The personnel problems of officers of the Navy are hardy perennials and crop up every year. As a rule their solution requires legislation and the last two years have been rather barren in this respect. In 1922 the personnel energies of the Navy were devoted to consideration of line and staff amalgamation but affairs did not reach the stage of a bill. In 1923-24, a great deal of energy was expended upon the bill for the equalization of line and staff promotion. Results so far have been negative. It is my purpose, however, to discuss mainly some problems which, if not yet acute, must be faced sooner or later. The sooner naval opinion arrives at conclusions upon them that are legislatively practicable, the better the chance of legislation in accordance with naval opinion.
Perhaps I should apologize in advance for discussing the whole commissioned personnel but about ten years ago I was so unfortunate, as representative of all the staff corps, on a board of three headed by the then assistant secretary, F. D. Roosevelt, as to have to deal with the whole commissioned personnel, the other member being the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Admiral Blue.
The F. D. Roosevelt board studied its subject for the better part of two years and made two complete reports. Neither met with the approval of the then Secretary of the Navy, or, so far as I am aware, of any ponderable portion of the officers of the Navy. In order to make it unanimous, I think it may safely be said that no member of the board was fully satisfied with either report.
A fundamental condition existing is that when we come to consider personnel matters we find three distinct sets of interests.
First, there are the interests of the Navy taken as a whole.
Second, there are the interests of the individual officers.
Third, there are the interests of the U. S. Treasury.
If there has been some personnel proposition concerning which these three sets of interests were all arrayed upon the same side I never heard of it and I never expect to hear of one.
It may, at first sight, seem wrong to class interests of individual officers as separate from those of the Navy as a whole, but man is a selfish animal. There may be a few spartans who, when a personnel proposition is first sprung upon them, calculate first its effect upon the Navy as a whole and second its effect upon them individually, but I do not number them among my acquaintances. I am afraid we generally calculate first its effect upon us and, if favorable, there is a very strong temptation to regard it as good for the Navy, and vice versa. Such is fallible human nature.
If we admit frankly that personnel propositions do involve consideration from three points of view, the next step is to point out that the chance of any proposition materializing into actuality depends almost entirely upon its relative effect upon the three interests. Suppose we make the impossible assumption that we can guage accurately in advance the effect of a proposition upon the three interests. Suppose proposition A would improve the Navy one per cent, prejudice officers of the Navy ten per cent and the treasury ten per cent. It would have a slim chance. On the other hand suppose proposition B would improve the Navy ten per cent, prejudice the officers two per cent and the treasury three per cent. If handled with judgment it would have an excellent chance. When I speak of "chance" I refer mainly to chance of legislative enactment, but, as a rule, an essential preliminary is recommendation by the Secretary.
I believe that no one can study the question with an open mind without becoming convinced that the interests of the Navy will not permit every officer who lives and remains in the service to pass through every grade. It is essential to efficiency, particularly in the line, that we should have officers in the upper grades with experience of the duties of those grades—trained for war, in other words. If every one passes through all the grades, the numbers in the grades being properly fixed, we shall have the condition of a number of years back, where an officer might be promoted to rear admiral one day and retired the next and the only flag officers who had real experience of command afloat were those who happened to enter the Naval Academy very young. Of course by making the numbers in the upper grades large enough, promotion can be had at an earlier age, but if we have four or five officers to do the work of one they cannot all get necessary experience in their legitimate duties and the interests of the treasury will sooner or later put an end to any such situation.
