In the first article of this series, Joint Army and Navy Operations— Part I, published in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS for December, special attention was devoted to a discussion of the requirements for effective cooperation between the War and Navy Departments, which cooperation, as was there stated, is a fundamental condition precedent to effective cooperation by forces within the theater of operations.
Also, in the previous article it was pointed out that the concept of the war, determined by the President upon the advice of the War and Navy Departments, is the guide to the character of the war and is the foundation upon which are based the Joint Basic Readiness Plans and Joint Basic Operating Plans.
Cooperation between the War and Navy Departments so far as planning is concerned, is made effective through the Joint Board. In the preparation of contributory plans to make the basic plans effective and in the execution of these plans there must be further cooperation between the subordinate agencies of the War and Navy Departments. A discussion of the cooperation which is required to make the basic readiness plans effective and to insure strategic deployment in accordance with the basic operating plans, would cover a wide field of administrative activities, including cooperation with such agencies as the war industries board, selective service organization, etc.
A discussion of such activities, though it might be desirable, cannot be considered to be within the field to be covered by these articles. It will be assumed, therefore, that effective administrative cooperation exists, and the requirements for effective cooperation between forces of the Army and Navy within the theater of operations will now be considered.
Effective cooperation between army and navy forces within the theater of operations is dependent upon—
(a) Mutual confidence between commanders and personnel of respective army and navy forces.
(b) Efficient training of personnel in the types of operations requiring joint action.
(c) A definite assignment of responsibility and commensurate authority.
(d) The assignment of definite strategical objectives.
(e) The provision of adequate and suitable means for the accomplishment of the task.
The necessity of mutual confidence was pointed out in Part I but, because of its importance, is repeated here.
It is well recognized that there does not exist a spirit of comradeship between soldiers and sailors. This antipathy, if we judge by history, dates back for centuries. It may have begun with the practice of Romans and Phoenicians of embarking soldiers on the galley to do the fighting. It was probably accentuated in the British service, from which we obtain many of our traditions, in the Elizabethan and Cromwellian periods, during which the British Fleets often were put under the command of generals.
During a period of nearly two hundred years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, most of the British joint operations were characterized by failure due primarily to lack of sympathy and confidence between the Army and Navy.
It is related in history that when in 1655 Cromwell sent a joint expedition to capture the West Indies, he was so certain that Admiral Penn and General Venables would disagree as to the method of procedure, that he sent three commissioners with the expedition to act in cases of disagreement between the two commanders. Naturally, the operation failed, for the appointment of the commissioners indicated lack of confidence in the commanders and the commanders had no confidence in the commissioners.
Other instances in British operations are numerous, such as the joint operation against Cartagena under Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth, and the Walcheren Expedition under Admiral Strachan and General Lord Chatham.
The French, too, have had many illustrations of the difficulty encountered in obtaining efficiency in joint operations. Although the French have usually followed the plan of having a joint commander, success has not been frequent. Certainly the French experience proves that the appointment of an officer to joint command does not in itself insure success. A lack of mutual confidence can destroy any chance of effective cooperation.
Whatever its cause, a lack of sympathy and confidence between the Army and Navy is a serious obstacle to the successful conduct of joint operations and every endeavor should be made to eradicate it.
Mutual confidence between army and navy forces can be attained only by training in joint operations based upon mutually accepted standard practice instructions and doctrine.
In no way can a feeling of comradeship be obtained except by contact and close association of personnel of the two services. Joint exercises furnish the means of obtaining this contact and association. Such exercises will acquaint each service with the methods of operation of the other service and will give an insight into its problems, difficulties and requirements, which can be obtained in no other way. Confidence will increase with knowledge of the sister service and with the eradication of differences of opinion through practical experience. The self confidence of each service will also be increased by experience in such operations.
So important is this joint training that the British while preparing for the Gallipoli Campaign in the Bay of Mudros, continually exercised their army units in landing operations in cooperation with the Navy. The French, when landing on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, had many delays and many unfortunate accidents which have been attributed to the fact that they had had but one rehearsal in landing operations, and, consequently, had not reached a high state of efficiency in the performance of such operations. Had the British not had opportunities to practice landing and to develop a satisfactory standard practice, the losses upon landing would doubtless have been much greater.
The United States Army and Navy have conducted exercises at various times but always as opponents. It is essential that in the future the exercises provide for army and navy cooperation and that such cooperation shall cause the forces to work in physical cooperation in landing operations.
