Motto: "Sleepers, Wake."
Note.—The enormous increase in the power of navies that has taken place within the past ten years, with the corresponding relative decrease in the power of armies, constitute a phenomenon whose causes and whose characteristics are only vaguely understood. To many it seems based on some mistake, and to it the phrase "craze for naval armaments" is frequently applied. The present paper is the outcome of an effort by the writer to discern what fundamental property has enabled navies to increase so tremendously in their power, and why the nations spend so much money utilizing it; and also to find some simple truths, to help us develop naval power still further.
Mahan proved that sea power has exercised a determining influence on history. He proved that sea power has been necessary for commercial success in peace and military success in war. He proved that, white many wars have culminated with the victory of some army, the victory of some navy had been the previous essential. He proved that the immediate cause of success had often resulted inevitably from another cause, less apparent because more profound; that the operations of the navy had previously brought affairs up to the "mate in four moves," and that the final victory of the army was the resulting "checkmate."
Before Mahan proved his doctrine, it was felt in a general way that sea power was necessary to the prosperity and security of a nation. Mahan was not the first to have this idea, for it had been in the minds of some men, and in the policy of one nation, for more than a century. Neither was Mahan the first to put forth the idea in writing; but he was the first to make an absolute demonstration of the truth. Newton was not the first man to know, or to say, that things near the earth tend to fall to the earth; but he was the first to formulate and prove the doctrine of universal gravitation. In the same way, all through history, we find that a few master minds have been able to group what had theretofore seemed unrelated phenomena, and deduce from them certain laws. In this way they substituted reasoning for speculation, fact for fancy, wisdom for opportunism, and became the guides of the human race.
The effect of the acceptance of Mahan's doctrine was felt at once. Realizing that the influence of sea power was a fact, comprehending Great Britain's secret, after Mahan had disclosed it, certain other great nations of the world, especially Germany, immediately started with confidence and vigor upon the increase of their own sea power, and pushed it to a degree before unparalleled; with a result that to-day must be amazing to the man who, more than any other, is responsible for it.
Since the words "sea power," or their translation, is a recognized phrase the world over, and since the power of sea power is greater than ever before, and is still increasing, it may be profitable to consider sea power as an entity, and to inquire what are its leading characteristics, and in what it mainly consists.
There is no trouble in defining what the sea is, but there is a good deal of trouble in defining what power is If we look in a dictionary, we shall find a good many definitions of power; so many as to show that there are many different kinds of power, and that when we read of "power," it is necessary to know what kind of power is meant. Clearly "sea power" means power on the sea. But what kind of power? There are two large classes into which power may be divided, passive and active. Certainly we seem justified, at the start, in declaring that the power meant by Mahan was not passive, but active. Should this be granted, we cannot be far from right if we go a step further, and declare that sea power means ability to do something on the sea.
If we ask what the something is that sea power has ability to do, we at once perceive that sea power may be divided into two parts, commercial power and naval power.
The power exerted by commercial sea power is clearly that exerted by the merchant service, and is mainly the power of acquiring money. It is true that the merchant service has the power of rendering certain services in war, especially the power of providing auxiliary vessels, and of furnishing men accustomed to the sea; but as time goes on the power contributable by the merchant service must steadily decrease, because of the relatively increasing power of the naval service, and the rapidly increasing difference between the characteristics of ships and men suitable for the merchant service and those suitable for the naval service.
But even in the past, while the importance of the merchant service was considerable in the ways just outlined, it may perhaps be questioned whether it formed an element of sea power, in the sense in which Mahan discussed sea power. The power of every country depends on all the sources of its wealth; on its agriculture, on its manufacturing activities, and even more directly on the money derived from imports. But these sources of wealth, and all sources of wealth, including the merchant service, can hardly be said to be elements of power themselves, but rather to be elements for whose protection power is required.
In fact, apart from its usefulness in furnishing auxiliaries, it seems certain that the merchant service has been an element of weakness. The need for navies arose from the weakness of merchant ships and the corresponding necessity for assuring them safe voyages and proper treatment even in time of peace; while in time of war they have always been an anxious care, and have needed and received the protection of fighting ships, that have been taken away from the fleet to act as convoys.
If commercial sea power was not the power meant by Mahan, then he must have meant naval power. And if one reads the pages of history with patient discrimination, the conviction must grow on him that what really constituted the sea power which had so great an influence on history, was naval power; not the power of simply ships upon the sea, but the power of a navy composed of ships able to fight, manned by men trained to fight, under the command of captains skilled to fight, and led by admirals determined to fight. Trafalgar was not won by the merchant service; nor Mobile, Manila or Tsushima.
Characteristics of Naval Power
If sea power be essentially naval power, it may be interesting to inquire: In what does naval power consist and what are its principal characteristics?
If one looks at a fleet of warships on the sea, he will be impressed consciously or unconsciously, with the idea of power. If he is impressed consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the broadest sense; power active, and power passive: power to do, and power to endure; power to exert force; and power to resist it.
If he goes further and analyzes the reasons for this impression of power, he will see that it is not merely a mental suggestion, but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical power, under complete direction and control.
In mechanics we get a definition of power, which, like all definitions in mechanics, is clear, definite and correct. In mechanics, power is the rate at which mechanical work is performed. It is ability to do something in a certain definite time.
Now this definition gives us a clear idea of the way in which a navy directly represents power, because the power which a navy exerts is, primarily, mechanical; and any other power which it exerts is secondary, and derived wholly from its mechanical power. The power of a gun is due wholly to the mechanical energy of its projectile, which enables it to penetrate a resisting body; and the power of a moving ship is due wholly to the mechanical energy of the burning coal within its furnaces.
It may be objected that it is not reasonable to consider a ship's energy of motion as an element of naval power, in the mechanical sense in which we have been using the word "power," for the reason that it could be exerted only by the use of her ram, an infrequent use. To this it may be answered that energy is energy, no matter to what purpose it is applied; that a given projectile going at a given speed has a certain energy, whether it strikes its target or misses it; and that a battleship going at a certain speed must necessarily have a certain definite energy, no matter whether it is devoted to ramming another ship or to carrying itself and its contents from one place to another.
Besides the mechanical power exertable by the mere motion of the ship, and often superior to it, there is the power of her guns and torpedoes.
Perhaps the most important single invention ever made was the invention of gunpowder. Why? Because it put into the hands of man a tremendous force, compressed into a very small volume, which he could use instantaneously, or refrain from using at his will. Its first use was in war; and in war has been its main employment ever since. War gives the best field for the activity of gunpowder, because in war we always wish to exert a great force at a definite point at a given instant; usually in order to penetrate the bodies of men, or some defensive work that protects them. Gunpowder is the principal agent used in war up to the present date. It is used by both armies and navies; but navies give the larger field for its employment.
Of course this does not mean that it would be impossible to send a lot of powder to a fort, more than a fleet could carry, and fire it; but it does mean that history shows that forts have rarely been called upon to fire much powder, and that their lives have been peaceful. And all the indications of the future seem to show that, while the great preventive value of forts will continue to be recognized, yet nevertheless forts will actually fire powder even less in the future than in the past, for the reason that they fulfill their purpose so perfectly that ships will keep away from them.
Leaving forts out of consideration for a moment, and searching for something else in which to use gunpowder on a large scale, we come to siege pieces, field pieces, and muskets. Disregarding siege pieces and field pieces, because there are so few of them, and they not very big, we come to muskets.
Now the musket is an extremely formidable weapon, and has, perhaps, been the greatest single contributor to the victory of civilization over barbarism, and order over anarchy, that has ever existed up to the present time. But the enormous advances in engineering, including ordnance, during the last fifty years have reduced enormously the relative value of the musket. Remembering that energy, or the ability to do work, is expressed by the formula: E = ½MV2, remembering that the projectile of the modern 12-inch gun starts at about 2900 f. s. velocity and weighs 867 pounds, while the bullet of a musket weighs only 150 grains and starts with a velocity of 2700 feet per second, we see that the energy of the 12-inch projectile is about 47,000 times that of the bullet on leaving the muzzle. But after the bullet has gone, say 5000 yards, its energy has fallen to zero, while the energy of the 12-inch projectile is nearly the same as when it started.
While it would be truthful, therefore, to say that the energy of the 12-inch gun within 5000 yards is greater than that of 47,000 muskets, it would also be truthful to say that outside of 5000 yards, millions of muskets would not be equal to one 12inch gun.
Not only is the 12-inch gun a weapon incomparably great, compared with the musket, but when placed in a naval ship, it possesses a portability which, while not an attribute of the gun itself, is an attribute of the combination of gun and ship, and a distinct attribute of naval power. A 12-inch gun placed in a fort may be just as good as a like gun placed in a ship, but it has no power to exert its power usefully unless some enemy comes where the gun can hit it. And when one searches the annals of history for the records of whatever fighting forts have done, he finds that they have been able to do very little. But a 12-inch gun placed in a man-of-war can be taken where it is needed, and recent history shows that naval 12-inch guns, modern though they are, have already done effective work in war.
Not only are 12-inch guns powerful and portable, but modern mechanical science has succeeded in so placing them in our ships that they can be handled with a precision, quickness, and delicacy that have no superior in any other branch of engineering. While granting the difficulty of an exact comparison, the writer feels no hesitation in affirming that the greatest triumph of the engineering art in handling heavy masses is to be found in the turret of a battleship. Here again, and even inside of 5000 yards, we find the superiority of the great gun over the musket, as evidenced by its accuracy in use. No soldier can fire his musket. even on a steady platform, himself and target stationary, and the range known perfectly, as accurately as a gun-pointer can fire a 12-inch gun; and if gun and target be moving, and the wind be blowing, and the range only approximately known, as is always the case in practice, the advantage of the big gun in accuracy becomes incomparable.
But it is not only the big projectile itself which has energy. for this projectile carries a large charge of high explosive, which exploding some miles away from where it started, exerts a power inherent in itself, that was exhibited with frightful effect against the Russian ships at the battle of Tsushima.
This brings us to the auto-torpedo, a weapon recently perfected; in fact not perfected yet. Here is another power that science has put into the hands of naval men in addition to those she had already put there. The auto-torpedo, launched in security from below the waterline of the battleship, or from a destroyer or submarine, can be directed in a straight line over a distance, and with a speed, that are constantly increasing with the improvement of the weapon. At the present moment, a speed of 27 knots over 4000 yards can be depended on, with a probability that on striking an enemy's ship below the waterline it will disable that ship, if not sink her. There seems no doubt that, in a very few years, the systematic experiments now being applied to the development of the torpedo will result in a weapon which can hardly be called inferior to the 12-inch gun, and will probably surpass it.
Controllability.—If one watches a fleet of ships moving on the sea, he gets an impression of tremendous power. But if he watches Niagara, or a thunder storm, he also gets an impression of tremendous power. But the tremendous power of Niagara, or the thunder storm, is a power that belongs to Niagara or the thunder storm, and not to man. Man cannot control the power of Niagara or the thunder storm; but he can control the power of a fleet.
Speaking then from the standpoint of the human being, one may say that the fleet has the element of controllability, while Niagara and the thunder storm have not. One man can make the fleet go faster or slower or stop; he can increase its power of motion or decrease it at his will; he can reduce it to zero. He cannot do so with the forces of nature.
