Motto: "For now we see through a glass darkly."
FIRST HONORABLE MENTION.
The principles which govern military operations on shore are well understood and have undergone few changes from century to century. Master minds have long since formulated the principles of land fighting, and the world has recently seen a Field Marshal of Japan, educated in youth in the military arts of the Middle Ages, a master of the science and art of war on land in its highest modern development. In naval tactics, on the other hand, we find only a few desultory pamphlets as an offset to the libraries written on the military art of war. The reason is not far to seek. Man’s natural element is the land. Sea life is artificial. Every step in naval progress is the result of the application of scientific principles in overcoming man’s limitations afloat, with the result that naval tactics have been, from century to century, profoundly modified by the advance of science to the undoing of those students who have looked too confidently to the history of the past as furnishing the key to the naval tactics of the present day.
To illustrate this:—
With the limited range of bows, arrows, javelins, pikes, and swords, and with oars as a motive power, we find, in the Galley Period the ram as the greatest weapon of destruction. The tactics were largely those of armies, as ships were generally commanded by military men. The weapons were of short range, and battles were decided by ramming and boarding, i. e., by direct contact.
With the general adoption of gun powder, and with sails as the motive power, the ram disappears and the supreme weapon is the gun, but the musket, the pistol, and the hand grenade, as well as the pike and cutlass, are the successors of the hand weapons of the galley period for use in close action. In this, the Sail Period, guns were mounted in broadside, the bow and stern fire being necessarily very limited. In this period the great naval commanders flouted army or military tactics, the great advantage being sought in the weather gauge and in breaking the enemy's line. Owing, however, to the limited range of the guns, and the obscurity caused by their smoke, battles were either decided by gun fire, or by boarding, which latter involved direct contact.
With the advent of steam the ram was revived, but in conjunction with the broadside fire of the sail period, sails being retained as an additional motive power other than in action. At this period the torpedo appeared in its simplest form, the floating mine, and with that combination of the ram and mine known as the "Spar torpedo." In this, the Steam-Wood Period, the obscurity caused both by gun fire and coal smoke gave the ram its opportunity and battles were decided either by gun fire or by ramming' which latter involved direct contact.
Crowding on and overlapping this period came the Steam-Iron. Period, in which iron replaced wood, the rifle replaced the smooth bore in the main batteries of ships, while bow and stern fire became the more noticeable as sail power became more and more auxiliary to steam. At this time the towing and the dirigible torpedo briefly flourished, and made ramming more and more dangerous. Direct contact now disappears except as a remote or alternate method of settling sea fights. With the gradual substitution of steel for iron, began the present, the Smokeless Period, with the high powered rifle, telescope sights, smokeless powder, face hardened armor, capped projectiles, search lights, automobile torpedoes, torpedo boats, triple screws, water tube boilers, enormous horse power, the submarine, the disappearance of sail power, the advent of the turbine engine, and the gradual increase of the bow and stern fire with no diminution of broadside fire. The dynamite gun rose and fell. Each new invention in this period has carried a threat to "revolutionize naval warfare," but, in the readjustment of our ideas from time to time, the gun has remained supreme, the torpedo ranking second as the weapon of both offense and defense, and the ram has been relegated to third place as the weapon of the offensive-defensive. In the war between Japan and Russia, we find the successful reversion to tunneling and mining in siege operations on shore against a fortified base, and the floating mine in blockade operations, as in our Civil War of 1861-5. Thus we see that the weapons of naval warfare have changed from time to time, have disappeared, and then returned again, yet the human factor has remained very much the same.
This brief and not altogether accurate historical summary at least shows why we sometimes feel that, in the study of naval tactics, we are groping and find it difficult to get on solid ground, but we can never really understand naval tactics until we clearly grasp wherein lies the elementary difference between naval tactics and military tactics. However much they may resemble each other in grand tactics or in the strategy of campaigns, in minor tactics, as here discussed, there is a wide difference.
MILITARY TACTICS VS. NAVAL TACTICS.
A crab, on the offensive, moves forward presenting its claws to the attack. When hard pressed and put on the defensive, it moves backwards but still presents its claws. It can side step with equal facility. As much as we may admire the crab in simplicity of its tactics, we must admit that it has its limitations when picked up by its rear end. Operating in its natural element the tactics of the crab remain immutable. Tactically speaking, man is a good deal of a crab. With all the remarkable advance in weapons, from the club of primitive man to the modern high- powdered rifle, man has never been able to fight to the rear without facing about, and when firmly grasped by the collar of his coat and the seat of his trousers is as immutably helpless as our friend the crab. Even artillery on wheels and man on horseback are practically limited to fighting to the front with the necessity of facing about to fire to the rear. To use a nautical term, land fighting is a question of bow fire. When in battle formation, a flank attack masks most of the fire and requires the defense to draw back to meet it. It would appear, primarily, that an army formed in a circle would be better able to meet an attack from any direction, but that is exactly the one formation it cannot take, for its very existence depends upon it protecting its line of communications. Threaten that, or make a flank attack, and it must turn and fight. If the flank attack is successful the whole army must retreat in order to cover the line of communications. The Battle of Mukden illustrates this, as indeed does nearly every decisive battle. The nearer an army in the field is driven towards a circular formation the more perilous is its position. In a fortified town, under siege, cut off from outside communication, the garrison has its base of supplies with it.
Another consideration which profoundly modifies military tactics is that of topography. To take advantage of favorable topographical conditions, or, by military engineering, to so alter and improve them is a large part of the problem of the soldier, but with all the advance in weapons, tools, paraphernalia, and the mechanical transmission of information and orders, military tactics have changed very little from century to century, except in adaptations and modifications of a minor character.
But man afloat in the modern battleship is no longer the crab. It is true that the weapons of the soldier are furnished him, but in action they are merely kept at hand in case of the last resort. He is there as the eyes, brain, nerves, and sinews to give life to a mechanical monster, which, without him, is a mass of inert elements. Behind armor protection he carries his camp, baggage, artillery, commissariat, ammunition, and reserve. Lines of Communication, in the strict sense, there are none. He may even dispense with a base of supplies for long periods by having supply ships and other impedimenta accompany him. His ships have all-around fire, although the bow and stern fire are not so strong as that of broadside. By the mobility of the units of his battle formation, flank attacks can be successfully delivered against him only by his ignorance, carelessness, or helplessness. Topography comes in only where sea fights take place close to land or in narrow waters. In the open sea, a level plane, there are choice positions in action, but only with regard to sunlight, or the Wind' or the state of the sea, or the distance at which it is desired to engage.
If we therefore dismiss from our minds, for the moment, all thought of military tactics and take up the consideration of naval tactics from first principles, we will save ourselves much confusion of thought. Later on we may accept such principles of military tactics as can be clearly shown to apply.
THE BASIS OF NAVAL TACTICS.
Reduced to its simplest terms a battleship is a floating gun-platform which, on a given displacement, has the maximum of concentrated destructive power for battle, in all conditions of wind and weather, on the high seas. Many battleships satisfy all the conditions only to a limited degree. For maximum destructive power the ram and the torpedo should supplement the gun, even assuming that the torpedo and ram are tactically the weapons of the defense, or, speaking more accurately, of the offensive-defense, and even granting that they merely, by their existence, affect the tactics of the gun. The gun is essentially the weapon of naval warfare, and on the tactics of the gun we must base naval tactics, subject to such modifications as the torpedo and the ram may impose.
It will clear the problem very much if we recognize that the difference between the tactical values of battleships and of all other classes of naval vessels is merely one of degree rather than of kind, because the others merely take some one weapon and some one quality of the battleship and sacrifice almost everything else, but the battleship dictates the special tactics which the others may use. Cruisers, torpedo-boats, and armored rams must have exaggerated speed to avoid encountering battleships unwillingly or in order to deliver their blow in the shortest possible time so as to escape as much gun fire as possible. Submarines or submersibles must, for the same reason, remain invisible as long as possible. Monitors must have smooth water because they are wretched gun platforms.
On the other hand these special classes of naval vessels react upon the design of the battleship, requiring it to have quick maneuvering qualities, powerful secondary batteries, search lights, nets, and other auxiliary appliances, but for all that the question of the tactics of the battleship, that is of naval tactics pure and simple, is primarily that of gun against gun and armor against armor, on the high seas.
If we therefore examine the installation of guns in the more recent battleships, built or building, we will note, as important. The gradually increasing development of bow and stern fire without a corresponding dimunition in the effective broadside fire. This has largely been accomplished by the increased calibre of guns and their concentration in turrets or heavily armored barbettes. Nor will the movement probably end until we have the battleship with only 12-inch guns in the main battery and 4-inch and fifteen pounders in the secondary battery. This increase in bow and stern fire, combined with the gradual extension of armored areas to all parts of the ship occupied by the personnel in action, has greatly simplified fleet tactics. While it is with conditions and not with theories that we must deal, we must nevertheless look ahead in our tactics to meet conditions which seem theoretically inevitable. One feature to be reckoned with is the enormous increase in range and accuracy of the automobile torpedo, but this affects tactics by increasing the range of fleet tactics. This in turn increases the importance of large calibre guns.
While the individual gun is the real unit of offense, we may state it as a tactical axiom:
Axiom 1. The combined fire of as many guns as possible, concentrated according to a definite plan, by means of a well directed fire control, is the essence of naval warfare and the true basis of naval tactics.
The armor protection of our ships and that of the enemy opposed to us is of importance, but when we make sure that out own fire is delivered to its best advantage as regards rapidity, accuracy, and character of projectiles, we may let the question of armor protection work itself out in practical results in battle, because gun fire is itself the best protection against gun fire.
