Although thousands of pages have been written about the Battle of Jutland, no apology is needed from a naval officer in writing for a service magazine on this important subject if his writings clear up any obscure points in this most complicated battle.
Many officers, who spend a lifetime in military service, never take part in a great battle; fewer still ever engage in a sufficient number of battles to gain, from personal experience, the amount of strategical and tactical knowledge necessary to fit them for leadership.
Napoleon probably fought more battles than any other great general, and one might think he had enough personal experience to furnish the basis for his profound knowledge of military affairs—yet, while the world thinks of the great French Emperor as a military wonder. Napoleon attributed his marvelous success in war more to a good memory than to flashes of genius. At some critical point in a campaign or battle Napoleon merely had the good sense to apply a sound principle, already tried out by his predecessors, in the situations he found confronting him.
In the study of history pertaining to the naval profession we have to search through masses of detail to find important points and principles, just as Napoleon studied the history of Alexander, Caesar and Hannibal for the maxims which stood him in such good stead in the many wars he waged in Europe.
Thousands of pages have been written on the life of the world's greatest seaman, Admiral Nelson. There is such a mass of Nelsonic history that those of us with poor memories read and forget—yet even those afflicted with the shortest memories gain, by reading the naval history of Nelson's time, a rough idea of the outstanding characteristics of the hero of Trafalgar, and find a few principles for use in modern war.
While the tactics and strategy of Nelson have been studied for over a hundred years, the Battle of Jutland is far more complicated than the whole of Nelson's war experience, and it will take many years of faithful study to prepare us to reap the benefit of all the professional data furnished by this great sea fight. No better indication can be found of the intricate character of the struggle between the British and German fleets in the North Sea on 31 May, 1916, than the great number of bridge and W. T. signals sent and received in the Grand Fleet during the interesting period between the late afternoon of 30 May and midnight of the following day. During this time the British fleet sent and received, on the average, a message every five minutes.
The importance of the Jutland Battle to the naval profession is accentuated by the fact that it is the only naval engagement in which practically all types of modern fighting ships were used. With the exception of submarines, every type existing at the time took part in the battle, and, if we consider the whole strategic plan of the commander of the High Seas Fleet, we shall see that even submarines were used. Sixteen of this type were in use during the operation, stationed off Scapa Flow, Moray Firth, the Firth of Forth and north of Terschelling Bank, and it is interesting to note that these undersea boats had, as one part of their dual mission, the supply of information to Admiral Scheer. A large number of dirigibles were to be used in observing the movements of the British forces, but under the plan, if reconnaissance from the air proved impossible, the U-boats were to be used as the advance scouts of the fleet. As it turned out the weather prevented the use of air scouts, and the submarines furnished to the commander of the High Seas Fleet at least three important reports of movements of British forces.
There is food for thought here. Where a submarine stands periscope watch, steaming so slowly that no "feather" is shown, or balancing and making no headway, the periscope is very difficult to see. If, then, the mission of the submarine is purely to gain information and it makes no attack to betray its presence, its use on scouting duty seems promising. Once discovered the value of the submarine in service of information will disappear, for destroyers will force it under and then its low speed will usually prevent it from regaining touch with the enemy fleet.
While on the subject of scouting, it seems rather strange that, although Admiral Scheer contemplated the use of dirigibles and actually used submarines for strategic scouting, no strategic scouting was done by the British fleet. Both the commander-in-chief and the commander of the battle cruiser fleet were informed on 30 May by the Admiralty that news pointed to early activity on the part of the German fleet, and later on, during the same day, received the following instructions: "You should concentrate to eastward of Long Forties ready for eventualities." The commander-in-chief then gave orders for the sweep to be made in the North Sea and appointed rendezvous for both the battle cruiser and Grand fleets at 2.00 p. m. the following day. The British fleet had 34 cruisers and 9 battle cruisers as opposed to 11 cruisers and 5 battle cruisers of the Germans. It seems that some cruisers at least could have been safely detached to scout against the enemy movement through the known swept channels leading out of Heligoland Bight, yet, no scouting was done at any considerable distance from the battle cruiser or Grand fleets. Was it feared that British scouts sent out well in advance would cause the High Seas Fleet to return to its base? Of course the American Navy has no scouts as compared to the other two leading sea powers, but we may have a well-balanced fleet in the future, so strategical scouting at a good distance from the main fleet is a matter that should receive consideration.