Directability.—Not only can one man control the power of the fleet, he can also direct it; that is, can turn it to the right or the left as much as he wishes. But one man cannot change the direction of motion of Niagara or the lightning bolt.
Power, Controllability and Directability.—We may say then that a fleet combines the three elements of mechanical power, controllability, and directability.
The Unit of Military Power.—This is an enormous power that has come into the hands of the naval nations; but it has come so newly that we do not appreciate it yet. One reason why we do not and cannot appreciate it correctly is that no units have been established by which to measure it.
To supply this deficiency, the writer begs leave to point out that, since the military power of every nation has until recently been its army, of which the unit has been the soldier, whose power has rested wholly in his musket, the musket has actually been the unit of military power. In all history, the statement of the number of men in each army has been put forward by historians as giving the most accurate idea of their fighting value; and in modern times, nearly all of these men have been armed with muskets only.
It has been said already in this paper that the main reason why the invention of gunpowder was so important was that it put into the hands of man a tremendous mechanical power compressed into a very small space, which man could use or not use at his will. This idea may be expressed by saying that gunpowder combines power and great controllability. But it was soon discovered that this gunpowder, put into a tube with a bullet in front of it, could discharge that bullet in any given direction. A musket was the result, and it combined the three requisites of a weapon, mechanical power, controllability and directability.
While the loaded gun is perhaps the clearest example of the combination of the three factors we are speaking of, the moving ship supplies the next best example. It has very much greater mechanical power; and in proportion to its mass, almost as much controllability and directability.
The control and direction of a moving ship is a very wonderful thing; but the very ease with which they are performed makes us overlook the magnitude of the achievement and the perfection of the means employed. It may seem absurd to speak of one man controlling and directing a great ship, but that is pretty nearly what happens sometimes; for sometimes the man at the wheel is the only man on board doing anything at all; and he is absolutely directing the entire ship. At such times (doubtless they are rare and short) the man at the wheel on board, say the Mauretania, is directing unassisted by any human being, a mass of 45,000 tons, which is going through the water at a speed of 26.5 knots or 30 miles an hour, nearly as fast as the average passenger train. In fact, it would be very easy to arrange on board the Mauretania that this should actually happen; that everybody should take a rest for a few minutes, coal passers, water tenders, oilers, engineers and the people on deck. And while such an act might have no particular value, per se, and prove nothing important, yet, nevertheless a brief reflection on the possibility may be interesting, and lead us to see clearly into the essential nature of what is here called "directability." The man at the wheel on board the Mauretania, so long as the fires burn and the oil continues to lubricate the engines, has a power in his hands that is almost inconceivable. The ship that he is handling weighs as much as the standing army of Germany.
Now can anybody imagine the entire standing army of Germany being carried along at thirty miles an hour and turned almost instantly to the right or left by one man? The standing army of Germany is supposed to be the most directable organization in the world; but could the emperor of Germany move that army at a speed of thirty miles an hour and turn it as a whole not its separate units) through ninety degrees in three minutes?
The Mauretania, being a merchant ship and not fully representing naval power, perhaps it might be better to take, say the Arkansas. The weight would be more than half that of the Mauretania, that is it would be more than the weight of the British standing army; and the usual speed would be about, say, 15 knots. But in addition to all the power of the ship, as a ship, she will have the power of all the guns, twelve 12-inch guns, and twenty-one 5-inch guns, whose projectiles, not including the torpedoes, will have an energy at the muzzle greater than the energy of all the muskets in the German standing army. Now anyone who has seen a battleship at battle practice knows that all the various tremendous forces are under excellent direction and control. And while it cannot be strictly said that they are absolutely under the direction and control of the captain, while it must be admitted that no one man can really direct so many rapidly moving things, yet it is certainly well within the truth to ay that the ship and all it contains are very much more under the control of her captain than the German standing army is under the control of the Kaiser. The captain, acting through the helmsman, chief engineer, ordnance officer and executive officer, can get very excellent information as to what is going on, and can have his orders carried out with very little delay; but the mere space occupied by an army of 600,000 men, and the unavoidable dispersion of its units prevent any such exact control.
In other words the captain of the Arkansas will wield a weapon more intrinsically powerful than the German standing army: and his control of it will be more absolute than is the Kaiser's control of that army.
Mechanism vs. Men.—Now what is the essential reason for the efficient direction exercised by the helmsman of the Arkansas. and the relative impotency of generals? It is not that the helmsman acts through the medium of mechanism, while the generals act through the medium of men? A ship is not only made of rigid metal, but all her parts are fastened together with the utmost rigidity: while the parts of an army are men, who are held together by no means whatever except that which discipline gives, and the men themselves are far from rigid. In the nature of things it is impossible that an army should be directed as perfectly as a ship. The rudder of a ship is a mechanical appliance that can be depended upon to control the direction of the ship absolutely, while an army has no such a thing as a rudder, or anything to take its place. Again, the rudder is only a few hundred feet from the helmsman, and the communication between them, including the steering engine itself, is a strong reliable mechanism, that has Do counterpart in the army.
The control of the main engines of a ship is almost as absolute as the control of the rudder; and the main engines are not only much more powerful than the legs of soldiers, but they act together in much greater harmony.
Inherent Power of a Battleship.—Possibly the declaration maybe accepted now that a battleship of 26,000 tons such as the navies are building now, with, say, twelve 12-inch guns is a greater example of power, under the absolute direction and control than anything else existing; and that the main reason is the concentration of a tremendous amount of mechanical energy in a very small space, all made available by certain properties of water. Nothing like a ship can be made to run on shore; but if an automobile could be constructed, carrying twelve 12-inch guns, twenty-one 5-inch guns and four torpedo tubes, of the size of the Arkansas, and with her armor, able to run over the land in any direction at 20 knots, propelled by engines of twenty thousand horse power, it could whip an army of a million men just as quickly as it could get hold of its component parts. Such a machine would start at one end of an army and go through to the other like a mowing machine through a field of wheat; and knock down ill the buildings in New York afterwards, smash all the cars, break down all the bridges and sink all the shipping.
Inherent Power of a Fleet.—An idea of the power exertable by i fleet of modern ships may be derived from the following comparison.
When Sherman made his wonderful march to the sea from Atlanta to Savannah, he made a march whose details are historically known, which was unopposed, which was over a flat country, in good weather, and without the aid of railroad trains. It was a march, pure and simple; and inasmuch as men are the same now as they were then, it gives excellent data of the way in which purely military or army power can move from one place to another, while still preserving its character and exercising its functions. Similarly, when Admiral Schroeder, in November, 1910, went from the east coast of the United States to the English Channel, his march was unopposed, its details are known, aid it gave an excellent illustration of how naval power can move from one place to another, while still preserving its character and exercising its functions.
Now General Sherman was a man of world-wide fame, and so were some of his generals, and Sherman's fame will last for centuries. Compared with Sherman, Admiral Schroeder was obscure; and compared with Sherman's officers, Admiral Schroeder's were obscure. Sherman's soldiers, privates and all were made glorious for the rest of their lives by having been in Sherman's march to the sea, while Admiral Schroeder's sailors achieved no glory at all. So, the next paragraph is not intended to detract in the slightest from Sherman and his army, but simply to point out the change in conditions that mechanical progress has brought about.
The statement of comparison is simply that when General Sherman marched from Atlanta to the sea, his army composed fe.ooo men, and it took him twenty-five days to go about 230 land miles or 200 sea miles; and when Admiral Schroeder went from our coast to Europe he had sixteen ships, and he made the trip of more than 3000 sea miles in less than fourteen days. Disregarding twenty-eight 5-inch guns, 252 3-inch guns, and a lot of smaller guns, and disregarding all the torpedoes, Admiral Schroeder took eighty-four 12-inch guns, ninety-six 8-inch guns, eighty-eight 7-inch guns and forty-eight 6-inch guns, ail mounted and available; which, assuming the power of the modern musket as a unit, equaled more than five million modern muskets.
Such an enormous transfer of absolute, definite, available power would be impossible on land, simply because no means has been devised to accomplish it. Such a transfer on land would be the transfer of ninety times as many soldiers as Sherman had (even supposing they had modern muskets) over fifteen times the distance and at thirty times the speed; and as the work done in going from one place to another varies practically as the square of the speed, a transfer on land equivalent in magnitude and speed to Schroeder's would be a performance 90 x 15 x 302= 1,215,000 times as great as Sherman's.
This may seem absurd, and perhaps it is; but why? The comparison is not between the qualities of the men or between the results achieved. Great results often are brought about by very small forces, as when some state of equilibrium is disturbed, and vice versa. The comparison attempted is simply between the power of a certain army and the power of a certain fleet. And while it is true that, for some purposes, such as overcoming small resistance, great power may not be as efficacious as feeble power, or even gentleness, yet, nevertheless, it must be clear that, for the overcoming of great resistance quickly great power must be applied.
The existence of a certain power is quite independent of the desirability of using it. The existence of the power is all the writer wishes to insist upon at present; the question of its employment will be considered later.
Not only is the power of a fleet immeasurably greater than that of an army, but it must always be so, from the very nature of things. The speed of an army, while exercising the functions of an army, and the power of a musket, while exercising its functions as a weapon of one soldier, cannot change much from what they were when Sherman went marching through Georgia. But, thanks to mechanical science, there is no limit in sight to the power to which a fleet may attain.
The power of a navy is of recent growth, but it is increasing and is going to continue to increase. Every advance of civilization will advance the navy. Every new discovery and invention will directly or indirectly serve it. The navy will become the repository of the profoundest thought and the sharpest intellectual endeavor of the age. The navy, more than any other thing, will give opportunity for mechanism, and to mechanism. Far beyond any possible imagination of today, it will become the highest expression of the Genius of Mechanism, and the embodiment of its spirit.
The Necessity for Naval Power
The amount of money now being spent by the United States on its navy is so great that the expenditure can be justified only on the basis that great naval power is essential to the country.
Is it essential and if so, why?
Primary Use for a Navy.—To answer this wisely, it may be well to remind ourselves that the principal object of all the vocations of men is directly or indirectly the acquiring of money. Money, of course, is not wealth; but it is a thing which can be so easily exchanged for wealth, that it is the thing which most people work for. Of course, at bottom, the most important work is the getting of food out of the ground; but inasmuch as people like to congregate together in cities, the things taken out of the ground in one place must be transported to other places; and inasmuch as every person wants every kind of thing that he can get, a tremendous system of interchange, through the medium of money, has been brought about, which is called "trade." For the protection of property and life, and in order that trade may exist at all, an enormous amount of human machinery is employed which we call "government." This government is based on innumerable laws, but these laws would be of no avail unless they were carried out; and every nation in the world has found that employment of a great deal of force is necessary, in order that they shall be carried out. This force is mainly exercised by the police of the cities; but many instances have occurred in the history of every country where the authority of the police has had to be supported by the army of the national government. There is no nation in the world, and there never has been one, in which the necessary laws for the protection of the lives, property and trade of the people that has not depended ultimately on the army; and the reason why the army could support the laws was simply the fact that the army had the power to inflict suffering and death
As long as a country carried on trade within its own borders exclusively, as long as it lived within itself, so long as its people did not go to countries oversea, a navy was not necessary: and to countries like Switzerland it is not necessary now. But when a country is not contented to live within its own borders, then a navy becomes essential, for the same reason that an army does.