Assume, then, that we are limited in the upper grades to only a modest surplus (one that can be argued no surplus) over the numbers really needed for the legitimate duties of those grades and that officers reach those grades at suitable ages. The situation, as regards individual officers, depends upon how far and in what direction the actual list departs from a normal list. By a normal list I refer to the imaginary condition where numbers are fixed and conditions stabilized, the same number of people being fed in at the bottom every year and the distribution of age through the grades remaining constant from year to year. The navy list is not normal, and probably never will be, and it is interesting to note that, so far, since the World War we are repeating the cycle that followed the Civil War. At the end of the Civil War the United States had the largest Navy in the world. Promotion was good for some Years. Large Naval Academy classes were graduated and fed into the service, but Congress authorized no new ships, and naval material dwindled rapidly. In a comparatively short time commissioned personnel became topheavy and in 1882, upon the recommendation of Secretary Chandler, Congress made drastic reductions in personnel. In the line there was but one promotion for every two vacancies. Only enough Naval Academy graduates (but not less than ten) were commissioned each year to fill the vacancies in the grade of ensign. In the staff corps there were no appointments at all until the numbers were reduced. The present stagnation in the supply corps is due to the Act of August 5, 1882. Rear Admiral Carpenter, who retired May 18, 1924, was the last appointment to the then pay corps prior to that act. The next retirement by the 1924 Navy Register will be that of Admiral Jewett, who was appointed March 22, 1892. This ten-year gap in appointments rendered it inevitable that officers appointed immediately after it would reach the top of the list some ten years sooner than otherwise, and would block the list for some ten years. That fact has been obvious for more than thirty years. The supply corps list has been abnormal for that length of time. The line list has been abnormal for more than forty years. With the drastic reduction of 1882 the few Naval Academy graduates who were commissioned for the next ten years suffered stagnation which it is difficult for young officers of the present day to realize. Graduates were then, commissioned ensigns after six years—four at the Naval Academy and two at sea. If I am not mistaken, few graduates between 1882 and 1887 served less than ten years as ensigns, and something like thirteen years—fifteen years from the Naval Academy—was the record. The current Navy Register shows the class of 1909 to be lieutenant commanders.
The case of these graduates of the '8o's of the last century was made much harder and the interests of the Navy suffered severely because, for a number of years after the Civil War, entirely too many men were graduated and commissioned, forming the historic "hump." This could have been easily avoided by a little intelligent foresight on the part of the authorities of the day.
After the Act of August 5, 1882, the navy list was abnormal in that so few people were being fed in at the bottom. The Spanish War and the steady increase in navy material and personnel which set in soon afterward brought it about that the abnormally few people fed in forty years ago, in spite of their cruel stagnation as ensigns, reached the upper grades, broadly speaking, at ages permitting them to pass through with very little elimination. The pendulum is now starting to swing the other way. For some years a larger and larger proportion cannot pass all the grades and when in time the new "hump" reaches the upper grades excessive elimination will be necessary. We will again be where we were some twenty-odd years ago.
While there seems little chance at present that Congress will go as far in neglect of the Navy as it did after the Civil War, there is an appreciable chance that the Navy will suffer even more by Congressional and Executive activity. The limitation of armaments conference has already given us one drastic material reduction. Another one like it, and the Navy personnel would inevitably have to repeat the cycle beginning in 1882.
Apart from that chance, however, it is necessary to face the fact that no further expansion of the Navy is in sight, and that being the case, for years to come there will be a steadily increasing proportion of the various Naval Academy classes who cannot be passed through all grades.
Will our present system stand the strain? In my opinion it will not, and the Navy should look ahead and improve it now. It is much easier to avoid a wreck than to salve one.
Fully convinced that the interests of the Navy require that we should not pass all officers through the upper grades, I am also convinced that there is no better way of determining those that should pass up than selection up. Theoretically, there is little difference between selection up and selection out, but under existing conditions there is a very serious, practical difference. Human nature being what it is, individual officers plucked in selection out, or passed over in selection up, will appeal to friends in Congress. When "A" is plucked he tells his congressional friend, with truth, that his record is good, proves he is a competent and experienced officer, and, convinced of this, his congressional friend is almost certain to press his case. It was this kind of thing, together with allegations of favoritism and enmity on the part of the plucking board, that killed the selection out scheme of the personnel act of 1899.
Under selection up, however, when "A" is passed over he must convince his congressional friend that he is a better man than all of the people selected up. This is a much more difficult thing, and not nearly so many officers will succeed. Even so, there will be plenty who will succeed.
When we consider methods of selection up there are two difficulties with the present system that will weaken it more and more as time goes on.
Selection by a board of limited numbers will arouse more and more opposition. Sooner or later accusations of favoritism will be freely made and believed. It is unfortunate in one way that, so far, promotion has been so good that it has been possible to promote nearly everyone. Under these conditions it is natural that apparently the majority of many boards have considered that the interests of the Navy were furthered by the selection of seniors. The selection board oath requires each member to swear or affirm: "That he will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view solely the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the naval service, perform the duties imposed upon him."
A slight change in this oath—the insertion of the words "without regard to seniority" would insure carrying out the intent of the present law. However, without any change in the law, the question of seniority will probably take care of itself when the percentage of people promoted is reduced, as it will be in a few years.