Perhaps our most serious obstacle to the development of mutual confidence is the absence of standard practice instructions and doctrine relating to joint operations, with the consequent uncertainty as to questions of command, functions, and methods of procedure.
An attempt is being made in this series of articles to furnish a ground work for such instructions and doctrine, but it is recognized that such standard practice and doctrine will be valuable only when mutually accepted by the Army and Navy after being put to the test of actual experience and practice. For the purpose ' of testing proposed instructions, joint operations on a large scale are indispensable.
Another of the chief causes of inefficient joint operations in the past has been the failure of the superior to assign definite authority and responsibility.
Instructions from superior authority must assign definite responsibility and establish commensurate authority.
Excepting inherent lack of mutual confidence there has been no condition which has jeopardized effective cooperation to such an extent as has the absence of definitely assigned responsibility and authority.
The British have consistently maintained the principle that in joint operations the admiral is supreme as to operations afloat while the general is supreme as to operations on shore. On the contrary, European continental nations like France and Germany, have always appointed a joint commander for the expedition. The United States has in general followed the British practice.
Perhaps there is no subject to be discussed in this series of articles concerning which differences of opinion will be so great or so strongly maintained. It is the author's opinion that there must be definite understanding as to unity of command wherever army and navy forces are cooperating.
In the case of extensive joint operations in which the Army and Navy are not physically cooperating, or in which physical cooperation is on a small scale, and where the operations are conducted within easy communicating distance of the seat of government, joint command may repose in the President, he being guided in its exercise by the Joint Board. In operations requiring physical cooperation of army and navy forces, conducted at a long distance from the seat of government, joint command should be assigned to an admiral or general designated by the President upon the advice of the War and Navy Departments; the choice as to whether the joint commander shall be an admiral or a general being dependent upon the nature of the operations.
In our own history many examples can be found to indicate the danger of the President exercising command over military and naval forces when such command is exercised without competent professional advice.
The Civil War furnishes instances of presidential interference. It was not until General Grant was given command of all of the armies that real progress was made.
At the time of the Civil War there was no real General Staff and no Joint Board. The President's advice was received largely from persons of no military training, who were often influenced by personal or political motives.
In 1915 President Wilson issued an order forbidding the Joint Board to meet. We entered the war unprepared and without a properly constituted Joint Board or staff to advise the President. It is probably fortunate for our Army's reputation that its operations were conducted so far from the seat of government that General Pershing was given full authority and responsibility for its operations.
While there is not sufficient space in this article to describe McClellan's Peninsula Campaign it is suggested that a full account of it be read to see the dangers of interference from ill advised presidential action.
Before discussing this question of joint command further, it is considered necessary to divert from the main theme long enough to analyze command. Such an analysis might be out of place in this article were it not for the fact that many of the inefficient operations of the past have been, and many of the fears concerning joint command will be, due to failure to appreciate the dual nature of command.
Command consists of two elements which, for purposes of analysis, may be designated—the directive element and the instructive element.
Directive command asserts what is to be done; the objective to be attained. The responsibility for directive command cannot be delegated. It is the exercise of definite authority inherent in one's orders to command.
Instructive command asserts how the task is to be accomplished. This element of command may be omitted entirely, in which case the responsibility for the method used is delegated to the junior.
If the command contains only the instructive element the junior is responsible that the command is implicitly obeyed and is not responsible for the result.
Step by step as the size of units and complexity of operations increases, the instructive element of command is made use of less and less. As operations become of still greater extent and forces are composed of large units, it becomes impracticable for a commander to issue instructive commands. As a consequence instructive command is made largely automatic through standard practice instructions and doctrines, and commanders rely on the knowledge and common sense of their subordinates to insure the efficient performance of the required operations without detailed instructions. The directive element of command becomes paramount and the instructive element may entirely disappear.
Unity of direction in the operations of war is essential. Divided responsibility for directive command is fatal.
The allied armies on the western front failed to achieve success until Marshal Foch was given directive command over all the allied armies. While it is hoped that the Army and Navy will cooperate better than did the allied armies, it will be found that there will be sufficient differences of opinion to require joint command when the theater of operations is at a great distance from the seat of government and the operations are of such a nature as to require physical cooperation.
The advent of aviation as an arm of the Army and Navy has accentuated the need for joint command for no longer can the shore be the dividing line between the authority of the general and the admiral.