Now the desire of the people of a country to extend their trade beyond the seas seems in some ways not always a conscious desire, not a deliberate intent, but to be an effort of self protection, or largely an effort of expansion: for getting room or employment. As the people of a country become civilized, labor-saving devices multiply; and where one man by means of a machine can do the work of a hundred, ninety-nine men may be thrown out of employment; out of a hundred men who till the soil, only one man may be selected and ninety-nine men have to seek other employment. Where shall it be gotten? Evidently it must be gotten in some employment which may be called " artificial' such as working in a shop of some kind, or doing some manufacturing work. But so long as a people live unto themselves only, each nation can practically make all the machinery needed within its borders, and still not employ all the idle hands: and when the population becomes dense, employment must be sought in making goods to sell beyond the sea. The return comes back, sometime? in money, sometimes in the products of the soil, and the mine, and the manufactures of foreign lands.
In this way every nation becomes like a great business firm It exports (that is, sells,) certain things, and it imports (that is, buys,) certain things ; and if it sells more than it buys it is making money; if it buys more than it sells it is spending money. This is usually expressed by saying that the "balance of trade" is in its favor or against.
In a country like the United States, or any other great nation, the amount of exporting and importing, of buying and selling almost every conceivable article under the sun, is carried on in the millions and millions of dollars; and so perfect has the organization for doing this business become in every great country, that the products of the most distant countries can be bought in almost every village; and any important event in any country produces a perceptible effect wherever the mail and telegraph go.
The organization for effecting this in every country is so excellent and so wonderful, that it is like a machine.
In fact, it is a machine, and with all the faults of a machine. Now one of the faults of a machine, a fault which increases in importance with the complexity of the machine, is the enormous disturbance which may be produced by a cause seemingly trivial. That such is the case with the machine which the commerce of every great nation comprises, every-day experience confirms. So long as the steamers come and go with scheduled regularity, so long will the money come in at the proper intervals, and be distributed through the various channels; so long will the people live the lives to which they are habituated; so long will order reign.
But suppose the coming and going of all the steamers was suddenly stopped. While it may be true that, in a country like the United States, no foreign trade is really necessary; while it may be true that the people of the United States would be just as happy, though not so rich, if they had no foreign trade,—yet the sudden stoppage of foreign trade would not bring about a condition such as would have existed if we had never had any foreign trade, but would bring about a chaotic condition which cannot fitly be described by a feebler word than "horrible." The whole machinery of every-day life would be disabled. Hundreds of thousands of people would be thrown out of employment, and the whole momentum of the rapidly moving enormous mass of American daily life would receive a violent shock which would strain to its elastic limit every part of the entire machine.
It would take a large book to describe what would ensue from the sudden stoppage of the trade of the United States, or of any large manufacturing nation, with countries over the sea. Such a book would besides be largely imaginative; because in the history of the world such a condition has never yet arisen. Although wars have happened in the past in which there has been a blockade of the coast more or less complete, peace has been declared before the suffering produced has become very acute; and furthermore the conditions of furious trade which now exist in certain countries have never existed before anywhere. Nations have never become so thoroughly habituated to, and dependent upon, foreign trade as now: so that there are no data upon which to base any actual statement of what would actually happen if our foreign trade were suddenly stopped by a blockade of our principal ports. Disasters would ensue, apart from the actual loss of money, due simply to the sudden change. In a railroad train standing still, or moving at a uniform speed the passengers are comfortable; but if that same train is suddenly brought to rest when going at a high speed, say by collision, the consequences are horrible in the extreme, and the horror is caused simply by the suddenness of the change. The same is true all through nature and human nature. Any sudden change in the velocity of any mass has its exact counterpart in any sudden change in the conditions of living of any man or woman, or any sudden change in the conditions under which any organization must carry on its business. The difficulty is not with individuals only, or with the organizations themselves, and does not rest solely on the personal inability of people to accommodate themselves to the losing of certain conveniences or luxuries; but it is a difficulty, possessing the nature of inertia, of instantly meeting new situations and grappling with new problems.
Every organization, no matter how small, is conducted according to some system, and that system is based upon certain more or less permanent conditions, which, if suddenly changed, make the system inapplicable. The larger the organization, and the more complex it is, the more will it be deranged by any change of external conditions, and the longer time will it take to adapt itself to them.
The sudden stoppage of our sea trade including our coasting trade by even a partial blockade of our ports, would change practically all the conditions under which we live. There is hardly a single organization in the country which would not be affected by it. And, as every organization would know that every other organization would be affected, but to a degree which could not possibly be determined, because there would be no precedent, it cannot be an exaggeration to declare that the blockading of our principal ports would, entirely apart from direct loss of money and other commodities, produce a state of confusion, out of which order could not possibly be evolved except by the raising of the blockade.
In addition to the confusion brought about, there would, of course, be the direct loss of money and non-receipt of imported things; but what would probably be the very worst thing of all would be the numbers of men thrown out of employment by the mass of foreign markets. So long as a country can keep its people in employment, so long the people will live in comparative order, but when there are many unemployed men in a country, not only do their families lose the means of subsistence, but the very fact that the men being unemployed leads them into mischief. Should the ports of any great commercial nation be suddenly closed, the greatest danger to the country would not be from the enemy outside, but from the unemployed people inside!
It will be seen, therefore, that the blockading of the principal ports of any commercial country would be a disaster so great that there could not be a greater one except actual invasion. Another disaster might be the total destruction of its fleet by the enemy’s fleet; but the only direct result of this would be that the people of the country would have fewer ships to support and fewer men to pay. The loss of the fleet and the men would not per se, be any loss whatever to the country, but rather a gain. The loss of the fleet, however, would make it possible for the enemy's fleet to blockade our ports later, and thus bring about the horrors of which we have spoken.
While it is true that an absolute blockade of any port might be radically impossible at the present day, while it is true that submarines and torpedo boats might compel blockading ships to keep at such distance from ports that many loopholes of escape would be open to blockade runners, yet it may be pointed out that even a partial blockade, even a blockade that made it risky for vessels to try to break it, would have a very deleterious effect upon the prosperity of the country and of every man, woman and child within it. A blockade like this was that maintained during the greater part of the Civil War by the northern states against the southern states. This blockade, while not perfect, while it was such as to permit many vessels to pass both ways, was nevertheless so effective that it made it impossible for the southern states to be prosperous, or to have any reasonable hope of ever being prosperous. And while it would be an exaggeration to state that the navy itself, unaided by the army, could have brought the South to terms; while it would be an exaggeration to state that all the land battles fought in the Civil War were unnecessary, that all the bloodshed and all the ruin of harvests and of homestead were unnecessary, nevertheless it does seem that so long as the navy maintained the blockade which it did maintain, the people of the South would have been prevented from achieving enough prosperity to carry on an independent government; so that their revolt would have failed. The South, not being able to raise the blockade by means of their navy, might have tried to do so by sending an army into the Northern States, to whip the northerners on their own ground: but this would clearly have been impossible.
The sentences above are not written with the intention of minimizing the services rendered by the army in the Civil War, or detracting from the glory of the gallant officers and men who composed it, or of subtracting one jot or tittle from a grateful appreciation of their hardships and bloodshed; neither does it dare to question the wisdom of the statesmen who directed that the war should be fought mainly by the army. Its sole intention is to point out that, if a meager naval force could produce so great an effect against a country mainly agricultural, that a very powerful naval force, blockading effectively the principal ports of manufacturing country, would have an effect so great that it can hardly be estimated.
It is plainly to be seen that the effect of a blockade against a modern country by a modern navy would be incomparably greater now than it was 50 years ago, for two very important reasons. One reason is that the progress of modern engineering has made navies very much more powerful than they were 50 years ago; and the other reason is that the same cause has made countries very much more vulnerable to blockade: because it has made so many million of people dependent upon manufacturing industries and the export of manufactured things, and forced them to live an artificial life. While the United States, for instance, does not depend for its daily bread on the regular coming of wheat from over the sea, yet millions of its people do depend, though indirectly, upon the money due from the sale of manufactured things coming into the country from over the sea; for with countries as with people, habits are formed both of system and of mode of life which it is dangerous suddenly to break; so that a country soon becomes as dependent upon outside commerce as a man does upon outside air, and a people suddenly deprived of a vigorous outside commerce would seem to be smothered almost like a man derived of outside air.
A rough idea of the possible effect of a blockade of our coast may be gathered from the fact that our exports last year were valued at about 1,800,000.000; which means that goods to this amount were sold for which a return was received, either in money or its equivalent, most of it, ultimately, as wages for labor. Of course no blockade could stop all of this; but it does not seem impossible that it could stop half of it, if our fleet were destroyed by the enemy. Supposing that this loss were divided equally among all the people in the United States, it would mean that each man, woman and child would lose about ten dollars in the year. If the loss could be so divided up, perhaps no very great calamity would ensue. But, of course, no such division could be made; with the result that a great many people, especially not people earning wages by the day, would lose more than they could stand. Suppose, for instance, that a number of people earning about nine hundred dollars a year, by employment in export enterprises, were the people upon whom the actual loss eventually fell by their being thrown out of employment. This would mean that more than a million people, men, women and children, would be actually deprived of the means of living. It seems clear that such a thing would be a national disaster, for any loss of money to one man always means a loss of money or its equivalent to other men besides. For instance: suppose A owes $20 to B, B owes $20 to C, C owes $20 to D, D owes $20 to E, E owes $20 to F, F owes $20 to G, G owes $20 to H, H owes $20 to I, and I to J. If A is able to pay B and does so, then B pays C and so on, and everybody is happy. But suppose that A for some reason, say a blockade, fails to receive some money that he expected: then A cannot pay B; B cannot pay C, and so on; with the result, that not only does J lose his $20, but nine men are out in debt $20 which they cannot pay; with the further result that A is dunned by B, B is dunned by C and so on; producing a condition of distress, which would seem to be out of all proportion to a mere lack of $20, but which would, nevertheless, be the actual result. So in this country of 90,000,000 people, the sudden loss of 900,000,000 dollars a year would produce a distress seemingly out of all proportion to that sum of money, because the individual loss of every loser would be felt by everybody else.
Since to a great manufacturing nation, like ours, the greater danger from outside (except actual invasion) would seem to be the sudden stoppage of her over-sea trade by blockade, we seem warranted in concluding that, since the only possible means of preventing a blockade is a navy, the primary use for a navy is to prevent blockade.
This does not mean that a fleet's place is on its own coast, because a blockade might be better prevented by having the fleet elsewhere; in fact it is quite certain that its place is not on the coast as a rule, but at whatever point is the best with relation to the enemy's fleet, until the enemy's fleet is destroyed. In fact since the defensive and the offensive are so inseparably connected that it is hard sometimes to tell where one begins and the other ends, the best position for our fleet might be on the enemy coast. It may be objected that the coast of the United States is so long that it would be impossible to blockade it.—perhaps, but that is not necessary: it would suffice to blockade Boston, Newport, New York, the Delaware, the Chesapeake and the Gulf—say with forty ships. And we must remember that blockade running would be much more difficult now than in the Civil War because of the increased power and accuracy of modern gunnery and the advent of the searchlight, wireless telegraph and aeroplane.
It may also be objected that the blockading of even a defenseless coast would cost the blockading country a good deal of money, by reason of the loss of trade with that country. True, but war is always expensive; and the blockade would be very much more expensive to the blockaded country; and though it might hold out a long while, it would be compelled to yield the end; not only because of the blockade itself, but because of the pressure of neutral countries: and the longer it held out, the greater the indemnity it would have to pay. The expense of blockading would therefore be merely a profitable investment.