The alternative to selection by a board is selection by some system of voting. This is an attractive idea and has the great practical advantage that it should reduce to a minimum charges of favoritism. Diffusion of responsibility obtained by such a system would be very desirable, but the mechanics, so to speak, would be difficult. If some method could be devised by which each candidate's complete record could be furnished each senior officer, who would make selections without consultation, the voting system would undoubtedly be superior to a board.
The difficulty of furnishing the record and the time senior officers would have to give to this selection work seem the principal objections to the voting method or the all hands selection board, it might be called. This brings me to the principal defect of the present system. In a small corps a selection board will have sufficient personal acquaintance with candidates to be able to act intelligently, but the line and some staff corps are now so large that this is hardly possible. The tendency will be more and more to rely upon the record and the records should be such as to enable any capable board to grade officers from them. Perhaps this is a counsel of perfection, but there is no more important job in the Navy today than that of improving matters along this line. Not only is the present fitness report unsatisfactory in form, but, apart from the unavoidably different characteristics of marking officers, there is great need of indoctrination of uniformity of basis of marking. Some years ago, when numerical marks were assigned, there was a Chief of Bureau in the Navy Department whose policy was never to give an assistant a 4.0 unless he regarded him as 100 per cent perfect. At the same time there was another Chief of Bureau whose policy was to mark every assistant 4.0 unless he had made some bad faux pas during the period covered. Obviously, such basic differences in ideas should not exist. It is, of course, a difficult thing to secure uniformity of ideas in such a matter, and it is really a question of education, as it were, but perhaps, if fitness reports contained a statement as to the proper basis for marking and the marking officer were required to certify that he had used that basis, it might help. This is virtually done in Army efficiency reports.
The present form of Report of Fitness is, I believe, the fourth that I have been acquainted with, and from my experience as a marking officer and member of selection boards, it is, I believe, in some respects the most difficult to fill out satisfactorily and to evaluate after it is filled out.
The part dealing with "Professional Qualifications" is, at least, easy to fill out, but the work of the Navy is not yet sufficiently standardized to allow all jobs to be characterized by two words.
For many years fitness reports answered, in substance, three questions. What was his job? How well did he understand his job? How well did he do his job? - Now we have condensed the last two into one—or rather dropped the second question—but the present form leaves something to be desired as regards answering the first, and it is very doubtful whether the second should be dropped.
When we come to that part of the report dealing with the somewhat elusive question of personality the present fitness report falls down badly. Nineteen qualifications are enumerated, some minor, some major, none defined, all to be marked either "Superior," "Above Average," "Average," "Below Average," or "Inferior." Why mark on a scale of 4 in part of the form and use words here? For detailed comparison we must, in the end, range people in order, which means to mark them virtually if not actually.
What proportion of superior officers can possibly mark more than a small fraction of their subordinates from personal knowledge as regards all nineteen of the qualities, and how can anyone evaluate numerically a candidate's standing from a set of marks on nineteen qualities—some major, some minor? Of course the problem of defining personality is a very difficult one, but it is not peculiar to the Navy.
The qualifications enumerated in the navy form are quoted below:
1. Aptitude for the service. 2. Conduct. 3. Cooperative qualities. 4. Courtesy. 5. Devotion to duty. 6. Education. 7. Force. 8. Industry. 9. Initiative. 10. Judgment. 11. Justice. 12. Leadership. 13. Military manner and bearing. 14. Neatness of person and dress. 15. Patience. 16. Physical energy and endurance. (In accordance with reporting officer's personal opinion, without reference to medical officer.) 17. Reliability. 18. Self-control. 19. Subordination.
Perhaps I should mention that in another part of the form the marking officer is required to mark the subject "when appropriate" upon a scale of 4, as "Executive officer or executive ability." Also upon "Seamanship." It would rather seem that executive ability should be classed with the nineteen qualifications above.
The Army meets the same problem in its Efficiency Report by marks under ten heads only. It also defines or explains briefly the qualities and defines "Inferior," "Superior," etc. The pertinent part of the army form is quoted below:
H. "1. Physical activity (agility; ability to work rapidly). 2. Physical endurance (capacity for prolonged exertion). 3. Military bearing and neatness (dignity of demeanor; neat and smart appearance). 4. Attention to duty (the trait of working thoroughly and conscientiously). 5. Tact (the faculty of being considerate and sensible in dealing with others). 6. Initiative (the trait of beginning needed work or taking appropriate action on his own responsibility in absence of orders). 7. Intelligence (the ability to understand readily new ideas or instructions). 8. Force (the faculty of carrying out with energy and resolution that which, on examination, is believed reasonable, right, or duty). 9. Judgment and commonsense (the ability to think clearly and arrive at logical conclusions). 10. Leadership (capacity to direct, control, and influence others in definite lines of action or movement)."