Superiority in min fire may be in the size and number of guns; it may be in the greater rapidity and more accurate shooting of a lesser number of guns; or still deeper it may be in the superior type of guns and projectiles, other things being equal; but, tactically speaking, superiority of gun fire may result from a tactical formation which puts the enemy at a disadvantage as regards his fire, and enables a fleet to concentrate its gun fire on certain ships of the enemy, thereby reducing his tactical efficiency by crippling one or more of his ships. The purpose and end and aim of tactical dispositions is, therefore, to present gun fire in its most effective position for the first blow, and then for each successive position which unforseen contingencies may necessitate. This may be stated as a tactical axiom.
Axiom 2. The object to be sought in fleet tactical dispositions—or formations in relation to that of the enemy—is to enable all ships to deliver an overwhelming concentrated gun fire on a portion of the enemy's formation at the earliest possible moment, and at the same time have him in such a position that he cannot bring his concentrated gun fire to bear on any one portion of your formation on equal terms.
This tactical disposition is known as the superior position. It implies, for one thing, that the fleet so disposed can concentrate at a less average range than the enemy, or that the enemy cannot concentrate on any one portion in return. Concentration of fire is the key to victory, and fleet formations and movements designed to secure this advantageously, and with the least disturbance of continuous aim, are what we must seek. A bad formation, stupidly adhered to at moderate ranges, for a few moments only, may, in these day of overwhelming gun fire, alone lose the victory. "At the earliest possible moment" implies the first blow, thereby injuring at once the enemy's initiative and increasing your offensive power in a geometrical ratio as you destroy his. This question of geometrical ratio has been illustrated in numerous tables, but is simply this: Given two hostile squadrons A and B, each of whose gun fire is valued at 100. At the end of a given period say that the damage to A has been 20 and to B io10 then in the next period the value of A's effective gun fire will be So and B’s 90.
If tactical dispositions can accomplish such results, it behooves us to study formations in their relation to gun fire.
FORMATIONS IN RELATION TO GUN FIRE.
The following considerations are theoretical in that no allowance is made for poorly drilled crews, or for arrangements or installations of guns which interfere with each other when all guns are firing, nor is fire control, nor range finding, nor any practical consideration, for the moment given weight. These matters will be dealt with later on in their proper place.
An examination of the installation of guns on our battleships, built and building, will show us that for each ship's total broad side fire as a unit, the corresponding bow and stern fire will be, in percentage, about as follows:
Oregon class and Iowa, 40%; Kentucky, 42%; Alabama, 38%; Maine, 37%; Virginia, 45%; Connecticut, 42%; and the 12-inch, 10-inch proposed installation, 50%. This bow or stern fire is reckoned from right ahead, or right astern, to 450 forward or abaft the beam on either side, but not on both sides at one and the same time (any more than that firing both broadsides at once would mean i00% on each side). This is because the forward and after turrets can only fire on one side or the other at one and the same time. Moreover, while no two persons will agree as to the exact percentage for this bow and stern fire, and, also, while the percentages given are not an index of the value of one ship's fire as compared with that of another, but only to each ship's own broadside fire, yet, for the purpose here used, none of these considerations are important other than that roughly speaking:
1st. Our battleships have an average bow (or stern) fire of about 43% in either bow (or stern) quadrant.
2nd. This percentage is large in spite of the number of smaller guns in broadside, because of the preponderating value of the fire of large calibre guns, where range, accuracy, and penetration are taken into consideration.
3rd. The forward and after turret guns, on the midship line cannot, for structural reasons, fire more than about 450 abaft or forward of the beam respectively.
Let us apply these considerations to a study of concentrated gun fire of our battleships in column of vessels. If the line A B C, Figure 1, represents a number of our battleships in column, then any object in the area E D F may receive the concentrated broadside fire of the starboard battery of all the ships in column. The distance B D = 1/2 A C = 1/2 the length of the formation. Any object within the arc A C E or C A F will receive less than I00% at a rapidly diminishing ratio as it approaches the line A B C. Similar conditions apply to the port battery.
These considerations may be put in the form of a tactical axiom.
Axiom 3. In column formation the area of maximum; concentrated broadside gun fire for either battery is at right angles to the middle line of the formation at a distance equal to half the length of the formation.
The ability to concentrate decreases rapidly as it goes astern of the quarter bearing of the leading ship or ahead of the bow bearing of the rear ship. As a corollary of this axiom it will be noted that the closer the unit ships can steam in column the shorter the distance B D. Naturally, therefore, the more that officers are drilled and accustomed to close order manoeuvering the better able ships will be in column formation to concentrate their fire at close range. This will become more evident as we proceed, and it can then be stated as a tactical axiom for all formations.
Let us now take line formation and examine its possibilities in the matter of gun fire. We find, from Figure 2, that in line formation, A B C, the area, F D E, for concentration of bow or stern fire, is not the area of maximum gun fire because the ships on the flanks, A and C, can bring certain guns of their broadside battery to bear just clear of the bows or sterns of their next in line, and that, within a limited arc between E D F and H D’ G, an area presents itself within which the total bow or stern fire of the fleet may be augmented. It is noticeable that the greater the distance between ships in line the greater the number of guns which can be brought to bear, although at increased ranges. This feature of line formation is important when we consider certain tactical arrangements later on but in general terms we may regard it as a tactical axiom that:
Axiom 4. In line formation the maximum area of concentrated gun fire is almost entirely that of the bow and stern guns, and is on a line normal to the middle of the formation and at a distance a little less than half the length of the formation.
As a corollary it may be stated that the closer the ships are in formation, the shorter the line B D and the longer the line B D'.
Let us now take echelon formation. A B C, Figure 3, with ships heading North, and on a line bearing 450, 1. e., NW.-SE. The ship at A is firing its broadside guns so as to clear the bows of the ship on its starboard quarter, i. e., North of the line A D F. The ship at C is firing its broadside guns to the Eastward of C D E and the area of maximum concentrated gun fire is E D F, the distance C D being about 1/2 A C = about 1/2 of the length of the formation. To the Southward of the line A D F the effective fire of the ships diminishes rapidly, until we reach the line of bearing A B C when only the stern (quarter) fire of the flank ship C is available. This marks the weak point of echelon formation, but the direction of the line of bearing of any formation is its similar weak point. This self evident proposition may be stated as a tactical axiom:
Axiom 5. In any rectilinear (or line of bearing) formation the maximum concentration of gun fire on any azimuth becomes less and less as the azimuth approaches the line of bearing.
We have spoken of the formations in Figures 1, 2, and 3 as column, line, and echelon, respectively. These are really unnecessary terms, but we have inherited them and they are convenient. As a matter of fact what is important is the line of bearing of ships in relation to the course which is being steered. In Figure 3, the ships are steering North on a line of bearing NW.-SE., A being the leader. This is echelon, but if the ships all simultaneously change course to NE., the line of bearing remains NW.-SE., but the formation is line. Similarly if the ships simultaneously change course to NW. the line of bearing remains NW.-SE., but the formation is column.
Let us for convenience adopt this method of considering formations by line of bearing and courses and study the effect on gun fire of changing lines of bearing, say two points (22°), the course remaining the same, say North, as in Figure 4. Afterwards we will study the same effect with the line of bearing constant and the course changing through the two points (22 1/2°). Let us assume that there are nine ships, A being the leader.
Disregarding for the moment A A', or line formation, as giving only a bow or stern fire (of 43% for our ships), we see that in the formation A B, Course North, line of bearing E S E, the area of maximum broadside concentration is at b (also at b'). Continuing in this way, for A C, line of bearing S E, we have c and c'; for A D, line of bearing SSE., we have d and d'; and for A E, line of bearing South, we have e and é, in all cases the broadside gun fire being 100% at the closest range possible for total concentration. If we continue to change the line of bearing by two points, SSW., SW., etc., to West, we will find that the diagram reverses itself and b', c', d' and e' are starboard battery areas. This will be seen to be a very important point when it comes to applying changes of bearing to tactical problems, and we may note that this is because b', c' and d' change very little in their continguity in a change of line of bearing through four points.
As shown in Figure 4, we may state it as a tactical axiom:
Axiom 6. With a fixed course, changes in line of bearing in any quadrant (90°) move the areas of maximum concentrated broadside fire in the same direction as the changes of bearing, but the location of the areas for said quadrant are not symmetrical on opposite sides of the lines of bearing.
For instance, the movements of the areas b, c, d, e, and e', d', c', b', are in each case to the right corresponding to the changes of bearing, but b, c, and d, and d', c', b', are not symmetrical as regards, say, the line A E.
Passing now to Figure 5, let us consider a formation on a fixed line of bearing, say East and West, and with a series of simultaneous changes of course of two points to the right. These changes of course, from North to East, are shown by the radial lines of azimuth A, B, C, D, and E, and for further illustration are carried past East to ESE. at F; SE. at G; and SSE. at H. The 'areas of maximum concentration of gun fire corresponding to each heading are designated by the same letter, viz., A by a, B by b, etc.
Figure 5 shows that the areas of concentrated gun fire are symmetrically disposed in quadrants on each side of the line of bearing, and that these areas move to the right or left as the ships turn their heads simultaneously in azimuth to the right or left. This may be expressed in the tactical axiom:
Axiom 7. In a rectilinear formation on any fixed line of bearing the areas of maximum concentrated broadside gun fire a.re disposed symmetrically in quadrants on each side of the line of bearing corresponding exactly to changes. of course through a similar quadrant, and these areas follow the motion of the ships in azimuth, moving to the right or left as the ships change their course to the right or left.
From a study of Figures 1 to 5, inclusive, we may also state it as a tactical axiom:
Axiom 8. In any formation the less the distance from centre to centre of ships the less the distance of the area of maximum broadside concentration of gun fire for that formation.
As previously stated the distance between ships in formation at which it is safe to maneuver depends upon the skill of the officers handling them.
