SECOND HONORABLE MENTION.
Motto: "Fire answers fire; and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umbered face."
Henry V, Act IV, Chorus.
Was the result to be expected?
Could the result have been different?
What lessons have been told and what new vistas opened?
When the forces of nature, according to their guidance and direction, are so potent for good or for ill as is the case on the seas, but a small margin of superiority will often suffice to turn the scale from complete victory to overwhelming disaster. On the memorable 28th day of May in the Strait of Tsushima, where physical and moral forces had full play, the tragedy enacted was, in its mode of enactment, in its swiftness, and in its ultimate completeness, certainly without a parallel in military history. Man's annihilation of man and of his works had not before been achieved in a manner comparable to that of the battle of the Japan Sea. Admiral Rojestvenski's fate was decided within an hour and the victory accomplished within three hours, after which it was only a question as to how completely the remnants of his force could be overtaken and destroyed.
I.
A question is natural: With the knowledge possessed or thought to be possessed at the time, being so completely overmatched, could the Russian fleet have entertained the faintest hope of success? Could on-lookers have for a moment thought any other issue possible?
There was a general impression from the time that the Baltic fleet started on its long voyage, that in the impending naval operations the advantage would lie greatly with the Japanese. As an offset to the simple and well-known fact that the Russian fleet comprised more battleships than the Japanese, there was generally cited (and very correctly, within bounds) the experienced veteran personnel of the latter, hardened, trained, and steadied by their service and participation in previous actions; also their immense preponderance in torpedo-boats and destroyers. There were also other factors less generally commented upon though of equal importance to influence the situation.
It is not necessary to quote the well-known relative strengths of the two fleets in ships; in the matter of heavy guns, however, the situation is less well understood, and it should be pointed out that Admiral Rojestvenski had the superiority in calibers above 8-inch, but that if that very efficient caliber were considered, the advantage in number of heavy guns lay with Admiral Togo. On the other hand, the value of the Japanese heavy batteries was modified to some extent by the circumstance that three of their 12.5-inch and four 10-inch and four 8-inch were mounted in unarmored cruisers of 4000 to 5000 tons, not usually considered competent to stand up in the line of battle. This is all under the supposition that both sides would have all their ships present; on both sides were some that the respective commanders might decide to leave out of the battle-line, and some also might not effect a junction, for instance, the Gromoboi and Rossia at Vladivostok.
The disparity in torpedo craft was very great and created a situation which must have given the Russian commander fully as much concern as any other one factor, especially as it imposed the necessity of a vigilance, alertness, and tension which lasted from before entering the Sumatra Strait until the day that battle was joined.
It is true that the experience of the war thus far tended to assign a diminished value to the torpedo. In illustration of this it is pertinent to recall the curtain-raising attack upon the unsuspecting Russian fleet off Port Arthur on the night of February 8, 1904. The Japanese boats approaching at midnight were mistaken for the Russian flotilla which was expected, and were allowed to approach without misgiving, the people of the Russian fleet apparently having no knowledge of the imminence of war; from close range they discharged their torpedoes at the nearest vessels as they passed and escaped to sea without injury. It was not until the officers of the Pallada actually saw the bubbles of three torpedoes speeding by that they realized the situation and went to quarters; and when they finally opened fire, the flagship signalled: "At what are you firing?" Under these exceptional circumstances, creating a condition tantamount to simple target practice at short range and in smooth water, it appears that at least 24 torpedoes were discharged, of which three took effect. On the other hand, it is to be remarked that two battleships, each struck once, had to be beached and afterwards docked; and beaching would be out of the question for Rojestvenski's ships except upon a hostile or at least a neutral coast.
Again on June 23, 1904, after the battle of that day and the return of the Port Arthur fleet, the Japanese flotillas commenced individual attacks after dark, making ten attacks in all; not one hit was scored although the fleet was at anchor. A notable and possibly significant fact transpired in connection with this occasion; in the morning after, twelve torpedoes were picked up having run all the pressure out of the flasks and not being set to sink. No doubt many others must have been carried away by the currents which run strong along there, and it tells a tale therefore of the number that were discharged during that soul-stirring night. But of still greater significance was the fact of these torpedoes being existent, that is not exploded; it is manifestly impossible that they should have been set to run just through the anchored fleet and then stop, for it was out of the question to get the distance; moreover, all the pressure was out of the flasks; they must have finally struck and been stopped by the shore (if not in some instances by the ships), and with so bold and rocky a coast they should have detonated. Is it possible that their safety appliances functioned poorly or were neglected when loading the tubes? If so, small comfort could be gleaned from this remarkable failure, for the most optimistic could not hope for a continuance of immunity from such a cause.
Despite this poor showing it cannot be denied that the number of the Japanese torpedo-boats constituted a most formidable element to be reckoned with. The circumstances promised to be materially different from those off Port Arthur. It was to be supposed that the crews of those small craft, smarting under censure and lack of success, would be not merely nerved to make the most heroic sacrifices (for that they seemed ever ready to do), but would have their weapons and accessories in perfect condition and not paralysed by failure to remove safety appliances or whatever was the trouble. Furthermore, it was on the cards that night attacks might be made incessantly, and, the fleet being on the open sea and assailable from every quarter instead of only from seaward, as when off Port Arthur, it seemed most probable that one or two torpedoes might reach home and annul the advantage in ships before the fleets should come together. Or after a day's battle, which might be indecisive, with secondary batteries and search-lights swept away, the big ships would be comparatively easy prey; the Russians had no serious torpedo-boat defense.
One of the greatest advantages possessed by the Japanese fleet was in its proximity to its fortified ports and dockyards, where a vessel injured in battle or otherwise could find refuge and be repaired. It was evident that any Russian ship badly hurt would be most unfortunately situated. In the event of a different outcome of the first day's battle, the remaining ships of the defeated fleet could have been rushed to port and saved, and although the enemy would have won a victory and gained the important point of reaching Vladivostok, still the defeat would not have become an overwhelming disaster; there would still have been a fleet in being, and command of the sea would still have been a problem. It was certainly patent that any Russian ship which might touch a reef or be touched by a torpedo would be of little farther value for the fight which must occur before reaching Vladivostok, and would probably have to be abandoned or sunk (or interned) to forestall eventual capture. Of the various elements of prime importance—the size of the fleets, the difference in their speeds, the possible difference in the quality of their materiel, the possible difference in the skill and morale of their personnel, and the proximity to or exclusion from repair yards—the last named may perhaps have been regarded as of the least weight in balancing the chances; and, as the event proved, it was actually of no influence in deciding the tide of battle; but that was not known and was hardly to be expected beforehand. In the opinion of the writer such relative assignment at the time was in error; if circumstances had permitted torpedo attacks previous to the battle, very likely Rojestvenski's peculiar situation in that regard would have compelled him to accept battle after suffering serious losses which the availability of a dockyard would have annulled in a few days; and in any event the possession of a harbor would have given a different coloring to incipient sparring for position. Looking at it in another light, a fleet repairing and resting comfortably in its own home ports, undisturbed by possibilities of night attack, had a vast advantage over one steaming 15,000 miles to engage in a fight immediately upon the completion of the voyage.
The efficiency of the individual ships of the two fleets, simply on the basis of the materiel, was somewhat a matter of speculation and intuitive conception. There is perhaps no fleet regarding which details have been kept from public gaze with such success as by the two in point. A newly created sea power, with little or no obsolete material, and, what is more important, with no obsolescent practices and theories to overcome, is apt, other things being equal, to forge ahead; and when the development of the new toy is attended by the enthusiasm accompanying the thoughts and hopes of a "revanche," an older and less actively stimulated service may well be distanced. The Russian Port Arthur fleet is understood to have been without telescope-sights, and it seems to be an uncontradicted fact that one of the battleships of that force fired its 12-inch guns for the first time in the battle of August '0. Did the Baltic fleet have proper sights on the guns? Was its powder of uniform action when manufactured, and did it remain so after so many months steaming at sea? In the construction of the ships, had the lessons of the Yalu and of Santiago been heeded and unnecessary woodwork eliminated from the hulls? The answer to this last question could supposedly be affirmative, for the reason that in the previous engagements of the war no serious instance of fire appears to have occurred. It is true that that immunity was possibly due as much to the failure of fire communication by the enemy's explosive as to the absence of combustible material in the structure and fittings of the ships attacked; but the ultimate result would be the same, as there was no good reason to suppose that the Japanese would (or could) have changed the character of their bursting charges. The Russian Navy Department having become thoroughly aroused, it was fair to assume that the ships were well gunned and equipped, as it was also fair to assume that in their original design and construction they embodied details abreast of modern naval progress. There had been nothing in previous operations to suggest imperfection of armor or of any other element excepting the lack of telescope-sights and possibly defective loading arrangements resulting in slowness of fire.
In the matter of speed there was suggestion of serious difference. Fifty years ago a fleet could remain at sea for years without finding its speed reduced by foul bottoms. But things are different now. Although two of Rojestvenski's battleships were sheathed, and although reports (less or more credible) were current that by means of the divers and of scraping appliances he had kept the other bottoms fairly clean, it was an acceptable hypothesis that the general speed of his fleet was materially less than Togo's. The three Russian coast-defense ships had been recently reengined and re-boilered (as well as re-armed) ; but the speed of a small and low-freeboard ship can never be relied upon to equal on the high seas a normal performance of a high-freeboard ship, and those three vessels therefore promised to be something of a handicap if put in the line of battle. The speed of a fleet being no greater than that of its lowest unit, an undoubted advantage was to be reckoned with as possessed by the Japanese. The extent and the value of this advantage are perhaps both open to some differences of opinion; in certain conceivable cases its value may not be gauged in the same way nor by the same standards as would govern in determining a general programme of construction for all-round service. Certain strategic advantages which might spring from a superiority in speed in the initial maneuvers of hostile fleets could be materially diminished by the possession of equal speed by a portion of the slower fleet, provided the liberty of action of that slower fleet were not restricted by restriction of the battle theater nor compromised by considerations of battle efficiency or other material or moral factors. On August 10, 1904, the speed of the Russian fleet was that of the Sevastopol, which is understood to have been very much reduced, and the Japanese could have fought the action at short range if they had so desired; but they naturally selected long range as a rule, having more heavy guns and telescope sights, and the Russians apparently made no attempt to close—except the Retvisan. There was reason to believe that Admiral Rojestvenski would be so situated in the matter of guns, sights, and possibly even gun-pointers as to be indifferent about the range, presuming the efficiency of the Japanese in those respects to be the same as on August 10. Take it all in all, the situation in the matter of relative speeds must have been considered as being favorable to the Japanese though not to an extent so overwhelming as might appear from a casual comparison of figures.
