The general demand for decreased governmental expenditures has fathered the belief that further efficiency and economy in the administration of the Government will be secured by the amalgamation of various governmental activities.
There is, in fact, something so fascinating about the general idea of amalgamation that many people practically mesmerize themselves by keeping their eyes focused on the possibilities of the amalgamation of anything. Amalgamation of various governmental activities has, therefore, been advanced as a general panacea for all our troubles; it is advanced as a cure for personnel jealousy, for departmental inefficiency, and for every large governmental expenditure. As a result, we read one day of the proposed amalgamation of the War Department and of the Navy Department. Then we hear of the proposed amalgamation of the staff and of the line of the Navy; and we hear every day of-the amalgamation of the Army Air Service and of Naval Aviation into a United Air Service.
The supporters of amalgamation base their belief upon the theory that centralization of authority and amalgamation of similar activities will result in both decreased total expenditures, and increased efficiency of the general activity amalgamated. Theoretically the above supporters are correct in their belief, but practically, there is a limit beyond which amalgamation will fail to secure either increased efficiency or decreased expenditures.
The two important factors in the problem of a United Air Service are therefore efficiency and expense. Unless a United Air Service guarantees to the country an increase of our total aerial efficiency and a decrease in the expense of aviation, it is most inadvisable to make any amalgamation of our aviation forces.
The value of each of the above factors, namely, efficiency and expense, varies according to the necessities of war and the requirements of peace. During war the enemy must be defeated, cost what it may, while in time of peace Government expenditure must be cut down to a minimum.
A good peace organization may not be an efficient war organization and vice versa. The country expects its Navy, however, to keep prepared for war in time of peace; the Navy’s peace organization should therefore be such as will allow it to expand smoothly and rapidly into a war organization. In other words, the country expects the maximum efficiency in its Navy, even in peace.
We cannot, however, get away from the question of money— the factor of expense; the money appropriated for the Navy by Congress may make it necessary for the Navy, in time of peace, to sacrifice a part of its efficiency in order to save money— or in order to get along on the funds allotted.
Naval Aviation, as a part of the Navy, must be so organized and so administered that it will attain the highest point of efficiency possible with the money given to it by Congress. In other words, Naval Aviation, as a part of the Navy, must give to the country the maximum return for the money allotted.
In so far, therefore, as the Congress and the country are concerned, the big question as regards a United Air Service, is: “Will Naval Aviation in a United Air Service give to the country a better return for the money allotted than Naval Aviation as a part of the Navy is able to give?”
If a United Air Service does not guarantee to the country a better return for the money, in so far as Naval Aviation is concerned, then by all means “leave well enough alone.”
The second big question is: “Will a United Air Service give to the country a better return for the money allotted aviation, than separate service aviation activities are able to give?”
If a United Air Service fails to guarantee a better return for the money allotted aeronautics, then certainly it would be poor business to amalgamate the two aerial activities.
The answer to these two questions depends upon your opinion as to just what is the best return for your money—when speaking of the country’s forces of defense and offense, and when considering the country’s national security.
We cannot figure our national security solely in dollars and cents; we should figure our national security on what we secure from our dollars invested. The appropriations for the Army and the Navy are insurance premiums for our national security. Do you want the cheapest policy without regard to kind or without considering the financial security of the company? This brings us back to our two old factors, namely, efficiency and expense. The value you place upon these two factors will determine your attitude toward a United Air Service.
Naval Aviation at present is a part of the Navy, a vital part of the Navy. Aircraft are in the fleet, are a necessary part of the fleet. Naval Aviation personnel are in the Navy, are a part of the Navy; they are consequently indoctrinated with navy methods, navy ideas, and navy traditions. The problems of Naval Aviation are problems of the Navy, the development of Naval Aviation is a part of the development of the Navy and of the fleet.
Other things being equal, the fleet having air supremacy will, in all probability, win the next great naval battle. Naval aircraft are not only a most valuable auxiliary and aid to the fleet but are fast becoming of great value as defensive and offensive units.
The design, the development, and the employment of naval aircraft are all naval problems—this applies to all types of naval aircraft irrespective of the type of landing gear.
The fact that naval aircraft operate in a medium of air can not overshadow an equally true fact that naval aircraft must operate over the medium of water. The sea must always be taken into consideration in all the problems and employment of naval aircraft. Naval aircraft, therefore, whether employed from carriers, from ships, or from fleet bases- must be designed for sea work, and employed for sea work.
Is it probable that any other organization can better deal with Naval Aviation problems of design and operation than the Navy? Certainly not.
Is it probable that any other organization can give the Navy better pilots for its purpose than the Navy can develop? Certainly not.
Is it probable that the Navy can obtain the same co-ordination of its forces, if one vital force such as aviation belongs to an independent organization? Certainly not.
No one can serve two masters—at least with 100 per cent efficiency to each master. Naval Aviation at present serves the Navy; Navy Aviation personnel are at present a part of the Navy; it stands to reason that if we place aviation under a United Air Service, Naval Aviation is no longer a part of the Navy—it will become a loan to the Navy. It will be neither fish nor fowl, nor flesh either.
Can we secure the same sympathetic, intelligent, understanding viewpoint of naval problems from an independent organization outside the Navy that the Navy at present has? Certainly not.
Can the Navy secure greater efficiency from an independent force of aviators than it is able to secure out of its own aviation force? Certainly not.
