A Further Discussion of Naval Organization from the Industrial Point of View
(See Page 1519, August, 1926, Proceedings)
Captain C. A. Abele, U. S. Navy—Boiled down the author °f this article argues for the control of navy material matters by a corps to be called an “Engineer Corps” or an “Industrial Corps” which corps is to be dominated by naval constructors.
His fetish is “Production.” Quoting from paragraph six—
Engineering, in the broad sense, has two branches, namely: production and operation…The major part, in the strictly professional sense, is production.
Production in the Navy is entirely a minor consideration. Military efficiency is our goal. Anything that does not tend toward that goal should be surrendered to civil endeavor.
Quoting from paragraph eleven.
…the member of a corps trained to the thought that his value to the government lies in production engineering, will be satisfied to continue his regular duties in time of war.
Does this mean that the author feels that naval constructors have lost interest or faith in their profession and want to shift to other pursuits?
Quoting from paragraph twelve.
There is another strong argument for a large and separate production engineering group, based on the consideration that there should always be a strong minority ideal in every organization to act as a balance wheel on the majority. The line, while possessed of the highest ideals, after all is only human and the writer considers the maintenance of such a minority point of view [absolutely necessary also to insure segregation of criticism] especially a need in a military organization in a country where the military function is fundamentally conceived as being subordinate to civil authority.
This would indicate a lack of conception on the part of the author of what the Navy is and what its mission is. In the execution of the Navy’s mission there is plenty of minority opinion. But when policies are settled, certainly loyal cooperation is what is then wanted; and not a strong minority in “production” to wrestle with. This would seem to be a perversion of the use of the terms “majority” and “minority,” and it further intimates that production is a military function.
Quoting from paragraph seven.
Efficiency growing out of criticism only is not of the ideal type but it is incumbent on the Navy to conserve every possible incentive to efficiency, and criticism is one of the most important....and the ideal organization for the Navy is one which recognizes it [criticism] at its true value and provides a segregation of activities so that criticism by the user shall land absolutely and without the possibility of evasion upon the producer.
Herein the organization of the Navy is to be based on other grounds than the efficiency of the Navy a reductum ad absurdum.
Quoting from paragraph twenty-one.
The proposed corps might be logically referred to as either the engineer corps or the industrial corps.
This sounds very much like Trotsky’s labor battalions.
Quoting from paragraph twenty-three.
The two conditions necessary in the Navy to insure the highest efficiency of the various individual specialties are: first, some common concept or ideal sufficiently strong and universal within the group to which the specialist belongs to give appreciation on the part of all the members of the group of the need for freedom of each specialty to develop and to function freely; and, second, a group large enough to constitute a strong minority in professional ideals as compared with the line. This common concept in the proposed engineer corps would be supplied by the common ideal of production engineering…
The good of the Navy and the safety of the nation should be the concept of all officers of the Navy. Unfortunately, it would appear from what the author says that in the shore-staying corps, other motives will govern. After a careful perusal of the elements the proposed corps is to be composed of, and an evaluation of the inducements held out to gain adherents to the planned organization, it would appear that the idea in view is the creation of an eleemosynary institution as the haven for those holding commissions in the Navy who wish to avoid going to sea with its attendant responsibilities.
Quoting from paragraph twenty-seven.
The line as the ultimate means of making the fleet effective as an operated agency should dictate policies and should enunciate the ideals which the material should meet but, haying done that, it should leave the technical details of providing the material to be worked out as a strictly production engineering problem under production engineering specialists but still subject to operating engineering criticism [inspection] of results.
These are high sounding words, “production” pertains to the civil establishment. Any production by the Navy should be technical and non-competitive. For that a corps does not seem necessary. Technicists, consultants, and inspectors would seem all that is necessary.
Quoting from paragraph twenty-nine.
.... the aides [referring to aide for operation, personnel, and material advocated in paragraph twenty-five] would represent the technical naval organization, having nothing to do with politics and actuated by the ideal that technical results in the extreme event of war would be more important to the nation than absolute economy at any time but with the element of production engineering effectively represented both as a means of obtaining the most efficient tool for the nation’s naval protection and as a means of obtaining it at the smallest practicable cost to the nation.