Not the least interesting element of efficiency requiring consideration is "the man behind the gun," which man includes very specifically the division officers who learn the range and communicate it in proper terms to the sight-setters, solve local problems of ammunition supply, control the fire, and are ready to meet all emergencies in engine room, magazine, and turret. The known conditions existing before, during, and after the battle of August 10 quickly pointed to a markedly less difference, if not an actual reversal, in the previously supposed relative efficiency of that "man behind the gun" of the two fleets. The fact undeniably and inexorably exists that the Russian fleet acknowledged itself vanquished and returned to port and subsequent annihilation; but a pregnant fact, big with significance in the present study, is that at the time that, by the death of Admiral Witgeft and the temporary disabling of his flagship, the supreme command devolved upon the next in rank, victory was in his grasp. The exact circumstances of that fatal retreat are not yet clear. Prince Ukhtomshi was in another ship and could not know just what had befallen the Tsarevitch; it is not certain that he signalled to return to Port Arthur, and if his signal was simply to follow him it appears that it was believed, rightly or wrongly, that the intention was to fall back, though the gallant work of the Retvisan was Illustrative of what could be expected of individual ships. Whether or not the fault lay with the commander-in-chief for Permitting, or not preventing, an unnecessary retreat, the Russian fleet was, at that crucial moment, in a condition and position to at least succeed in the object of the sortie, viz, to make Vladivostok.
None were more surprised than the Russians on that day to find that they were not pressed in their retreat. Why was this? It was a matter of common note that the Japanese fire was much the more rapid, the estimates varying between two and three shots to the Russians one; as a direct result of this the Japanese must have been in danger of running short of ammunition if the fight were prolonged, while the Russians must have been sure of a considerable supply. But this situation was not enough of itself to explain such complete letting go. Admirers of Admiral Togo, among whom must be counted all who can read or hear, find a reasonable explanation in the wonderful self-possession of that remarkable man who realized that every greatest benefit would be reaped by allowing the enemy's ships to return intact to the harbor where they were doomed to be captured. Great indeed, and reckless, would have been such prescience and forbearance. But the supposition is at variance with the fact that the torpedo flotillas were ordered to the attack and did attack gallantly though without avail, for which it is said that they received a caustic rap. No; there were other reasons, which must be sought in the vague rumors of damages inflicted partly by the enemy's fire and partly by other agencies, injuries of no small moment having apparently been received through misfeasance of their own ordnance material. Nothing definite can be stated regarding this; Japanese dockyards are closed to outsiders, and Japanese workmen, newspapers, and general public are loyally reticent to a point apparently not conceived in other countries. On the other hand, in spite of the Japanese superiority in heavy guns and of the rapidity of their fire and of their guns having telescope-sights, serious damage does not appear to have been inflicted upon any Russian ship except by one shot in the Retvisan, although for some time the huddled fleet in confusion was an ideal target for the converging fire of the Japanese circle. The Tsarevitch, whose gun protection was practically similar to that of four of Rojestvenski's ships, after steering for some time from the berth deck, managed to repair her steering gear and made a neutral port; she has been described by our own and foreign officers who saw her afterwards at Kiau Chau as practically uninjured in any vital part, with her guns intact, and after repairing smokestacks able to make 16 knots. It is said that Admiral Togo signalled twice to his fleet to fire more slowly and carefully; also that, at the end, because of the evident ineffectiveness of his fire and the approaching exhaustion of his ammunition and other circumstances best known to himself, he was on the point of signalling to retire on Sasebo when the Russians were observed to be heading off for Port Arthur.
It may be contended that the admiral forms a part of the personnel of a fleet, and that as he fails so does the personnel fail; and this is very true, taken literally—the admiral is indeed much the most important part of the personnel. But if the rest of the personnel of a fleet inflicts more damage than it receives, the failure of an admiral to reap the advantage of the circumstances cannot logically outweigh the fact in a study of relative efficiency as indicated by material results. On August I 0 the personality of the man who succeeded to the command of the Russian fleet, or possibly his lack of means to convey his intentions to the other ships, annulled at the critical moment the value of the superior situation of his command; there was every reason to think that in the coming contest no such factor would be present to influence the result, but that what advantages might lie with the Baltic fleet would be ably and gallantly utilized to overcome the undoubted disadvantages under which it would operate.
There is no doubt that any fleet leaving the home dockyards on first commissioning (as was the case with most of the Russian Ships) and proceeding directly to meet the enemy, suffers a disadvantage more and more accentuated as the refinement of weapons and methods increases. With naval warfare in its present state of development, a disparity in training and what may be termed local practice and experience, that is to say, practice in and with the individual ships that are to enter the fight, is of more acute vitalness than heretofore; and with this farther difference, a few months passed at sea will not now diminish the inequality of efficiency to the same extent as in the Nelsonian days. A certain length of time on soundings and at anchor is now as necessary as shaking down at sea. With ordnance material so advanced and yet so backward that velocities of 3000 f. s. are obtained but the finest range-finders are impotent and useless when confronted with the vagaries of smokeless powder; with torpedoes effective at 3000 yards, and soon more; when keeping the sea is accomplished only at the cost of passing weary hours and days in coaling ship, at the expense of drills and target practice; when practice at targets and in fire-control can be had only with the co-operation of an accompanying ammunition-ship and a shelter to make it possible to transship the ammunition; in short, with the many varying and conflicting conditions and requirements of a 20th century fighting fleet, not only is the mere steaming 14,000 miles away from home inadequate to produce even fair efficiency, but such undiversified confinement and labor tells upon the physique, especially of new men. The fact that before entering the China Sea the major part of Admiral Rojestvenski's fleet had steamed nearly that distance, and the whole of it over 10,000 miles, without facilities for repairs beyond its own resources, the last 4000 miles having been continuous and at a speed evidencing no material stop,—this spoke well for it and discredited the fanciful reports of the inefficiency of its engineering personnel, while the bringing of so large and motley a collection of vessels such a distance without mishap also showed Rojestvenski to be at least a good organizer and a fine seaman. But it was only the stay in Madagascan waters that gave to officers and men any opportunity to become familiar with their weapons and co-ordinate the various factors of sea fighting. Whether or not that practice, brief and carried on in smooth water, was adequate was a question. Yet the Port Arthur fleet had been essentially without recent sea practice, and the circumstances and actual work on August 10 gave good indication that the Russian guns were well handled.
And so the efficiency of the Russian personnel relatively to that of the Japanese could fairly be assumed as at least equal in the coming struggle. The remarkable improvement attained in the interval by the latter in the various directions requiring intelligent assimilation of the finest instruction and scientific methods could not be forecasted; nor were moral conditions to be anticipated in the Russian fleet, the true inwardness of which was possibly reflected in the unfortunate events occurring later in the Black Sea. With the information at hand at the time, there was reason to expect that the man behind the gun would at least not redress the disparity in ships.
Summing up all conditions and factors as understood at the time while realizing the several inherent weaknesses of the Russian situation, it does not appear that the hope of victory undoubtedly held in St. Petersburg was unreasonable. It would have to be bought at a terrible price undoubtedly; but the result would constitute a victory if only a sufficient force remained afloat to imperil the communications of the half million of men in Manchuria that had to be supplied with provisions and ammunition.
II.
A farther question, less easy to handle, is: With the circumstances and conditions as they actually were, could a different result have been achieved?
No other one factor in such a contest is of as overshadowing importance as the skill, nerve, and endurance of the admiral; but other things do play their important part. Was the commander-in-chief properly seconded? Was his materiel what it was thought to be? Was anything tangible effected, or affected, by luck?
A first natural question that arises is whether the Russian fleet, having arrived in the Indian Ocean, would not have done better by proceeding directly on its way without stopping, so as to arrive in the Sea of Japan while some of the Japanese ships were still possibly undergoing repairs; for the reinforcements brought by Admiral Nebogatoff were not worth the long wait, the protracted tension, and the increased assurance of the entire fleet of the enemy being ready. All criticism on this point, however, is silenced by Admiral Rojestvenski's statement that his intention was to stand right on, but many reasons, the principal of which were difficulties with the German colliers, compelled him to make long stops.
Having successfully accomplished the great work of bringing his huge command to the theater of war, the first and burning question for him to decide was as to which route he would take of the three which lead to Vladivostok. Critics are not lacking who have attributed the entire disaster to the selection which he made. Singularly enough, however, the number of those who have quoted that criticism as having been made and have then proceeded to demolish it, seems to be greatly in excess of the number of those who have actually thus condemned the course chosen.
It goes without saying that while his desire must have been to bring on a general engagement before prolonged exposure to torpedo attack, his one objective was Vladivostok. As already pointed out, one great advantage possessed by the Japanese fleet lay in its proximity to its dockyards and the isolation of the enemy. This situation would be greatly modified, if not wholly relieved, if the Russian fleet could make its one fortified base, or put itself between it and the Japanese fleet before being brought to action. For this reason and because the efficiency of a fleet which had steamed over 16,000 miles could certainly be greatly increased by a few weeks' stay in a dockyard, it was imperative for Togo to interpose and bring on an action at once, his own ships, fresh from the dry-docks and mechanics' hands, being in the pink of condition, although he would, no doubt, be glad to harass the enemy first by torpedo attack.
Such considerations may have suggested the propriety of standing out into the Pacific and endeavoring to make the Siberian coast through the Tsugaru or La Perouse straits, the distances from the China Sea being respectively about 750 and 1150 miles greater by those routes than by the direct course through the Korean Channel. One simple circumstance, however, rendered such a suggestion ill advised:—scouting, such as is now possible with wireless telegraphy, would infallibly keep the Japanese admiral cognizant of such a move, and, being on an interior line, he could proceed at economical speed, without unduly tiring his engine-room people, and always meet the enemy at the western entrance of either passage.