History proves beyond a doubt that effective cooperation between modern army and navy forces will require that in joint operations the responsibility and authority for the exercise of directive command shall be vested in one person.
As has been pointed out before, there may be instances in which this command can be exercised by the President advised by the Joint Board, but in cases where forces are cooperating physically at a great distance from the seat of government, the authority and responsibility for the exercise of directive command jointly over army and navy forces in the theater of operations, should be vested in one officer designated by the President upon the advice of the War and Navy Departments.
The fear of joint command which for several years made the British decline to place their armies under the joint command of a French general, was largely due to national jealousy. The objection to joint command was also due to lack of confidence in the French leaders and in the French Army. It was not until the entry of the United States into the war that the French morale was improved to an extent which reestablished confidence. Also the appointment of Marshal Foch provided a leader in whom the British had confidence. In the agreement placing the British Army under the allied commander-in-chief a condition was insisted upon which provided in effect that Marshal Foch should exercise directive command only and that all orders involving the British Army should be issued to the British commander-in-chief and by him transmitted to the British troops.
This is correct. The principle may be expressed thus:
In joint operations responsibility with commensurate authority shall be definitely assigned by higher authority.
An officer assigned to joint command shall exercise directive command. He shall exercise instructive command only over forces of the service to which he belongs.
Directive command to forces of the service to which the joint commander does not belong, shall be issued only to the senior officer present of such service.
It is apparent from frequent discussions of the subject of joint command that some officers fear that a commander appointed to joint command will not abide by these principles nor give adequate consideration to the views of the commander of the force of the other service.
This danger naturally does exist, but there are three ways to assist in preventing it from occurring. These are:
(1) Careful selection of officers assigned to high command, having in view the ability to cooperate as one of the primary attributes.
(2) Development of mutual confidence to such an extent that a joint commander will feel the utmost confidence in the recommendations of the officer commanding forces of the other service.
(3) Appointment of a joint staff to assist the joint commander.
The first and second are essential for the success of any joint operation. The third is necessary only in the case of operations involving major strategical decisions.
The opponents of joint command can, by a careful perusal of history, find examples of successful joint operations conducted without the designation of joint command.
Among these may be cited; the capture of Louisburg by the British under Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst; the capture of Quebec by General Wolfe and Admiral Saunders; the capture of Martinique by Admiral Rodney and General Monkton, and the successful campaign in the West Indies by Lord St. Vincent and General Grey.
A study of these campaigns, however, will indicate that at no time were the expeditions endangered by the presence of an active enemy fleet. From the tactical point of view the interests of the army forces in the operations were paramount and the naval forces were in reality subordinate parts of these expeditions.
Furthermore the strategical objectives were definitely fixed and the necessity of making important strategical decisions did not arise except at Quebec. At Quebec Admiral Saunders was becoming fearful that his fleet would be frozen in before the campaign was finished and on several occasions made known his intentions of abandoning the campaign if Quebec did not fall by a definite date. The capture of Quebec prevented a serious dispute between the admiral and the general.
Here was a situation which in its general aspects may be frequent. Two commanders of equal authority are cooperating. A dispute arises as to whether the operations shall be continued or abandoned. It is essential that, unless communication with a joint superior is possible, one of these officers be charged with the responsibility for the decision and that he have adequate authority to require obedience to his decision. This necessity for placing the responsibility has been previously stated as a principle.
The consideration of this example leads to another question—How shall one determine whether the Army or Navy has the paramount interest in the operation?
The question of paramount interest, has been considered from the point of view of coast defense in the joint army and navy publication entitled Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense.
The paragraph relating to this subject reads as follows:
17. Cooperation between army and naval officers directing operations against enemy attacks will be governed by the following principles:
(a) When an enemy force of a strength greatly superior to that of the naval force available for use against it approaches the coast, the naval officer will inform the army officer of the situation and shall assume that the Army has a paramount interest in the operation and shall coordinate the operations of the naval forces with those of the military forces.
(b) If, however, the conditions are such that the enemy is, or can be, engaged by a naval force approximately in strength that of the enemy, the army officer shall be so informed and shall assume that the Navy has a paramount interest in the operation and shall coordinate the operations of the military forces with those of the naval forces.
(c) In the application of these principles, it is assumed that both the Army and Navy have forces suitable for operating against enemy attacking forces; one service obviously could not be given a predominating interest in frustrating an enemy attack, if it did not have available forces which were suitable for operations against the attacking forces, even though the other service were greatly inferior in strength to the attacking forces.