Before proceeding further, it will be noted that in speaking of the "areas of maximum concentration of gun fire" we have in all cases considered the minimum distance at which such maximum concentration can be obtained in a given formation. In actual battle at long ranges the corresponding areas widen out enormously. For instance, in Figure 4, the broadest area e extended includes also d, c and b, and the area b' extended includes also c', d', and e'. Also in Figure 5, d includes c and b and part of e; f includes g and h and part of e, etc. This is so important that it is well to put it in the form of a tactical axiom:
Axiom 9. As the area. of maximum concentration of gun fire for rectilinear formations are fan-shaped they overlap more or less at ranges much beyond the minimum distances.
Also it may be noted that in discussing formations in relation to gun fire, it has been shown that in all simple rectilinear, or line of bearing, formations, it is possible to concentrate all the broadside on a target at some point or other beyond a certain minimum distance, excepting in line formation, when bow and stern fire only are available. As before stated bow and stern fire merge into broadside fire at 45 on the bow or quarter, and in our ships are only 43% of the value of broadside fire.
Thus far we have considered the mutual relations of the line of bearing and the course. In Figure 4, the line of bearing is the variable, and in Figure 5, the course is the variable. A closer inspection will show that in Figure 4, for instance, the areas b and b' bear the same relation to the two-point line of bearing formation A B that the two-point course formation bears in Figures 5, in which b, b', Ii, and h' represent the corresponding areas of gun fire. In the same way in Figure 4, the formation A C and corresponding areas c and c' represent exactly the similar areas c, c', g, g' in Figure 5, both being four point variations. Similarly in Figure 4, the formation A D and corresponding areas d and d' are exactly the same as the areas d, d', f and f in the similar six point formation in Figure 5.
We may therefore deduce the following important tactical axiom:
Axiom 10. If, in changing a line of bearing a certain number of points to the right or left, we also change the course, or azimuth of the ships heads, the same number of points to the left or right, the area of maximum concentrated broadside gun fire will not be changed in its relation to the resulting formation.
This axiom gives the key to the relation between the line of bearing and the course in simple rectilinear (or line of bearing) formations. We will now consider other than simple rectilinear formations.
In Figure 6 we have disposed nine ships as if steaming on the arc of a circle whose centre is at E. The nearest point at which we may secure the maximum concentrated broadside fire of all the ships is at D, which is at a point abreast the middle ship and at a distance, B D, less than half the radius B E. This is for the concave side of the formation. On the convex side it is not possible to obtain, at any point, a concentrated fire. To illustrate the limited value of the curved formation, in Figure 7 the ships in Figure 6 are assumed to have all simultaneously changed course to North. It is not possible to concentrate the broadside on the convex side, and on the concave Side the conditions are as if A B C were a column of vessels A D C and D E' 1/2 the distance A C. Similarly if in Figure 7 all the vessels simultaneously change course to, say West, the concentrated bow and stern fire would be the same as that of a line formation = A D C. In other words, it is a disadvantageous formation, except, as in Figure 6, on the concave side, where the ships are steaming along the arc of a circle, and in that case the area of maximum concentration is as shown at D.
What has been said as to the circle applies with equal force to a double echelon formation as to the value of its concentrated fire. It is merely that of a smaller simple rectilinear formation A D C, as in Figure 7. According to Axiom 5 it has the further disadvantage that the ships are on two lines of bearings with two weak points. In Figure 6, with ships steaming on the arc of a circle, we have the formation which fleets assume, at times, when one has a marked advantage over the other in speed. The slower fleet endeavors to partially offset the disadvantage in speed by turning in a circle of somewhat shorter radius than that which the faster fleet is obliged to assume in order to parallel it. The advantage in concentrated gun fire rests with the faster fleet because its formation is concave towards the slower fleet whose formation is correspondingly convex. The latter cannot concentrate its gun fire and the former can. Superior speed has both a strategic and a technical advantage. The slower fleet must accept battle on terms dictated by the faster fleet, and the faster fleet can assume formations which give an advantage over the slower. We will see this clearly as the discussion progresses, but it is just as well to state it in a tactical axiom.
Axiom 11. Superior speed is tactically of the greatest value in enabling a fleet to quickly assume a superior position.
It may be stated as a corollary that large reserve speed may answer the same purpose. For instance, with a fleet able to steam 16 knots, it may manoeuvre at 10 knots or 12 knots and use its reserve speed to assume quickly the superior position when a chance offers. On the other hand the enemy may use reserve speed to make a counter move. It must ever be kept in mind, however, that battles may be decided by an initial advantage, as suggested in Axiom 2.
The superior position in general is made up of many elements:
1st. The sunlight on the enemy's ships and in his eyes for firing at your ships.
2d. The sea rough and the enemy rolling and exposing vulnerable parts above and below the armor belt.
3d. More effective concentrated gun fire can be delivered at less average range than the enemy can possibly return on anything like equal terms.
4th. A certain distance or range may be advantageous for special reasons.
5th. The wind may be strong or blowing towards the enemy, interfering somewhat with the rapidity of this fire.
6th. In the next move you may be sure to get the advantage.
7th. Having the enemy where he can only make a certain
move, or failing to take it, he must fight with the odds against him.
If all that has so far been said on the relation of formations to gun fire, as stated in the tactical axioms, and illustrated in Figures 1 to 7, is not clear, it is because the language used is obscure, but at least the gun fire diagrams are clear, and speak for themselves. They must be the basis of naval tactics, for there can be no other. It is in the practical application of these diagrams and tactical axioms that we have the elements of fleet tactics.
TACTICAL METHODS.
We have discussed the gun fire diagrams. The question is how to go from one formation into another by a method which shall least disturb gun fire in the process, or by a method which shall favor concentration of gun fire as far as possible during or on the completion of the manoeuvre. This should be simple enough but it is at this point that experts disagree, and people begin to stumble. This is because our tactical signal books are merely a jumble of diagrams of tactical manoeuvres which have no relation to gun fire, with no hint as to the why or wherefore of any formation. The result is that we accept fleet tactical drills as a necessary evil without realizing that there are important problems to be solved which are as vital and as pressing as those which brought about the recent revolution in our target practice methods.
The fact is briefly that there are many methods of going from one formation into another. One method may be splendid under one set of conditions and fatal under another, just as in deployments in military tactics in actual battle. Everything depends upon the bearing and formation of the enemy as to what relation our formation should bear to his. A false move may give the deciding advantage to an opponent. The chances of victory are with the side which makes the fewest mistakes. Only an expert who thoroughly understands naval tactics in relation to gun fire can handle a fleet to its full advantage. There is no throwing dice. It is a game of skill requiring all the training and science of polo, or base-ball, or foot-ball. There is no special virtue per se in rectangular methods, or direct methods, or in column, or in echelon, or in fancy group formations, or in any formation in particular. The choice of method lies in the relation, at the moment, of your gun fire to the bearing and formation of the enemy as affecting his gun fire. This we will consider later, because one must first take up the question of tactical methods in general, then compare the different methods under exactly similar conditions, and, finally, in a few tactical problems apply them as we probably would in action. Only by the comparative method can we grasp what eludes so many.
There are three classes of tactical methods which we shall consider (1) The Rectangular (or Angular), (2) the Direct (really Oblique) and (3) Special Methods.
By the Rectangular Method a fleet goes from one formation into another by a series of simultaneous and successive movements in which each ship performs the same evolution at undiminished speed, and in which the course and distance passed over are ultimately the same for each vessel, or to state it tersely: Each ship executes, either simultaneously or successively, identically the same manoeuvre, at the same speed, and with the same effective helm.
By the Direct Method the guide or leader slows after the movement is begun (or other vessels use reserve speed) and the obliquing ships change course a certain number of points, reaching their new positions by prescribed rules as to variations in helm and speed. Much depends on the speed of the guide as to how much time and sea room the direct (oblique) movement occupies. Usually the oblique does not exceed three points.
By Special Methods the aim is to reach the new formation quickly. In the main the special methods are compromises between the rectangular and direct methods, but each must be studied in relation to all others as regards the object to be sought before one can use any method intelligently.
The formations here considered are line, column and echelon, i. e., either four or eight point variations of lines of bearing. Two point Variations are merely intermediate forms of these three and are not here illustrated. In comparing the three tactical methods, it will be simpler to consider that reserve speed is not used because if it is used in one case it may be used in the others to hasten their performance. Assuming therefore that standard fast speed (and not full speed) is used, we will in each case apply certain tests to the different methods of changing formation by way of comparing them. These tests are (1) time consumed, (2) least interruption of concentrated gun fire, (3) non-interference of ships with each other in gun fire, (4) variations in range during the manoeuvre, and (5) change in range on its completion. As previously stated, the bearing and formation of the enemy is the determining factor in selecting any particular method in a given case. There are, of course, times when the proximity of land or lack of sea room will admit of only one certain method being used, but we will consider only the general proposition with plenty of sea room.
Assuming that there are nine ships steaming at standard fast speed of 12 knots, and that the maximum distance from center to center of ships is 250 yards, any formation would be one nautical mile (6,000 feet or 2,000 yards) in length, and the formation would advance one mile in five minutes. In obliquing the advance would correspond to difference of latitude in plane sailing, and lateral transfer to difference in longitude or departure. Thus in every manoeuvre we must consider both the advance and lateral transfer in their relation to the bearing and distance of the enemy. It will be noted in all diagrams that A is the leader or a flank ship, B is the flagship (always the centre ship), and C is the other flank ship, or in column the rear ship. The diagrams are not drawn to scale and do not represent the actual turning powers of ships in relation to the dimensions of the drawings. They are merely intended to be suggestive and comparative, and must not be taken too seriously. They illustrate, however, the only means by which we may intelligently judge the methods to be used.
1st. To go from line into column, or column into line, at right angles to the original formation.
