitz Hill and St. Etienne. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 149th, and the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiments, warded this attack off. On this occasion, according to reports from the 1st Battalion, 149th, the enemy made use of cavalry, which rode against its lines in the form of strong patrols and were repelled with heavy casualties. These may very likely have been mounted reconnaissance patrols of the 6th Marine Regiment.
During the afternoon it was observed that the enemy continued to bring up fresh forces. As we now know, it was the American 6th Marine Regiment which by this time was located in the front lines at the left of the American 23d Infantry Regiment. The Germans warded off an attack against Blodnitz Hill which was launched at about 4:00 p.m.
We have already seen that on October 5 the right neighbor of the American 2d Division was unable to keep abreast of the latter, and that in fact the commanding general of the French 21st Army Corps was genuinely worried about his situation. Of this situation, the Germans reported briefly:
Several attacks against the sector of Group Py collapsed in our artillery fire. A local penetration in our lines southwest of Orfeuil was immediately smoothed out by the determined counterattack of the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division, whose men, without awaiting orders, hurled themselves against the enemy.
Early in the morning, the 2d Battalion, 4th Bavarian Infantry Regiment, of the sector of Group Perthes, reënforced by one company of the 13th Infantry Regiment, attacked hostile positions southeast of Monthois in a lively drive, penetrated them to a depth of one kilometer, and captured 47 men. They continued to hold the captured ground as an outpost area. Hostile detachments that later on felt their way forward into this terrain were repulsed.
Following a strong artillery preparation at noon, the enemy attacked the entire front of the 3d Guard Infantry Division and the 199th Infantry Division. The main pressure of this attack was directed on Liry Hill against which, —fifteen attack waves strong—they hurled their troops vainly. Running directly into a well-directed, especially effective artillery fire, his assault detachments, suffering tremendous losses, retreated as far as points in rear of Schwerin Hill. We recognized a renewed assembly area of the enemy and at once launched an effective, concentrated artillery fire on that point. In the defense of Liry Hill the companies of the 357th Infantry Regiment especially distinguished themselves; their tenacious resistance wrecked all the enemy’s earlier attacks. One of the company commanders. Lieutenant of Reserves Ma- rock, was a splendid example of steadfastness to his men during the most critical hours of the defense.
The commanding general of the 213th Infantry Division, all of whose troops had at last been reunited, issued the following order of the day:
Once more the 213th Infantry Division, heretofore continuously employed at scattered portions of the front, has come under my command as an independent unit. ' Much has been undergone, still more must be undertaken. Let us not forget that our sector must be kept absolutely clear, come what may.
The divisional order further outlined that the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment had been designated divisional reserve and that to each of the front line regiments was to be attached a tank-defense battery, with an accompanying battery for the reserve regiment. It was intended to employ the 3d Tank Detachment, scheduled to arrive on October 6, for counterattacks, in case the enemy accomplished a deeper penetration of the front lines.
In its report of October 5 concerning the combat value of the division, Army Headquarters, 3d Army, repeated the statements already made on October 2 regarding the condition of the 3d Guard Infantry Division, and gave its opinion regarding the remainder of the divisions as follows:
The 200th Infantry Division, since September 26 engaged in serious combats, has suffered heavily. There are grave doubts as to whether this division should be left longer in lines. At the present time the combat strength of the three Jäger Regiments has shrunk to a total of 500 men.
The 51st Reserve Division has no further combat value. Exhausting night marches prior to its employment and the last eight major combat days have worn its men out completely. According to last reports, the 234th Infantry Regiment has assembled a remnant of 150 men, the 235th about 350 men, and the 236th about 150 men, which numbers include staffs, machine-gun units, etc.
The 203d Infantry Division is in practically the same condition. The heavy losses have considerably decreased the number of officers, enlisted men, and horses of battalions and batteries. It is necessary that the 410th Infantry Regiment be reorganized. Success in warding off the recent hostile attacks has raised the morale of the men, and confidence prevails despite their weariness.
The 213 Infantry Division maintains the excellent combat value displayed during yesterday’s attacks, in which the 149th Infantry and the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment were engaged in efforts to hold Blanc Mont and block the points of penetration at Médéah Hill. It must, however, be assumed that these bitter combats have been accompanied by considerable casualties.