The decisions as to paramount interest contained in these paragraphs flow naturally from the missions of the Army and Navy. In offensive operations the decision is not so easy.
Take, for example, the capture of an enemy base such as Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. The capture of Port Arthur was not essential to the success of the Japanese Army strategical plan except in so far as it was necessary to assist the navy to destroy the Russian Fleet. But again the destruction of the Russian Fleet was essential principally to secure the lines of communication of the Japanese Army.
The army force employed at Port Arthur greatly outnumbered the naval forces and was in fact the force which eventually destroyed the Russian Fleet.
In this case it appears that tactically the interest of the Army was paramount whereas strategically the navy interest was paramount. Tactical decisions must be made immediately on the spot. Strategical decisions can be made at greater leisure and often better from a distance where the man who makes the decision is less affected by the local distractions. From this it is reasonable to conclude that—
In joint operations conducted within communicating distance of a common superior, tactical considerations shall determine paramount interest, whereas, if no communication with a common superior is possible strategical considerations shall determine paramount interest.
If this conclusion is correct it is apparent that in some instances paramount interest may change with the situation. While this method does not insure a clear cut decision there does not appear to be any other logical basis for its determination. The conclusion above indicates that:
For joint operations to be conducted outside of easy communicating distance from a common superior, such superior shall appoint a joint commander who shall he responsible for all strategical decisions.
An officer appointed as joint commander shall yield tactical command to the senior officer of the other service when the situation is such that the most effective action against the enemy, either offensive or defensive, can be taken by the service to which the joint commander does not belong.
For joint operations to be conducted within easy communicating distance of a common superior, no joint commander will be appointed. The superior will, however, state which service has the paramount interest in the operation and the commander of the force of the service so designated shall exercise directive tactical command unless there is a marked change from the contemplated situation.
Upon such a change in the situation the commander of the force designated as having the paramount interest shall yield tactical command to the commander of the force of the other service when such service can take the most effective action against the enemy.
Strategical objectives must be definitely assigned
Many of the inefficient joint operations of the past have been influenced by the failure of superior authority to assign definite strategical objectives to forces.
This has been due in many cases to the inefficient performance of duty of superior authority at the seat of government. War plans were not made. Operations were conducted in a most haphazard fashion. Decisions were hastily made and orders issued without adequate consideration. This situation was largely due to the civilian control of the operations of war. The best professional officers were sent into the field where they seldom received adequate support from the government.
The condition in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century is clearly pointed out in the following quotation from Napier's Peninsular War:
The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and blind chance governed the councils at home. For, first, a force collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to the Baltic, at a time when an expedition composed of troops which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic was sailing from England for the Mediterranean. An army intended to conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the moment when an unexpected event called for its services in Portugal. A division destined to attack the Spaniards at Ceuta arrived at Gibraltar at the instant when the insurrection of Andalusia fortunately prevented it from making an attempt that would have materially aided Napoleon's schemes against the Peninsula. Again, three days after Moore had withdrawn his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it (the fleet) in carrying off the Spanish troops under Romana, an operation for which it was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely frustrated, the campaign in Portugal, but the ministers were resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the Army destined for Portugal. Nor was it the least part of England's fortune that in such long-continued voyages in bad seasons no disaster befell the huge fleets thus bearing her strength from one extremity of Europe to the other.
A further light on the indefinite nature of the strategical objectives assigned to commanders in those days, is indicated by the following quotation from Furse's Military Expeditions Beyond the Seas:
When on the 12th of July, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the head of ten thousand men, sailed from Cork for the Peninsula, he received no more definite instructions than to afford to the Spanish and Portuguese nations every possible aid in throwing off the yoke of France. The Ministry having laid down no special plan of action, nor determined where the British troops were to be landed, it devolved upon Sir Arthur to decide in which quarter he could act against the French with the best effect. Being thoroughly convinced that there was no prospect of coping with the invaders in Spain, he resolved to undertake operations against Junot in Portugal.
Referring to page 8 on which illustrations of successful joint operations were given, we find that in each case the assignment of the strategical objective was definite.
There must be definite responsibility for the success or failure of each operation of war, and definite responsibility can be justifiably required only when accompanied by commensurate authority and definite assignment of the objective.
It is the duty of the superior to decide upon the strategical objective and to provide adequate force for the accomplishment of the task. Except in so far as the operations of a force affect operations of other forces through coordination of objectives, the officer to whose command has been assigned a definite strategical objective, should not be restricted by suggestions and instructions as to the method to be employed. In the attainment of the assigned objective, within the limits prescribed for the purpose of coordination, a commander should be allowed absolute freedom of action.