D. "CONSIDER CAREFULLY THESE DEFINITIONS, KEEP THEM IN MIND WHEN RATING, AND COMPARE THE OFFICER WITH OTHERS IN THE SAME GRADE.
INFERIOR: Exceptionally poor performance of duty; exceptionally lacking in qualification considered.
BELOW AVERAGE: Duty not performed as well as should reasonably be expected under circumstances; not entirely satisfactory.
AVERAGE: Efficient; duty well performed; up to standard; qualification satisfactory.
ABOVE AVERAGE: Duty performed markedly better than could reasonably be expected under the circumstances; qualified to marked degree.
SUPERIOR: Very exceptionally efficient performance of duty; qualified to a very exceptional degree”
Certainly the army definition of "Average" will be helpful to a Marking officer.
The same personality problem occurs in civil life. The newspaper item quoted below gives an account of its attempted solution at the University of California.
PERSONALITY IS RATED
University of California Regards It as Vital as Good Grades. Berkeley, Cal., June 7,—Personality records of graduates in engineering, declared equally or more valuable than scholastic achievements, are now kept by the University of California and are made available for manufacturers and other employers of young engineers.
All juniors and seniors are rated both by members of the faculty and by their fellow students as to character, address, appearance, leadership, disposition, popularity, speed in work, accuracy and attention to detail. A student committee is asked each year to rate the members of its class. These ratings are compared with those of the faculty and an average is thus struck. The students' rating has the weight of one instructor's rating, and, according to the university authorities, it has been found that the students are more strict than the teachers.
Professor Blake E. Vanleer, in discussing the system, points out that employers do not select college graduates primarily because of their scholastic grading, but put a high value on personal recommendation.
The personality records are permanent, so that, with the passing years, the graduate is protected against the death or resignation of the professors who knew him best.
Professor Vanleer reports that personnel officers from large corporations come regularly to the College of Mechanics to study the data of those about to be graduated and to check the records by their own observation of candidates for employment.
It is explained that a man need not rate high in every particular to be acceptable. If, for instance, he is rated relatively low in precision and detail, he may stand high enough in other respects to make an excellent salesman or executive; while for research or technological work, diffidence is no bar, though accuracy is necessary.
Here we have only nine qualities enumerated: Only two of them, leadership and appearance, are found in both the navy and army lists.
The statement that various characteristics are suited to Various jobs reminds me of one serious difficulty with navy selection as regards the line. There are a number of line specialties essential to the work of the Navy and it is obviously difficult for any selection board or other method of selection to do even-handed justice to the various specialists. This matter will become more acute as promotions dwindle in the future. If the line and staff amalgamation proposed two years ago had gone through, the situation would have been much worse, and it seems quite probable that in years to come this question of promotion may force segregation into more corps rather than amalgamation.
It is quite evident that the Navy, the Army, and the University of California have the same end in mind yet their solutions are very different. For instance, the navy lists "cooperative qualities." The nearest approach to this in the army list is "tact" and in the University of California list, "disposition" or, perhaps, "popularity." Now there is no doubt that the ability to do teamwork is a great asset to a member of any organization and no list of personal characteristics should omit it. On the other hand the navy list, apart from its great length, appears subject to a great many criticisms. For instance, take "Aptitude for the service." Does not this include all the rest? And will not the average senior assigning marks sum up in his mark for aptitude his average of all the characteristics of the subordinate? If this is the case, aptitude should be segregated from the other eighteen.
Take "Self-control." Does this refer to control of temper or something else? There is much chance for misunderstanding here.
What has gone before is subject to the just criticism that it is mostly fault finding and not suggestions for improvement. I will endeavor to suggest a few improvements which will all be subject to criticism but I may point out as one possible mitigant of criticism that they are intended for the U. S. Navy as is and not for the Navy of Utopia.
In the first place all statements of senior officers should, if possible, be made as marks upon a scale of 4. If they are to be used to compare one officer with another some one must at some time evaluate them on a basis of marking and the person who originally makes the statement is in the best position to do this.
In the second place fitness reports to be used by selection boards should contain only matter of use to the board. Desires for duty, information as to the address of next of kin, and other matter of use only to the Bureau of Navigation should be eliminated.