(a) By the rectangular method ships go from line into column or column into line by all vessels going eight points simultaneously to the right or left. In this case, to change into formation at right angles, involves head of column going eight points to the right, or left, and all ships following successively. The entire evolution takes, for nine ships, about six minutes, and the rear ship will be about 400 yards from the point at which the evolution began. In either case of line into column or column into line the flank or leading ship will be one nautical mile from where the evolution began. This is shown in Fig. 8, which illustrates the rectangular method of going from line into column. C advances one mile and A is transferred laterally one mile. By the direct method, Figure 9, we will first consider going from line into column. The flank or guide ship C slows to g speed (in this case 9 knots) because the other ships have to cover distance in the ratio of about 7 to 5 on account of obliquing. Each ship, as it comes into column astern of C, slows to 3/4 speed, and, just as the column is formed, signal is made and all ships go ahead at full speed. A or A' will be much beyond D, by the time full speed is regained. The time occupied in the manoeuvre to regaining full speed will be about ten minutes, and the distance of the rear ship about one mile from where the evolution began. A (or A') would be laterally one mile to the right (or left). As compared with the rectangular method the direct movement is more difficult, and during the movement the formation is disorganized, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to make a quick counter move. For all that, as in Figure 9, the enemy being in the direction of the left hand arrow for A B C, or of the right hand arrow for A' B' C', the direct method has the advantage over the rectangular in gun fire and range during the movement, but the guide has had to slow to speed, and loses the lead over the direct method, four-tenths of a mile in this particular case.
In going from column into line by the direct method there are several things to consider. If the guide slows to steerage way and allows the rear ships to oblique and make up distance quickly it will take about eight minutes to form line. If the guide continues on at half speed it will take about twenty-five, and this does not include the time necessary to resume standard speed. We will therefore drop out of consideration the direct method of going from column into line as a waste of time.
By the "Special Method," shown in Figure 10, ships may go from line into column, -without loss of speed, without loss of distance literally, and with gun fire available during a large part of the movement. The flagship B will also still retain its central position. When the signal of execution is made, A B C being in line heading North, all ships put their helms to starboard, as if to go into column, but the right division of four ships after going through eight points left, executes head of division eight points right, and stands on heading North, the other three ships following in succession. The leading division of five ships circle, each ship from B to A using less and less helm in order to turn in larger circles. B, the flagship, turns in as small a circle as possible to B', and follows in astern of C' (which is the new position of C). It will be found that the wing A B, without reducing speed, will arrive in position to form column coming up astern of C', as shown in Figure Jo, at A' B', without loss of distance. This movement will occupy six minutes, or exactly the same time as the rectangular method, and has many advantages over it. It has the advantage over the direct method in that there is no slowing. It has the advantage over both methods in that it confuses the enemy as to your real intentions.
To go from column into line by the "Special Method," shown in Figure 11, the rear division of the column goes head of division eight points to right. The five ships of the leading division circle, as shown in Figure 10, and come in astern of C'. When all the ships are in column, they execute eight points left simultaneously and come into line heading North. The movement might have been executed by the head of rear division going to the left and the leading division circling to the right.
The advantage of the "Special Method" over the rectangular in special cases may be illustrated in Figure it with the enemy in the NE. quadrant. If A B C should perform the change of formation by going head of column eight points right, the rear ships would soon have to cease firing because A would be between them and the enemy. The more the special methods are studied the greater the average advantages will become apparent. To illustrate all the available methods comparatively they are grouped in Figures 12 and 13. In Figure 12 the rectangular, direct and "Special Method" are compared side by side at the completion of the evolution of going from line into column. The rectangular and "Special Method" are on equal terms as regards advance, but the "Special Method" does not change the average distance laterally. By the direct method the advance is more than twice as much, and the lateral transfer practically the same as for the rectangular method. All things considered, the "Special Method" is best for average conditions. (It will be noted that the flagship B always retains its central position.)
In Figure 13, the direct method of going from column into line is not considered as it is practically useless. The question as between the rectangular and the "Special Method" is referred to in the discussion of Figure ii. The lateral transfer is the same, but the advance is one-half mile greater for the rectangular than for the "Special Method." This latter may be the important and deciding feature in choosing between the two methods.
The advantage of the special methods will be apparent also when we consider the evolutions of going from (1) column into column at right angles, or (2) from line into line at right angles, or (3) echelon into echelon at right angles. This last, echelon into echelon at right angles, is illustrated in Figure 14 as typical of all three movements.
In Figure 14, A B C is in echelon NW.-SE., heading North. By the "Special Method" at the signal of execution the four rear ships execute ships four points left and the head of division eight points right. The five leading ships circle to the left, as heretofore explained, and come into column astern of C' (the new position of C). When all are in column the course is changed by signal to North.
By the rectangular method, Figure 15, A B C goes ships four points left and then head of column eight points right. When all are in column heading NE., signal is executed ships four points left. There is no adequate direct method of going from echelon into echelon at right angles, but for line into line at right angles, or column into column at right angles, the direct method might under certain circumstances prove very valuable. As between the rectangular and "Special Method," shown in Figures 15 and 14 respectively, there is a difference of about 1/2 mile (1,000 yards) in advance, and this may prove the deciding point in choosing between them. By the "Special Method" there is less change of average range and better average gun fire during the movement.
It is manifestly impossible to lay down any rules for eight points change of line of bearing as to what method to use without considering, in each case, the position and formation of the enemy. Given this, and also the purpose of a change of line of bearing, the method to be used will be clear at a glance.
We will now consider four point changes of line of bearing.
2d. To go from column into echelon, or echelon into column, changing line of bearing four points.
Four methods are here given of performing this evolution. They are illustrated separately in Figures 16, 17, 18 and 19, and together graphically in Figure 20.
In Figure 19 the direct method is illustrated, and when the evolution of going from column into echelon is completed, and full speed resumed, the guide, A, has advanced considerably over one mile, and the lateral transfer of the rear ship has been 4,350 feet (1450 yards) to the left. By the rectangular method in Figure 16, A has advanced to A', a distance of about 4,500 feet (1,500 yards), while the lateral transfer has been about the same amount to the right. In Figure 17, by the "Special Method" the lateral transfer of the flank ship has been about 4,500 feet, but the advance of the leading ship is less by some 3,000 feet. (1,000 yards) than in Figure 16, or, in other words about 1,500 feet (boo yards). By the special method shown in Figure 18, called the "Pin Wheel," at the signal of execution B slows to half speed, the rear division of four ships uses the direct method and obliques into position, slowing to half speed before coming on the line of bearing, while, at the same time, the leading division of four ships put helms to port, sheer over into position, then slowly take up half speed as B arrives on the line of bearing. In the resulting echelon formation, A' B' C', Figure 18, A has both advanced and transferred laterally about half the distance as by the "Special Method" of Figure 17.
The four methods are graphically compared in Figure 20, by which it will be seen that the direct method gives lateral transfer to the left; the rectangular and "Special Method" to the right, and the "Pin Wheel" is a compromise of all the other three. The great drawbacks to the "Pin Wheel" are difficulty and danger in execution, and having to slow to half speed.
To go from echelon into column by the rectangular method, by the direct, by the "Special Method," and by the "Pin Wheel" method are all four illustrated in Figure 21, showing the relative positions of the column on the completion of each manoeuvre.
A B C, Figure 21, is the original formation in echelon. A' B' C' is column by the direct method; A' B' by the rectangular method; A' B' C' by the "Special Method," and A' B' C' by the "Pin Wheel" method. The choice of methods depends, as always, upon (1) the position and formation of the enemy, and (2) upon the object sought by A B C. In the direct method we have the extreme of combined advance and lateral transfer, and in the "Pin Wheel" the least. The "Special Method" offers the best average conditions.
3d. To go from line into echelon is illustrated in Figure 22, in which A B C represents the fleet in line, and A' B' C' the fleet in echelon NE.-SW., heading North by the direct method, in which the guide slows to half speed. A' B' C’ represents the corresponding position by the rectangular method. A' 13' C' D shows the same by the "Special Method." A' B' C shows the same by the "Pin Wheel" method, in which the guide, B, slows to half speed, the four ships of the left division slow to steerage way, closing in with port helm, and resuming half speed as B comes on the line of bearing. The ships in the right wing proceed at standard fast speed, and oblique to the left slightly, slowing to half speed as they successively come on the line of bearing. When all are on line of bearing NE.-SW., standard fast speed is resumed. The "Special Method," as shown in A' B' C D, satisfies best the average conditions.
In going from echelon into line, as shown in Figure 23, four methods are compared graphically. A B C is the original echelon formation. A' B' C' is line by the direct method, in which the guide, A, slows to half speed. A' 13' C' is line by the rectangular method. A' B' C' D is line by the "Special Method," and A' B' C' is line by the "Pin Wheel" method.
It is only by studying the methods comparatively and considering the object sought that one can decide intelligently upon which one to use.
Figures 4 and 5 as gun fire diagrams, and Figures 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 25 are in themselves a small compendium of fleet tactics, worthy of many months of careful study.
Most flag officers prefer rectangular methods owing to the smaller margin for misunderstandings, the continual maintenance of standard speed, and the general "follow the leader" character of the movements, but there are times when other methods are imperative. Under average conditions the "Special Method" has all the advantages of the rectangular, but it is not the purpose to here advocate anything except the study of fleet tactics on the broadest and soundest lines. Only practical fleet exercises can really test the different methods as here illustrated, but, after all, it is in the practical application of theories that we make progress of any kind.
TACTICAL PROBLEMS.