This is rather involved, but it is understood to mean that “Production Engineering” as described is to participate with operation of the fleet and personnel of the fleet, on an equal footing—that is, that these three are to be co-equal— and the co-equal material division is to be headed by an officer who has not the vision, ideals, nor concepts of a naval officer; but as stated in paragraph twenty- three—
The two conditions necessary in the Navy to insure the highest efficiency of the various individual specialties are: first, some common concept or deal sufficiently strong and universal within the group to which the specialist belongs to give appreciation on the part of all the members of the group of the need for freedom of each specialty to develop and to function freely; and, second, a group large enough to constitute a strong minority in professional ideals as compared with the line. This common concept in the proposed engineer corps would be supplied by the common ideal of production engineering…
This minority is to be a counter-balance apparently to the operation and personnel aides. In the prosecution of war as well as in the routine of peace such a minority would be a mill-stone around their necks rather than a counter-balance.
Quoting from paragraph thirty-two.
It would be exceedingly important that material production and maintenance should be absolutely under the cognizance of the material division by law but this does not mean that in minor cases the material division should not delegate the performance of minor production and maintenance functions to the head (not to any subordinate) of a particular operative establishment. This would always be the condition insofar as maintenance of equipment afloat by the ship’s force is concerned but in all such cases the material function should rest in the immediately responsible senior.
Herein a naval constructor proposes to dominate all repairs of the Navy ashore and afloat graciously permitting the forces afloat, through the senior officer present, to effect necessary repairs.
In paragraphs nine and ten the author tells us by indirection that the naval constructor is the super-specialist in production.
In paragraph thirty-four the author proposes among other things that the material officer shall take over the material matters of the Marine Corps—a wide reach!
Relative to the assignment of officers to the proposed engineering corps the following is noted from paragraph forty-one:
(j) If he then still chooses to follow his specialty, commission him in the engineer corps provided he is recommended for it by all his commanding officers both line and staff. Otherwise, unless the Chief of the Division of Material recommends to the contrary, do not assign him to the corps.
(m) Give to all line officers of not less than nine and not more than twelve years commissioned service the privilege of transferring to the engineer corps as extra numbers and without loss of rank or precedence provided their transfer is recommended by the Chief of Material and provided they pass a satisfactory examination before a board composed of officers of the engineering corps.
Herein the author proposes that the Chief of Material shall dictate by negation to the Chief of Personnel his “co-equal” among the aides, in personnel matters. The Chief of Personnel’s job would be worth just about a plugged nickel. Furthermore it is proposed that the line shall be a dump for such officers as the Chief of Material may not want. This idea is not new, it was suggested in connection with the proposed independent air corps drawn up last winter under the egis of naval constructors.
Fortunately, a little investigation by the Office of Naval Intelligence can shed some light on the practicability of such a corps as the author suggests for adoption in the U. S. Navy. The Russian Navy had what was called its Guard d’Equipage. From information received from a former Russian officer of long experience, it would appear that the proposed engineer or industrial corps is quite similar to the Russian Guard d’Equipage. This organization comprised all the shore staff branches of the navy and handled its material.
Russian sea-going officers claimed that the Guard d’Equipage, due to its lack of understanding of the needs of the navy, its dictatorialness, dilatoriness, and its resultant failure to cooperate, was responsible for the Russian Navy’s defeat in the Russo- Japanese War. The sea-going officers immediately after that war set themselves to the task of breaking the power of the Guard d’Equipage. By the outbreak of the World War this had been accomplished and as a result the Russian Navy acquitted itself with distinction up to the time of the Revolution.
Surely a system of Navy organization and administration which brought such disaster to Russia can be of no interest to us, except as a warning.
“Production” is a function of the civil establishment. The Navy’s business is military. “Production” fostered by the Navy will gain it few friends and probably many enemies, as has been amply demonstrated in the case of aircraft production at the Philadelphia Navy Yard during the recent aircraft investigation by Congress. Production should not be carried on by naval officers. Experimentation and repairs are legitimate functions. No matter how we blink the facts, the German Navy was the Navy par excellence of its time. For each dollar the German’s put into their navy they got a dollar’s worth. Industrial matters for the German Navy were handled by civilians.
Approval has been given to internal criticism by the author. It is of course polite to call it “criticism” among ourselves, but Congress and the public call it “bickering.” We have already in the Selection Law sufficient cause for bickering without asking Congress to give us more. A weary Congress gave us that law so that the Navy could keep its troubles to itself instead of pouring them on the Congress.
The Germans had selection out and did not fill their Navy with sore heads, a condition that is growing in our Navy which is not a good portent to the service or the nation.
A house divided against itself cannot stand.