The course by La Perouse Strait greatly accentuated the coaling problem; for even after moving at the most economical speed and carrying heavy deck-loads, probably every ship would have had to coal before going into action in the Japan Sea. The eastern approaches to that strait, also, are somewhat intricate and difficult for a large fleet, especially in a season of fog, and present good opportunities for annoyance and attack. The one advantage which it might present was that of possibly diminishing the number of the enemy's smaller torpedo craft and even submarines which were presumably massed in the vicinity of Tsushima Island. That this possibility was considered by Admiral Rojestvenski is shown by the following passage in an order of the day issued on April 26: "The Japanese have many more torpedo-boat destroyers; they also have submarine boats and supplies of floating mines, in the laying of which they are experienced… Torpedo attacks must not find us asleep; no floating bodies and periscopes projecting from the water must be left unnoticed."
The Tsugaru Strait presented the difficulties of being long and not over broad, possibly mined in spite of the depth of water and strong currents which of themselves constituted a danger in fog; and the enemy's fleet waiting at the western entrance would be an ideal position for capping the advancing formation if in column or doubling upon a flank if in line.
All considerations were in favor of the Tsushima Strait. Even if the decision to take it was due to imperial orders to make Vladivostok at once; or even if, as has been suggested, it was necessary for its effect upon the morale of the crews, or due to the admiral's own temperament which incessantly spurred him to active work, or to a great mental tension naturally caused by the protracted anxiety and which forbade deferring the supreme ordeal; whatever the reason, it does not seem that any other course than the one followed would have increased the chances of slipping through. And it appears that Admiral Togo studied out what appeared to him to be the best thing for his adversary to do, and paid that adversary the compliment of assuming that he would do just that thing.
The writer's opinion was that the impending battle would take place in the northern part of the Korea Channel, just beyond Tsushima, with the farther expectation that the restricted waters of the strait would be the scene of desperate torpedo attacks in the hope of possibly weakening the invader before the battleship squadrons should meet. This latter expectation was not realized, but there seems little doubt that such action was contemplated by Admiral Togo and only frustrated by various adverse conditions and play of events. As it turned out, it was all for the best for him that the flotillas were intact to supplement the magnificent work of the battleships, which they did with a dash and daring and success unsurpassed. But it did not seem probable that he would forego the great chance of making the fight more even in ships, and very likely this consideration is what determined Rojestvenski to so regulate his departure from Woosung and The Saddles as to reach the critical zone in the middle of the day so as to have daylight for passing through the area where torpedo craft might well be expected to await him.
Admiral Togo did not have to pin his faith exclusively upon his diagnosis of the Russian commander's decision. With hardy and devoted scouts forming wireless chains, he could reasonably expect that such a vast assemblage of ships could not long conceal their movements. At the same time, aided by a power for secrecy unmatched in the days of telegraphing, with no one to betray him, and by the nature of the coasts easily screened from ships which might pass, he was master of a situation of his own creation and which he utilized with a skill which left absolutely nothing to be desired or even conceived.
One must think that the uncertainty as to the Japanese plans, so skillfully veiled, caused unending anxiety to Admiral Rojestvenski. But he evidently credited his enemy with sufficient acumen to hold the great advantage of fighting in waters adjacent to his repair ports, for he made no serious change in the disposition of his fleet from cruising to battle conditions until quite near the eventual theater of battle.
The Russian fleet could not employ scouts to much advantage, although they had some very good ones. Once at sea they could not collect information. But they knew that the enemy could. The recitation of how the Japanese scouts signalled by a simple code that the enemy was in a certain square, standing in a certain direction, at a certain speed, makes one ask in wonder if no attempt was made to prevent such communication. Not only is it a matter of course that intelligence will be conveyed by wireless telegraphy, from ship to ship if necessary, but the Russian wireless indicators showed a disturbance which could have but the one cause. It is easy and seems graceless to criticize after the event; but surely a leaf could have been taken from among the pages of recent naval history and at least the precision of such information marred. The stratagem of overhauling a Norwegian steamer and casually telling him that they would soon be heard from in the Korean Strait was admirable, especially when followed up by purposely slowing down while in the Pacific in order that the possible impression might be confirmed that the remark was an artifice and that the fleet was really bound to one of the northern passages. But when the bulky convoy was heedlessly sent to Woosung, thus proclaiming the approach of the fighting fleet, and when the wireless receivers indicated that spark messages were flying about in an unknown code showing that their presence, and probably their position, was being re ported, the mask could then have been thrown off and an attempt made to prevent the communication of detailed information. In the British naval maneuvers of 1902 the X cruisers issuing from Argostoli kept using their wireless apparatus incessantly, thereby blocking all signals made between the A ships and getting clear away. Also, it is related that at Port Arthur on August 10, when the Russian fleet commenced the tedious operation of getting out through the difficult channel, the big wireless station on shore began solemnly grinding out the Russian alphabet, paralyzing the weaker outfits of the Japanese pickets; the same source has it that the Bayan, wishing to send a message, signaled to the shore station to stop for a moment, which was done, and in that short reprieve the Japanese scouts in the offing were able to flash the intelligence that the enemy was coming out. Se non e vero, e ben trovato.
Be all that as it may, such tales are suggestive. If Rojestvenski, upon approaching the strait and noting the illegible disturbances recorded by the receivers, had kept his wireless incessantly at work, he would almost certainly have interfered and prevented the enemy's scouts from keeping their people posted as to his movements, especially as, for at least a part of the time, some of those scouts were actually beyond him and telegraphing over and through him. Togo probably expected him to take the western channel, between Tsushima and the Korean coast, until informed specifically that he was heading for the eastern. In his detailed report he says: "On the 27th at 5 a. m. the wireless telegraphy of the Shinano Marti sent me a report that the enemy's squadrons were sighted at the point 203 and that they appeared to be steering for the East channel. . . At 7 a. m. the Idsumi, the left wing scout ship of the inner patrol line, reported also that the Russian squadrons were sighted at 25 miles northwest of Ukushima, steaming toward the northeast... The detachments were fired upon by the enemy now and then, but continued to maintain touch until they arrived at the neighborhood of Oki-no-shima and telegraphed from time to time the state of the hostile fleet. The day was foggy and we could not see beyond five miles off, yet I was informed of the enemy and his movements tens of miles off, as if I were actually looking at him, and before I saw him I knew that his fleet consisted of all the forces of the 2d and 3d squadrons, that he was accompanied by about seven special service ships, that his formation was in double column and his special service vessels following at the rear; that he was steaming at about 12 knots; that his course was toward the northeast. Thus I was enabled to decide that I would receive him at about 2 p. m. in the neighborhood of Oki-no-shima, and that I would first attack and destroy the head of his port column."
While this precise situation, of course, could not be known to the Russians, it stands to reason that any interference with the enemy's exchange of intelligence might very possibly work important confusion or misapprehension. In this particular case the Japanese admiral had all the intelligence he needed to plan the exact place and time and order of attack. And most of it could have been prevented. Any uncertainty, particularly as to which channel was being taken, would at least have postponed the battle for some 50 or 100 miles farther northward, and this would have been a very good thing for Rojestvenski; the Japanese squadrons would not have been able to open the battle with such chessboard-like precision, but would have been hurried and in the broadened theater would have effected junction with less perfect concert of action and with crews less fresh; the meeting would have taken place at night, and with the Japanese coming up on the quarter or astern; the Japanese torpedo boats would have had more steaming in rough water and the ships' secondary batteries would have been intact for their first assaults. Quite a different aspect could have been given to the beginning of the fight, and possibly its development and finale somewhat modified.
Allusion has been made above to Rojestvenski so regulating his movements as to reach the critical zone after having had daylight to approach it, presumably in recognition of the probability of meeting torpedo boats at the entrance to the strait. This has been the subject of comment and adverse criticism. It has been urged that he should have left Woosung at such time as to enter the strait at daylight; that being generally the time of maximum fog, he could hardly have been attacked there by the enemy's whole fleet, and he would also have been able to gain the open sea beyond before nightfall with improved prospect of avoiding the torpedo flotillas. As farther argued also, if the Japanese scouts had had to signal at near midnight to Togo the presence of the Russian fleet, he would have had difficulty in making as good haste as in the morning; and what with the fog and the greater difficulty of finding the enemy off and northward of Ikishima, the latter would have succeeded in passing beyond the dangerous zone, which would have been a great material and moral success. There may be something in that; but it hangs rather heavily upon the supposition that Rojestvenski knew just where Togo was—which is not only impossible but absolutely known not to have been the case. For validity these criticisms argue good aftersight rather than the more difficult foresight. Had the fleet traversed the immediate approach to the strait at night and lost a couple of ships by torpedoes, the unfortunate admiral would have been unmercifully condemned for such reckless disregard of what was a very probable part of the enemy's plan of battle. Placing ourselves in the position as it existed, with no knowledge of the enemy's position or plan, there does not appear valid cause for criticism; and looking at it even with the advantages of a retrospective view it is far from certain that entering the strait at an earlier hour would have made any material difference. This phase of the operations was one in which the value of speed was appreciable, but there was nothing that Rojestvenski could do to increase the speed of his fleet except possibly detach the slower units and accept battle with a smaller number of faster ships.
Whether or not there should have been a sifting out of the slower Russian vessels is a question regarding which there must be some divergence of opinion, the indisputable fact being that, as it was, the speed of the fastest had to be reduced about three knots to that of the slowest. On the other hand, the first serious drop in speed was from the 18-knots or more of the five best battleships and one armored cruiser to the 16 knots of the next five, and then came the remaining three vessels of about 15 knots. To content himself with the first six ships, depriving himself of the battery of the i6-knot group of armored vessels would have been to assume a serious and very dubious responsibility; while the gain in squadron speed which would have been effected by dropping only the Donskoi, Monomach, and Aproxine would have been only about one knot. Had the first group been detached and taken to the front immediately after leaving Woosung, there is no doubt that the critical zone of the strait would have been passed both earlier and more quickly, and it is far from certain that the enemy would have been encountered at all. But that could not well have been foreseen. At all events there were other general considerations, and as the particular trend of events could not be anticipated, it seems questionable whether the gain of three knots speed would have compensated for the loss of ten 12-inch, three 10-inch, twelve 9-inch, and forty-five 6-inch guns, or the gain of one knot for the loss of three 10-inch and fifteen 6-inch. The other general considerations were that in case of defeat any ships left behind would be lost practically without firing a shot; and in case of partial victory, it was important that all the fighting fleet should be in the most advanced position for making Vladivostok. Per contra, in the event of the main fleet forcing the passage, with the undoubted loss of some ships but after seriously crippling the enemy, the three ships of the 15-knot group, if left behind, would have been in condition to convoy the auxiliaries and get most if not all of them to Vladivostok; whereas without such convoy there would still have been small chance for them among the enemy's smaller and auxiliary cruisers.