The 195th Infantry Division: Health and morale satisfactory. This division is fully able to engage in defensive warfare.
The 15th Bavarian Infantry Division: Not a single unit of this division is capable of combat.
The following order was issued at 1:15 p.m., October 5, by Headquarters, 3d Army:
At a number of points along our front our infantry, after repulsing major attacks of the enemy, has repeatedly pursued them into their own lines. Also several attacks, launched for the purpose of improving our own front lines and the attainment of certain objectives, have been carried out with great success. Among others, the following regiments have especially distinguished themselves: Infantry Regiment Count Bülow von Dennewitz (the 55th), the Guard Fusilier Regiment, the 74th Reserve Infantry Regiment, the 149th, 406th, and 409th Infantry Regiments, the 199th Infantry and the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division, as well as the heroic Jäger Battalions of the 200th Infantry Division. All divisions will exert particular efforts to make it plain to the men in lines that by offensives at all points the enemy must again be brought to feel the necessary respect for our troops. According to statements of prisoners it appears that the enemy is worn out and has suffered heavy losses. We must therefore, all the more, show that our combat strength is still unbroken. I shall call the attention of higher authorities to all divisions that especially distinguish themselves during the coming offensive operations.
In the evening of October 5, the commander in chief of the 3d Army, General-Oberst von Einem, despatched the following wireless message to Group Py:
His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince, commander in chief of the Group of Armies, German Crown Prince, has requested me to convey to all troops his appreciation and greetings for the valor manifested during the repulse of today’s hostile attacks.
Signed: Von Einem, General-Oberst.
His Majesty the Kaiser, on October 5 issued the following order, which was to be made known to all troops a day later but which was not to be broadcast by wireless:
To the German Army and the German Navy
For months the enemy, with a powerful array of reserves, has hammered almost without cessation against your lines. You were forced to persevere, often without rest, for long weeks, valiantly opposing an enemy numerically far superior to your own strength. Therein lies the greatness of the task with which you are now confronted, and which you are carrying out. Troops of all German stocks are fulfilling their duties, and on foreign soil courageously defending the Fatherland. Difficult is the lot of my Navy in its efforts to be of useful service in the face of the combined sea forces of the Allies, and in its tireless endeavor to assist the Army in its hard struggle. With pride and admiration, the eyes of the Fatherland are directed upon the achievements of the Army and Navy.
To you I express my own gratitude and that of the Fatherland. In the midst of this struggle for existence comes the collapse of the Macedonian front. Yours is still unbroken and will so remain.
In agreement with our Allies, I have once more decided to offer terms of peace to the enemy. But only to an honorable peace will we consent. This we owe to our dead heroes who have sacrificed their lives for us; this we owe to our children. Whether arms will rest is still undecided. Until then we must not cease in our efforts; we must, as heretofore, give all our efforts tirelessly to withstanding the onslaught of the enemy. The hour is grave. But, trusting in our strength and God’s gracious help, we feel strong enough to defend our beloved Fatherland.
Signed: Wilhelm Imperator, Rex.
Before we take up the events of October 6, at least one critical comment appears necessary. We have seen that during the forenoon of October 5, St. Etienne was partly occupied by enemy patrols and partly unoccupied, and that behind it were located the completely exhausted Jäger Regiments, each one of which had only about the strength of one company. If, on that day, Major General Lejeune had launched an attack with his entire division, not only the village but probably also the positions behind it would have fallen into the hands of the Americans. But General Lejeune had no way of knowing this. And even if he had known, and had believed the report of the French 118th Infantry Regiment, which, however, arrived only late in the afternoon after the fresh 8th Jäger Regiment had come up—then what? Major General Lejeune had had such hard going with his two French neighbors that he would perhaps have hesitated even then to drive another wedge pointed by American troops beyond the rest of his front, a wedge which would at once have been subjected to strong German flank attacks. In addition it should be remembered that Blodnitz Hill, then held by the still very able 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry Regiment, might have proved a thorn in his side. Its garrison would have been in a position to hurl strong flank attacks against the Americans had they advanced in attack against St. Etienne, and would have made this assault a costly undertaking.
(To be continued in the next issue)