A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet
(See page 1111, June, 1926, Proceedings)
Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. Navy.—In the several discussions in the September number of the Proceedings anent my paper on, “A Destroyer Leader for the United States Fleet,” it is pleasing to note that in at least one respect there is unanimous agreement on the part of those who submitted suggestions and criticisms. This is in that we do need the leaders.
As might be expected, there was some criticism of the general features of design, and especially in regard to size and gun power. If the reader will forbear with me I would like further to discuss these matters.
Captain Dinger suggests a smaller vessel,—one of from 2,000 to 2,400 tons displacement as being capable of filling the bill. The desirability for the smaller vessel is based primarily on a less expenditure of funds. In my original paper the question of funds was neglected, the arguments being based entirely on military characteristics.
I take for granted that Captain Dinger’s arguments in support of the engineering outlay for his small leader are sound. But I cannot agree with him in certain other respects:
- This small leader will be considerably inferior to the small cruisers which the Japanese are using as leaders, and to the new, 3,100-ton French leaders which are soon to be laid down.
- While the three single six-inch guns are widely separated, they would need spray and wind shields to be efficiently served. The combined weights of these shields would probably be as great as the weight of the two light turrets which would cover four guns. The after gun is entirely too low and too far aft. Experience at sea has proved that this gun position, which looks all right theoretically, is very bad practically. And it is probable that with this small displacement, and the middle gun installed in the high position as shown in the sketch, the stability would not permit of raising this gun to a suitable height.
- To place only two triple torpedo tubes on any vessel of this type would be a decided step backwards.
- The displacement of this proposed design is not sufficient to give a sufficiently steady gun platform for six-inch guns and to provide for sufficient living spaces for officers and crew. Nor will it permit the necessary facilities for directing a large number of units.
- If the guns, torpedo tubes, and catapult are drawn to scale it is apparent that with a length of only 360 feet, there is not sufficient room for all on the center line without placing the bow and stern guns undesirably close to the ends of the ship.
- It is noted that Captain Dinger’s plan gives a beam of only thirty-four feet for a 360-foot length. This is a finer hull than we have either in our destroyers or light cruisers. I am inclined to think that this would be a decided disadvantage as to sea keeping qualities.
Commander Kays apparently agrees with me as to the general characteristics of the proposed leader provided it can maneuver with the destroyers. Although he does not say it in so many words, it is apparent that he is opposed to the half measure vessel of about 2,000 tons displacement. This stand, I believe, is' sound.
The point he makes about the shorter masts is well taken. It has recently come to my attention that the new developments in radio may make the high masts unnecessary. If this is so, they should be cut down.
Mr. Livingston brings up the question as to the feasibility of six-inch turrets on so small a vessel, and calls attention to the fact that on the Omaha class with a beam of fifty-five feet these turrets project over the side when trained abeam.
It should be remembered that when the Omaha class were originally designed the two six-inch gun turrets were not contemplated. They were later added to the requirements, with the result that the forward turret is farther forward and the after turret is much farther aft than would have been the case had their installation been originally contemplated. In addition the hulls of the Omaha class are unusually fine both forward and aft. In consequence of these two features the decks of these vessels have a width of only thirty feet at the frame where the forward turret is placed, and of only twenty-two feet at the frame where the after turret is installed. It is the turrets that make the installation of these six-inch guns on these narrow decks feasible. Without the turrets the crews would not have sufficient foot room for loading. That the turrets overhang the sides is no drawback. Instead it would seem that on a narrow ship it is the turret that makes the larger gun practical.
Mr. Prendergast’s analysis of the question of light cruisers, destroyer leaders, and half leaders is most interesting. I agree with him in regard to the undesirability of the employment of light-cruisers for destroyer flagships. This should not be necessary. The flag boats of our destroyer squadrons as now organized correspond closely to what the British call half-leaders. They are not real leaders and are not suitable as such. It is noted that Mr. Prendergast suggests one leader for every twenty-four destroyers instead of one for every eighteen, the difference being due to his four division organization instead of our three division organization.
While Mr. Prendergast is apprehensive of the weight of the six-inch turret so far forward, it should be borne in mind that such a turret is not heavy construction but only of sufficient weight to protect against the elements, i.e., wind and spray,—and to give footing for the guns’ crews. I believe that our constructors can overcome the difficulties of spray by the proper design of hull, ship control station, and fire control station.