So far we have considered formations in their relation to gun fire, and have noted the different methods available for going from one formation into another. We will now consider the practical application of the gun fire diagrams and various formations to certain theoretical problems. The difficulty is that we must consider every possible movement and formation it is in the power of the enemy's fleet to take either offensively or defensively; for it is much like a game of checkers in which certain moves on one side compel the opponent to sacrifice two checker men for one. We must quickly grasp the advantages and disadvantages of every tactical disposition, as well as the possibilities of the next move. The instant there is an opening, or a weak point, advantage must be taken, and taken quickly. We must therefore use that method of going from one formation into another which will give the required advance or lateral transfer, and use that line of bearing and heading which will deliver gun fire most effectively.
To accustom officers to judge these things drills should be instituted, at first with steam launches of a fleet, or even with pulling boats. The only fittings needed are boat compasses, and sighting vanes at 450 forward and abaft the beam. At first, umpires will decide on the relative values of concentrated fire at the end of each move. Later on, simulating somewhat actual battle conditions, it will be recognized that, during the time ships are manoeuvering for a change of formation, gun fire will be disturbed. Mistakes in moves will be expensive. Expertness in handling boats, and afterwards ships, will count for much. Familiarity with moves and counter moves will suggest what signal will come next, and, in the case of the failure of one or more ships or boats to read signals, intelligent action can be taken from seeing other boats or ships change course or manoeuvre. Officers pitted against each other in steam launch or pulling boat flotillas should become familiar with the principles, so that in subsequent tactical exercises with battleships in drills at sea, they could gain familiarity with the true tactics of the guns as actually mounted in ships. A few ships should always be detailed to represent the enemy's skeleton formation, so that, given an advantage, every captain will recognize it on sight, or, if at a disadvantage, we will know how to make the counter move and retrieve the situation. Any other tactical drill is illusive, barren, and lifeless, except in so far as it teaches officers to handle ships in close proximity to each other.
To illustrate the question of judgment, let us consider the following problem:
Problem 1. Two equal hostile squadrons in parallel columns within range of concentrated broadside gun fire, one squadron being somewhat in the lead of the other, as shown in Figure 24, which has the superior position?
From a casual glance at Figure 24, we might say that neither column has a decided advantage, since A B C can concentrate on the leading vessels of D E F, which can, in return, concentrate on the rear vessels of A B C.
As a matter of fact A B C has the superior position, but is in a wrong formation.
To show this let us assume that the leading ship, A, in the new formation, A B C, in Figure 25, is in exactly the same relative position from D as in Figure 24, but, instead of being in column heading North, is on line of bearing NW.-SE. with all of his ships steering NNW. Let us further assume that it is calm, the sea smooth, and the sunlight not a factor. In the formations, as shown in Figure 25, A B C has the following advantages over D E F:
1st. A B C concentrates all of his broadside fire on the leading ships in the column D E F at much closer average range than D E F can in return concentrate on any point of his formation.
2d. By steering NNW., A B C gradually closes with the enemy using his superior gun fire to great effect, and, while he loses some of the leading position by steering a converging course, he can at any time change course back to North. This change of course to North will, by Axiom 9, bring the area of concentrated fire to as favorable a position as before (see Figure 5), and at equal speed, A B C will, in echelon, retain the advantage until such time as D E F makes a counter move.
3d. A B C, by steering NNW., soon reaches a superior torpedo position, in which his torpedoes are fired at an enemy steaming to meet them, and in a formation in which the openings between ships (or chances of missing) are small, being presented at an oblique angle.
All this answers the question indirectly, for it shows that, in parallel columns, the leading position is valuable in that it has possibilities if properly utilized. With superior speed on the part of A B C, it shows that his object should be to get into an echelon formation as in Figure 25. Let us assume, however, that the speed of the two fleets is the same, and, returning to Fig. 24, with the hostile fleets as there shown, let us put it in the form of a tactical problem:
Problem 2. Two equal hostile squadrons, in parallel columns, at equal speed, within the range of concentrated broadside fire, the one squadron being somewhat in the lead of the other, as shown in Figure 24, how can the leading squadron best manoeuvre to change line of bearing two points or in this case to NNW.- SSE.?
We have taken a two point change, because, if A B C should manoeuvre for a four point change, i. e., to go into echelon on the line of bearing NW.-SE., as shown in Figure 25, D E F would gain on A, and, by the time the manoeuvre was completed, D would probably be abreast of A. For a two point change we will first consider the direct method, Figure 26, with regard to two important features (1) the gun fire of A B C during the manoeuvre, and (2) the loss of lead due to the change of formation. A slows to 3/4 speed, and the other ships oblique simultaneously to the right. While A B C is thus reaching A' B' C', D E F advances to D' E' F'. A is not so far in advance of D' as A was of D, on account of the loss of distance by obliquing and by A slowing to g speed, but, during the process of obliquing, all the ships of A B C can bring their port broadsides to bear on the leading ships of D E F. The drawback to the direct method is that, if D E F makes a counter move, A B C must signal during the manoeuvre and reform his column, before he can do anything else.
In Figure 27 the "Pin Wheel" method is illustrated. B slows to half speed. The rear division obliques to the right and the leading division to the left. By this method time is saved, but the loss of distance or lead is no greater than by the direct method because of the less time at half speed.
By the rectangular method, in Figure 28, head of column A B C changes course to NNW. and, after the last ship has gone into column heading NNW., all the ships change course simultaneously to North, as shown in A' B' C'. During this movement the ships of A B C are in a concave formation as regards D E F somewhat like that shown in Figure 6, which is favorable to gun fire. The loss of lead is only that due to obliquing two points, as by this method all ships maintain standard full speed.
Of the three methods illustrated, the rectangular is the soundest and safest, because it does not involve change of speed, it does not lose distance, and at no time is the formation disorganized.
It is well to here again emphasize the fact that, with superior speed, A B C may assume the echelon formation of Figure 25 from column, as in Figure 24, without losing the lead over D. Figure 25 merely shows one phase of Figure 4. If A bore NW. of D and were in echelon on the line of bearing NE.-SW. with ships heading NNE.; or if DE F were heading South and A bore either SE. or SW. of D and were in echelon formation, in the former case NE.-SW. and heading SSW., or, in the latter, in echelon NW.-SE. and heading SSE., we would have all the elements of the superior position in all four quadrants as commonly understood. It is merely that in every case the line of bearing of A B C in echelon shall be about 450 with the course being steered by the column D E F. When this condition obtains, unless D E F at once gets out of the position of disadvantage, he will be defeated, because a few of his leading ships are sustaining the brunt of A B C's concentrated gunfire and cannot concentrate on A B C's ships except at much greater range. Besides having the superior torpedo position, A B C using the broadside battery which, in Figure 4, is shown to be favorable to concentrated gun fire, and D E F is using the corresponding unfavorable one.
This general tactical proposition in which from a leading two point, four point, or six point formation, as A D, A C, and A B, Figure 4, the enemy is held in the superior quadrant of concentrated gun fire, may be called the "lock."
Problem 3. Given a column of vessels in the inferior position D E F, as shown in Figure 25, how can it get out to the best advantage?
In other words, how can it break the "lock." To simplify the problem let us assume that speeds are equal, the sea smooth, and that neither squadron has any auxiliary vessels to protect, both squadrons being free to move at will.
It might seem that D E F could best get out of the inferior position, in Figure 25, by reversing his course and heading South, with a view of taking some other formation more favorable to gun fire, but A B C would make this an expensive move, as in Figure 29, by going into column heading NW., and then changing course first to West and then to South forming line, and thus "capping " or "T-ing" the rear of the column F' E' D'. Every one recognizes the value of "capping" as a tactical maneuver, and, for the sake of illustration, we will assume that, when D E F changes course to South, he immediately goes head of column East, Figure 30, while A B C goes into column heading SE. The head of D E F's column will receive the concentrated broadside fire of A B C, and will be forced to alter course to the southward. If D E F on the other hand changes head of column to West, instead of East, A B C can remain in line of bearing formation NW.-SE., and by heading SW., "cap” the rear of D E F's column.
In Figure 31 is given the only method available for D E F, in Figure 25, to break the "lock." It consists merely in D E F's going head of column NW. to parallel the line of bearing of A B C. During the process D E F has the convex formation and cannot concentrate on any part of A B C's formation. A B C changes course simultaneously to NW. A will be abreast of D, and will therefore have lost the leading position, as A' B' C' and D' E' F' will be in parallel columns on equal terms as regards position. However, during the time D E F is changing to D' E' F', A B C will have had a great superiority over D E F in broadside gun fire, but had D E F remained as he was he would have been defeated. D E F must break the "lock," and, to do so, must pay the necessary penalty of the inferior position. If A B C has superior speed, he can use it to gain the lead and again manoeuvre to change bearing two or four points. This will again force D E F to change head of column to the left, and in doing so he will again suffer for being in the inferior position.
Figures 29 and 30 illustrate the inferior position in the "lock," and the danger to D E F of getting "capped" in trying to get out.
The method of Figure 31 illustrates very well the tactics of a squadron with inferior speed (D E F) which has to change course to neutralize somewhat the superior speed of the other squadron (A B C) by making him steam on the arc of a circle with much greater radius than that of D E F. As a matter of fact D E F has no other choice. A B C with superior speed can force him to keep changing course in this manner. Moreover, A B C has the advantageous concave formation as opposed to D E F's convex.
Figures 29, 30 and 31 illustrate clearly:
1st. The advantage of superior speed.
2d. The advantage of the "lock."
3d. How the "lock" has the further advantage that in case the enemy makes a false move in trying to get out, he merely exchanges the "cap" for the "lock."
We must clearly realize that the advantages which come from the superior position are those due to superior tactics. Other things being equal this will decide the engagement because of the advantage accruing in a geometrical ratio to superior gun fire. As soon as one squadron gets a superior position the other can get out of the inferior position only by paying the costs during the process. To remain in the inferior position is fatal. To get out is merely a choice of the lesser evil. This may be illustrated by a tactical problem:
Problem 4. Given a column D' E' F', as in Figure 29, with a hostile squadron in line as in A' B' C', using the "cap," how can the former best get out of the inferior position?
