THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR, Vol. I, Offensive Operations, 1914-15. By Captain Thomas G. Frothingharn, U. S. R. 349 pp. $375. Harvard University Press, 1924.
A Review by Rear Admiral W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy
The writer of this Naval History of the World War has already shown his ability as a military historian, in a work written soon after the close of the war. Although much information necessary to a complete story will not be available for many years, yet so many of the chief leaders, both civil and military, belonging to all the combatant powers have set forth their views and apologies that a careful comparison with official papers enables painstaking students to arrive at approximate truths. Such an examination has been made by Captain Frothingham in his present volume, which carries the reader to the spring of 1915.
When naval officers read naval history, it is presumably for the purpose of instruction, and this objective is reached rather by a just appreciation of errors committed than by admiration for successes achieved. The author’s clear and well-balanced narrative points out with a sure hand the errors on both sides but then, in some cases, leaves the reader to his own reflections to determine the underlying causes of these far-reaching mistakes.
Apparently, at the outbreak of the war, military and naval commanders and plan-makers on the general staffs knew better what orders they ought to give to their subordinates than either what they should do themselves or how they should coordinate the activities under their own control with those of co-equal departments of government. In a word, they were not sufficiently educated for their high tasks. Either, as in the ease of the English Navy, they were insufficiently versed in the technique of great command, or, as in the case of the German Army, they knew little except army technique and did not realize how much of war lay outside their own familiar field. None of the general staffs seem to have been acquainted in any adequate degree, either with domestic industries or with foreign national diplomatic and commercial policies, or with the nature and sources of commodities necessary to the prosecution of war, which yet were not to be had except by importation. The result of all this was that, the civilian heads of governments being imperfectly instructed by the combatant services as to the probable demands of warfare, everybody, including military leaders themselves, had to learn the art of warfare for nations in arms during the course of the war by trial and error; whereas, the military leaders should have better prepared themselves to deserve the confidence of their countrymen by a wider preliminary acquaintance with all the varied demands that were made upon them, as to war, as to diplomacy, and as to economics.
The author opens with an account of the national policies of the opponents, beginning with that of the Germans. The German Army held a conventional view of warfare founded upon its great successes in 1866 and 1870. Many years before the war, a chief of staff of great force, thoroughly impregnated with Moltke’s system, had devised a plan of campaign for a war on two fronts: i.e., a war against France and Russia. The plan assumed that Russia would be slow in mobilizing, so it put only a small containing force on the Russian frontier and assembled the great majority of the German troops on the Belgo-French line to overwhelm France by a quick enveloping movement in vast numbers through Belgium. This plan was drawn up before 1900 when Germany’s navy was small and it took no account of England as an ally of France. In 1914, when the war broke, the author of the plan was dead and his less able successor made no arrangements with the German Admiralty to employ the then powerful fleet against the English opponent while the army was attacking France. It was a fatal mistake. In any war, there are two ways of overcoming an enemy: to attack the life of the armies in the field directly by bloodshed and to attack indirectly the lives of both combatants and noncombatants by depriving them of the economic means of support. Moreover, it is an axiom of war that success costs the least when the blow is struck with the utmost possible strength. In the present case, the German General Staff was led into presumption by dwelling too much upon the methods and victories of a previous generation and felt secure of triumph with a plan of campaign which was undeniably based upon deep and sound knowledge of land warfare, but which was so narrow and arrogant as to underestimate the competence of both the French and Russian armies, while it totally neglected England as an enemy and took account neither of the might of English sea-power nor of the economic vulnerability on the sea of the British maritime empire, and particularly of England herself, the center of British effort.
So when the first German rush was balked at the Marne, and the hostile armies settled down in the trenches, the original disregard of naval aid entailed consequences which could not be remedied: for the early German unreadiness to strike at hostile shipping allowed British measures of maritime defense to keep up with development of German submarine attack, and eventually the pressure of the British sea-power broke the spirit of the hostile noncombatants. The German General Staff gave too much attention to kriegspiel and neglected to pursue the wider studies which are necessary to the highest class of leadership and so failed to coordinate with the navy, which it regarded as a secondary national arm. The English national plan of war was likewise defective in that apparently it had not even made office studies for raising and maintaining a great army. To be sure, Lord Haldane’s organization of the territorial army worked admirably and the six divisions destined by it for overseas service were placed in France very promptly, but there seems to have been undue apprehension of a German invasion. The author mentions an assembly the day after the declaration of war which was attended by most of the cabinet and the leading men of the army to discuss sending the expeditionary force to France. Apparently, the navy was represented only by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and he was an ex-army officer. It was decided that the danger of invasion would not permit all the expeditionary force to be sent to France. Had these distinguished army officers known as much as they should have known of the capabilities of the senior service, they would have understood the ability of the fleet to afford full protection. Here also, as in the case of the Germans, the army placed no proper reliance upon the navy, as it should have done.