The writer is aware that actual invasion of a country from the sea would be a greater disaster than blockade, and that defense against invasion has often been urged in Great Britain as a reason for a great navy; so that the primary reason for a navy might be said to be defense against invasion. But why should an enemy take the trouble to invade? Blockade is easier and cheaper, and can accomplish everything that an enemy desires, unless there are enough battleships to prevent it.
Command of the Sea.—While the primary use of a navy seems to be to prevent blockade, a navy, like any other weapon, may be put to any other uses which circumstances indicate. For instance, the northerners in the Civil War used the navy not to prevent blockade, but to make blockade; the Japanese used the navy to cover the transportation of their armies to Manchuria and Korea and Great Britain has always used her navy to protect her trade routes.
A general statement of the various uses of a navy has been put to the phrase "command of the sea."
Probability of War.—Inasmuch as an adequate navy can prevent blockade, besides serving other uses, and inasmuch as our annual expenditure on the navy is only about 8 per cent of the value of our exports, it would seem logical to conclude that such expenditure is advisable, unless it is a larger percent than is paid for insurance of other kinds, and with a smaller risk.
Of course, the percent is smaller; but what is the degree of risk? What is the degree of probability of war with a country able to blockade us?
This degree of probability cannot be determined as accurately as the probabilities of fire, death, or other things against which insurance companies insure us; and one reason is that insurance companies do not really insure against fire, for instance, but only against loss by fire, whereas a navy does insure against war. For this reason, the probability of fire can be figured out to be indefinite fraction; but the probability of war between two given entries cannot be so figured out, because it is a variable quantity. As between two countries of equal wealth, the probability of war varies with the disparity between their navies, and is actually zero, when their navies are equal in power; and, other factors being equal, the greatest probability of war is between two countries, of which one is the more wealthy and the other the more powerful.
In reckoning the probability of war, we must realize that the most pregnant causes of war is the combination of conflicting interests with disparity in power. And we must also realize that it is not enough to consider the situation as it is now: that it is necessary to look at least ten years ahead, because it would take the United States that length of time to prepare a navy powerful enough to fight our possible foes with reasonable assurance for success.
Ten years, however, is not really far enough ahead to look, for the simple reason that, while we could get a few ships ready in ten years, we could not get many ready. If, for instance, some change in policies or in interests should make war with Great Britain probably within ten years, we could not possibly build enough ships to prevent our being beaten, and blockaded, and forced to pay an enormous indemnity.
Is there no probability of this? Perhaps there is no great probability: but there certainly is a possibility. In fact, it might be a very wise act for Great Britain, seeing us gradually surpassing her, to go to war with us before it is too late, and crush us. It has often been said that Great Britain could not afford to go to war with us, because so many of her commercial interests would suffer. Of course, they would suffer for a while; but so do the commercial interests of competing railroads when they begin to cut rates. Cutting rates is war—commercial war: but it is often carried on, nevertheless, and at tremendous cost.
Of course, just now, Great Britain does not wish to crush us; but it is certain that she can. It is certain that the richest country in the world lies defenseless against the most powerful; and that we could not alter this condition in ten years, even if we started to build an adequate navy now.
Yet even if the degree of probability of war with Great Britain within say ten years, seems so small that we need not consider her, are there no other great powers with whom the degree of probability of war is great enough to make it wise for us to consider them?
Before answering this question, let us realize clearly that on of the strongest reasons that leads a country to abstain from war, even to seek relief from wrongs, actual or imagined, is doubt of success; and that that reason disappears if another country, sufficiently powerful to assure success, is ready to help her, either by joining openly with her, or by seeking war herself at the same time with the same country. As we all know cases like this have happened in the past. Great Britain knows it; and the main secret of her wealth is that she has always been strong enough to fight any two countries.
It is plain that a coalition of two countries against us is possible now. The United States is regarded with feelings of extreme irritation by the two most warlike nations in the world, one on our eastern side and the other on the western. War with either one at the present moment would call for all the energies of the country, and the issue would be doubtful. But if either country should consider itself compelled to declare war, the other could not possibly be so blind to her opportunity as not to declare war simultaneously. The result would be exactly the same as if we fought Great Britain, except that our Pacific Coast would be blockaded besides the Atlantic, and we should have to pay indemnity to two countries instead of to one country.
A coalition between these two countries would be an ideal arrangement, because it would enable each country to force us to grant the conditions it desires, and secure a large indemnity besides.
Would Great Britain interfere in our behalf? This can be answered by the man so wise that he knows what the international situation and the commercial situation will be ten years hence. Let him speak.
Expenditures
Clearly, expenditures for a navy are not expenditures in the correct sense of the word. An "expenditure" is something which one person pays out to somebody else; but the money spent on our navy is not paid out to somebody else but to ourselves. Furthermore, not only is the money given to ourselves, but it provides employment. What civilized man in civilized communities needs more than any other thing, is employment and the wage therefore that whatever gives good employment and good wage is a national blessing of the highest order.
But not only does the yearly expenditure on our navy give good employment and good wages, directly and indirectly, to thousands of men; it also gives scope for the use of capital, and opportunity for the development and improvement of the most perfect grades of manufactured articles; opportunity for invention of the highest kind.
Therefore, it must be accepted as a fact, that in addition to the security assured, the existence of a navy properly proportioned to our wealth and foreign trade, and to the probability of war, does not impose a burden, but rather bestows a blessing.
Will the Importance of Naval Power Increase or Decrease?
It is clear that the importance to a country of a navy varies with two thing's—the value of that country's foreign trade and the probability of war.
It is also clear that, other things being equal, the probability of a country becoming involved in war varies as the value of her foreign trade; because the causes of friction and the money at stake vary in that proportion.
Therefore, the importance to a country of her navy varies as the square of the value of her foreign trade.
In order to answer the question, therefore, we must first consider whether foreign trade—sea trade—is going to increase or decrease.
As to the United States alone, the value of our exports is about ten times what it was fifty years ago, and it promises to increase. But the United States is only one country, and perhaps her increase in foreign trade has been due to conditions past or passing. So—what is the outlook for the future—both for the United States and other countries? Will other countries seek foreign trade?
Yes. The recent commercial progress of Germany, Argentina, and Japan, shows the growing recognition by civilized and enterprising countries of the benefits of foreign trade, and of the facilities for attaining it which are now given by the advent of large swift, modern steamers: steamers which are becoming larger and swifter and safer every year, more and more adapted for ocean trade. For not only have the writings of Mahan brought about an increase in the sea power of every great country; but this increase has so aroused the attention of the engineering professions, that the improvement of ships, engines, and other sea material has gone ahead faster than all the other engineering arts.
The reason why the engineering arts that are connected with the sea have gone ahead more rapidly than any other arts is simply that they are given wider opportunity and a greater scope. It is inherent in the very nature of things that it is easier to transport things by water than by land; that water transportation lends itself in a higher degree to the exercise of engineering skill, to the attainment of great results.
The underlying reason for this difference seems to be that it is not possible to make any vehicle to travel on land appreciably larger than the present automobile, unless it run on rails ; whereas the floating power of water is such that vehicles can be made, and are made, as large as forty-five thousand tons. Two ships, the Mauretania and Lusitania of forty-five thousand tons displacement, have been running for three years, larger vessels are building, and undoubtedly will be run: for the larger the ships, the less they cost per ton of carrying power, the faster they go, and the safer they are.
Sea commerce thus gives to engineers, scientists and inventors, as well as to commercial men, that great gift of the gods—opportunity.
The number of ships that now traverse the ocean and the larger bodies of water communicating with it aggregate millions of tons, and their number and individual tonnage are constantly increasing. These vessels cruise among all the important sea ports of the world, and form a system of intercommunication almost as complete as the system of railroads in the United States. They bring distant ports of the world very close together, and make possible that ready interchange of material products, and that facility of personal intercourse which it is one of the aims of civilization to bring about. From a commercial point of view, London is nearer to New York than San Francisco, and more intimately allied with her.
The evident result of all this is to make the people of the world one large community, in which, though many nationalities are numbered, many tongues are spoken, many degrees of civilization and wealth are found, yet, of all, the main instincts are the same: the same passions, the same appetites, the same desire for personal advantage.
Not only does this admirable system of intercommunication bring all parts of the world very closely together, but it tends to produce in all a certain similarity in those characteristics and habits of thought that pertain to the material things of life. We are all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior than vice versa. Particularly are we prone to imitate those actions and qualities by which others have attained material success. So it is to be expected, it is already a fact, that the methods whereby a few great nations attained success are already being imitated by other nations. Japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already surpassed her models.
With such an example before her, should we be surprised that China has also become inoculated with the virus of commercial and political ambitions? It cannot be many years before she will be in the running with the rest of us, with four hundred millions of people to do the work; people of intelligence, patience, endurance and docility; people with everything to gain and nothing to lose; with the secret of how to succeed already taught by other nations, which she can learn from an open book.
If Japan has learned our secret and mastered it in fifty years, will China not be able to do it in less than fifty years.
Before we answer this question, let us realize clearly that China is much nearer to us in civilization than Japan was fifty years ago; that China has Japan's example to guide her, and also that any degree of civilization which was acquired by us in say one hundred years will not require half that time for another nation merely to learn. The same is true of all branches of knowledge; the knowledge of the Laws of Nature which it took Sir Isaac Newton many years to acquire may now be mastered by any college student in two months. And let us not forget, besides, that almost the only difficult element of civilization which other people need to acquire, in order to enter into that world-wide competition which is characteristic of the time we live in, is "engineering" broadly considered. Doubtless there are other things to learn besides; but it is not apparent that any other things have contributed largely to the so-called new civilization of Japan. Perhaps Japan had advanced enough in Christianity to account for her advance in material power, but if so she keeps very quiet about it. It may be, also, that the relations of the government to the governed people of Japan are on a higher plane than they used to be, but on a plane not yet so high as in our own country; but has anyone ever seen this claimed or even stated? It may be that the people of Japan are more kindly, brave, courteous and patriotic than they were, and that their improvement has been due to their imitating us in these matters; but this is not the belief of many who have been in Japan. One thing, however, is absolutely sure: and that is that Japan's advance has been simultaneous with her acquirement of the engineering arts, especially as applied to military and naval matters and the merchant marine.
But even supposing that China does not take part in the world-wide race for wealth, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Argentina and the United States; besides others like Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Spain and Portugal, are in the race already; and that several in South America bid fair to enter soon. Not only do we see many contestants, whose numbers and ardor are increasing, but we see, also, the cause of this increasing. The cause is not only a clearer appreciation of the benefits to be derived from commerce across the water under conditions that exist now; it is also a growing appreciation of the possibilities of commerce under conditions that will exist later; with the countries whose resources are almost entirely undeveloped. For four hundred years, we of the United States, have been developing the land within our borders, and the task has been enormous. At one time it promised to be the work of centuries; and with the mechanical appliances of even one hundred years ago, it would have taken a thousand years to do what we have already done. Mechanical appliances of all kinds, especially of transportation and agriculture, have made possible what would, otherwise, have been impossible; and mechanical appliances will do the same things in Tierra del Fuego and Zululand.