F' E' D' should use the "Special Method" and go into column at right angles, heading either East or West. It is true that during the process F' E' D' pays the penalty of the inferior position, but on .the completion of the manoeuvre A' B' C' must go into some other formation than line, or suffer the consequences.
As a tactical problem, it will be interesting to review the theoretical "Battle of the Azores" of August 9, 1903, between the British fleets B and X, as given in Brassey's Naval Annual for 1904, pages 69 to 85, to which the reader is referred for numerous details.
B fleet was composed of 14 battleships whose best speed at the time was from 11 to 12 knots, and the X fleet of 10 battleships whose speed was 15 knots. X had not intended to permit action, but B gave X "such an advantage that he took it," according to the official report. Really X decidedly failed to take it. Passing over the intermediate manoeuvres by which B's column approached from 14 miles to within 5 miles of X's column at 3.00 p. m., we will take up the narrative when action opened at 3.18 p. m., at 7,000 yards, and became general at 3.30 p. m. at about 5,000 yards, at which time the two fleets were in the relative positions shown in Figure 32, in which the rear ship of X was only 4,340 yards from the leading ship of B's formation and got the concentrated fire of six of B's leading ships. Compare the formation of X at this juncture with that of A B C in Figure 25, and note also that B, in order to close with X, has to approach steering South, i. e., having practically to use bow fire. In Figure 33, fifteen minutes later (or at 3.45 p. m.), B is steering SSE., using bow fire, and does not go into column heading SE., parallel to the X fleet, until 3.54 p. m. Meanwhile the second division of X gets between the first division and the enemy by a mistake in signals (explanatory semaphore message), and in retrieving the mistake by signal at 3.50 p. m., the Caesar and Illustrious (rear ships) made a further mistake in reading or interpreting an explanatory hand semaphore signal and dropped out of column, as illustrated in Figure 34, in which the relative position of ships is shown at 4.00 p. m.
In commenting on the "Battle," Mr. Thursfield says in the Annual, pages 74-5, "It is probable that in real action the whole course of the engagement, if not the final issue, would have been determined by the results of the first few minutes fire. But the action off the Azores, if fought as Admiral X intended to fight it, must, it would seem, have inflicted quite as heavy losses on him as it inflicted on his adversary, and its initial effects might have compelled him to fight it after all not as he wanted to fight it, but as his adversary wanted. No stage of the action subsequent to its first few minutes can be regarded as possessing any real actuality. In these first few minutes things must have happened in both fleets, the effect of which must have determined every subsequent disposition on both sides. It makes no material difference how long it took for these critical things to happen, whether it was ten, fifteen, or twenty minutes after fire was opened. The essential point is that as soon as they had happened any subsequent disposition made by either side on the hypothesis that they had not happened was altogether bereft of any intelligible relation to 'what would be probable in war.' It is altogether outside every imaginable probability of war that two fleets should be engaged for a quarter of an hour, several ships on both sides being within 5,000 yards of each other, without palpable results, such as must determine every subsequent stage of the action, and every disposition which either would make."
If the foregoing comments are justified, what could we say as to results to B of X having taken a formation such as that of A B C in Figure 25, using superior speed, and playing upon the earnest desire of B for action, B having a superior number of ships. There is, however, from pages 69 to 85 of Brassey, not the slightest intimation from any source that X's formation was under the circumstances fundamentally wrong, and that B had not the remotest tactical justification in reason for approaching X in column, or as the British call it "line ahead." Some of the "critical things" which did happen were mistakes in reading or in interpreting supplementary semaphore signals. In action what would happen if, in time of peace, with no disturbing gun fire, numerous expert signalmen fail to get, and especially selected officers fail to grasp, the intent of signals of many words sent by semaphore to explain or modify tactical signals? There is no use wasting coal and oil with battleships in our navy until the steam launch, or pulling boat period is gone through with, and, if we are sufficiently elementary, we may even go back to the kindergarten method of practising, on a marked field on shore, with men representing ships with 450 bow and quarter fire represented by wooden frame work. This is not meant in the slightest degree as a comment on the exercises in question, or in criticism of actual, valuable, and admirable tactical and practical British exercises here reproduced in outline, but it is meant to emphasize the importance in our navy of studying formations in relation to gun fire in order to reduce the necessity for signaling to a minimum, i. e., to make it a "captain's fight" in the sense in which, if the flagship drops out through damages sustained, the battle goes on because the plan is well understood by many officers. Admiral X, with superior speed, has only to choose his position in order to wipe out the head of B's formation eager for action.
This is well illustrated in the Battle of the Sea of Japan on May 27, 1905. The Japanese squadron appeared to the Russians about 1.45 p. m. Admiral Togo says, "we steered Southwest as if steering a route directly opposite to that of the enemy." Suddenly, at 2.05 p. m., he changed course to East and headed across the head of the Russian columns. One Russian report explains the Japanese movement as follows: "Finding himself at a great distance from our line of advance, the enemy suddenly headed to port and turned his broadsides against us. They literally overwhelmed our vessels with a hail of projectiles, concentrating their fire generally upon our flagships or upon the leading ships. Beginning with explosive shell, they tore away our smoke stacks, masts, and entire superstructures and set us on fire before using armor-piercing projectiles." Admiral Enquist's report states that the Japanese squadron "manoeuvred to prevent our following our route towards Vladivostok. Each time that our squadron directed its course towards the North, the Japanese ships, by their superior speed, got ahead of our column of battleships and attacked whichever one of them was the leader. Fifty minutes after the fight began, the Os!labia sank. The Borodino was put out of action; and soon afterwards the Kniaz-Souvaroff, on fire, without masts or smoke stacks, was likewise put out of action. The Japanese tactics obliged our squadrons to move in a circle around the transports and torpedo boats, while the Japanese vessels manoeuvred in an outer circle. On account of inferiority of speed, it was difficult to get out of this position." Admiral Togo says, "Our signal for action was made at 1.55 p. m. The result of the battle was settled at 2.45 p. m."
Speaking more generally, from all the data at hand, the Japanese ships at 15 knots circled back and forth around the Russian ships at to knots, concentrating on the leading ships with the astonishing result of sinking modern battleships by gun fire alone. The Russian tactics were confined to turning movements in an endeavor to parallel the Japanese formations, and, failing in that, to "countermarch" and thus try to escape crushing gun fire. The superior speed of the Japanese battleships enabled a few ships to overwhelm in detail a fleet immensely superior in numbers, and to escape the concentrated fire of even a portion of the Russian fleet. It was the reverse of the tactics of Admiral X in the "Battle of the Azores," and illustrates admirably the tactical value of superior speed.
The few tactical problems here illustrated show the practical application of some of the tactical axioms. The limits of this paper preclude the posibility of formulating tactical rules for all cases. As a matter of fact rules apply only to a given relation, temporary or otherwise, between two opposing fleets. As we have seen, an advantage gained by a skillful manoeuvre may be lost by a counter move of the enemy, and can only be held, or regained, by either superior speed, or by superior tactical skill. If we understand the principles, rules are unnecessary.
The superior position implies that the chances are favorable, and that the inferior position must pay the penalty before it can retrieve itself, but we must always realize that a lucky shot may turn the scale by destroying the initiative of the fleet which has, up to that moment, had all the advantage. Luck of this kind, however, generally favors the side which has the better training and the greater skill.
TACTICAL PROPOSITIONS.
In order to successfully handle a fleet in action the individual ships must be well handled. To do this there are certain things or certain information which must be accurately known or quickly ascertainable. These are (1) the compass course; (2) the speed; (3) the distance and bearing of the guide and of adjacent ships in the formation; (4) the import of signals displayed; (5) the plan of action; (6) the distance of the enemy or of that portion of the enemy designated as the target; (7) the speed of the enemy; (8) the resultant allowance to be made on the sliding leaf of gun sights to compensate for (a) the speed of the ship, (b) the speed of the enemy, and (c) the direction of the wind; (9) the readiness of each division of the battery to fire; (10) the readiness of each torpedo tube to fire; (11) the helm angle; (12) the intactness of the hull; and (13) the degree of heel of the ship.
On the one hand, some officers claim that our ships are overloaded with delicate mechanical indicators which will probably get out of order in action; and, on the other, that the captain cannot possibly look out for so many things in action as the mechanical fittings imply. It is therefore well to pass in review the many duties of the captain in order to see what may be done to take as many details as possible off of his mind without weakening his effective control. From this we may decide what instruments or means of interior or exterior communications are necessary, and what personal aid is required to assist him properly in his manifold duties and responsibilities. We must consider also the contingency of a successor having to take command quickly in case of accident to the captain so that he may assume charge intelligently. If we therefore first select out what the commanding officer must do and must know, we may be able to determine what other officers must know and be able to tell him, or do and thus relieve him of some of the details.
Looking broadly at the duties of the commanding officer in action, we may note that the ram is completely under his control, because ramming is a question of helm and speed. With fixed torpedo tubes, torpedo firing is somewhat dependent upon him, being a question of aiming by means of the helm. In order to avoid wasting ammunition and injuring friends, gun fire must be under his direct control by mechanical signal or otherwise. When signals are received which involve a change of course, or speed, or the use of weapons, the commanding officer is responsible for the execution of the order, or for the position and performance of the ship in obedience thereto. With this much as a guide, we may consider in detail the things enumerated above in relation to the captain's duties and responsibilities.