The writer is attempting to bring out only the outstanding features of this battle, so wherever events ran along in their normal course they will not be subjected to comment; we are trying to touch upon only the points worth remembering.
It will be convenient to divide the battle into the three phases into which it is usually divided and then, concerning each phase, ask ourselves this question—what can we learn from this part of the action?
First Phase. Battle Cruiser Action
The forces engaged in the battle cruiser action were:
British. German.
4 Battleships. No Battleships.
6 Battle Cruisers. 5 Battle Cruisers.
14 Light Cruisers. 5 Light Cruisers.
27 Destroyers. 32 Destroyers.
This part of the battle was a normal gun-action with the usual torpedo attacks by destroyers and light cruisers and with the normal fight to be expected between these types. Notwithstanding the great superiority of the British ships, the German battle cruisers suffered but little damage, while two British battle cruisers were sunk.
Admiral Jellicoe ascribes the rough handling of the more numerous British capital ships in this phase of the action to these advantages in favor of the Germans: (1) Heavier armor; (2) a better delayed-action fuse; (3) armor protection above the main deck. Others seem to think that lucky shots sank the Indefatigable, the Queen Mary and the Invincible. As the Germans kept sinking battle cruisers all the afternoon, it seems more like superior marksmanship on the part of the Germans than anything else. Those of us who are lucky enough to have had much experience in battleships realize how complicated the fire-control problem is. The absence of one officer or man may vitiate the whole fire-control drill. From our knowledge of the willingness of the Germans to work, it is not difficult to believe that they spent more time on fire-control drill in pre-war time than was spent in either the British or the American navies. Was not the better German shooting in the battle cruiser action the simple reward of more drill when preparing for war? If so the lesson is simple.
It is generally admitted that the Germans were ahead of the rest of the world in range finders at the beginning of the war, just as they were in advance of all other navies in the construction and handling of submarines. They had better optical instruments than the rest of us and, in consequence, they hit with more salvos early in the fight, than the British. The fleet that can land the first salvo has a marked advantage. The answer here is not so easy. There are two ways to keep abreast of other navies in any type of ship or in any kind of material. The first is to spend time and money in investigation and experiment; if the navy had the money to do this we would not admit that any other nation could excel us in anything—but the wave of economy sweeping over the country will leave the navy with little money for experiment for a number of years. The other way is to spend money to find out what other navies develop; we can never hope to do this, for the money spent would have to come from a secret fund, and the average Congressman is not willing to vote for a fund where he cannot see "in black and white" what the money is spent for. For the remedy we must depend on our high naval officials in Washington and a Secretary of the Navy sufficiently strong to be able to convince Congress of the necessity for spending money both for experiment and for information as to the progress our possible enemies are making. These remarks also apply to the shells for our guns and, in fact, to all the material that goes into the makeup of any kind of implement of warfare.
The Main Fleet Action
The first thing that strikes one on a study of this part of the engagement is that the battle fleet was 18 miles from the rendezvous made for it by the commander-in-chief for 2.00 p. m. on the day of the battle. Of course, hind sight is clear, yet there was every reason to believe the High Seas Fleet was out and, as this was to be a coordinated use of the whole fleet, had the commander-in-chief any right to be an hour's run from his own appointed rendezvous? The whole battle fleet lost an hour in the examination of trawlers, when another hour of daylight in the engagement might have brought quite different results. The lesson for us is to "stick to the plan."
"Be perfectly clear in your own mind what you want to do, and then carry it out to the letter."
The reports made to the commander-in-chief concerning the position of the High Seas Fleet were conflicting to a degree. In Admiral Jellicoe's report concerning his doubts as to how to deploy, he writes: "The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer."
The stumbling block of the British commander-in-chief was lack of accurate information. The damage done by the lack of this information was intensified at two points, first it delayed the deployment—second, later on in the action, the British battle fleet lost touch with the Germans because Admiral Jellicoe did not know the German fleet had turned away. The first lack of information cost the British a loss of 16 minutes, the second a loss of about 20 minutes and, as Nelson said—"Time is everything. Five minutes makes the difference between a victory and a defeat."