Mechanism, working on land and sea, is opening up the resources of the world. And now, another allied art, that of chemistry, more especially biology, is in process of removing one of the remaining obstacles to full development, by making active life possible, and even pleasant, in the tropics. It is predicted by some enthusiasts that, in the near future, it will be healthier and pleasanter to live in the tropics, and even do hard work there, than in the temperate zone. When this day comes, and it may be soon the development of the riches of lands within the tropics will begin in earnest, and wealth undreamed of now be realized.
The opening of the undeveloped countries means a continuing increase of wealth to the nations that take advantage of the opportunity, and a corresponding backsliding to those nations that fail. It means over all the ocean, an increasing number of -teamers. It means the continuing increase of manufacturing in manufacturing countries, and the increasing enjoyment in them of the good things of all the world. It means in the undeveloped countries an increasing use of the conveniences and luxuries of civilization and an increasing possession of money or its equivalent. It means, throughout all the world, an increase of what we call "Wealth."
In discussing a subject so great as sea trade, while it may be considered presumptuous to look fifty years ahead, it can hardly be denied that we ought at least to try to look that far ahead. To look fifty years ahead, is, after all, not taking in a greater interval of time than fifty years back; and it certainly seem? reasonable to conclude that, if a certain line of progress has been going on for fifty years in a perfectly straight line, and with a vigor which is increasing very fast and shows no sign of change, the same general line of progress will probably keep up for another fifty years. If we try to realize what this means, we shall probably fail completely and become dazed by the prospect. We cannot possibly picture accurately or even clearly to ourselves any definite conditions of fifty years hence; but we certainly are warranted in concluding that by the end of fifty years, practically all of the countries of the world, including Africa, will be open to trade from one end to the other; that the volume of trade will be at least ten times as great as it is now; that the means of communication over the water and through the air will be very much better than now; and that there will be scores of appliances, methods and processes in general use of which we have, as yet, no inkling, and cannot even imagine.
Now let us call to mind the accepted proverb that "Competition is the life of trade," and this will make us see that, accompanying this stupendous trade, extending over, and into, every corner of the world, there will be stupendous competition, involving in a vast and complicated net, every red-blooded nation of the earth.
We seem safe in concluding therefore, that the importance of naval power will increase.
The Danger from a Great Navy
The power that a navy can wield may be urged by some as a reason against creating it; on the ground that while such great power may be desired by naval officers, and desired even by the government; and while, from their standpoint, a navy should be as powerful as possible, and as directable as a swordsman's sword,—yet, from the standpoint of the citizen, such a condition would be a danger to the country at large, because it would have all the elements of danger that a standing army has, but developed to a much higher point.
To this it may be answered that, although naval power is the greatest power we know of, yet, like some explosives, it combines tremendous power with perfect safety. Because a thing is powerful it is not necessarily dangerous; a thing-is dangerous, not because it is powerful, but because it is uncontrollable. Now a navy, although it can make itself very disagreeable to the government, as Brazil's navy has recently done, can speedily be reduced to impotency by depriving it of food and fuel.
Arbitration, Limitations of Armament, Etc.
A great deal is said and written nowadays about the ability of arbitration to make wars unnecessary, and a good deal also about the possibility of an agreement among the nations, whereby armaments may be limited to forces adequate to ensure that every nation shall be compelled to abide by the decision of the others in my disputed case.
In view of the number, the earnestness and the prominence of many of the men interested in this cause: in view of the number of arbitration treaties that have been already signed: in view of the fact that arbitration among nations will simply establish a law among them like the law in any civilized country: in view of the fact that individuals in their dealings with each ether sometimes surrender certain of their claims, and even rights, for the common good: in view of the fact that nations, like all business firms, like to cut down expenses, and in further view of the fact that a navy is not directly, but only indirectly, a contributor to a nation's prosperity, it seems probable that arbitration will be more and more used among the nations, and that armaments may be limited by agreement. It is clear, however, that the practical difficulties in the way of making the absolute agreement required are enormous, and that the most enthusiastic advocates of the plan do not expect that the actual limitation of armaments will become a fact for many years.
After the necessary preliminaries shall have been arranged, and the conference takes place which shall settle what armament each nation may have, it is plain that it will be to the interest of each nation to keep down the armament of every other nation, and to be allowed as much as possible itself. In this way, the operation of making the agreement will be somewhat like the forming of a trust among several companies, and the advantage will lie with that nation which is the most powerful.
For this reason it would seem a part of wisdom of each country to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible.
Therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason for abating our exertions towards establishing a powerful navy, is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them.
How Great Should Our Navy Be?
This may seem a question impossible to answer. Of course it is impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns: but an approximate estimate may be reached by considering the case en a man playing poker who holds a royal straight flush. Such a man would be a fool if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit possible from it. So will the United States, if she fails to back her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world, she holds the best hand. She has the largest and most numerous sea ports, the most enterprising and inventive people: and the most wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary undertakings.
This does not mean that the United States ought, as a matter either of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her wealth and glory by simple force, as France was shorn in 1871.
It is often said that the reason for Great Britain's having so powerful a navy is that she is so situated geographically that without a powerful navy, to protect her trade, the people would starve.
While this statement may be true, the inference usually drawn is fallacious: the inference that if Great Britain were not so situated, she would not have so great a navy.
Why would she not? It is certain that that "tight little island" has attained a world-wide power, and a wealth per capita greater than those of any other country; that her power and wealth, as compared with her home area, are so much greater than those of any other country as to stagger the understanding; that she could not have done what she has done without her navy; that she has never hesitated to use her navy to assist her trade, and yet that she has never used her navy to keep her people from starving.
In fact, the insistence on the anti-starvation theory is absurd. Has any country ever fought until the people as a mass were starving? Has starving any thing to do with the matter? Does not a nation give up fighting just as soon as it sees that further fighting would do more harm than good? A general or an admiral, in charge of a detached force, must fight sometimes even at tremendous loss and after all hope of local success has fled, in order to hold a position, the long holding of which is essential to the success of the whole strategic plan: but what country keeps up a war until its people are about to starve? Did Spain do so in our last war? Did Russia fear that Japan would force the people of her vast territory into starvation?
No—starvation has nothing to do with the case. If some discovery were made by which Great Britain could grow enough to support all her people, she would keep her great navy nevertheless —simply because she has found it to be a good investment.
The anti-starvation theory—the theory that one does things simply to keep from starving—does apply to some tropical savages, but not to the Anglo-Saxon. Long after starvation has been provided against, long after wealth has been secured, we still toil on. What are we toiling for? The same thing that Great Britain maintains her navy for—wealth and power.
The real reason for Great Britain's having a great navy applies with exact equality to the United States. Now that Great Britain has proved how great a navy is best for her, we can see at once how great a navy is best for us. That is—since Great Britain and the United States are the wealthiest countries in the world, and since the probability of war between any two countries is least when their navies are equal in power,—the maximum good would be attained by making the United States Navy exactly equal to the British Navy.
Efficiency
Inasmuch as the naval power represented by any fleet depends on its efficiency as well as on its numerical strength; and inasmuch as our fleet will be required, within not many years, to fight the fleet of some foreign power, or powers, in a war greater than any that has ever yet occurred, to decide whether the progress of the United States shall continue or shall cease, we, naval officers, see before us the necessity of shouldering responsibilities more racking and far-reaching than can ever come to men in any other calling.
It may be interesting, therefore, to consider, broadly, in what general directions we should work, to make our navy as efficient as possible: not including any great questions of strategy, drill or tactics, which are sciences in themselves, and which must be adapted to changing conditions year by year, but merely some simple principles, which, if rightly apprehended and correctly stated, will be permanent guides for thought and action.
The subject may be considered in its two main divisions, material and personnel.
Material
While it is plain that the material is dominated by the personnel, and is therefore subordinate to it, and while the difference between them seems clear in all our minds, yet nevertheless it would be difficult to define that difference, and to state its intrinsic features.
The difficulty appears as soon as a little reflection leads us to see that people, as well as machines, are composed of matter, controlled by mind and spirit. We can all see this, even if we neglect any consideration as to the ultimate constitution of matter; for we agree closely enough for the purposes of this paper as to what matter is, and know that the bones and flesh of the human body are as truly matter as are the steel and brass parts of an engine.
In fact, there is a curious likeness between man and mechanism, for both are made of inert matter, but are capable of prodigious activity when vivified. The Bible tells us that God made man out of the dust of the ground and afterwards breathed into his nostrils the breath of life: and we see a hundred times a day some combination of brass and iron parts begin to do the most wonderful things, as soon as some one opens a valve, or closes a switch.
In both man and mechanism we see ordinary matter act in obedience to laws, some of which we do not understand at all and some of which we understand in only a restricted sense. But in even those cases which we seem to understand—say the nourishing effect of food, or the energizing effect of burning coal,—we know that behind each one has been the Creative Mind.
So, may we not say that in both man and mechanism we see the direct effect of mind on matter?
Matter is often called "dead;"—but it just as much alive as bones and flesh per se; and a machine without steam or electricity, or other element that gives it life, is no more dead than a human body, from which the spark of life has fled.
In fact, it is very much less so ; because, even if badly deranged, it can, with sufficient pains, be restored to health; and with a supply of steam or electricity, it will start again sturdily at its work; while nothing can put the spark of life into the dead body of a human being. And not only in this way but in another is machinery less lifeless than a human body; in the quality of progress. The human body does not progress; it remains the same from generation to generation; but mechanism is of such a nature that each improvement forms a stepping stone for improvements yet to come.
In two essentials of living, in strength to do, and in delicacy to perceive, mechanism surpasses anything to which man can dare to aspire. This does not mean that there are no things which man can do which mere mechanism cannot do; for such an assertion would be absurd. Mere mechanism, perhaps, has no consciousness of its own existence; cannot consciously see, smell, hear or feel; has no conscience, and cannot think (so far as we know); yet there can be no question that the photograph can produce pictures of things which the eye, unaided, cannot see; that the microphone can pick up vibrations which the ear, unaided, cannot hear; that chemical tests detect essences far more delicately than can human smell or taste; that electric contact is far more accurate than human touch. And while it may be true that mechanism cannot think, some of its operations surpass in quickness and precision the mind and nerve coordination of the human body. If we wish to find out how long it takes for the finger to press an electric button, after a certain signal has been made, we find out by electric mechanism; that is, although man assumes that the human machine is the most highly organized machine there is, we use an ordinary electrical machine to test the degree of perfection of one of the human machine's most wonderful faculties.
Mechanism cannot think: but what is thinking and what does thinking accomplish? In the lives of most people, all the thinking they do is devoted to getting them through life with the least trouble and the most enjoyment. Yet everybody knows that their thinking, even along this line, is not very efficacious; they do not even know how much to eat and drink, while automatic stokers feed the exact amount of coal required, no more and no less, and an ordinary street car pumps up its air tank automatically.
These are mechanisms invented by man, yet they do things that man himself cannot do. And some mechanisms invented by man, such as the wireless telegraph, possess an inherent delicacy compared with which the nerves of the human body are as coarse as manila hawsers.
But why multiply examples of things which mechanism can do and man cannot do,—when the objection will be made at once that mechanism does not do these things, but that man does them using mechanism as his tools?