(1) The Course.—The captain cons the ship, assisted by the navigator and a quartermaster, whose duties consist, in this respect, in seeing that the ship is maintained on the course designated. The helmsman uses a definite compass course, and the more skillfully he maintains a steady course the better the gun trainers can do their work. Frequent changes of course disturb gun fire. This point must be kept in mind by both flag and commanding officers in connection with gun fire. What is important tactically is the relation of the course being steered to that being steered by the enemy. The flag officer has to consider this, and it is equally important for the range-finding party on each ship to know this, because, if the courses diverge or converge, the range changes rapidly and this affects gun fire. In changing course by signal it is therefore more rational to signal a change of so many points, rather than to signal the new compass course, and it certainly simplifies battle signals to do this. The helmsmen in the fleet steer the same true or magnetic course, but not necessarily the same compass course. Tactically the compass is of no importance per se. The gun fire diagrams speak of quadrants of 90°, but not in the compass sense, of say North to East, but in relation to the angular difference between the, compass courses or lines of bearing of the opposite fleets, from zero degrees when parallel to 90° when at right angles. We must divorce in our minds utterly the mariner's compass from the gun fire and tactical diagrams. The compass is shown in the illustrations merely to start from a fixed direction and to discuss changes of course or bearing on the familiar angular basis. If we see this clearly then we will see that the captain does not personally concern himself other than in keeping his ship in the formation as steadily and with as little disturbance of gun fire as possible, and in this he is assisted by others. The consideration of the course being steered in relation to that of the enemy is for the flag officer, and the necessary mental arithmetic in computing the varying ranges is for the range finding party.
(2) The Speed.—A ship's speed is governed by the number of revolutions of the main engines. These should be shown on the bridge and at central station for each engine by mechanical indicators. Usually a mechanical annunciator is used to signal each engine what to do, the gradations being "full speed," "half speed," and "slow speed" ahead and back, with "stop" as an intermediate position, but tactically the ordinary annunciator is inadequate because station or position is usually kept by voice tube, or mechanical means whereby adjustment of position is affected by slowly increasing or decreasing the number of revolutions. Tactically there are several gradations of speed not recognized by the ordinary annunciator. A division, squadron, or fleet is usually maneuvered at "standard fast speed." "Standard full speed" is the "reserve" speed of all ships. "Full speed" is an individual ship's best speed, independently of any standard. While the engines are seldom used to assist the helm in turning in general tactical evolutions ("standard helm" being used) yet for the purpose of a single ship, to aid in ramming or in torpedo aiming, the engines may be used with good effect. Speed cones are used to indicate to other ships in formations the performance of the engines, but too much reliance cannot be placed on these in action. It would therefore appear that frequent drills in tactical evolutions can alone attain that degree of efficiency which will enable fleets to dispense with them. The course and speed are therefore two of the considerations resting on the captain and his Immediate and personal assistants. But there are others.
(3) The Distance and Bearing of the Guide and of Adjacent Ships in the Formation.—Either a sextant or a Fiske stadimeter is used to determine the distance of various ships in the formation. The bearings may be obtained by a "tactical square" painted on the deck of the bridge, or by a pelorus, or dumb compass. The officer charged with keeping the captain informed of distances and bearings should be on the bridge as a personal aide with additional duties as signal officer. It is in no sense the duty of the range finding party, but is one of the things the captain must consider personally at critical times, especially in changing formations.
(4) The Import of Signals Displayed.—Battle signals should be few and simple, corresponding to a few well understood movements. There should be a plan of battle and definite rules where by in the absence of signals logical and definite course of action may be pursued in certain contingencies, such as flagship injured, guide dropping out, etc. The day of battle is no time to improvise methods of signalling, and to send long semaphore or improvised messages, explanatory of hastily formed plans. The hand semaphore is all right for conversation, but is a poor substitute for a plan of action. Also under any system the captain will have enough on his mind without having to search through signal books for all kinds of signals. He must have a number of people on his personal staff to make and receive signals, and take details off his mind, but just the same he must be sure of the signals, for mistakes are expensive.
(5) The Plan of Action.—As stated previously, a good plan of battle will minimize the necessity for signals, and reduce the chance of errors and misunderstandings. The captain should not be the only one to know this. The executive, navigator, and personal aides as well as the range finding officer should understand it thoroughly.
(6) The Distance of the Enemy.—This brings us to some of the considerations involving fire control through spotting the fall of shots, and through range finding as a fine art. Trial shots with accurate spotting at ranges based on as reliable a method of range finding as can be devised are the fundamental elements of battle practice, assuming that there are no serious defects in ordnance, and that proper training has been employed in teaching gun captains to shoot straight. A range finding party for each calibre of gun of the main battery, consisting of officers and trained men, should be stationed in the tops with range finders, sextants, stadimeters, etc., to determine the range and lateral correction of sights, and to watch the fall of shots. The range selected should be that of the portion of the fleet designated as the target. By means of a set of clock like indicators facing downwards from each top occupied by a fire control group, the range should be shown to those on deck whose business it is to see it, but in addition the main reliance should be mechanical indicators to signal to each gun station the ascertained range. The visible dial in the top is merely a second means of information in case of accident to the mechanical indicators for each gun station. The captain may or may not correct the given range, but it is manifestly impossible that he should handle ship, and at the same time estimate ranges from moment to moment.
(7) The Speed of the Enemy.—This being a matter of calculation from actually observed changes of bearing, based on speed and course of both fleets, it should be the duty of the range finding party to ascertain this, and embody it in the estimates of change of range.
(8) The Resultant Allowance to be Made on the Sliding Leaf of Gun Sights to Compensate for (a) Speed of ship (b) Speed of Enemy, and (c) The Wind.—This compensation is the duty of the range finding (fire control) party to estimate. By means of a second dial displayed from each top for each calibre of guns, and by means of mechanical transmitters to each gun station, the correction for lateral error in. feet on the target to right or left should be signalled. Graduations of the sliding leaf in minutes of arc, or knots, are possibly accurate but anyone can, independently of distance, estimate with the eye a certain number of feet on a given ship's profile, rather than use angular (arc) measure. The dials should therefore show feet to right or left in multiples of 5. The visible dial in the top should supplement the dials at the guns in case of accident.
(9) The Readiness of Each Division and of the Battery to Fire.—Fire control is imperative. It prevents waste of ammunition, interference, and danger to friends. Even with smokeless powder the interference of guns from powder gases when all of one battery are firing is very serious. Broadside volley firing With all guns of the same calibe is a modern up-to-date necessity. Isolated gun positions make this a question of mechanical communication. If a reliable mechanical instrument is found to be necessary for any form of communication, its invention and installations is merely a question of money. In conning towers there is usually an electric battery indicator which works well. The captain, through the range finding party, must exercise fire control. Mechanical details will be considered later.
(10) The Readiness of Each Torpedo Tube to Fire.—In some ships the torpedo director is in the conning tower. In others it has a separate station. Until the tube gate is open the torpedo cannot be discharged. Unquestionably torpedo fire control should rest with the captain independently of the battery fire control, because the helm must be used but principally because the responsibility rests with him.
(11) The Helm Angle.—As the course is controlled by the captain the information as to the helm angle should be quickly available. Usually a mechanical helm indicator is installed, but the helmsman also necessarily knows the helm angle except in case of certain accidents to the steering gear.
(12) The Intactness of the Hull.—Usually there are water alarms which mechanically indicate the presence of water in compartments. The flooding of one or more compartments produces changes in the trim of the ship, affecting the steering, the speed, the armor protection, and battery efficiency. Knowledge of this enables the commanding officer to give orders to stop leaks, or to have the compartment pumped out, or to trim the ship by flooding others.
(13) The Degree of Heel of the Ship.—There is usually a mechanical indicator for this. Heeling principally effects the armor protection and the efficiency of the battery.
A consideration of the needs of interior communication in battle brings us to the question of the conning tower and protection of the captain and his assistants. There is a growing feeling that the real conning tower, as now fitted, should be below the protective deck with an armored tube communicating with the bridge deck. Through this tube all orders should be given, megaphone like, to the central station below. The bridge should be free from every form of iron stanchion, protection to personnel, or any fitting which will arrest the flight of projectiles or tend to explode their fuses. The captain and his assistants on a perfectly clear bridge are in less danger than with partial armor protection. In case of injury to the sets of indicators on the bridge, reliance will have to be had on communication through the armor tube.
Of the various requirements for communicating information and orders in a fleet and on board ship it is well to condense them in the form of tactical propositions.
1st. As many methods of interior communication should be available in each ship as will enable the captain and his assistants to handle her efficiently.
The things which the captain has under his complete control are (a) the course, (b) the speed, (c) the ram, (d) the gun fire, and (e) the torpedo fire.
The things which the captain ought to be able to ascertain quickly or to give orders concerning by means of interior communication or mechanical instruments, or through personal assistants, as occasion requires are (1) the compass heading of the ship, (2) the helm angle, (3) the revolutions of the engines, (4) the distance and bearing of any ship in the formation, (5) the meaning of any signal made, (6) the readiness of each division of the battery to fire, (7) the readiness of each torpedo tube to fire, (8) the intactness of the hull, and (9) the heel of the ship.
The captain should have on the bridge with him, the navigator, a signal officer, and a detail of quartermasters and signalmen to keep track of things and to transmit orders.
Speaking tubes to the central station should be distributed at various points to enable the ship to be handled in case the bridge itself is wrecked by a shell.
2d. There should be a range finding (fire control) party for each calibre of gun in the main battery located in separate tops to regulate the gun fire.
The instruments needed in each top by each range finding group are: (1) a reliable range finder; (2) a sextant; (3) a stadimeter; (4) a dumb compass; (5) a stop watch; (6) printed range tables; (7) a mechanical range computer; (8) powerful glasses to watch the fall of projectiles;. (9) a large dial for indicating ranges to deck; (10) a large dial for indicating lateral corrections to deck; (11) mechanical transmitters or annunciators to all gun positions of the particular calibre; (12) a voice tube to central station, and (13) an alarm bell or buzzer to cease firing, which signal should be given by the captain, through the range finding party, using the mechanical transmitters.