An ideal organization of a United Air Service whereby we should have two divisions of aviation forces, namely, Army and Navy, cannot alter the fact that Naval Aviation would thereby be a part of an independent organization.
Regardless, therefore, of our various opinions as to the present and future efficiency of Naval Aviation, it is apparent that no increase of efficiency of Naval Aviation would result from a United Air Service; and, in fact, we can be certain that there would be a decrease in the efficiency of Naval Aviation. A decrease in the efficiency of Naval Aviation means a decrease in the fighting efficiency of our fleet. A decrease in the fighting efficiency of our Navy means a big decrease in our national security.
How about the effect of a United Air Service upon the factor of expense of Naval Aviation?
The actual cost of Naval Aviation under a United Air Service is, of course, problematical and dependent upon just how much attention would be paid to Naval Aviation. If we are to judge by recent events in England it would appear that Naval Aviation would have to fight for what it would get from an Air Ministry.
Let us assume, however, that every effort would be made to develop and maintain Naval Aviation in a United Air Service. Is it reasonable, then, to suppose that an independent organization, paying all the bills in connection with Naval Aviation, can lower the costs of Naval Aviation which at present draws upon the services of the whole Navy?
The funds allotted by Congress to the Navy have been economically disbursed, and every regulation possible promulgated to safeguard the expenditure of such funds.
No, we cannot expect any lowering of total expense in Naval Aviation from a United Air Service, judging from our own experience, and from the experience of countries abroad.
In so far, therefore, as Naval Aviation is concerned, a United Air Service does not guarantee to the country a better return for the money—and we had best leave well enough alone.
The second question: namely, what return for the money a United Air Service will give to the country, depends again for its answer upon the values of the factors of efficiency and expense.
If one organization is inefficient, make it efficient; if one organization is wasteful, make it economical. The joining of an efficient organization to an inefficient organization usually lowers the efficiency of the better one. If the country wants only an efficient air service without regard to the Army or to the Navy, I cannot see how the amalgamation of the Army Air Service with Naval Aviation would necessarily mean an efficient air service as a whole. I do not see how an Army file can increase the efficiency of the Navy, nor a Navy file increase the efficiency of the Army. Perhaps the Army Air Service has some ideas as to how Navy Aviation should be run, and perhaps Naval aviators have some ideas as to how the Army Air Service should be run, but the fact remains that each would hesitate considerably to put those ideas into effect. There is too much to be done, there is too much to be learned, in each service, to mix them up efficiently. Regardless of every effort, and notwithstanding the best of intentions, there would be a lowering of efficiency of each aerial branch of the service should they be united in a separate air Service.
There has been considerable talk as to the financial benefits to the country from a United Air Service. We hear of the costs of duplication; we read of the lowering of aeronautical expenditures in event of a United Air Service. But at the same time we are told that both naval and army aviation will be benefitted, and that every effort will be made to keep the aerial forces of both services efficient and up to the strength required. If efforts are to be made to keep Naval Aviation up to standard, considering personnel and material, then certainly the same amount of money will be spent doing it—unless there is duplication of mission.
There is no duplication of mission at present. The Army aviators have their duties, Naval aviators have theirs. Naval Air Stations and Fleet Air Bases have naval work to do, work which the Army has no desire to take upon itself because the missions of the Army and Navy are not only known and understood by both services but are also so different and exacting that each service finds plenty to do.
The missions of the Army Air Service and of Naval Aviation are clearly laid down and outlined. “Duplication of facilities” is a very catchy phrase; “duplication of production” sounds like a waste of money.
If a United Air Service is to take over the duties and missions of the Army Air Service and of Naval Aviation then the United Air Service must either use the facilities each service has, or build new ones. There can be no saving there to amount to anything. There would, in all probability, he large expenditures in any effort to combine them.
Aviation in the fleet is still in an experimental stage. Furthermore, if we are to develop Naval Aviation in the fleet, we must keep on experimenting. A United Air Service would have to do the same; and certainly would spend at least an equal amount of money doing it.
The Navy is seeking to standardize its types; but who can prophesy the exact planes in the fleet in 1934? Who can foretell our Naval Aviation program of 1934? Will the Navy be able to use Army motors, and Army planes use Navy motors in 1934? If so, that can be taken care of by present facilities and by present organization. The point is that motors cost money, and a United Air Service will have to spend money to get them, and if bought by wholesale as in the last war, many will soon accumulate in stock, already obsolete.
I cannot see any lowering of aeronautical expenditures from a United Air Service if efforts are made to maintain efficiency of both services. It appears to me that all the chances are for a United Air Service increasing expenditures by trying to buy aircraft for both services when only one is ready or able to use them.
It is better business to go on as the Navy is doing, experimenting and developing, always in a position to change its policies without a financial loss to the country.
The financial return to the country from a United Air Service would be furthermore reduced by the lack of competition between the Army and the Navy in aeronautical contests. Certainly there is usually a net gain to the country in such a competition.
From a naval standpoint, therefore, the amalgamation of the various activities of naval aeronautics in the Bureau of Aeronautics, and the amalgamation of the activities of Army Aviation in the Army Air Service, is the limit of amalgamation desirable or advisable in service aeronautics.
From a layman’s standpoint, a United Air Service does not guarantee to the country any increase in the efficiency of the Army or of the Navy, nor does it guarantee a decrease in the gross expenditures of the Government for aeronautical purposes. In fact, a United Air Service would decrease both the fighting efficiency of the fleet and the safety of troops at sea, and that without saving money to the Government.