Granting that he does, is not man merely a medium between the Almighty and the mechanism? Is he not merely an intermediate mechanism? There are many people who believe that man does not do so much as he thinks he does, and that he himself is as much a tool in the hands of Providence as a hammer is in his hands. One fact is certainly clear: and that is, that man is not the master of mechanism, for the simple reason that he can not control mechanism after he has once "created" it, or undo what he has done. After Bell had invented the telephone, he became powerless to control it. He could not uninvent it, he could not return conditions to the point from which he had moved them. Having certain forces at work, he had to sit an almost helpless spectator of the effects of which his own invention was the cause.
Returning to practical affairs, and looking back to man's first discovery of fire, and his fashioning of his first rude implements, and watching his progress to his present high estate of material well being, do we not see clearly that man himself has changed but little in all the centuries; that systems of government and philosophy have merely kept society in order, and maintained the status quo; and that the principal means by which man has achieved his present material prosperity has been by overcoming material difficulties, by inventing and developing material mechanisms ?
If this has been so in the past, will it not be so in the future? If so,—the principal means by which a man will be able to make his material condition better still will be by inventing and developing material mechanisms.
Now in what field do we find to-day the largest use of mechanism ? The navy. What field gives the greatest promise to the inventor, the physicist and the engineer? The navy. What thing gives such an opportunity for the invention, development and use of mechanism, that—if wisely treated—it will become the most potent instrumentality in all the world for advancing civilization and the power of civilized nations ? The navy.
Our warships have acquired a power, a vastness, and a multiplexity of functions, such that they offer an almost infinite field for the development of good ideas. The warship, more than any other thing, is a little world in itself. It must be self-sustaining, it must be self-contained, it must go to all parts of the world and be able in all parts of the world to deal the strongest blow, and withstand the strongest blow that science and art make possible. And as the people on board are subject, more than any other people, to the dangers of varying climates, of accidents, and of war; and as their guns, torpedoes, electric mechanisms of all kinds, and all their appliances, must combine the highest possible power with the highest possible delicacy, there seems no limit to their requirements in the matter of mechanism; there seems no kind of mechanism for which they may not find a use ; there seems no limit to the power that they will reach.
If we agree that our material should be as efficacious as possible, we shall probably go ahead as we have been doing in the past few years, and keep up with the progress of the engineering arts. We feel perfectly safe in assuming this, for the officers and men of the navy are an exceedingly intelligent and enterprising body; and the task of keeping our material up to the times is a definite task, performable by hard work, directed by good judgment and common sense.
But there is a duty that we ought to do, that we never have done, and that we Americans can do better than any other people in the world.
This duty is to take advantage of the national inventive genius of our country and encourage—not merely engineering skill, not merely mechanical ingenuity—but real invention. Knowing the brilliant original inventive genius of our countrymen, and the dazzling opportunities of the future, we must not stop short of a determined effort to "ascend the highest Heaven of invention." We must hold as high an ideal in this matter as we do in the matters of strategy, tactics and engineering.
Such a policy, wisely and energetically carried out, will have as direct and beneficial effect on the navy as our admirable patent system has on the country at large. But, to carry it out, we must first treat inventors as sane and reputable men, and recognize the fact that not only does an attempt to evade plain patent rights seem to inventors as dishonorable, but it turns inventors to fields where they have more chance than in a battle against the Government.
Why inventors should be treated as they have been is not quite clear. Why encourage authors to publish books on naval subjects and reap not only the money but the glory:—and then deny to inventors—no matter what pecuniary sacrifices they may have made in developing their inventions—all remuneration and all glory? Certainly it has been neither wise nor right to humiliate a class of men who have been useful in the past, and can be made useful in the future.
What is gained by such a policy? A little money is saved sometimes: but is it not a little like saving money by not paying a tailor's bill?
Certainly it is not right for a great government to violate its own patent laws, and infringe patents which the government itself granted and for which it received $35 each.
Does anyone deny that the inventor is a necessity of progress? Does anyone deny that the inventor must precede the engineer— that conception must precede development? Does anyone deny that our electric lights, torpedoes, guns and engines were invented before they were developed; that they were conceived before they grew and waxed into maturity? Does anyone deny that, but for inventors, the coal and iron and brass of our ships would still be in the bowels of the earth?
We all know that ideas are what have breathed the breath of life into material brass and iron, and made cities and churches, and pictures and books, and ships,—and every single thing that distinguishes men from brutes. It has already been possible for one invention to increase the hitting power of naval guns at least ten times. Why not develop such things as soon as possible in secret, and secure the military advantages accruing; instead of resisting them until all the world knows about them, and then being tremendously secret about details that any intelligent mechanic can vary in a dozen ways?
Personnel
When thinking of a naval power, one cannot help thinking of Great Britain, which has pushed naval power to a point far beyond that attained by any other nation, and far beyond the dreams of not many years ago. And one cannot help thinking, too, of France, almost in sight of England; a country of more natural wealth, with a longer coast line to guard, and formerly with a greater population; a country, which not many years ago, was equal to Great Britain in naval power, but which is now immeasurably behind her, and is becoming more so with each succeeding year.
Why is it that Great Britain has surpassed France in naval power? We are familiar with many of the answers given; the policy of the Government, the killing of many French officers during the Reign of Terror, the greater need of Great Britain for a navy, etc. But is there not another factor as great as any of these: the difference in the characters of the two peoples?
Daring.—Some years ago, in the harbor of Toulon, the writer had the opportunity on several occasions of watching the sailors of French battleships, while in swimming. He had often seen the sailors of our ships and of British ships when in swimming from their vessels; and the occasions were always those of boisterous merriment and frolic, in which many men would jump from the lower yards and the davit heads, and dive backwards from the booms; but he was amazed, at first, to see the French sailors glide very carefully down the lower booms, until they reached the water, and then drop into the water in the gentlest fashion. There was an utter absence of that rollicking, devil-may-care, risk-taking element that is so plainly to be seen when American or British sailors are in swimming.
While not accusing the French people of timidity, may not one say that this apparently unimportant difference in swimming indicated an extremely important difference in character? And is not one safe in saying that the French are much more prudent than the British? Certainly they are more prudent in money matters; and while the individual Frenchman is, because of his prudence, or thrift, as comfortably established in life as the Englishman, yet the prudence of the Frenchman makes him shrink from risking money in large enterprises; with the result that Great Britain, Germany, and the United States have far outstripped France in those great commercial enterprises, which require for their success the risking of money. And it is well known that the Frenchman's prudence has caused the lowering of the birth-rate of France to such a degree that she is already in a condition from which it will be very hard to extricate herself.
Ruggedness.—Associated with the prudence of the Frenchman. is a quality somewhat allied, and yet a little different; the shrinking from disagreeable things. We all shrink from disagreeable things, but the Frenchman seems more sensitive to disagreeable things than the Briton. He is more fastidious: he cannot "endure hardness" to an equal degree. If a British ship and a French ship are in the same harbor, we see the British officers taking long walks ashore in ugly clothes with heavy boots, perhaps in the rain and mud; a thing amazing and almost revolting to the French, who prefer to go ashore in a gentlemanly fashion, and sit down in the club and read, and smoke cigarettes.
Now supposing that this comparison of the individual Frenchman and the individual Briton is substantially correct, and supposing that we knew that there were two fleets, one manned by British and the other manned by Frenchmen,—and that we knew that one was the blockader and the other the blockaded in a port, would not any man wager at once that the British would be the blockaders and the Frenchmen the blockaded? Or suppose we knew that one of two fleets of sailing ships took the weather gauge, and forced the fighting, while the other took the lee gauge and accepted the attack; would not any man in the world know immediately that it was the British who were forcing the fighting and the Frenchmen who were awaiting it? Surely anyone would know which would take the weather gauge and which the lee gauge; and anyone would know which would be the better sailor.
While it would be incorrect to state that the Briton enjoys being hurt, he does not mind being hurt so much as does the Frenchman : he is tougher ; he is more rugged; he is not so easily turned from his path by some unpleasantness; he does not mind hardship so much as does the Frenchman.
This ruggedness, with its accompaniment of fondness for outdoor life, has brought about in the Briton (or at least the two qualities co-exist) a superior physique; this meaning not necessarily greater freedom from disease, or greater longevity, but a greater physical strength, a greater ability to withstand the rigors of the elements,—a capacity for feeling comfortable when other people are most uncomfortable. This ruggedness is needed by the sailor more than by the soldier, whose hardships, while at times as great as those of the sailor, are of very much less frequency and duration.
Since a man accustomed to hardship is not so easily dismayed by an undertaking involving hardship as a man who is not accustomed to it; since a man accustomed to hardship is not so apt to lose his equanimity under unpleasant conditions: since a man's equanimity is one of his greatest assets; since a man of even temper is apt to have better judgment under trying conditions than a peevish or irritable man, the proverbial equanimity of the Briton would seem to be due in some measure to his rugged mode of life, and to account in some degree for his success in attaining naval power.
By an effort of will a man accustomed to luxury may force himself to undertake severe hardship; and a man habituated to self indulgence may be master of himself under bad conditions; but it must be true as a matter of common sense that, if two nations are otherwise equal, but one nation is composed of daring men, inured to hardship, while the other is composed of prudent men not inured to hardship, the former will be able to create the greater naval power.
As an important feature of the personnel, therefore, it would seem wise to follow St. Paul's advice, and learn to "endure hardness."
Spirit.—Yet mere ruggedness and strength, mere physical courage even, will not avail to produce great naval power, if a nation's men are not inspired with a curious essence, which is not physical or mental, but is wholly spiritual. So great is the potency of this essence that, under its influence, men and women of the most delicate physique have risen to the loftiest heights of daring and endurance. It is this which, often carried to excess, makes the runner or the oarsman die in the race; the thing which gives the football match its character; which made the Christian martyrs what they were; which has enabled many so-called suffragettes in England to starve to death, rather than to surrender.
We all know what this quality is, though it is called by several names: "pluck," "grit," and "sand," are perhaps the names most used in English; but the word "spirit" seems to express the quality itself and also the cause behind it. It is the spirit, as distinguished from the body or the mind; it is seen in brutes, but it is spirit just the same. It enables a man, sometimes a brute, to be superior to circumstances, often to dominate them. Associated with it are will, determination, courage, endurance, etc.; but they are all inspired by spirit, the direct gift of the Almighty.
Mahan speaks of Nelson as being the "embodiment of the sea power of Great Britain." Why? Many officers have attained higher rank than Nelson; many have commanded larger fleets; many have been more impressive, more learned, and in the usual sense of the words, better officers than Nelson. Rut Nelson had something in him that enabled him to triumph over his poor weak body, and his various faults and deficiencies of character, and be the greatest naval officer that ever lived. That something was spirit: an impetuous and yet perfectly guided spiritual force, that carried along not only him, but everybody under him. There was no such man in the French navy, but there was such a man in the French army, whose name was Napoleon. It is doubtful if Nelson had the same intellectual power as Napoleon, but this can never be determined, because Nelson lived in a comparatively restricted field. But Napoleon was not intellect alone, he was a tremendous force. He and Nelson were alike in their little bodies and their impetuous activity, which put impetuous activity into everybody else, and made one the greatest sailor of modern times and the other the greatest soldier.
Probably this spirit is shown in a higher degree by the Japanese than by any other nation. It seems almost possible for the men of a Japanese regiment to be not individuals at all, but simply parts of the regiment. The Japanese attitude towards the Mikado and towards Japan is one that we cannot understand, or they explain to us; but it is said to be one of the uttermost devotion.