A point of great importance in the prosecution of the war, which is not sufficiently brought out by Captain Frothingham, is the failure of the British Government to close trade with the enemy through neutral territory. Yielding to pressure of the business community, the government long allowed British shipping to supply neutrals with goods essential to Germany for the prosecution of the war. In this case, also, the British Cabinet was unacquainted with the fundamental principles of maritime warfare and the naval heads of the Admiralty did not insist on their observance. As the author forcibly points out, it is the task of every navy to fight for the control of the sea but he fails to emphasize that the object of battle is to interrupt the enemy’s sea commerce and protect one’s own. Victory which is not utilized to affect maritime communications is a waste of effort: yet at the beginning of the war, the British fleet having been yielded the control of European waters by the enemy without a contest, nevertheless the government made no good use of its advantage but rather abused it by restraining neutral commerce with hostile powers in order to profit by substituting British business with the enemy through neutrals. This subject was a topic of complaint by the United States while still neutral, and was the cause of much regrettable friction. Not until this country came into the war and insisted, was the British mastery of the sea fully exercised for the purpose of its creation: namely, the economic exhaustion of the enemy— until the blockade was stringently enforced, individual English business men profited by the consent of the people’s government at the price of the blood of the people.
Yet the government was neither sluggish nor venal: it was merely ignorant of the art of war. Every nation maintaining an army and navy employs therein a body of public servants whose special duty is to master the art of war in its widest applications and to insist upon being heard when the country commits its destinies to war. It is not clear that such a voice was raised. This is far from suggesting that the military branch should overtop the civil administration as in Germany. It means only that all branches should cooperate for a common objective with full knowledge of each other’s special problems and difficulties and capacities. At the beginning of the war this desirable condition was far from attainment by any government and perception and concert of action grew slowly, even within the activities of single governments, and as for allied teamwork, that was still slower in maturing.
We may hope that the author will develop this matter of the cabinet’s employment of blockade in continuation of his work.
After sketching the general strategic plans for the war, our author takes up the question of traffic protection. The Germans interned their merchantmen, so that the task of attack was the only one their navy had for solution, and it is instructive to see how thoroughly and ably they effected their policy. As already noted, the general strategic plan for the navy was scarcely commendable but the arrangements for raiding commerce were wonderfully good and correspondingly successful. There seem to have been two reasons which explain this success: one was that thorough administrative preparation and forethought in the way of selection of secret bases and arrangements for colliers to open the campaign was a chief element, and the other was that Berlin, in accordance with its general doctrine of military administration, left the captains on the spot to modify their procedure from day to day as occasion required. Thus it was that von Spec had the freedom of the sea for over four months until the Admiralty called him home. Until then, his success against commerce had had an administrative basis (and even in the battle of Coronel the tactical victory was the result of administrative skill, for it was owing simply to bigger guns better aimed) ; at last, he had an important strategic question before him and he went wrong. The naval objective assigned him by Berlin was to break through the blockade to Germany. Up to this time the secrecy of his movements had guarded him. He had ample coal and supplies with him and it appears that the continuance of secrecy would still be his best play, but at an assembly of his captains after rounding Cape Horn, he decided to destroy the naval station at the Falkland Islands, even at the loss of concealment in so doing. Count von Spec was correctly advised by several of his captains to avoid the Falklands to preserve secrecy as long as possible on his homeward dash but a thirst to strike some notable blow misled him. Even if the English squadron had not been there, nothing really serviceable for Germany could have been done. Besides the strategic error in going there at all, the German admiral made a poor tactical approach to the harbor, as is shown by the author. He assumed that if he found an enemy it would be in inferior strength; he was unprepared for the superior force he actually found. In short, in spite of the high training and valor of the German fleet and the administrative skill and fine personal qualities of its commander-in-chief, its military leadship can scarcely be termed as of a lofty order.
On the other hand, the author suggests that the British arrangements for subduing the hostile raiders might have been better: he thinks the British cruisers relied too much on a passive form of protection by patrol instead of an active safeguard by search and attack. The later events of the war confirm this view. As for the strategy of the English admiral in accepting battle at Coronel, the author heartily condemns it. It was another illustration of the English neglect of the study of war as an art.