The writer has hazarded to himself the opinion that there should have been some separation of the sheep from the goats, if only to the extent of leaving at The Saddles the seven or eight special service vessels that followed in the wake of the formation. Whether they were colliers, tank ships, provision ships, repair ships, or what not, with only a thousand miles to steam from Woosung to Vladivostok, they were an unneeded incumbrance, added to the visibility of the armada but contributed nothing to its fighting value, and under the circumstances were only "food for powder."
Reviewing up to this point, the moment of tactical contact, the entire drama has continued to unfold itself with a logicalness unmarred by a single positive misstep on either side—barring the failure of the Russians to interfere with the Japanese wireless messages. Admiral Togo's selection of Sylvia Basin on the Korean coast for his hiding place was perfect; the fleet while at anchor there was completely hidden from passing vessels by Koje Island; all wires and other means of communication were in his hands; he was closer to his wireless scouts and at least no farther from any possible course of the enemy than he would have been in any suitable bay on the coast of Japan, and less exposed to prying eyes than even in that land of patriotic single-mindedness and devotion. His object was to keep Rojestvenski absolutely in the dark as to his whereabouts, and in this he succeeded in a way that would have been almost impossible under less exceptional circumstances.
Disregarding the cruisers and the special service vessels as foreign to the tactical formation, the Russian fleet advanced through the strait with seven battleships and one weakly gunned armored cruiser in two columns, and another division apparently close astern of the port column. Considering only the battleship squadron, the formation was technically double-column; that is to say, the interval between the columns was such that they could go to single column or to line without confusion or change of speed. To be exact, this was only surely the case in the event of gaining sea to starboard; if exigency had demanded heading off to port in single column, very possibly some confusion would have been caused by the starboard column trying to come in between the leading division of the port column and the rest. This is not quite clear at present writing. But a formation in two columns was undoubtedly the best in which to advance. No one would think for a moment of cruising or advancing in line, especially with fogs to be expected and the probability of the enemy appearing suddenly off either flank; single column would have strung out the armada to an unhandy degree, particularly for signalling; and double column, as compared with single column, has the advantages of diminishing by a half the danger in being capped, and of requiring just one-half the time to get into line or into single column heading off at right angles.
Whatever may be the formation, one must of course stand by to change it promptly if the first sight of the enemy indicates the necessity, especially as after firing has begun no reliance can be placed upon either visual, electric, or sound signals; signal flags, halliards, semaphores, aerials, sirens, whistles are all apt to be shot away. It was related of the battle of the Yalu that the two Chinese battleships, after the first cumbrous wheel, stood serenely on side by side through the remaining phases of the battle, quite ignoring either their own consorts or the enemy's vessels which passed ahead, on both sides, and astern of them, simply because they had no means left of communicating. On May 27, 1905, when the Japanese fleet hove in sight, in column, and changed course to cross the bows of the Russian double column, there was plenty of time to grasp the situation and defeat the move by promptly forming single column, the leader regulating course to parallel the Japanese column or to threaten to cap it. All accounts and diagrams indicate that the Russians "were forced off to the eastward" or "sheered off a little;" Admiral Togo says in his report: "The head of the enemy's columns being pressed by our battleship squadron changed course somewhat to the right and at 2.08 the enemy opened fire. We held ours and when we approached to a distance of 6000 meters we concentrated a heavy fire upon the two leading ships of the enemy. Thus the enemy seemed to be pressed more and more to the southeast, and both the right and the left divisions veered their course gradually to the east, thus naturally changing into an irregular single column and steering parallel with us."
Here is the key to the whole catastrophe; there was apparently indecision or lack of purpose at a moment when it was still possible to signal and when the only simple thing to be done was to get into column at once, heading off to bring the broadsides to bear. The Russians opened fire at 900o to 10,000 meters; the Japanese held theirs until the range was reduced to about 6000; during much less than that interval every Russian ship of the battleship squadron would have come up to and turned into the new column, with her full broadside bearing. But, as it was, there was only a half-hearted easing away, and the three leading vessels of the double column were crushed before any adequate reply could be made either from them or their consorts. As related by Commander Akiyama: "Now the two Russian ships Sievaroff and Osliabya were fired at by over ten of our ships. It is very natural that the most stubborn enemy should be defeated. . . . Now the enemy, not being able to stand our attack, changed his formation into an irregular single column. . . . But it was too late. . . . "
This is inexplicable, except possibly upon the hypothesis that the desire and intent to make Vladivostok had become so paramount that the one aim was simply not to be forced off the course. This theory, and this alone, can also explain the subsequent conduct of the battle on the Russian side and indicates the cardinal error which made victory impossible. The, Japanese column continued to draw ahead and by 3 o'clock was beginning to cross the head of the Russian formation, heading about SE., when the latter starboarded in succession and stood off to the northward, apparently intending to pass astern and escape to the north. This move was easily met by the Japanese going about, and the same process was repeated of pressing the head of the enemy and threatening to cap it until they again went about, which was met in the same way; the rest was a debacle.
With both flagships disabled, in flames, and out of the formation, and with fog and the smoke of the burning ships and from the funnels obscuring the field, it is conceivable that the remaining leader may not have had the facilities and familiarity necessary to make the battle signals, even if the means still existed; therefore, turning the head of the column from southeast to the northward, the other ships following in succession, may have been the only way to execute the movement, although it lost time and accentuated the badness of their position by bringing each ship in succession still more absolutely under concentrated fire; this was alleviated to a considerable extent by the diminution of fire in the fog and smoke, which may also have made them hope to begin if not complete the maneuver unobserved. But why was such a maneuver attempted at all? It was not in any way a matter of speed. By keeping the enemy's leader about abeam, danger of being capped would have been entirely averted, and that would have been easy enough to do, being on the inner circle, even if the difference of speed were much more than the three knots which is understood to have existed—the Japanese fifteen and the Russians' twelve. The ships of the inner circle would also have remained quite safe from any dangers of navigation, however near the wanderings might take them to either shore. By this maneuver the two fleets would have described circles, or possibly spirals from the continued endeavor of the outer one to head off the other; in course of time the paths might come together, but before that there would have been no ships left on one or the other side.
The fatal idea of getting to Vladivostok at all costs must have become a veritable obsession. In all undertakings, however humble, it is well to direct the best endeavors toward the accomplishment of one object at a time; the doctors tell us, and with truth, that one should not even read the morning paper while eating breakfast, but devote every unconscious effort of the human economy to perfect starting of the digestion. Passing from the relatively ridiculous to the sublime, what a different account might have been rendered if the Russians had dropped all thought of Vladivostok and devoted themselves with a single mind to trying to defeat the enemy! If they had started that first squadron of 18-knot ships ahead at full speed in single column immediately upon sighting the enemy, they would probably have kept abreast of him and would not have been subjected to the threat of being capped and to the temptation of trying to head off for their goal; it would then have been simply a give-and-take gun fight, in which they would probably have been worsted, as their gun work was not nearly as good as the enemy's, but they would not have started in "in chancery" and would probably at least have put some of the Japanese out of commission. Some such eventual action must have been under consideration by Admiral Rojestvenski, else why did he put the 18-knot Nakhimoff, with her contemptible battery of eight 6-inch, up in that first battleship squadron, making a homogeneous unit only so far as speed was concerned? The rest of the fleet, being left to their own devices, would have then been free to meet the Dewa and Uriu divisions, which, as it was, harassed them from both quarters in their situation of having to follow their leader, threw them in disorder, and ultimately destroyed them in detail. The position assigned to the Nakhimoff absolves the Russian commander from the oft-made reproach of mixing his units without regard to their tactical qualities; but when the time came, no advantage was sought to be drawn from that excellent disposition which made it possible.
There were other causes operating to the Russian defeat; and they were more than contributory. Some were of such importance that they alone might have decided the day with all other things equal; but had it not been for that fatal error of indecision committed in tactics, not only would the rout have been less overwhelming, but the Japanese might have been seriously maltreated and possibly have lost a ship or two.
First and foremost, the Russian gun practice appears to have been markedly inferior. Commander Akiyama, of Admiral Togo's staff, asserts that the Japanese scored about 40 per cent of hits to about 10 per cent made by the Russians. Forty per cent of hits under battle conditions, at varying ranges between 4000 and 6000 yards, would be phenomenal shooting, and the statement may better be taken with a grain of salt. However, the relative showing is what counts, and it seems possible that the proportions may have been nearly four to one. On August 10, 1904, it seems to have been conceded that the Japanese fired two or three shots to the Russians' one, but the hits were very evidently not in nearly the same proportion. During the interval there had evidently been wrought a great change in their expertness in all matters contributing to efficacy of fire. Madagascan waters undoubtedly afforded the Russians good opportunity for target practice, but it appears that it was held only three times there and not at all in Kamranh Bay; so it may be assumed that the Russian gun-pointers were only fairly expert and that they may have been somewhat disconcerted on the day of the battle by the swell which kept even the big ships rolling a little, and that the problem of fire control had not been seriously touched. It is true, as stated by Commander Akiyama in his article, that "this skill in gunnery was attained by the practice of long years; it is not an outcome of days and months;" but such an immense discrepancy in results, as compared with the doings nine months before, points to the acquirement of very much more far-reaching skill and expertness than mere gun-laying, important as that is.
The painting of the ships may have had some little effect upon the shooting, the pearly gray of the Japanese making them blend with the mist in a way very unfavorable to the enemy's gun-pointers. The black of the Russian hulls, on the other hand, made a most favorable target under those particular meteorological conditions. It is probable that what Admiral Rojestvenski had most concern about was torpedo attack at night, and for that reason he had had his ships painted black. It is difficult, however, to understand the object of the white funnels, which would be visible when black would not be, especially in the search-light beams at night, while the black hulls would be visible under conditions rendering the white invisible.
It appears also that many of the Russian shell failed to burst. One entered the Mikath, struck, and glanced downward, landing on the engine room floor intact; others passed through decks and bulwarks overboard, doing no damage. On the other hand, all the Japanese shell apparently did their whole duty.