What single factor can be a greater influence for good in any personnel than a spirit that fears no pain, or danger, and binds all together in a vehement devotion to a common cause?
Discipline.—Of course, it is one of the efforts of discipline to keep down in men any tendency to resist the will of the directing authority; this is usually done by a system of punishments. It is also an effort of discipline to develop a tendency to assist the will of the directing authority; this is usually done by a system of rewards. There has also come into existence, within the past few years (or, more correctly speaking there has been very greatly developed from a very small beginning,) another plan for developing this spirit of assistance, and this is by developing a spirit of competition—a method very largely used in commercial life, but not much used in the navy until lately.
All these methods recognize discipline as merely a means towards an end, and not an end in itself; a means that takes account of a man as a man.
Or, it may be said, by no very great stretch of the meaning of words, that they take account of man as a certain kind of machine, and employ certain ways of actuating him, which are efficacious because of certain definite properties that characterize a man. It may be said that if we get a man to do a thing by giving him a dollar, we are actuating internal mechanism just as much as if we put a penny in the slot of an automatic vendor.
Perhaps there is a little truth in this idea, even though it seems somewhat uncomplimentary to the human race; and, it makes us realize that, in order to handle men well, we must understand the motives by which they are actuated, so that we shall know which button to press and when; and know that some buttons ought not to be pressed at all. Not only this, but it makes us realize that no two men can be treated in exactly the same way, or even one man on two different occasions. We all know this in the abstract, and yet how few of us utilize our knowledge well!
But even if some of us lack that keen apprehension of human nature that some people have, and that exceedingly skillfulness in knowing just what, and when, and how, to say and to do, we can at least note a few general truths which are of almost universal application, and which some few people seem to know intuitively and apply unconsciously, or at least without effort. These truths are of the simplest kind: and an appreciation of them leads us to see how some officers always get their work done efficiently, without seeming to have any trouble with their subordinates; while others, who do not accomplish any more are perpetually reporting somebody to somebody for something, and are it hot water with some one nearly all the-time. Certainly this phenomenon is apparent everywhere; certainly it is important; certainly it must be in accordance with some rules or laws;—and yet where are those rules and laws to be found?
While the writer does not pretend to know much about this himself, he ventures to suggest that it has to do very closely with the presence or absence of sympathy. Of course, sympathy does not mean a disposition to allow a subordinate to continue in neglect or wrong-doing, simply because such neglect or wrongdoing may be convenient to the subordinate; but it does mean a correct appreciation of the rights of that subordinate as a man, and of the fact that we can do nothing but harm by needlessly wounding him. It recognizes the fact that he has feelings, or ought to have; that he has pride or ought to have,—and it even realizes the fact that no man can walk a line exactly straight, and that certain waverings to the right and left must be allowed to every man. All attempts to regulate the lives of men with a degree of rigidity which is greater than the power of man to be rigid, must be mistakes due to a fundamental ignorance of human nature. They are like the constant exhortation "Keep quiet," which some unthinking parents repeat from morning to night to their little children, whose restless little bodies were not intended by the Almighty to keep quiet, or he would not have made them so restless.
Another truth, which one almost blushes to mention, because it is so commonplace, is the one expressed in the old adage, "Example is better than precept." If the officers in one ship tried as hard as they could to do all their duty as well as they could, and were considerate towards each other and towards the men: while the officers of another ship, of equal professional knowledge and experience, did not try very hard to do their duty, and were perpetually wrangling with each other, and were unjust and inconsiderate towards each other, and towards the men, is there any possibility that the discipline in the second ship could be as good as in the first?
Example is better than precept; and the higher the position of the man who sets the example, the greater the effect. Can the captain who is habitually surly and rude expect that his officers and men will be habitually respectful and polite? Can the executive officer who indulges in the luxury of saying cutting things to his subordinates expect that they will say respectful things of him or feel respectful towards him; or can he expect that, on some occasion, the restraint of discipline will not be broken down, with the inevitable court-martial afterwards? Can the watch officer who is negligent and unobserving expect that the boatswain's mates, coxswains, and lookouts will keep on the qui five?
At one time, flogging was used in the navy as a means of discipline; but flogging was abolished, and it was found that the ships got on just as well without it. Since that time, the treatment of the enlisted men in the service has been getting better and better, and the only results have been good results. Of course, this does not mean that flogging may not have been necessary at one time; in fact there is very good reason to believe that it was necessary. Sixty years ago, men were not so well educated as they are in the United States today. But now our public school system, and the strictness with which order is maintained in our tremendous cities, are such that most children absorb an understanding of the necessity and value of obedience to authority, long before the age at which young men enter the navy. This condition of things has been growing gradually with the years; so that men, when they enlist in the navy, have already learned a certain measure of obedience. Therefore the gradually increasing gentleness towards the enlisted man has been merely a continuous adaptation to changing conditions, due to the necessity of getting good men into the navy and keeping them.
But if it has been desirable in the past to have good men in the navy, it is becoming more so, and will continue to become more and more so, with every advance made in mechanism and invention, and with every attempt to make our organization what it should be, a system of trustworthy units. In every machine, no matter how magnificent, its perfect working is dependent upon even the smallest parts. A few grains of sand in the main bearings may stop the mightiest engine; the failure of an electrical contact may cause a disaster; the mistake of a spotter, or an error in some sub-station, may lose a battle.
Organization.—An organization of men is strikingly like a living organism in that it comprises a number of branches which have functions that are separate, are each separately necessary to the life of the whole, and yet are mutually dependent, and are themselves sub-divided.
It seems to be a law of nature that the more highly organized the structure of any living organism, that is, the higher it is in the scale of nature, the more complex is its structure, and vice versa.
It is the same with organizations. The simplest kind of an organization is one in which there is only one kind of thing to do; the boss managing a gang of street sweepers is an illustration of this kind of organization. Somewhat higher we find the organization of an infantry company, in which the number of things to be done is not very great, and the number of divisions is not very great. The most complex organization and the one in which there are the greatest number of different kinds of things to do, is a modern navy. Between a modern navy and a gang of laborers are thousands of organizations of different degrees of complexity: and through them all we see the same law running, that the higher the order of the organization and the more multifarious its faculties, the more complex it is.
The idea of organization is, of course, to get the combined effort of many men to produce a desired result; the whole effort being directed by one man, the head of the organization. This man cannot control directly a very large number of men, but it is plain that the number will decrease in proportion to the number of kind; of things that have to be done. For instance, one man might control 10 men very efficiently, if they were all doing the same thing in front of him, say sweeping a street; but he could not control 10 men very well, if they were in places far apart, and doing 10 different kinds of things.
Few organizations are so small and so simple that one man can personally direct efficiently all the men in the organization. Even in the simplest organization, it is necessary to divide the organization into parts, each under the control of a chief, and then to subdivide those parts. In fact, the idea of division and subdivision and sub-subdivision, seems inherent in the very idea of organization. If one man could control 10 other men perfectly, then one man, assisted by no men, could control 1000 men perfectly, and get done a thousand times as much work as one man can do.
But no man can control 10 men perfectly; and the result is a loss of efficiency that increases with the number of subdivisions. Suppose, for instance, that one man could control 10 men, with an efficiency of, say 90 per cent so that he could get the work of 9 men out of those 10 men. Suppose, further, that each of these ten men under him could also handle ten men with an efficiency of 90 per cent and each of those ten men could handle 10 men with an efficiency of 90 per cent. It will be seen that the first man would practically control perfectly, 9 men; that these nine men would control 81 men, and that those 81 men would control 729 men. That is, the first man instead of getting done a thousand times as much work as one man can do, could get only 7.29 times as much work done, although he would have no men to help him get it done. That is, the efficiency would be En, where 11 represents the number of times the organization is divided and subdivided.
This shows that in every organization the effort should be to keep down the tendency to subdivide, and the organization kept as simple as the different kinds of work to be done permit. Of course, even if only one kind of work is to be done, division and subdivision must be used if the organization is large. For instance, no colonel could handle personally a regiment of say a thousand men; and, except under peculiar circumstances, no colonel and ten captains could handle personally ten companies. The number of men that one man can handle efficiently depends, of course, on numberless circumstances; but it seems clear that the effort should be made to make this number as large as possible, by proper methods, so as to reduce the tendency to subdivide. One conclusion seems plain; and that is the number of men one can handle increases with the similarity of the men and their tasks; so that it should be the aim to make the units into which the organization is divided as similar as possible,—like the companies in an infantry regiment. This does not mean that any attempt should be made to make the units in the steam engineering department like the units in the ordnance department, because the functions of the two departments are utterly unlike. But it does mean, for instance, that two like units—say two gun divisions on the same deck—should not be clothed in different uniforms, receive different rates of pay, or belong to different branches of the navy.
Yet such a state of affairs exists on board our most modern ships, where no expenditure of time, money and mental effort has been spared, to make the ships the best that can be made. The Marines, who form so large a part of the complement of our ships, perform the same duties as ordinary seamen can, duties of the simplest kind, and yet they have an entirely separate organization, accounts, and esprit de corps.
Co-ordination.—A good illustration of co-ordination is to be found in a highly trained orchestra, in which we see many performers, not only playing different instruments, but different kinds of instruments, these different kinds of instruments playing different notes, and often in different time. And yet, under the sway of the skilled director, the result is the sweetest harmony we know.
The attainment of co-ordination is perhaps the most difficult part of the work of the head of a great organization. He himself, decides what policy he shall pursue in the relations of the organization to the external world, taking as much advice, or as little, as he may choose from his advisors and subordinates. la the line of external policy he is entirely independent of them: but when he attempts to co-ordinate their efforts along that line he is very dependent on them ; and his ultimate success will be a function of his success in co-ordinating their efforts.
The most obvious difficulty lies in the possible unwillingness of some subordinate to follow the line laid down. In a strictly military or naval organization this difficulty is not often met: and it would be a strange failure of the purpose of such organizations if that difficulty were often met: because their main purpose, as organizations, is—and always has been—to effect coordination. But in semi-military and other organizations, the difficulty is frequently met, and is sometimes extremely difficult to overcome. Often it cannot be overcome except by the removal of either the subordinate or the chief.
Another difficulty in effecting co-ordination lies in preventing the overlapping of the work of one division over the work of another division. Inasmuch as it is essential that there shall be no gaps left between the works of the different divisions, it is practically impossible to prevent a certain amount of overlapping and here is always an abundant source of trouble. A curios phase of this trouble is that the more efficient and energetic the various divisions are, the more trouble there is apt to be.
Undue interference with the work of any division by a superior, is another source of trouble. No man in authority can have a good grip on his men, if a superior is continually interfering between him and them. Not only does it make him uncertain as to what he is expected to do, and can do, but it lessens his influence over his men: and this, not only because they cease to regard him with as much respect as they otherwise would, but because they naturally come to look to the higher chief, not only for directions, but also for promotion.
One of the greatest holds that the head of any division has over his men, is the fact that his men must look to him for promotion, or, more strictly speaking, recommendation for promotion. This fact is inherent in organizations, because they are organizations, and must not be ignored. If a captain of a ship, in going through the engineer's department, should be struck with the efficiency or industry of some man, and promote him, without the approval of the chief engineer, he would strike a blow at the very vitals of the organization of his own ship. If his selection happened to be a good one, and the man worthy of advancement, he would do wrong just the same. And this wrong would not be an academic r theoretical wrong, but the infliction of a definite and practical injury, and lessen the respect of every man in the ship for that spirit of co-ordination and discipline which it is the captain's duty to foster.