The form should be such as to enable anyone of ordinary intelligence to ascertain the reporting officer's conclusion as to the proper replies to the following four questions:
1. What was his job (or jobs) during the period reported on?
2. How well did he understand his job (theory or experience)?
3. How well did he do his job (practical ability, industry, etc.)?
4. What are his personal characteristics?
Of course No. 4 is the difficult one; not only difficult for the marking officer but difficult for the selection board. The present form not only enumerates nineteen headings of personal characteristics but requires the marking officer under "Remarks" to "give a general outline of this officer's character."
It would seem advisable under 2 and 3 to amplify the marks given by specific remarks and explanations in each case. When it comes to 4, characteristics should not be arranged alphabetically and indiscriminately but grouped (and preferably arranged in order of importance in each group) into what I may call positive and negative characteristics.
Positive characteristics would be those such as leadership, and ability to do teamwork, whose presence up to 4 add always to an officer's value. Negative characteristics would be those such as education, courtesy, self-control, as to which an officer should be satisfactory but as to which a mark of 3.2 is virtually as good as a mark of 4. The list of positive characteristics should be so short that anyone using the report should be able to condense all marks upon them into a single mark, using his own ideas of their relative importance and of the bearing of the marks under the negative group, which may be as long as you like.
It may seem that the suggestions above tend to reduce a selection board to clerical functions only. It is true that they depart in this direction from the present system, but we might as well face the fact that selection by a board of naval officers will not continue unless Congress is convinced that it is made upon the basis of, and can be justified by, the written record. The present law of 1916 is exceedingly liberal in this respect. The Army Act of 1920 is much less so and any future legislation for the Navy will undeniably be more restrictive than the present law for the Navy.
It may be of interest to quote here a portion of the Army Act of 1920:
"24b. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFICERS.—Immediately upon the passage of this Act, and in September of 1921 and every year thereafter, the President shall convene a board of not less than five general officers, which shall arrange all officers in two classes; namely, Class A, consisting of officers who should be retained in the service, and Class B, of Officers who should not be retained in the service. Until otherwise finally classified, all officers shall be regarded as belonging to Class A and shall be promoted according to the provisions of this Act to fill any vacancies which may occur prior to such final classification. No officer shall be finally classified in Class B until he shall have been given an opportunity to appear before a court of inquiry. In such court of inquiry he shall be furnished with a full copy of the official records upon which the proposed classification is based and shall be given an opportunity to present testimony in his own behalf. The record of such court of inquiry shall be forwarded to the final classification board for reconsideration of the case, and after such consideration the finding of said classification board shall be final and not subject to further revision except upon the order of the President. Whenever an officer is placed in Class B, a board of not less than three officers shall be convened to determine whether such classification is due to his neglect, misconduct, or avoidable habits. If the finding is affirmative, he shall be discharged from the Army; if negative, he shall be placed on the unlimited retired list with pay at the rate of two and one half per cent of his active pay multiplied by the number of complete years of commissioned service, or service which under the provisions of this Act is counted as its equivalent, unless his total commissioned service or equivalent service shall be less than ten years, in which case he shall be honorably discharged with one year's pay. The maximum retired pay of an officer, retired under the provisions of this section prior to January 1, 1924, shall be seventy-five per cent of active pay, and of one retired on or after that date, sixty per cent. If an officer is thus retired before the completion of thirty years' commissioned service, he may be employed on such active duty as the Secretary of War considers him capable of performing until he has completed thirty years' commissioned service. The Board convened upon the passage of this Act shall also report the names of those second lieutenants of the Quartermaster Corps who were commissioned under the provisions of section 9 of the Act of June 3, 1916, who are not qualified for further promotion. The officers so reported shall continue in the grade of second lieutenant for the remainder of their service and the others shall be placed upon the promotion list according to their commissioned service, as herein-before provided."
Here we have the old navy plucking system with important modifications. Though not specifically required, it is very strongly implied that all action must be based upon official records and no officer can be plucked until a court of inquiry has passed upon his case.
The present army system was very suitable for the conditions existing in 1920 and has not, on the face of things, the objections that killed the old navy plucking board, but when stagnation of promotion sets in and cannot be avoided except by plucking many meritorious officers it will be under a severe strain and a strain which it was not constructed to meet.
Of course there is one specific advantage of the selection out system—its simplicity. When a man is selected out he is out and that is the end of it. With selection up it is necessary to dispose of those not selected.