We have all heard the painful reports affecting the good name of some of the Russian ships' companies. Such reports may have been exaggerated or they may have fallen short of the truth; let us hope the former. However true they may have been, it seems impossible that during the fight the scenes of destruction should not have incited even the disaffected to most strenuous endeavor merely in self-defense. But irreparable harm was done before the engagement; in the crucial moment of battle, under duress, reparation could not be made of the inefficiency engendered by previous apathy or open insubordination. The unfortunate situation indicated by the tales must have had a notable effect upon the relative efficiencies of the "man behind the gun" of the two fleets and a marked bearing upon the result. For this reason reference has to be made to what would otherwise seem extraneous and needless criticism. The many kindling stories told of single-hearted devotion and self-sacrificing heroism should be soothing to the pride of those who have suffered from the alienation of certain component parts of that vast assemblage of peoples.
Such are the causes of the Russian defeat: skilful handling of the Japanese fleet throughout; a terrible initial error of hesitation on the part of the Russian commander which virtually decided the fate of the day within an hour, but which was also followed by similarly vicious tactics along the same lines; marked superiority of the Japanese fire-control and shooting; inferiority of the Russian ordnance material as shown by the slowness of their fire and the failure of their shell to burst; reduced efficiency of the Russian personnel in consequence of moral conditions. The overwhelming completeness of the disaster was due further to the inferior speed of the Russian ships in their attempts to escape, and to the superb work of the Japanese torpedo boats.
As for luck,—by this is not meant guignon, not "that which happens by chance conceived as having a real tendency to be favorable or unfavorable;" what is meant is the supervening of a succession of natural causes which fortuitously operate to the advantage of one side or the other. There is something to be said here. Note this succession of natural causes: the fog, which would have helped Rojestvenski by concealing his movements in the Tsushima Strait, lifted toward 7 a. m.; the strong wind and heavy sea which prevailed during the first day's fight was naturally of greater disadvantage to the fleet less skilled in gunnery; toward sundown, when the ship-to-ship fighting ceased, the Wind went down and the night remained clear, assisting the torpedo boats to complete the work of destruction inaugurated by the guns; finally, on the morning of the 28th, the fog, which had again settled, lifting quickly, favored the search, pursuit, and capture of the remnants. All these conditions, if reversed, would not have reversed nor perhaps even seriously modified the general result; but it did seem as if the very elements had conspired to consummate a tragedy unparalleled in modern history. It is conceivable that under different meteorological conditions some of the ships might have reached Vladivostok.
Reviewing the principal scenes and incidents of this great battle, weighing the actual conditions as they finally proved to exist, we are forced to these conclusions: Victory was impossible for the Russians, principally because of the inferiority of their gun-fire; overwhelming disaster could have been avoided by better handling of the fleet. The result could have been different to the extent of the Russians emerging from defeat with enough ships to constitute a fleet in being, and of the Japanese emerging from victory with the loss of some of theirs.
III.
One cannot ponder a battle such as that in the Japan Sea without the instinctive thought that at last some lessons have been told which will modify or confirm the reasonings which have gradually led to the evolution of naval war material in its present shape and to our understanding of the best means of employing it. Such is indeed the case, and the developments, while not startling, have generally tended to confirm these reasonings; and this is something of a compliment to the sagacity of naval thought.
In the summary of the causes of the defeat, given on a preceding page, the great preponderance bears upon the personnel. Every support is given to the universally quoted fact that the best man will win the day even against material odds. It only remains to point out how far-reaching is shown to be the real definition of that "man behind the gun;" he comprises the admiral, the captain, the range officer, the division officer, and the engineer officer, as well as the gun-pointer, ammunition handler, and fireman.
TORPEDO BOATS.
Among the most important deductions from the battle is that usually clothed in the expression, "The torpedo has rehabilitated itself." The honor has fallen to the Japanese flotillas of demonstrating that even in daylight can the torpedo boat go into action and achieve success. Greater daring and dash has never been shown than by the crews of those little vessels, their attacks being marvels of fury, resolution, and skill. But we must be careful not to let our admiration for the players carry us too far in lauding the play; we must take account of the stage-setting. There appears to be no doubt that the battleships Suvaroff, Sissoi Veliki, and Navarin, and the armored cruisers Nakhimoff, Monomach, and Dmitri Donskoi were torpedoed with effects more or less instantaneous. There is some dispute as to the Borodino; she caught fire about 6.40 p. m., and at 7.23 blew up and sank (as stated in Admiral Togo's report) supposedly from the fire reaching her magazine; a Japanese officer states that she was attacked by two flotillas and was finally sunk by two torpedoes, but it is possible that it was the Suvaroff that that officer saw.
Without the slightest disparagement of the valor of the men who attacked or of the terrible effects of a torpedo hit, it would be very misleading to disregard the circumstance that no attack was made until after the battle had raged for some time, three of the battleships having been completely crushed and all very much reduced in resisting power. Admiral Togo states in his report: "Our flotillas approached to such short distances that the Russians could not train their guns to bear upon them." If this be literally true, it could only refer to the main batteries, showing that everything not behind heavy armor had been swept away. All were struck under conditions which must still be considered as absolutely essential to success. This matter is so important that it will be better to describe each case separately.
The Suvaroff, receiving at once the concentrated fire of a large Part of the Japanese fleet, burst into flames and fell out of line about 3 p. m., disabled. While enveloped in flame and smoke she was attacked unsuccessfully by two destroyer flotillas. At 3.45 she was attacked again by torpedo craft; and again at 4.45, this time effectively, being hit on the port side aft, which resulted in giving her a list of ten degrees. Unable then to use any gun except one small R. F. at the stern, she was again attacked by a destroyer flotilla, hit by two torpedoes, and sunk at about 7 p. m.
It is related that in one case, supposed to be the Suvaroff, after the destroyers advanced to the attack some of the Japanese ships kept up their fire, when the destroyers signalled, "We will finish her," using the words todome wo sasu, which signify the dagger thrust in the throat of a defeated adversary, most significant to a Samurai and indicating clearly that the torpedoes merely delivered the coup de grace.
The Sissoi Veliki, with her battery largely if not wholly disabled by gun-fire during the two engagements of the 27th, was subjected to continuous torpedo attack from 8 p. m. until about 11 p.m., and some of these were apparently successful, for when sighted by the Japanese the next morning about 30 miles north of Tsushima she was in a sinking condition and finally sank at about 11 a. m. Her captain, however, states positively that although she was torpedoed once her sinking was caused by gunfire and not by torpedoes.
The Navarin, with her battery crippled by the day's fighting of the 27th, was attacked during the night by a destroyer flotilla and sunk by four torpedoes at 2 a. m.
The Nakhimoff and the Mon ontach, disabled by gun fire during the two engagements of the 27th, were attacked continuously by torpedo craft from 8 p. m. to about 11 p. m., and sank at about m a. m. of the 28th near Tsushima.
The Donskoi, seriously damaged on the 27th, escaped during the night, but was sighted, chased, and attacked by the Uriu division and two destroyer flotillas and two cruisers; was torpedoed, but escaped in the darkness; kept afloat by pumping until near Matsushima early in the morning of the 29th, when pumping was stopped and valves opened, and she sank.
Apart from the crippled condition of the Russian ships, the circumstances of this battle were furthermore exceptionally favorable to the employment of torpedo boats by the Japanese in the proximity of the scene of operations to home ports, where they lay while the rough weather lasted and from whence they were called to action as the sun and wind went down. Rarely will conditions lend themselves with such notable liberality to the use of a weapon of restricted field.
It is evident from all this that while the torpedo boat is entitled to at least all the honors which it has held with greater or less continuity, it is not in a position to assail the supremacy of the battleship. Naval professional opinion has all along been fairly unanimous on this subject, and no reason for any material change has been furnished. The absolute confirmation of the theories held must certainly produce some effect upon that small group who have remained enamored of the idea of producing large results with small means. Nothing can be more completely proven than the restriction of the torpedo boat to the role of a supplementary weapon.
There may be some truth in a suggestion that in this individual event the result would not have been materially different if there had been no torpedo boats present. Admiral Togo hurried toward Vladivostok and would have unfailingly intercepted any Russian ships which, escaping destruction by the torpedo boats, might have reached the vicinity of that port; and it seems hardly possible that any that actually were sunk could have otherwise reached neutral ports and been interned. But the simple and great fact remains that a number of powerful and important fighting units can be and actually were destroyed by torpedo attack after their powers of resistance had been destroyed by the gun. And this, in turn, points to the necessity of destroyers for the defense of the big ships after the main battle. Apart from the evident helplessness of those that were successfully torpedoed, the photographs showing the tangled maze of wreckage and debris in all parts of the Orel not armor-protected are an eloquent exposition of the torpedo boat's opportunity.
It may, therefore, be emphatically stated that no naval force can be considered complete or in the plenitude of its powers without a large number of both destroyers and torpedo boats. Admiral Togo's fleet is said to have had over sixty of them in action; and he says that, "Our flotillas attacked the Russian ships so thickly that the Russians had no time to give them proper reception." Here is a lesson in tactics, and in programmes, too.
Positive endorsement of the torpedo was, of course, restricted to its employment in torpedo craft, as none were discharged from any ship of the battle line. Any deduction regarding torpedo tubes in battleships is, therefore, only inferential and therefore perhaps less convincing. Every battle, however, cannot illustrate every known method of attack; and not only is it well to look at actual occurrences through smoked glasses so as not to be dazzled and led to exaggerated conclusions, but reasonings of simple logic should be applied to incidents not actively illustrative. In the Donnybrook Fair engagement off Lissa in 1866, before the day of the automobile torpedo, the keynote of Admiral Tegethoff's plan of action was to "charge at everything grey," and as a result, after three unsuccessful attempts, he succeeded in ramming and sinking the Re d'Italia, which had suddenly and opportunely emerged from the smoke right under his bows; as a consequence the ram then took a great and illogical spurt which has never been justified. The extreme ranges used in the battle of August 10, 1904, off Port Arthur, gave prominence and favorable endorsement to the rising idea of homogeneous batteries of one heavy caliber, based upon the diminished precision of fire from medium calibers at long range; and it also tended to cause a revulsion of sentiment in regard to torpedo tubes in battleships, the demand for which had been increasing. Now comes the battle of the Japan Sea, fought at ranges at which the 8-inch gun proved itself to be admirably efficient, and which also came perilously near efficient torpedo range. It certainly cannot be foretold that the next battle will be fought at under or over 4000 or 5000 or 6000 yards; and in the uncertainty it would not be a wise measure to cease installing the underwater tube which deters the enemy from seeking close quarters under circumstances favorable to him, and furnishes one's self with a safe and powerful weapon of offense if circumstances should permit its use. A range of 4000 yards at 26 knots or more will surely often make circumstances favorable.