Of course this statement, like nearly all statements, does not mean that there are no possible exceptions to it. It does mean, however, that when a case comes up in which it is proper for one high in authority to interfere between the head of any division and his men, either in directing their work, or in giving promotion, the case must be recognized, either as an exceptional one, an emergency, or else a case in which the head of the division is not doing his work well; because if he is fit to be where he is, he must be able to direct the work of his individual men, and to know better than anybody else who are worthy of promotion; not only because he is more familiar with the requirements, but because he is not apt to be unduly influenced by acts—good or bad—which, though noticeable, are accidental or infrequent.
A man going into a billiard room might see a player make a very difficult shot; and unless he were an expert himself, would be apt to conclude that the man was an excellent player, whereas the man might be a very poor player, and the shot merely a "scratch." Thousands of men in actual life have received great promotion for single acts which came to the notice of high authority when those acts were simply "scratches." On the other hand, many a very excellent and deserving man has received a set-back, because someone high in authority happened to see or hear of some act which was in itself deplorable, but which was almost an accident, totally out of harmony with the man's habitual life, and not at all indicative of his character and attainments.
Hope of promotion is a great incentive towards co-ordination So great care must be exercised—not only in getting the best men, but in making responsible positions as attractive as possible and making the accompanying titles exclusive. Even if civilians think our attitude towards titles is silly (and perhaps it is), yet nevertheless every man in the world would like to have a title, provided that title meant something honorable. But what use is there in having the title "Judge," no matter how fine a judge one may be, if everybody is called "Judge?" We all crave distinction; and even if this be egoism and vanity, it is one of the strongest forces in the world: and no one who deals successfully with men ignores it.
But if the desire for the distinction of a title is due to vanity, what shall we say of the desire for the distinction of a title that conveys to the world an erroneous impression of the duties and responsibilities of the man desiring that title?
It would be idle to assert that the mere bearing of a title that signifies ah untruth concerning its bearer does no harm to a man who really is what his title describes; because everybody knows the reverse. Every man who carries a title that conveys to the world a false impression, is doing definite harm to every man who carries that title rightfully. It has been stated that one reason why Secretary Stanton made so many Brigadier Generals at the end of the Civil War was in order to degrade the title of "General," which Mr. Stanton wished to do because of his dislike of several generals, especially General Sherman. Whether this story be true or not, the fact that it exists shows that there is a belief in the minds of men that titles lose their value in proportion to the number of people holding them; knowing that the world is apt to accredit equally all possessors of any title, not having the time or the interest to make an examination into the exact degree in which each man has a right to his title.
Returning to the subject of co-ordination as a prime object of organization, let us remind ourselves that co-ordination may be divided into two parts, internal and external; internal co-ordination being the regulation of the various functions to produce harmonious action, and external co-ordination being the regulation of the organization as a unit with reference to the external world. Applying this idea to a navy, internal co-ordination would be the regulating of all the functions of a navy so as to produce the harmonious action of all its parts; while external co-ordination would be the regulating of the relations of the whole navy to the country of which it forms a part.
The internal co-ordination of the navy is what has thus far been touched upon in this paper, but it must be plain that its external co-ordination is at least as important.
External co-ordination must be as good as possible, or the country and the navy will not be in harmony. The country owns the navy and has a right to do with it as it wishes. Its coordination with the navy is effected through the President and the Secretary of the Navy. As the President has many things to attend to, he usually deals with the navy entirely through the Secretary; so that the co-ordination of the navy with the country is practically through the Secretary.
Now the Secretary is usually a man of high ability and character, well versed in the affairs of public life, and holding the confidence of the country. He is never a man of much knowledge of the navy when he first enters upon his duty: but he usually acquires enough after a greater or less stay in office to act successfully as the connecting link between the country and this curious complicated thing that is called a navy, which is so wholly different from anything else in the country that nobody outside the navy knows much about it.
There has been a great deal of criticism of the custom that prevails in Great Britain and the United States of having a civilian direct the affairs of the navy; but how else can the navy and the country get together? Naval officers belong to an isolated profession, which is just as technical and distinct as that of medicine; and they live so little among the people of the country, that it seems sure that, if any naval officer were made Secretary, he could not deal with Congress, the President, the newspapers, and the country at large, as well as a man can who had been doing those things successfully all his life.
This brief discussion of organization and co-ordination may perhaps be closed with the truism that, in deciding on the plan or conduct of any organization, we should keep most carefully and persistently in view the main purpose which it is intended to effect.
The Main Purpose.—Clearly, the main purpose of a navy is to build and maintain a fleet that can defend the country.
The factors that enter into the problem of building and maintaining such a fleet are international, political, naval, and technical. The first three factors are included in the word "strategic." The various factors, then, may all be included in the two words "strategic" and "technical."
Objection may be made to the omission of the word "tactical." While such an objection would clearly be sound, the writer wishes to state that the word "naval," as just used was intended to include such prevision of tactical probabilities as comes under the domain of strategy; and that his intention is not to speak of the tactical conduct of a fleet in actual battle, but merely of the measures to be taken in order to build and maintain a fleet that shall be able to fight that battle with success.
Now, while it is clear that the two factors, strategic and technical, are mutually interdependent and are both essential; so that neither factor should be declared more important than the other. yet nevertheless it is also clear that technical factors, in all the spheres of their employment, industrial as well as military, owe their value, not so much to their intrinsic qualities, as to the way in which those intrinsic qualities may be applied to the attainment of some desired result. A bridge builder, for instance, would not care for steel, no matter what were its qualities, unless lie could utilize those qualities in building a bridge.
For this reason, all technical factors, in all the lines of their employment, must be regarded as factors contributory to the main purpose and, in a sense, subordinate. Sometimes, in fact often, the technical factors assume so much prominence that they obscure the main purpose; but this is a clear case of "human fallibility," and one against which we must most zealously and patiently guard.
It may now be asked—if the two factors in carrying out the main purpose are strategic and technical,—who are the men best fitted to decide as to the proper policy to carry it out? The answer is clearly that, under the direction of the Secretary, naval officers are the men best fitted, and in fact the only men fitted, to decide as to the policy.
But who are "naval officers?" If one answers according to the dictionary, he will say that "naval officers are men who hold an office that is connected with a navy." If this definition be accepted, then every watchman in a navy yard, and every private marine, is a naval officer.
But this is a "reductio ad absurdum," and is the result of an attempt to define in a few words what cannot be so defined. Many words in every language are so thoroughly understood, that they cannot be defined except by using words less well understood. Unless he befogs his mind by looking in the dictionary, every educated man knows perfectly well what a naval officer is. Every educated man knows that a naval officer is a nautical person, a man who goes to sea, whose work is done on the bridge, and in the turret, engine room, and fire room; whose mail is often a month late : whose life-long sorrow is his far and frequent absences from home; who handles guns, and drills men, and lives in an atmosphere of discipline and danger; who manages ships and all that they contain, and lives with them day and night; himself as essential a part of the fighting machine as one of the masts or turrets.
These men go up the successive steps of the professional ladder more systematically and rightfully than do the men of any other calling; acquiring at each step experience to be used on the step above, and not being permitted on any step until fitness has been proved. In natural sequence, each degree of responsibility is assumed; and, the scope as well as the degree of responsibility expanding, as higher steps are mounted, and coming responsibilities cast their shadows before, the natural career of the naval officer fits him gradually, but surely, for the correct apprehension of strategic problems, and all questions of naval policy.
This does not mean that nobody should be allowed to have anything to say about the navy but naval officers, but it does mean that naval officers should be the final judges about everything pertaining to the strictly naval side of the navy. It does not mean that naval officers should decide questions of hygiene, handle the finances, construct the ships, or build the dry-docks; because all these special kinds of work can be done better by specialists who make those special kinds of work their lifelong study and profession, in the same way that naval officers make naval work their lifelong study and profession.
Shore Duty
It has been suggested very often that, in our navy, naval officers are on duty on shore entirely too much. It has even been held that there is nothing distinctly naval in any duty on shore, and that all that is required to be done on shore for the navy should be done by civilians, so that naval officers could go to sea all the time except during occasional vacations on shore.
Without insisting too much that a naval officer is a man, and not an albatross, it may be pointed out that, even if this idea were true for a non-progressive navy, it cannot be true for a progressive navy. If we are to improve our numberless mechanisms continually, the people on shore who get these mechanisms ready for the ships, and the people on board the ships who test and use them must work together, with the common purpose of improving the mechanisms and the ships: and this they could not possibly do. if they were two unlike bodies of men. They could not understand each other, the people on shore could not possibly comprehend the essential features required for the practical use of the mechanisms on board and the people on board, not having the opportunity of keeping posted in the progress of mechanism on shore, would not be able to take advantage of the new mechanisms put in, even if the people on shore produced good ones.
We must never forget that the naval profession comprises not only an art but a science also. If it comprised an art alone, we could master it at an early age, and spend the rest of our lives on blue water, practicing that perfected but stagnant art. But since it is a science too, and since every science is infinite in scope, we must master as much of it as we can; and this requires periods of comparative leisure from executive duties, in properly equipped stations on the land. There we can study the principles of naval science—as fixed as the principles of every other science—and strive to apply them to the infinitely varying requirements of the naval art and the furtherance of naval power.
Conclusions
The reflections set forth in this paper seem to lead to the following conclusions:
- The increased power of navies is due primarily to the progress of the mechanical arts and sciences.
- The rapid growth of ocean traffic; the augmentation in numbers and in power of ocean ships; the increased and still increasing diffusion of knowledge; the amazing growth of mechanism ; the increased and still increasing appreciation of the value of wealth; the increased and still increasing love of luxury; the development of agriculture and transportation in even savage countries, combine to increase an ocean commerce that already covers the world, though thinly, and that will probably grow ten fold in the fifty years to come.
- "Competition is the life of trade;" competition is the same thing as rivalry; "trade rivalry" is a common expression for a condition as common as trade, and inseparable from it. There is no rivalry more bitter than trade rivalry. There is no thing more dangerous to peace. There is no thing for which men will fight more savagely than for money.
- Three of the great powers, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, have built up navies that are so large, compared with their foreign trade, that we are forced to infer that they have determined to fight, to maintain any stand which their trade interests may impel them to take.
- Two of these countries have causes of complaint against us which they consider just.
- Each country now has a navy so powerful that, in case we went to war with her, the issue would be doubtful.
- In a few years the navy of one of those countries will be much more powerful than ours.
- War with either country would probably entail war with the other at the same time.
- War with both countries would cause the overwhelming defeat of the United States and the payment of enormous indemnities to both countries.
- The probability of this occurring within the next ten year, unless the United States builds a navy able to fight both, is so great, and the resulting expense, both in the war itself and in the succeeding indemnities, would be so crushing, that it would be good business to follow Great Britain's successful policy, and build a navy equal to hers.
- We must not be content with merely building big ships and big guns. We must ransack the resources of science, to make the material as efficient as possible: and we must develop in the personnel, first the same heroic qualities which have animated the sea warriors of the past; and, second, that skill in strategy, tactics and engineering which will direct the mechanical power of the material to the most effective use.