A review of the joint operations of the past indicates that where the strategical objectives have been definitely set forth, cooperation has been much more efficient than in operations in which strategical objectives have been indefinite. The presumption is, that most of the differences of opinion between admirals and generals have been in the field of strategy and that it is in operations requiring strategical decisions that joint command is essential. Whether the operation be large or small the more definite the objective the less chance there is for inefficient cooperation.
Effective cooperation is also dependent to some extent upon the means furnished commanders for the accomplishment of their tasks. The provision of the most suitable means available is the duty of the superior. While a subordinate must, of course, make the best use of whatever is provided, cooperation includes the provision of material assistance to the other service, and effective allocation of forces and material will greatly assist in obtaining efficiency in the conduct of joint operations.
Superior authorities in organizing task commands are responsible for providing the commanders thereof with adequate and suitable means for the accomplishing of the assigned task.
The provision of suitable material for the conduct of joint operations is the duty of the War and Navy Departments. In this country, as in most others, little attention has been paid to this important item. It can hardly be expected that the War and Navy Departments will expend their limited funds for the preparation of such material until there is a demand for it, and there will be no such demand until attempts to cooperate in joint exercises prove conclusively how inadequate is our material.
In 1854 France and England sent a joint expedition into the Baltic to prevent the departure of any Russian ships from the Baltic and to protect Danish and Swedish territory. The force was not properly constituted for the work required of it. Sir W. Clowes explains the lack of success as follows:
In the first year of the war neither Great Britain nor France was able to employ light-draught steam gunboats, and bomb-and-mortar-vessels, because neither power possessed anything of the sort. Yet such vessels were absolutely requisite for effective operations in the bays and among the islands of the Baltic.
Until the Army and Navy conduct joint operations involving the simulation of landing against opposition under modern conditions, there can be little progress in preparation of material.
The determination of the material required can be made only by practice in doing the job. No amount of theorizing will convince any one in authority to such an extent as will one failure in practice.
If cooperation is to be efficient there must be sufficient practical experience to form a sound judgment as to the material the Navy must acquire to be capable of doing its share in cooperation.
Operations involving the Army and Navy within the theater of operations are of four types:
(1) Independent operations of the Army and Navy.
In independent operations there may be cooperation in the assignment of objectives. Cooperation of this type is determined upon by the President and is enunciated in the basic joint operating plans. Joint command is exercised by the President advised by the Joint Board.
(2) Physical cooperation in large operations.
Cooperation of this nature requires important strategical decisions and can be effective only by the exercise of joint directive command. A joint commander should be appointed by the President.
(3) Physical cooperation in operations undertaken with a definite minor strategical or tactical objective, within easy communicating distance of a joint superior.
Cooperation of this nature does not require joint command. Directive command is exercised under the principle of paramount interest. Instructions from higher authority should definitely state which branch has the paramount interest in the operation.
(4) Physical cooperation as a result of circumstances, which has not been planned nor contemplated by instructions. Cooperation of this nature is governed by the principle of paramount interest.
Physical cooperation of army and navy forces will be required in any of the following types of operations:
(1) Invasion of enemy territory not contiguous to the United States.
(2) Cooperation with an ally not contiguous to the United States; by transporting an army to aid in the defense of its territory or to assist in invading enemy territory.
(3) To seize enemy colonial possessions with a view to forcing the enemy to sue for peace to prevent the loss of such possessions, or with a view to using such colony for trading purposes in the terms of peace, or of requiring the cession of such colonial possession when peace is made.
(4) To protect a colonial possession or allied country from an enemy, or to release it from a sovereignty from which it has rebelled.
(5) To create a diversion requiring the enemy to operate in a theater of war in which he may not be advantageously situated.
(6) To establish a base for further offensive operations.
(7) To destroy an enemy base from which offensive operations of the enemy may be projected.
(8) To assist in the exertion of economic pressure against an enemy by seizing areas from which the enemy obtains raw materials or contraband, or through which such raw materials, contraband, or enemy exports must pass.
(9) To gain command of the sea; the army forcing an enemy fleet to engage in action at sea or suffer destruction from shore batteries.
The next article will discuss operations of the types indicated above, pointing out the general nature of the operations involved, and the relation between the operations required of the Army and Navy.