No word has been heard from the submarine. It .is understood that those that had been shipped across the Pacific some six months before were not yet in condition for service. Aside from that, however, the place and circumstances of the battle were quite prohibitive for craft of the size and type that were on hand. And so the submarine's baptism of fire is reserved for a future occasion,—which, let us hope, will be a long time in coming. In the meantime, with all its growing achievements, it would not be safe to ignore that coming additional auxiliary.
THE RAM.
In regard to the ram, that short-range weapon may certainly be said to have received its quietus. The development of the fish torpedo and of smokeless powder has long indicated the end of its possible utility. In the battle of the Japan Sea the opposing ships did not come even within torpedo range of each other; and beyond that, it is pertinent to note that throughout the entire war the only instances of the use of the ram have been in collisions with vessels of the same fleet: the Y oshino being sunk by the Kasuga, and the Oshinia by a sister-ship. There seems to be no reason for continuing the practice of building ships with a protruding spur which is only a menace to friends who are always in close quarters, while the enemy ships are always far away.
SPEED.
The battle developed nothing new concerning the influence of speed. The victory was won by the faster fleet, but that does not necessarily carry the conclusion that speed was a determining factor; as a matter of fact a close study fails to reveal any material advantage properly attributable to it from the moment that tactical contact was established until the Russian fleet was shattered and its remnants seeking refuge in flight. A very general Popular commentary, so uniformly voiced as to sound almost stereotyped, has been that "the Japanese fleet by its superior speed kept pressing the head of the Russian column, continually capping it," etc. But that does not appear to reach the heart of the matter. As remarked ante, all that is necessary to prevent being capped under those circumstances is to keep turning away, the leader not allowing the leader of the enemy's column to get materially forward of the beam. A simple calculation shows that with a distance of 4000 yards between columns, the outer having a speed of 15 knots and the inner 12 knots, if the inner keeps heading off and the outer keeps circling to retain the same distance and threaten to cross ahead, the diameter of the inner circle will be about 16 miles, under which conditions the inner fleet will certainly not be bunched to such an extent as to present an unduly favorable target.
It is not likely that one would have either the time or the inclination to use traverse tables and enter into computations after action had commenced; mental processes are less simple at such a time than when playing chess or studying the tactical game-board; but an instinctive and natural plan would be for the leader to keep the enemy's leader about abeam,—with as little swerving as possible, of course, to help out the gun-pointers; if the enemy were to reduce speed you would insensibly tend to cap him, but in any event he could not cap you. By no conceivably probable superiority in speed can one fleet cap another if the other keeps turning away on an inner circle; nor by any such action, intelligently carried out, would there be any danger of the inner fleet becoming massed to an undesirable degree. So the apparently prevalent argument that it was by their superior speed that the Japanese were able to press the heads of the Russian columns and cap them does not appear to be tenable.
Even in the matter of the Japanese closing the range,—that is one thing that superior speed can do while still maintaining broadside fire and presentment, by keeping the enemy bearing forward of the beam. But the frequent and attractive expression that one fleet can thus choose the fighting range does not represent a wholly safe assumption. The faster fleet can avoid action ab initio, and can always bring on close action; but, if the other resolutely opposes the choice, it cannot maintain a long range without continually frankly heading off, and that is attended by several grave considerations; take it all in all and considering that any preponderance in end-on fire is generally forward, no ship or fleet will be apt to place itself in the direct retreating position except to attain some important specific object. Returning to the case in point: a fleet with as many 12-inch guns as the Russians had, and no 8-inch, should be expected to prefer long range in action with a fleet carrying a number of 8-inch; yet it is more than probable that the Russians recognized that, with their limited gun practice, short range would suit their gun-pointers better; and, therefore, in the matter of the faster Japanese fleet apparently choosing the range, the closer range was undoubtedly not unfavorable to the other side and was not contested, and the greater speed was of no value in determining it.
Greater speed would, no doubt, have enabled several ships to escape in the final sauve qui peut; but that hardly seems a valid argument, because to provide security in case of defeat is a consideration very secondary to so proportioning and combining forces as to favor victory.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that if the Russians had had the better speed, and if the engagement had taken place a little farther on with more sea room, they could have gradually worked around the head of the other column and at least a portion of the fleet gone on its way rejoicing to Vladivostok. This was exemplified in the British naval maneuvers in 1903. Greater speed would also have taken the Russian fleet more quickly through the critical part of the Tsushima Strait, and possibly might have resulted in the action beginning under totally different circumstances and with the Japanese coming up on their port quarter instead of ahead, which would quite possibly have modified the final outcome, because in this situation and without the advantage of superior speed the Japanese might have failed to bring on a general or at least a decisive engagement. All of which would have gone to confirm the undeniable value of speed in the general conduct of a campaign and in attaining positions of strategical and even of tactical importance in individual operations. And this should not be lost sight of when noting the penury of evidence in the battle proper. Only, if in addition to the undoubted strategical value of speed, fallacious arguments be admitted assigning to it a great tactical importance as well, a false coloring would be lent to suggestions of higher speed at the expense of the guns and armor. When the hour has come and battle is joined, it is the guns that will decide the day, not the speed.
If by the application of turbine effort, or gas engines, or mechanical stokers, or liquid fuel, or other means, ships' speeds can be increased without increase of weight, that will be progress,—a positive advance from which all may profit, and, therefore, a relative advance for none; but any who fail to keep up will effect a very marked relative retrogression. Eternal vigilance is the price of preparedness, for there is no finality in shipbuilding.
What has been quite positively emphasized in connection with speed, in the Japan Sea, is the great importance of uniformity in this, as in all other features, in all the vessels of a fleet. Admiral Togo suffered from wasted engine power in his armored cruisers, with the attendant diminution of their gun power; while Admiral Rojestvenski's pace was set by a few comparatively slow ships whose deficiency in engine power was not retrieved by any important gain in battery because of their small size and limited carrying power. Two of the Russian battleships were sheathed and coppered, and, although that entailed no restriction of battery or armor, yet, by association with unsheathed vessels, they lost all of the advantage sought; and, as concentration in squadrons has now come to be a necessary policy and single-ship actions between battleships will hardly possibly occur, it follows that any such device advisable per se is of no material benefit if applied only to isolated ships. There is, indeed, no detail of homogeneity, however small, such even as standardized fittings, that does not carry increased efficiency in its train. When it comes to reaching the important conclusion as to speed and guns, the one decision should apply to all the units of a tactical group, otherwise individual superiorities will be wasted and combined efficiency positively impaired.
Closely related to the question of speed is that of steaming radius. If the Russian ships had had greater fuel endurance, there would have been less temptation to overload them with deck loads for a passage of no great length and with a battle almost surely anticipated. Per contra, the Japanese, being in their own waters with coaling facilities close at hand, were able to use some of their bunker room for an additional supply of ammunition, and with the lesson of August to fresh in mind they took that precaution. In spite of the development of improved methods of coaling at sea, capacious bunkers (or tanks) seem to still be important. And smokeless fuel is the best material to put in them.
DANGER FROM FIRE.
Three Russian battleships burst into flames during the action, and burned to an extent that destroyed them or put them out of action permanently until they sank or blew up. There is no telling in how many others minor fires were started; in the Orel, which was taken to Maidzuru, it was observed that a 12-inch shell had started a fire in a wardroom compartment which was gutted, and it is said that she was on fire three times. Admiral Rojestvenski has since stated that there was very little wood in his ships, but that the incessant explosion of shell made them seem veritable furnaces, the pumps being soon smashed and the very paint itself taking fire; he seemed indeed impressed with the great danger caused by the amount of paint which covers everything on shipboard. It seems possible that an accumulation of R. F. ammunition in the batteries may have done its share toward the terrible result; it is reported that this practice, which is common to many services, had previously led to fires in the Rossia and Gromoboi, the fixed ammunition being struck and ignited and the fires extending by means of linoleum, oilskins, decks, boats, and inflammable material. A further partial explanation may perhaps be found in a passage in Admiral Enquist's report to the effect that the "Suvaroff without masts or funnels . . . and covered with flames and black smoke, hauled out of line . . . ;" the loss of the funnels, added to the experience of the Tsarevitch on August Io, emphasizes the necessity of protecting the bases of the funnels up to the upper deck.
PROTECTION OF STABILITY.
At least one of the Russian ships (the Alexander III) certainly capsized before sinking, and probably others. Some contradiction exists in the treatment of this matter; in one and the same critique will appear a comment on the lack of stability of the Russian ships as shown by their heeling outwardly in turning, and a farther comment upon their heavy rolling which impaired the shooting and exposed the hulls below the water-line to a greater extent than in the steadier Japanese ships,—a manifest confusion of qualities and effects. All battleships heel in turning, but it is significant that in rehabilitating the captured Orel (now the Iwami) the Japanese are so shaping the alterations as to increase the metacentric height. Still, in the Alexander's normal condition there could not have been any very serious lack of stability; the question is, how was her normal stability impaired? There is food here for thought along several lines, one of which trenches upon a possible neglect on the part of the ships. The error possibly committed was that of going into action with coal on deck; a heavy deck load was found still in the Orel, although a good deal had been used from the bunkers, and it is understood that some if not most of the others had similarly taken a supply on deck before leaving The Saddles.
There has been no known instance during the entire war of the heavy armor having been pierced, except possibly by one shot in the Retvisan on August 10. Admiral Rojestvenski in a recent interview stated that his ships were not pierced, but that the repeated impacts and explosions of shell against the armor sprang the bolts and rivets and shook the plates from their backing so that water entered and caused the ships to list and finally sink. This is an interesting explanation. Battering attack has been less seriously considered since the development of modern high velocities and capped shell, although in the battle of the Yalu it was indicated that the cumulative effect of a number of non-penetrating hits was more disastrous than that of several perforations. But here is now an important concrete instance, under up-to-date conditions, which should not be disregarded. The armor of the Alexander III and class, above the 10-inch water-line belt, is only 6 inches thick, and here is where perforation was probable and where the smashing was apparently accomplished. It is true that this armor is above water, but as there was a considerable sea on, water in serious quantities could have entered there, and this, if confined to the side, would have destroyed the stability. With a deck-load of coal to bring her down in the water, the upper edge of the main belt was correspondingly nearer to if not actually below the surface; if it be that the weight of the deck-load had been gradually offset by the consumption of coal from the bunkers, then two powerful agents of instability were working in unison.