The blinding effect of the six-inch gun when fired at night cannot be much greater than that of the five-inch. One reason for placing the guns in a turret is to get them .farther from the bridge than would be the case if two guns were mounted singly so that one would fire over the other.
I cannot agree that it would be desirable to have torpedoes of two sizes as Mr. Prendergast suggests. If cold shots are necessary we should be able to make them with twenty-one-inch torpedoes as well as with smaller ones. It is better to have all of the torpedoes larger than necessary to sink a small ship than to have some of them not large enough to cripple a big ship.
There may be something in Mr. Prendergast’s point about the location of the searchlights. However, while in a night action the searchlights might be used as a point of aim, the chances are that the deflection of the enemy’s shots will be such as not to hit the exact locality of the lights.
I am inclined to agree with Mr. Prendergast in the possibility that the funnel area is not sufficient. The designers must be trusted to remedy the defect when the calculations are made. As for staying of the mainmast it would seem that the answer is to cut down the size of the mast to the dimension where it could be stayed without interfering with the after turret.
Mr. Prendergast bases his stand that the leader of from 2,000 tons to 2,200 tons is of sufficient size on British destroyer leader experiences in the World War. Now I think we in the United States would make a tremendous mistake to let this influence our judgment against the larger vessels. Studies of the Battle of Jutland clearly demonstrated that the destroyers were poorly led on both the British and the German sides. This was not necessarily the fault of the personnel. It was essentially the result of unsuitable vessels that did not permit of the higher command making the best use of the destroyers at their disposal. With all the destroyers available in the battle, the greatest number that attacked simultaneously at any time was eleven 1
In watching the trend of affairs in the foregoing navies it is noted that the size of destroyer leaders gradually increases just as did and does the size of practically all other classes of vessels. We have the opportunity to build a ship that will meet all the present and future requirements insofar as can be foreseen. To build the smaller vessel can have no other results than to leave us dissatisfied and wondering why we did not obtain a big enough ship in the first place.
The Tidal Wave and Earthquake at Arica, Peru, in 1868
(See page 1319, July, 1926, Proceedings)
Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. Navy.—I have learned through the discussion of my paper by Commander Hewitt in the September Proceedings and through a letter from Lieutenant Wylly of the Cleveland, which ship has recently been at Arica, that Mr. von Tresckow, the American Consul, is much interested in collecting data concerning the earthquake and tidal wave.
Lieutenant Wylly sent me copies of a paper by the late Rear Admiral L. G. Billings titled, “Some Personal Experiences with Earthquakes,” which was published in the National Geographic Magazine of January 1915, and of a letter written by Mr. von Tresckow to Admiral Billings which was never delivered owing to the latter’s death.
Admiral Billings’ account is a very vivid description of the earthquake and tidal wave as he remembered it after a lapse of forty-seven years.
As Mr. von Tresckow’s letter throws light on the Wateree’s career after the grounding, and as it may lead to further information, I am sending it for publication. It is as follows:
American Consular Service,
Arica, Chile, February 16, 1923*
* Returned to American Consulate April 4, 1923, Arica, Chile.
Rear Admiral L. G. Billings,
U. S. Navy, Retired,
c/o Navy Department, Washington.
Sir:
I have to state that as American Consul of Arica I have been very much interested in your vivid description of your personal experience of the tidal wave and earthquake at Arica in the late sixties, which appeared in the Geographic Magazine of January, 1915. This interest is accentuated by the fact that the river Wateree, after which the U. S. Naval vessel Wateree was named, flows about one mile from my native town, Camden, South Carolina.
Mr. B. S. Fry, manager of the firm of George P. Finlayson, and British Vice Consul, has a bound volume of the Geographic Magazine of 1915, and lends it to dozens of American and English visitors every year, who peruse your article, especially that part dealing with Arica, with the greatest interest.
What prompts me primarily to write you is the closing paragraph of your article, which reads:
Careful survey of the Wateree proved that while she was practically uninjured, it would be impossible to launch her, so after removing the most valuable of her equipment, she was sold at auction to a hotel company. An epidemic of yellow fever broke up that enterprise, and the old ship was afterwards successfully used as a hospital, a storehouse, and lastly as a target for great guns during the Peruvian-Chilean war. But her gaunt ribs still rise above the shifting sands, a fitting monument to one of the greatest modern earthquakes.
I note from this that you do not know the more than remarkable later history of the Wateree, and I would also like to ascertain where you got your information as to the old ship being a hospital, storehouse, etc., and a target for Peruvian guns, of which tradition nothing is known here.