3d. Signalling between' ships is merely a means to an end, and, while this end can be attained with the minimum of signalling by perfecting the rules of tactics, yet every known method of transmitting the necessary signals should be available for battle, so that if one fails another may be used.
Next to straight shooting at battle ranges, and proper tactical dispositions, looms up the great and generally misunderstood question of battle signals. There should be but one code of signals, but all possible methods of transmitting it. For instance, by the four lamp electric night system we can transmit the Army and Navy code of thirty characters with the utmost rapidity, visible from four to five miles, and covering every conceivable purpose of signalling. It appears that sending this same code by hand wig wag flag was found to be too slow. Instead of taking thirty characters from the hand semaphore and using them as a rapid method of transmitting our regular code, we have deliberately gone out of our way to adopt a foreign hand semaphore code which as a code is in no way superior, has no resemblance to our own, and has the doubtful merit that we can communicate with the foreign ships using it. If peace cruising is the criterion of signalling, this consideration has weight, but for a battle code in our Navy this foreign hand semaphore code is useless and should be curtailed in its use to transmitting the thirty characters of our regular code. The four arm semaphore transmits our code admirably at greater ranges than the hand flag or two arm semaphore, but no one can deny that the latter is a good adjunct for short distances, but there is no merit in taking the British code when we can use our own just as well.
In the same way our flag system of one to four flags in a hoist should be made to correspond to our thirty character code. Incidentally all code calls should be abolished and our signal book numbers be run consecutively from I to 35,000. With thirty flags corresponding to the thirty characters in the Army and Navy code and with a straight signal book there are no requirements of signaling in peace or war which cannot be readily met. This contentious digression is only meant to show the importance of one code and many methods vs. the many codes and many methods into which we seem to stumble through losing sight of fundamental principles.
In the regular code some characters have two meanings. It is proposed to expand the thirty characters into a battle code by giving meanings to letters now having but one signification, the "Interval" excepted. As here given the regular recognized secondary meanings are in parentheses and the proposed secondary meanings for unassigned characters are given in quotation marks.
This battle code is based upon the considerations previously explained as follows:
1st. The course. This can be changed by all ships changing course at once (simultaneously) or by the leader or leaders (in compound formations) changing and the others following (successively).
2d. The bearing of the leader in any rectilinear formation. The object of this battle code is to transmit many tactical and battle signals which can be understood at once without reference to a signal book, thus reducing the list of battle signals to a minimum.
By this code the letters "A," "T," and "D," are prefixes or distinguishing letters as follows: " A " means that the signal which follows is for the auxiliaries and reserve ships; " T " means for torpedo boats, torpedo boat destroyers, and scouts armed with torpedoes; and " D " means all groups, divisions, or squadrons in a compound formation such as double column, double line, etc., or in other words, where the fleet is subdivided, it means for all ships. With no prefix a signal is for the group commanded by the flag officer making the signal, or, if all ships are in one formation, then for all ships in the line of battle.
Simultaneous changes of course are signalled thus: R 5 which means "Ships turn through five points to the right," or R8 "through eight points," or L6 "ships turn through six points to the left."
A successive change of course is signalled thus: H L 4, which means "Leader turn four points left," or H R 6, "Leader turn through six points right." (This is the "Rectangular Method" of changing line of bearing.)
Changes in line of bearing are signalled by displaying a numeral before a tactical letter. Thus: 4 H R means, "Leader bearing four points to the right" (echelon), or 8 H L, "Leader bearing eight points to the left" (line), or o H (Zero H) "Leader bearing right ahead," (column).
In case of compound formations, such as double column, a signal such as D 4 H L means, "In all formations the respective leaders bear four points to the left" (groups in echelon), or D R 4, "Ships in all formations turn through four points to the right."
To go from one formation into another by the rectangular method, say from column into echelon, implies merely signaling a change of direction of the Leader the required number of points, thus, H R 4. To accomplish the same movement by the special method or by the direct method requires that the new line of bearing be signalled thus, say the ships are in column and go into echelon to the right 4 H R S. "Leader bearing four points right, using the special method," or 4 H R I same but use "direct method." To commence firing is signalled by "0," and to cease firing by "N." Concentration of fire is signalled thus: Y 6, "Concentrate on enemy's 6th ship counting from leader." This code is put in operation by signalling 2111, "Battle Code Use." At any time to revert to a spelled out message it is only necessary to signal, 1112 "Letters Call or Alphabet Use." While using the battle code, the regular signal book is always in full operation, because, unless the letters A, D, H, I, L, N, 0, R, S, T, U, or Y are used with numerals, any numerals signalled are read from the signal book. In other words in battle the "Battle Code" does not supersede the signal book (" G. S. U.") and is merely an admirable supplement to it saving time, and being readily understood.
If this code of thirty characters can accomplish all this, is it not important to adapt all our methods of signalling to the transmission of the Army and Navy code by flag hoist, by four arm semaphore, by wig wag, by hand semaphore, or by any other means by which we may make these signals by day or night in any kind of weather? It is thought that a fleet can be maneuvered tactically by these battle signals without the use of a signal book, but nevertheless it should be thoroughly tried in order to remove the taint of theory from it, and in order to enable the officers of the fleet to expand, modify, or improve upon it practically.
4th. The flagship of the line of battle should be a battleship and its position should be in the centre of the formation rather than near the ends of flanks.
This applies to the flagship of the commander-in-chief. There may be rear-admirals in command of divisions and the second in command may even have command of the armored cruiser division, if there is one, but the commander-in-chief belongs to a battleship in the line of battle.
5th. The role of the armored cruiser is that of scout and destroyer of everything but battleships.
In defensive tactics their superior speed enables them:
(1) To protect auxiliaries.
(2) To support smaller scouts and torpedo boat destroyers.
(3) To help protect injured battleships that may fall out of line of battle.
(4) To form a reserve for the line of battle in order to support it at critical junctures.
In offensive tactics, after engagement has progressed a short time, an undamaged armored cruiser has many advantages over a damaged battleship, and its mission is to destroy any vessel of the enemy it possibly can.
6th. The tactics of a fleet greatly inferior in point of numbers or in type of ships should be to bring on an engagement, if at all, in narrow waters well known to its officers.
7th. The reserve should be made up of slower ships and all classes of impedimenta or auxiliaries, and should be protected by torpedo boat destroyers and protected cruisers (if any) with armored cruisers as a support. The role of the reserve is to avoid action until such time as it may relieve a weak position or follow up an advantage gained. Such protection as the line of battle may afford the reserve should be given without sacrificing the initiative.
8th. Under average conditions the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line at right angles to the bearing of the centre of the enemy's formation.
In order to close with an enemy it is necessary to steam towards him. While doing this only the bow guns can be brought to bear and these represent but 43% of the maximum fire of broadside, but if you are forcing the action you must use bow fire at some stage or other, and it is better to use it at the preliminary long ranges at the beginning of an engagement. In the line formation here spoken of ships may oblique as much as six points to edge towards a superior position, but the main thing is that the line of bearing shall be at right angles to the bearing of the enemy, thus bringing all the ships into action at once and on equal terms. In thus approaching none of your ships have to bear the entire brunt of the enemy's fire as would be the case in approaching in column. This line formation is merely tentative. Once within the zone of fire line of bearing and course may be changed according to circumstances. "Under average conditions" means that it is not always well to use line formation for the approach to the attack, but the exceptions will be found sufficiently rare to make it a general rule.
9th. In concentrating gun fire on a portion of the enemy's formation from a superior position the secondary object should be to oblique or edge closer so as to force home the advantage while it lasts.
Closing in on the enemy, or surrounding or overwhelming by gun fire, as described by Admiral Enquist in the Battle of the Sea of Japan, is variously described tactically as "concentration accompanied by constriction" or as "enveloping," but under any name it is forcing the issue while at the same time avoiding a melee.
10th. Chase should always be given when opportunity offers.
Chasing has the drawback of exposing your ships to torpedoes, or floating mines in the wake of the enemy's ships, and also of the danger of being cut off by a superior force when distant from support, but it has the advantage that all the chances are in its favor in case of accidents to motive power or steering gear of ships of the enemy, causing one or more to straggle or drop back. Being thus at a disadvantage they are more easily destroyed or captured. A lucky shot may bring a ship to, or changing weather conditions may prove favorable to overtaking.
The few tactical propositions here enunciated are added to the general consideration of the elements of fleet tactics in order to suggest study and discussion. No attempt has been made to outline a consistent scheme of tactics. What has been here said is merely an introduction to the study of fleet tactics along sound lines. It has been as much a process of elimination as of constructive reasoning. The fleet is the school of tactics, but the training must be from the simple to the complex. It is manifestly impossible in the limits of this paper to treat of wireless signalling, of commerce destroying, of scouting, of reconnaissance in force, of safety service, of auxiliaries, of torpedo boats, of torpedo boat destroyers, of the reserve, or of submarines and mines in their relation to the tactics of a fleet, nor has ramming been considered. It has only been possible to consider the tactics of the line-of-battle independently of all accompanying ships. It is, however, inconceivable that a squadron of nine battleships should be unaccompanied by ships of many types. The treatment of tactics is therefore essentially elementary.
The study of military tactics is important as affecting the strategy of campaigns but it has no bearing on the study of minor naval tactics as here considered. As expressed recently by a distinguished foreign naval officer, "In land warfare small bodies of cavalry may one day act as independent patrols or scouts, and the next day they may form an integral part of a regiment, but in naval warfare no such integration of the units can be effected; no number of small cruisers can, by acting together, become the equivalent of a large cruiser." The difference between military and naval tactics are fundamental.
The writer's aim has been merely to clear away some of the misconceptions which seemed to shroud the subject of naval tactics and to offer for study consideration the basic elements of fleet tactics.