This dramatic incident puts in question the practice of fitting longitudinal wing bulkheads unless means be afforded of promptly relieving the burden possibly imposed on either side. In the Alexander III there was a 4-inch armored bulkhead about eight feet inboard, which virtually formed a downward extension of the protective deck; the wing passage thus formed was apparently unprotected at the top, and water entering near the waterline evidently found its way down there through open or disrupted hatches or scuttles. In the Suvaroff the same arrangement existed, and it will be remembered that, when torpedoed, she took a list of 10 degrees, which prevented using the battery. It was the same with the Borodino, which, according to some accounts, also turned turtle. On the other hand, a 14-inch bulkhead, some 15 feet inboard, was all that saved the Tsarevitch after being torpedoed on February 8, 1904; she listed about 18 degrees, but was righted by filling the corresponding wing compartments on the opposite side, which increased her draught aft about five feet, but left her able to navigate and enter port. It is quite patent that a heavy bulkhead affords protection to the vital interior of a ship; but it seems to be equally evident that capacious drains should connect corresponding wing compartments on opposite sides, fitted with valves which may be opened or shut at will. Valves are not like doors.
Apart from the care of the water when it once gets in, it seems that in order to keep it out the heavy armor should be carried well up, for battleships are not expected to fight in millponds; monitors are good enough for that. With the impending increase in heavy batteries at the expense of the intermediate, and with perforation shown to be not the only danger, the possible value of thin armor for keeping something out becomes greatly reduced, and the fate of the Alexander III seems to cry aloud in support of the plea to devote all the weight of thin broadside armor to carrying up the main belt as high as possible, undiminished in thickness.
SCOUTS.
The great importance of the work done by the Japanese scouts need hardly be commented upon. The only question that has ever arisen has been as to the means, and a new implement has sprung into the arena. "The battle of the Japan Sea was won by the wireless telegraph," is the reported exclamation of one enthusiast. And there is no denying that it did marvelous work. It was by means of it that the Japanese commander learned of the approach of the enemy and understood, while still miles away, his exact strength, position, formation, course, and speed, and could make his initial moves before sighting him or being sighted by him. It is worthy of note that the first intelligence of the enemy was flashed, not by an armored cruiser or even by a protected cruiser, but by a large merchant ship scout, the Shinano Maru. Torpedo craft had been used as picket boats off Port Arthur, being fitted with wireless and being thus also ready to oppose any night sortie; but a sound appreciation of the difference in conditions was shown in now keeping them for their legitimate work and not assigning them to duty as high-sea scouts. Apart from wearing out the crews, to attempt to combine the two types would indeed result in a hybrid of minimized value. Destroyers may possibly come to be larger than at present, for their own purposes; but information service is sui generis, with an importance all its own. Speed, and size to maintain it in a seaway, are the prime requisites, supplemented by powerful wireless apparatus and enough battery to prevent being driven off by torpedo craft.
Whether or not the wireless was employed as a means of signaling to the fleet during the action is not known at the present writing; it is most improbable. But we read farther in Admiral Togo's report of how Admiral Nebogatoff's squadron was intercepted and surrounded: "At 5.20 a. m. . . . I received a report from our cruiser squadron which was about 6o miles behind steaming to the north, that several columns of smoke were seen in the east. Soon after, the same squadron approached the enemy and reported again that the enemy consisted of four battleships (afterwards it was found that two of them were coastdefense ships) and two cruisers and were then heading northeast. It was certain that those ships were the principal remnant of the Russian fleet. Upon this the battleship and armored cruiser squadrons reversed their course and gradually steamed toward the east so as to appear at the head of the enemy . . . and at 10.30 a. m. we completely surrounded this enemy . . .Greater tributes to the success and value of this invention would be difficult to conceive. It now remains to accomplish selectivity, with all that the term implies.
Incidentally, it may be remarked, Admiral Nebogatoff at least, undoubtedly remains impressed by certain disadvantages attending the use of soft coal.
ONE-CALIBER BATTERIES.
"A prominent Japanese naval officer" is quoted as deducing from the battle the opinion that "in the armament of a battleship there should be not only 12-inch guns but also 10-inch and 8-inch, with an auxiliary equipment of 6-inch pieces." The same officer, however, in speaking of armored cruisers, is made to say that "There can be no doubt, however, of the inferiority of four 6-inch pieces to two 8-inch," which seems rather to invalidate a portion of the former remark. Vice-Admiral Saito also has expressed himself in favor of 6-inch guns. The Japanese fleet closed somewhat with the enemy in order, no doubt, to bring within effective range their numerous 8-inch guns, of which the Russians had none; and the fire of these was apparently most accurate and effective. But it is to be observed that in none of their ships was a 10-inch or a 12-inch associated with anything heavier than a 6-inch, with the single exception of the Kasuga, which carries one 10inch and two 8-inch. The same applies to the Russian ships with the exception of the Nicolai, which carried two 12-inch and four 9-inch. Eight-inch guns (properly installed and protected) are very formidable and excellent weapons; but, given the flatter trajectory and the greater natural accuracy of heavy guns; given the present uncertainty of combined fire due to the erratic performance of smokeless powder; given above all the indubitable fact that the Osliabya, Suvaroff, and Alexander III, which were so quickly put out of action, received their maltreatment at the hands of the leading ships of the enemy (battleships) and were, therefore, evidently crushed by 12-inch fire, we should be chary of accepting opinions from however high a source challenging the present tendency to restrict main batteries to one large caliber. More to the point is the opinion of the defeated Rojestvenski, who spoke wisely from the depths of his bitter experience: "Battleships carry a great many small guns of 1 1/2 to 2-inch caliber, which make a great deal of noise and do no earthly good; moreover, their crews, having no protection, are immediately killed. In future battleships should carry no guns smaller than 3-inch, and very few of those. The only role of these small guns is to repel torpedo-boat attack. The only guns for battle are the 12- and 10-inch pieces. Guns of this caliber alone have the power necessary for naval fighting; handled by cool and well-trained men these will be for many years the kings of naval battles." In France, M. Lockroy, former Minister of the Navy, reached the tersely expressed conclusion that "The ideal should be a single type of projectile, a single type of gun, a single type of ship;" which sentiment is echoed by M. Charles Bos in the recent report on the budget. England, not tarrying to talk, is already about to launch the Dreadnaught, carrying ten 12-inch.
BIG SHIPS.
Intimately connected with the tendency to accept as the ideal a single type of gun, is the present leaning toward bigger ships, for the reason that bigger ships are admissible only if they carry heavier batteries, and the only way in which batteries can be adequately increased is by unifying the calibers. The big ship proposition is without doubt the most interesting now to the fore; but in trying to draw light upon it from this battle, all that can be done is to weigh the pros and cons and try to determine how a change would have operated on that occasion.
For all service other than a fleet action, diffusion of power is needed, within certain limits, of course, which limits are a matter of judgment and not of mathematical calculation. But as participation in a fleet action is the one great function and raison d'etre of a battleship, the question should be studied solely from that point of view. Initial comparison will be best made by consideration of two fleets of equal combined tonnages but with different numbers of units having armaments in proportion to size. Questions of space and its adaptation operate so as to make the problem of increasing heavy gun armament proportionally with the displacement a complex one; for instance, while one gun becomes a large proportion of the whole, an odd number of guns, such as nine, is impossible without accepting at least one single-gun turret, and wasting upon it the choice middle-line position; or in a ten-gun ship there can be no gain in broadside fire over an eight-gun ship without resorting to single turrets, and it is very doubtful even then. It is, therefore, difficult to exemplify the case with ships and armaments as it may be found possible to develop them; but the principles involved will be quite well illustrated by supposing an engagement between six ships of 16,000 tons and four of 24,000. As the former can carry a battery of eight 12-inch guns, the latter may be allowed twelve. Then the opposing fleets will each carry 48 guns.
We are now immediately confronted with a salient and incontrovertible fact: with equal numbers of guns in the two fleets, the smaller ships will present the heavier combined broadside. The six cited in the comparison can fight on either side their entire battery, or 48 guns; while the other four can at the very most fight ten on either side, or 40 in all. As a partial offset the end-on fire of the larger ships may be heavier individually, though probably not so collectively.
The big ships will present better targets than the smaller ones. The total target area of the six smaller ships will, of course, be the greater, but the target for each shot is a single ship, and the proximity of another ahead or astern does not increase the chance of hitting. As far as hitting is concerned, the four present the better targets, each being longer, broader, and higher.
Fire control at battle ranges is naturally dependent upon observing the falls and correcting the range. There are consequent objections to directing the fire of any one ship at more than one target, because each target requires a separate fire control station and system, and fire control stations are limited, beside being apt to be knocked out. Therefore, the four big ships would possibly operate at a disadvantage if firing at more than four of the other fleet.
The loss or the disablement of one of the big ships by accident or injury to steering or motive power or otherwise would be in more serious proportion to the whole than that of one of the smaller ships. And furthermore, the injury inflicted on any one larger ship by a single shot would never be less and would often be greater in effect upon the total force engaged than the same injury to one of the smaller ships, e. g., the death of the captain, damage to a boiler uptake, jamming of the steering gear, etc.
The six ships will form a longer column than the four, and, with the centers abreast, they would overlap at both ends; but this overlap will be modified by the fact that 24,000-ton ships will almost certainly maneuver at greater distance than 16,000-ton ships. Should the latter maneuver at 400 yards and the former at 500, there would be an overlap at each end of 250 yards, which is immaterial at fighting ranges. The advantage of any concentration effected in big ships will be felt when opportunity offers to emphasize tactical concentration; when the squadron of four is abreast of or projecting beyond the van or rear of the other, all of the four may be able to concentrate their tremendous fire on a few of the others, while some of the long column of six will be out of effective range; in the extreme case of capping this advantage will be still further greatly emphasized. And this is the situation which was presented in the battle of the Japan Sea. If the Japanese ships had been larger, with batteries in proportion, they would have had increased advantage in capping the Russian column. If, on the other hand, the Russians had had heavier ships with batteries in proportion, they would have been able to reply more vigorously from the heads of their columns. Concentration, within practical limits, will undoubtedly be of advantage in fleet actions; that is to say, concentration of guns; the ship is of no importance except as the gun-carrier.
