Indoctrinating Civilians in Matters of Naval Defense
(See page 1854, November, 1924, PROCEEDINGS)
BY BROCKHOLST LIVINGSTON
Lieutenant Daniels has covered the subject of indoctrinating civilians in matters of naval defense most thoroughly. His article is opportune at a time when the only civilians who seem to bother with matters dealing with the Navy are, generally, persons who are hopeful that they may thus advance their personal ideas. Often these ideas are based upon decidedly false interpretations of naval matters.
Our newspapers in the "Sunday Supplements" mentioned by Lieutenant Daniels do give to the public a slight knowledge of naval affairs. They are, as he also states, "apt to be either untrue or so garbled as really to result in giving out misinformation." This regrettable state is brought about through the lack of actual and useful information on the part of newspapermen. It is due, partly, to the retiring disposition of the average naval officer. Captain Knox in his book on the Conference states: "American naval officers have long since formed the habit of ultraconservatism in regard to publicity. . . . The swarm of correspondents, having little technical knowledge themselves, and being denied the only source of correct information, naturally depended on the only other sources available. . . ." The naval officer is our only assured source of information, and consequently he must come to the fore with his knowledge that we may rid ourselves of others who are only too ready to make representations harmful to the interests of the Navy.
Truth and a clear interpretation of naval matters are among the principal requisites for one who attempts to divulge navy news for future publication.
We need not wait until the university is reached before the study of war is begun. Our public schools furnish us with a powerful medium through which the youth of the nation may be reached and taught the principles and causes of war.
Lieutenant Daniels' statements as to cooperation between the naval forces and our diplomatic corps are, by far, the best feature of his instructive paper. It is high time now that the two branches of government recognize in each other a bond which must be rendered secure by the utmost coordination. The diplomat must cease to see in the naval officer, as the naval officer must no longer see in the diplomat, nothing but a medium of sociability and enjoyment. Upon these two services rests the security of the whole nation. Each must know the principles of the companion service. Diplomacy is taught the naval officer but the diplomat has not, as yet, been indoctrinated in naval strategy.
The school for diplomats has yet to be established but there are several hundred men already in our foreign service who lack the teaching in naval matters which this school should embody. Offer these men the chance to study the Navy through the War College and they will be only too glad to avail themselves of the invitation. To the younger men, the correspondence courses of the War College would not only teach them the naval matters with which they should be acquainted but also would provide them with much that would be beneficial to them in the preparation for future examinations in their service. It would go far toward supplying the school for diplomats.
We may look back upon the late Conference for Limitation of Armaments and blame the loss of the right to fortify our insular possessions upon statesmen who lacked training in naval strategy. The technical advisers supplied cannot always be convincing. One's personal knowledge of the subject can do much more. It shows him, directly, the course which he should pursue. The work of cooperation between diplomat and naval officer is not over. It is but beginning and becoming apparent to the onlooker. Lieutenant Daniels has made the first step in an essential move.
Seagoing Aircraft
(See pp. 1795-1801, November, 1924, PROCEEDINGS)
LIEUTENANT F. P. SHERMAN, U. S. NAVY—After carefully reading Lieutenant Commander Ballou's article I can not but feel that it unduly minimizes the effectiveness of the aircraft which can accompany the treaty fleets. He states on page 1796, "Aircraft which can be carried on the treaty fleets are relatively few in number and will be launched singly and unhandily." It is becoming fairly apparent that the 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers allowed by the Washington Treaty could, with the help of catapults on capital ships, cruisers, auxiliary vessels and submarines, carry many more airplanes than the country will afford to maintain or provide with personnel and incidentally a number by no means small.
As for launching planes singly, a unit of three fighting planes can take off in formation from a carrier deck, while all the catapults in the fleet can, if necessary, launch their planes simultaneously on signal. By crossing the deck of a large carrier in echelon with the wind on the bow it may even be possible to take off a complete fighting division in the air in formation.
Aircraft search operations on the high seas will, except in rare cases, be carried on by planes operating from an aircraft carrier or by planes catapulted from cruisers. The use of the latter must necessarily be confined to weather in which the planes can land in the water and be picked up, so this one consideration will greatly decrease their use. It seems most probable that cruisers will usually conserve their catapult planes for use after making contact when their value will be so much greater, instead of using them in search operations where one bad landing in rough water or forced landing away from the ship may expend both plane and pilot. Our best scouting planes are at present the CS, DT and PN types. The NC is obsolete and none are in service, the F-5-L is obsolescent. The CS and DT type planes have been operated from the experimental carrier. The serviceability of the DT type has been recently demonstrated by the Army Around the World Flight, in which the planes used were DT's modified by the substitution of extra fuel capacity for the offensive armament. A DT with full load including 1,600 pounds for a torpedo has been flown off the U.S.S. Langley at anchor and it is reasonable to expect that a larger plane can lift a 2,000 pound bomb off the Lexington and Saratoga when underway. One must, therefore, disagree with Lieutenant Commander Ballou's statements on page 1797.
The scheme for using the planes of scout cruisers to bomb enemy carriers seems rather impracticable if one realizes that these planes are small observation planes already charged with carrying pilot and observer, fuel, radio, defensive armament, and with the duties of tactical scouting and spotting cruiser gunfire. These small two-place observation planes, if equipped with the additional matériel necessary for successful bombing, would indeed be sluggish, vulnerable targets for a hostile fighting pilot.
The aim and tendency of modern thought on aerial tactics is toward formation fighting. The day of the individual ace is about gone and in future wars we may expect to see the aircraft work in formation just as much as the surface craft. Other things being equal the victory in an aerial fight will go to the side which fights in formation and thus concentrates its masses on enemy fragments. Fighting formations are usually multiples of three plane units since three plane units are the easiest to handle and the most efficient. Larger units lose the power of rapid collective maneuver. The greatest living free lance fighter, René Fonck, said on this subject: "I prefer the group of three; the leader with a plane on each wing. I usually fly in a group of three. I like to have other groups of three placed so that they do not impede each other's maneuvers, yet close enough to receive signals, and to lend support at crucial moments."
The question raised on page 1801 of the relative value of bombers and pursuit planes to the superior fleet is a most interesting one. Given a force of bombers on the decks of enemy carriers, which is best, to meet them in the air with our pursuit strength or to bomb them and their carriers? It seems both practicable and advisable for the superior fleet to take the aerial offensive, to attack from the air with bombs, torpedoes, machine guns, every enemy carrier and thus destroy the enemy air offensive before it is launched. Experience has shown that the interception of an enemy bombing formation in the air is by no means easy.