I will state that in the tidal wave of 1878 the Wateree was floated back from the position at the bottom of the hills to within perhaps 120 feet from the shore line, and would have floated into the bay had not a low sand dune obstructed her passage and held her there. Mr. Edward J. Hulman, an Englishman who has resided in Bolivia and Tacna for some forty-five or fifty years, and who in the seventies was a clerk in the house of Campbell Brothers in the adjoining town of Tacna, stated to me that while he was with that firm just after the second tidal wave, the firm through the American Consul bought the Wateree, sold the guns and ammunition to the Peruvian Government, that some of the guns were shipped to Lima, and that one at least was used on the Morro at Arica against the Chilean bombarding fleet in ’79. That as the shells were a little too small for the Peruvian guns they put brass or copper rings around them so that they would fit the bore of the Peruvian guns. That the firm of Campbell Brothers dismantled the ship and sold the metal, and that the few pieces now remaining in the sand dune about fifty feet from the Tacna-Arica Railway are the remains of the Wateree. The Peruvian ship called, I think the America, which also was floated ashore in the first tidal wave, was also dismantled by someone, probably after the second tidal wave, as her eight fireboxes are still about midway between the bottom of the mountains and the shore.
There has been some argument here as to whether the remains of the America were really those of the Wateree, but Mr. Hulman claims that he positively knows that the few pieces of iron left near the seashore are those of the Wateree.
If you had a picture of the eight fireboxes of the so-called America, could you identify them if they were really those of the Wateree, or would all fireboxes be alike?
As stated above, nothing is known here of the ship’s being used as a hospital, storehouse, etc. How she could be so used I cannot imagine, because she was in the desert with no water or habitations near.
You will perhaps be interested to know that Mrs. George P. Finlayson, Sr., daughter of the British Vice Consul at the time of the first tidal wave, Mr. Nugent, and her family, though born later, have had handed down to them stories of the courtesy and kindness of the officers of the Wateree, and the Nugent family have had a piece of furniture from the Wateree.
If you have the time and inclination, I should be very much interested to hear from you on the subject, as I would like to make an entry of any additional facts in the Miscellaneous Record Book of this Consulate.
Very respectfully yours,
Egmont C. von Tresckow,
American Consul
The Threshold of a New Era In International Law
(See Page 1367, July, 1926, Proceedings)
The Christian Science Monitor, 19 August, 1926. — The July number of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings contains a very suggestive article, “The New Era in International Law,” by an officer of the United States Navy, Lieutenant Commander Lucius C. Dunn. It is of importance because of the great stress it lays upon the part played in the maintenance of peace by a wider interest in international affairs. As a naval officer Commander Dunn cannot be denied his fling at “the pitiable Pacifist advocates—those emotional theorists and their peace-at-any-price doctrines.” But he recognizes the fact that an active and intelligent interest in international affairs by no means precludes a thorough understanding of the necessity for adequate equipment for national defense.
There is great value in Commander Dunn’s brief summing-up of the essays in international cooperation during the last fifty years which have led up to what he holds to be a new era in international law. International conferences have not always assured peace. That the world knows too well. Ever since the Berlin Conference of 1878 the nations of Europe have more and more often sat around a council board, yet the cataclysm of 1914 was not averted. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe that the more things nations have in common the less they are apt to quarrel.
Among the recent conventions are the International Postal Union, the Conference of International Sanitation, International Marine Conference, Congress for Adopting a Common Meridian, and International Labor Congress. Under the League of Nations are many conferences such as those on narcotic drugs and that on the labor of women and children. Only recently a Pan-American Press Conference was held in Washington, and delegates are now on the way to an International Press Conference in Geneva. An international commission is codifying international law, and the International Chamber of Commerce is at all times a force for the establishment of better commercial relations between nations. And of supreme importance is the preliminary conference for the Limitation of Armament now sitting at Geneva.
Commander Dunn sees in all this a reason why naval officers should be ardent observers of foreign affairs and well versed in international law. That is, however, too narrowly technical a view. The more widely knowledge of the thought and activities of foreign nations is spread among the American people the less will be the danger of those international misunderstandings which so frequently culminate in war. It is for this reason that such institutions as the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, perform a true service to humanity, and it is for the same reason that the growing interest of the American press in foreign affairs is a healthful and a helpful symptom. As Americans develop the international consciousness they will lose that parochial narrowness that sees only potential enemies in foreign nations.