The opportunities for speed in the larger ship are greater, because with the greater length a fixed ratio of engine weight to displacement will result in a continued increase of speed as the displacement increases. Also, any difference in fuel endurance will be in favor of the larger ship, because with the greater length and the increased maximum speed, the most economical steaming will be at a higher rate of speed; the fleet harbor consumption may also be less in the smaller number of larger ships. Furthermore, the weight of hull for the same strength is relatively less in the larger ship, leaving a margin for additional power or fuel.
Other minor considerations are: The bigger ship will be the steadier platform, and it will have the advantage of single direction of the greater proportional amount of offensive power; also the larger ships will occupy less sea and the group will be under better control, especially in smoke or fog. Decrease in the personnel and in the cost of both construction and maintenance will also favor the smaller number of bigger ships. Handiness, once of great importance when single-ship actions at close range were possible, is no longer a considerable feature and can not be cited in favor of the smaller ship.
The comparison stated between the two types appear to result favorably to the smaller ship, because the restriction of total broadside fire seems to check the possibilities of increased concentration. Evidently it is not a cut-and-dried proposition. There are considerations, however, which may not appear in an academic discussion of features with inflexible percentages of weight and equalization of total tonnages, but which nevertheless do enter into the actual problem. Considering the matter in its general aspect, serious increase of total battery power being rendered possible by unifying the calibers, the field open to the naval architect is to increase the available fire in proportion to the size and importance of the ship. It so happens that with two-gun turrets the relation of a normal size of ship to the size of gun now universally adopted is such that an increase in displacement may not be attended by a proportional increase in the number of broadside guns, if the percentage of weight devoted to armament remain the same. But there are various ways of effecting concentration of gun power: for instance, eight 13-inch guns are more formidable than eight 12-inch similarly disposed; or, with three guns in a single-deck or double-deck turret, the strength of broadside fire may be made a larger percentage of the whole; or other expedients may suggest themselves.
If, in a ten-gun ship, there cannot be effected any increase in broadside fire over an eight-gun ship; and if the battery of a twelve-gun ship can be so disposed as to present ten on either side, then the ten-gun ship would better be left wholly out of consideration and study be confined to the twelve-gun type. That would be a very big ship, requiring deepened harbors and canals and larger docks, and, far from being immune, it would be increasingly open to dangers of navigation, collision, and torpedo and mine. It is doubtful if such a size would be advisable from the standpoint of maximum fleet efficiency. But if increase in power be decided upon, there is no use in taking half-way measures if they do not produce a commensurate augment of gunfire; the gain in speed alone would not justify an advance in size. The whole question is as to the practicability of obtaining a proportional increase in available fire; if it can be done, there is no doubt that fleet efficiency will be increased by the possible concentration. General Forrest's intuitive conception of tactics, popularized in the rule to "get there the fustest with the mostest men," may well be paraphrased for sea work "to get at the leastest ships with the mostest guns."
In a certain sense, to quote a recent remark by Lord Brassey, "shipbuilding for the navy must necessarily be an answer to construction in hand elsewhere." This applies primarily to the amount of tonnage; but it applies with no less vigor to types. If other nations were to build nothing but torpedo boats and fast protected cruisers carrying 6-inch guns, there would manifestly be no reason for building battleships which could resist 12-inch guns. As some nations are building heavier ships, it is doubly incumbent upon the others to determine the best way of meeting the changing conditions.
There is but one thing more to be said about it, and this is indeed the crux of the whole question. The practical outcome in any country will be, not a restriction to a certain tonnage expressed in larger units, but about the same number of larger units. This being the case, there is no doubt that the safest way to ensure at least equality, if not superiority, of fleets is to ensure at least equality of ships. So it really comes back to a question of how to produce the most efficient, hardest-hitting single ship. There have been most attractive accounts published abroad lately of expected combinations of gun-power, armor, speed, and endurance, so far ahead of anything yet produced as to indicate nothing short of actual revolution in means and methods. If these designs materialize in actual ships, other services can but "hide their diminished heads" and yield tribute in that sincerest form of flattery—imitation. It remains to be seen how far those flamboyant expectations will be realized.
AMMUNITION.
The writer is not prepared to follow M. Lockroy in the advocacy quoted above of a single type of projectile, although apparently this battle was won mainly by common shell. The Japanese evidently used very few armor-piercers; wherever the Orel's armor had been struck the shell had simply splashed on it; and all those that had struck above the armor had burst immediately into hundreds of little fragments, the radius of destruction of even the 12-inch seeming to be limited to about 15 feet from the point of impact. Throughout the entire war the favorite practice of the Japanese appears to have been to use common shell to wreck the unarmored parts and demoralize and kill the personnel; and throughout the entire war the comment of able observers and critics has been that their shell have such sensitive and quickacting fuses that they burst on striking even such light things as funnel casings, Chinese tile roofs, etc., while the character of the bursting charge is such that the explosion, while terrific in instantaneous force, lacks volume. The effects in every case noted were very much localized; in some instances they were actually exterior to the ship, while in others hammocks, men's bags, etc., afforded adequate protection from the fragments. Yet these shell destroyed several battleships, and by wiping out all means of secondary offense in others put them in condition to be easily disposed of by torpedo boats. Furthermore, while the fire in the Alexander III must have been caused by common shell, it seems probable that the same instrumentalities are to be credited with the injuries which made her capsize.
Two of the Japanese battleships had each a 12-inch gun disabled during the action by the premature explosion of a shell in the bore, which same accident is understood to have occurred several times on August 10 with more or less disastrous effects. Whether these prematures were caused by supersensitiveness of the Shimose burster or fuse, or by weakness of the shell, or by erratic action of the cordite propelling charges causing excessive pressures, is not known. Leaving it to the victors in the battle to decide for themselves whether or not the doubtful advantages of such sensitive material are commensurate with the dangers of handling it, there will probably be no resulting tendency to greatly modify the character of ordnance material generally. In regard to what kind of shell to use, the suggestion is manifest that if torpedo boats are on hand in effective numbers and condition, the common shell will pave the way to successful attack by them.
While on the subject of projectiles, the opportunity cannot be neglected of pointing out the possible usefulness of a few stand of grape or very heavy case-shot for each heavy gun, for employment against torpedo craft. This may seem to smack of using a steam hammer to kill a fly, but when circumstances approximate to those at the end of the day fight of May 27, when all unprotected guns had been swept away, a round or two from a 12-inch gun would be well expended in crippling a torpedo boat.
UPPER WORKS.
An emphasis, which should not be needed, has been laid upon the dire effects of upper works and fittings when struck and converted into langridge. As a single instance among many, it is said that on board the Mikasa 23 men were killed or wounded by fragments of a semaphore struck by a shell. (It seems possible that some of the shell fragments were mingled with those of the semaphore.) There were also incidents recalling the experience of the Tsarevitch on August 10, when her military mast, almost wholly shattered in its support by the explosion of a shell, was in a condition to endanger or to seriously impair the efficiency of the ship. All upper works must be designed so as not only to offer the minimum target but also to minimize the effect of shell striking; superfluous bridges and derricks must be done away with, and masts and smokestacks, etc., must be well stayed.
ARMORED CRUISERS.
One final circumstance well worthy of note in connection with the conduct of this battle, is that the position, and the only position, assigned to armored cruisers on either side was in the line of battle. All theories that have been advanced as to the roles to be played by vessels of this type have failed of confirmation. If the Russians had had an effective scouting and anti-scouting service, it might have been necessary for the Japanese to do their scouting by reconnaissances in force; but throughout this entire war armored cruisers have played no important part as such. Three large ones were at Vladivostok at the outbreak of hostilities, and the Japanese told off an adequate force of the same type to watch and if possible contain them; their presence on one side furnished a use for them on the other, and it must be admitted that the principle similia similibus curantur has some application in the determination of naval programmes as well as in homceopathic therapeutics. There is no doubt that the steadily converging paths of development of battleships and armored cruisers are nearing a point of junction. Some years ago 10-inch guns began to appear in the battery of the latter, and the speed of the former has continually increased. The two types have thus unmistakably approached each other, and the assignment of the cruisers to positions in the line of battle emphasizes the true nature of their most important and ultimate function; and in performing this function their two to five knots' greater speed was not utilized while they suffered a serious diminution of battery power for the sake of obtaining it. The Japanese are said to be now building heavy armored cruisers to carry 12-inch guns with some 8-inch in one and a number of 6-inch in another; but, victorious as their fleet was, its lack of homogeneity seems to impugn the soundness of their programme. Although these new vessels will carry heavier guns than any cruisers built heretofore, they will presumably be faster than battleships, and there may arise circumstances in which they will be useful; but the refinement could go still further and useful work be found for still a third type with a little less speed and a little heavier battery. The question is—is such a multiplicity of classes desirable? In a service which can afford the luxury of both, there may at times be a useful variation from the standard type of battleship; but if it is a question as to one or the other, there is no avoiding the plain fact that in the battle of the Japan Sea and the operations leading up to it, and indeed throughout this entire war, the armored cruiser has failed to justify its existence.
* * * * *
Such seem to be the principal gleanings from the Sea of Japan, and deductions of a reasonable logic crystallized in the fierce light of that epoch-making battle. While the event does indeed mark a new era in naval history, it is noteworthy and a most interesting circumstance that the suggestions emanating from it are in the main confirmatory of peace-begotten theories and practices based upon professional judgment. Lights and shadows have become a little more pronounced, while we are reminded that nature will not be coerced and that her immutable laws must be invoked in aid, not violated.
After all is said and done, nothing remains so steadily confirmed as the supreme influence of the human factor, the personnel, the man behind the gun. More important than the production of the finest weapons is the production of the finest skill and nerve and endurance in using them; and this can exist only hand in hand with the familiarity born of constant practice by all, from the admiral and the captain to the gun-pointer and mechanic. In commenting upon what seem to be the lessons from this direction, as from others, criticism of personnel has been a far less agreeable task than discussion of materiel. But in distilling future guidance from past achievement it is not possible to wholly follow Emerson's sweet counsel not to bark against the bad but rather to chant the beauty of the good. It is from failures that the most pointed teachings are drawn. The battle of the Japan Sea has thundered forth anew the lesson that bravery is not all that is required—else there had been no such defeat.