Coming now to general questions, it would be very desirable to institute some system of weeding out naval officers in grades below lieutenant commander. This is desirable with a normal list, and the present abnormally large classes in the lower grades render it particularly desirable. Theoretically, this could be accomplished by present examining boards but experience of many years has shown that, human nature being what it is, very few eliminations are made by examining boards. A simple and adequate method of obtaining the desired result would be to retain examining boards for promotion, but promote only a certain percentage from each grade to the next higher, leaving it to the examining board to separate the sheep from the goats. It would seem to be the fairest method to apply percentages to classes inclusive of deaths, resignations and dismissals, both stimulating weak sisters to resign and giving the remaining members of a class the benefit of dismissals.
Considering the upper grades, there is no problem as regards the people selected to go up. The problem that will rapidly grow more and more serious is the disposal of those not selected. There is no doubt that age in grade retirement is the best thing for the Navy. Unfortunately it is against the interests of the individual officers (on the average) and against the interests of the treasury. It always seemed a very surprising thing that Congress was willing to incorporate age in grade retirement when, in 1916, it legislated for promotion by selection in the line. When, in 1917, it extended promotion by selection to the staff there was no provision for age in grade retirement and we have now a double standard.
The so-called "equalization" bill considered by Congress during last session extended age in grade retirement to the staff. Portions of the bill might have had some chance, even if it did read like an appendix to Alice in Wonderland, but, according to the press, neither committee gave any favor to the age in grade retirement feature.
We have had a few age in grade retirements but they have all been virtually cases of selection out. There seems hardly a chance that the present age in grade retirement will survive when we reach a condition where the vast majority of officers will be retired for age in grade.
Too strong a practical case can be made against it and it will be killed by the condition that capable and experienced officers will be forced unwillingly to retire to satisfy the theory that young officers are better for the Navy. Imagine an officer of the rank of captain holding forth as follows to a congressional committee— any committee:
"I am an officer — years old of the rank of captain. I was selected twice for promotion to commander and captain and have a first class record as captain but have not been selected as rear admiral as only one captain in ----------- can reach that rank. I am able bodied, thoroughly experienced in and qualified for the duties of my present rank, and could give the Navy — more years of good service, but by the age in grade retirement law am about to be forced unwillingly on the retired list."
Any committee would promptly recommend repeal or modification of the age in grade retirement law. We cannot expect any system to endure under which numbers of able and experienced officers are forced unwillingly to retire under an arbitrary age limit simply to prevent a stagnation that is in the future.
The question is, how little can we depart from the present system and still obtain congressional approval?
The system outlined below is suggested as possibly meeting the requirements.
Provide, in a bill of not over two pages:
1. That no officer passed over shall be retired with less than thirty years' service.
2. That when stagnation detrimental to the interests of the Navy exists the President may retire, in order from the top of the ranks of captain, commander and lieutenant commander, officers who have been passed over.
3. That the present stagnation in the medical and supply, corps, due to the Act of 1882, be met by the good old expedient, approved repeatedly in the past, of temporary extra numbers in the upper grades.
The above system would be flexible and could be applied as necessary to meet the individual needs of the line and the various staff corps. In practice, retirements would never be forced unless naval opinion was fully behind them. Unfortunately, there would always be objectionable stagnation, but it is not likely that Congress would approve any system permanently that did not involve sufficient stagnation to be somewhat detrimental to the Navy.
There would still be opposition from individual officers affected, but with existing stagnation demonstrable their case would not be very strong.
Since officers now may retire as a privilege after thirty years, and a right after forty, it would seem only fair that the Navy should have a right to force retirements after thirty years when it benefits thereby.
A very little investigation brings out the striking differences between the Army and the Navy as regards these personnel questions. The differences are more radical than former pay table differences but the benefits of recent cooperation as regards pay tables are so obvious as to suggest the desirability of joint consideration and action as regards what are, after all, very similar personnel problems.
The army "Efficiency Report" seems, on the whole, distinctly superior to the navy "Report on the Fitness of Officers" as a basis or selection for promotion. In conclusion, I venture to repeat my opinion, already expressed, that there is no more important job in the Navy today than that of improving the method of making the record of an officer's fitness as a basis for promotion by selection.
This does not mean improvement of the fitness report only— though that is much needed—but also indoctrination of the officers of the Navy, the majority of whom are, I believe, still opposed to promotion by selection, with the idea that records should be made in such a manner as truly to guage the value of an officer to the Navy, that too high a mark given a subordinate is as much an injustice to the Navy as too low a mark is to the officer.