It is quite naturally a difficult matter for a ship to keep accurate record of her position, with reference to the flagship, during a hot engagement where there are numerous changes of course and perhaps even zig-zagging; but the results of Jutland show the vital importance of accurate navigation when approaching for battle and even when engaged. If the positions of reports are misleading, the commander-in-chief is hopelessly blinded.
The necessity for efficient tactical scouting, prompt and accurate reports and the charting of all incoming information seems to be far and away the most important of our lessons from Jutland.
The next event of importance on the British side was the "turn away" by the British battle fleet to avoid torpedoes. The "turn away" or the "turn towards" torpedoes to clear them is a thing that can only be decided by the commander on the spot. That no commander could be justified in entering a known torpedo area with capital ships is certain. The main point for us, however, is this—Admiral Jellicoe's light cruisers and destroyers were out of battle position when the torpedo attack was made on the battle fleet; they were out of position on account of the deployment and the four point turn to starboard (by divisions) to close the range. When we have built our light cruisers can we keep them and our destroyers in battle position when deploying the fleet or when changing direction in battle?
The other most interesting feature of the main fleet action was the three reversals of course made by the High Seas Fleet while engaged with the enemy. Our battle theory, up to the World War, was that such a thing would be disastrous. Even rank changes of course during a fight were to be shunned to avoid a "knuckle," danger from partial cap, and to keep clear from a further complication of the fire-control problem, too complex at best. In this connection zig-zagging was resorted to both by the British and the Germans in the battle cruiser phase of the action in order to derange the enemy fire delivery. Scheer's reversals of course under protection of a torpedo attack by his destroyers and smoke screens from these vessels show how incorrect were our old conceptions as to the danger of making a rank change of course while under fire.
Our lesson from this part of the battle will come from a closer study of smoke screens. The commander-in-chief will need to have handy for use on his plotting sheet some kind of a smoke diagram giving the resultant form of the screen with the wind at various angles with his course, taking into account also the speed of the smoke screen layers and their distance from the battle formation. I believe it safe to say that much experiment is needed along these lines.
The Night Action
The official dispatches of the Battle of Jutland show the last flag signal to have been made at 9.30 p. m. 31 May, and the first hoist next morning at 2.30 a. m., thus giving the duration of darkness.
This phase of the battle again shows the necessity for accurate knowledge of all ships' positions with reference to the rest of the fleet. The sketches made from a study of the battle data by Lieutenant Commander Frost show—(1) High Seas Fleet generally west of the Grand Fleet at 9.30 p. m., distant about 10 miles; (2) head of High Seas Fleet about west-northwest of the British battleships at 10.30 p. m., distant about 7 ½ miles; (3) by 11.30 p. m. the High Seas Fleet bore about north-northwest from the British battleships, distant about 9 miles; the German fleet was now heading off to the eastward, crossing Jellicoe's track (well astern) and at 2.30 a. m. the High Seas Fleet was about 30 miles north-northeast of the Grand Fleet.
The Grand Fleet was fairly well concentrated with the light cruisers and destroyers in general about 5 miles astern, and the battle cruiser force about 15 miles off to the westward. The High Seas Fleet, according to a track chart signed by Admiral Jellicoe, was badly scattered; the tracks of the Westfallen battle squadron, Deutschland class, and the Kaiser and Konig squadrons are 5 miles apart. It is inconceivable that, when the relative remaining strengths of the two fleets are considered, the British commander-in-chief did not desire to renew the action at daylight on 1 June. The opportunity to renew the action was probably lost on account of lack of information—possibly the information that came in from contacts was not promptly and efficiently charted for use of the commander-in-chief. It seems most probable that if the information of contacts had been promptly plotted, the general course and speed of the High Seas Fleet would have developed early enough so the British fleet could have still interposed at Horn Reef between the Germans and their base. The German fleet was about 17 miles west-northwest of Horn Reef light ship at daylight on 1 June.
Our lesson from the night action is that tactical information must be given promptly and accurately and that it must be plotted quickly and correctly; the work of the plotting party may spell victory or disaster.