One of the most far-reaching incidents of the early part of the war was the escape of the Goeben and Breslau from the English fleet. Here a study of the account by Captain Frothingham cannot fail to be profitable, the errors of the English being more instructive than the wisdom of the Germans. During the Balkan troubles preceding the war, the Goeben had been at Constantinople, where her presence had been an important diplomatic factor, aiding the German influence in Turkey. At the outbreak of the war she was about to leave Pola after an overhaul. With the Breslau, she had three possible objectives: to escape into the Atlantic, to attack the transports carrying the French Army of Africa to France, or to go to Constantinople, there to resume her diplomatic and military influence in Turkish affairs. The latter course she actually took and it was of major importance yet neither the British nor French commanders-in-chief nor their Admiralties nor their Foreign Offices seem to have thought of such a thing. It illustrates once more that successful war rests largely on sound diplomacy and knowledge of foreign affairs. The French Admiralty issued a better set of instructions to its Mediterranean Fleet than did the English. At the British Admiralty the orders were unskilfully drafted; their writer noted down all his preoccupations as possibilities and virtually gave the command attend to all these things.” It was not a helpful order, for in substance it dealt only with the Western Mediterranean and in form it demanded too much, but the chief weakness in this short and momentous campaign was in the military soul and character of the British commander-in-chief. There is not the slightest ground for impugning either his courage or his seamanlike or administrative skill. His habit of mind, as shown by his actions, was to look for orders and say “aye, aye sir,” and leave the consequences to his superiors. One cannot imagine that he had ever pondered upon the subject of divining the enemy’s conduct by scrutiny and analysis of his situation. His objective was to please the Admiralty and his eyes and cars were directed toward London, more than toward the enemy which both he and the Admiralty were alike anxious to destroy. No doubt the British commander-in-chief was an accomplished ship-captain, but in war he proved unequal to the responsibilities of independent command in the presence of the enemy. He was made to be a subordinate. He needed someone to tell him what was best to do, but the Admiralty failed him and he failed the nation. It is unnecessary to summarize here the interesting details of Captain Frothingham’s account. The fleet was most zealous to execute every suggestion and order from London and succeeded in burning much coal but although some of the captains did well, the result was nil.
The cabinet pleased the country, but made a great error, in appointing Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord soon after the war began, for he also, in spite of his great and deserved reputation, showed little knowledge of war. He was put into office on account of his great administrative skill exhibited in the same post some years previously. It has been whispered that in the interval his undoubtedly great powers had suffered seriously from advancing years. It is an objection always to be considered in reappointing an old man to high office, but be that as it may. Lord Fisher turned the shipbuilding efforts of the navy toward providing a fleet of somewhat specialized type to enter the Baltic and enable a Russian Army to land on the shores of Germany. The consent of Russia was not previously gained to the plan and the development of the war rendered it an impossible scheme before the ships were ready. It was an unfortunate commitment of the industrial effort of England without reasonable basis. Lord Fisher made his reputation on administrative skill (to which he had devoted his life) and lost it in the conduct of naval war. There is no evidence that he had much studied the art of war; he was a naval reformer.
The last subject dealt with is the attack on the Dardanelles. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, saw the great military importance of holding these straits as a means of preserving military and commercial communications with Russia, but the venture was badly planned in London where there was no one placed in complete charge and made responsible for the proper management of all. Cabinet and other officers seem to have thought of it casually and at odd times, and Churchill, the only one who perceived all the consequences of success, could arouse little interest in the rest of the cabinet. With such slight general concern for the outcome, things could only go according to the old French saying, “order, counterorder, disorder." It is a truism in naval warfare that a fleet’s attack on coastal fortifications needs support by troops on shore to make success permanently effective, but in this case, such was Churchill’s anxiety to win a victory of great—of overwhelming importance, that contrary to the canons, he employed the navy alone to force the passage of the Straits, and made a disastrous failure. But the fault was not wholly in London. Captain Frothingham’s account suggests that perhaps in this campaign, also, the local admiral in command was too deferential to the wishes of the Admiralty, and failed to insist on his own views as to necessary preparations and army support. The admiral assented to the First Lord’s plans, but without enthusiasm. The story raises the suspicion that he lacked the moral force which Napoleon so highly esteemed; that equal to refusing to command in a campaign whose principles he did not approve. It is a delicate matter, calling for much thought and reflection through years of service to know the line between due military subordination and undue subservience to the government’s views when holding command of the highest responsibility.
The book closes with a pregnant allusion to the change in the character of the naval war after the first six months. The change came because neither side was well grounded in the principles of naval warfare when the war began. The errors of each were offset by those of the other. The losses by such superficiality are incalculable and inexcusable. Our Navy should be trained with the end of avoiding them. There were countless incidents of fine and gallant conduct to which the work makes slight allusion, but their narration would be out of place in its scheme, which is to deal with the high administration of war. The lesson the book teaches us all is to avoid errors in plans, particularly those for opening the war: for in our errors lie our opponent’s best opportunities. In the errors shown by history we can find our own profit in the preparation of our minds, no less than in the preparation of resources.
When the next war comes, the tactical and many other conditions cannot fail to differ much from the last: but the enduring lesson of this study of the outbreak of the war is the necessity for intelligent teamwork between the Foreign Office and the different combatant forces. Each should know something of the problems confronting all the others. In this country it is scarcely likely that the civil branches of the government will ever know as much as is desirable of combatant matters and, therefore, it is the more necessary that not only should our naval officers be soundly versed in strategy and tactics, (they get daily practice in administration) but they should know foreign policies and their probable developments. If they do not, there is no other class in the country able to take the necessary all-round view of hostilities as affecting all the activities of government. It is to be hoped that by means of the Examining Board and the War College this point of wide education may be pressed upon all officers of high rank.