AS TO NAVY YARDS AND THEIR DEFENSE*
On the formation of the government under the constitution of 1789 there were no navy-yards. The public armed vessels that had figured in the Revolutionary war had been built at private shipyards. Indeed, from the time of the sale in Philadelphia in June, 1785, of the Alliance, the last ship of the Revolutionary period, to the launching of the United States (44), at the same port in May, 1797, an interval of twelve years, the country was without a navy.
The passage of the act of March 27, 1794, authorizing the construction of six frigates, was the first step towards the formation of the second, or present navy.
In regard to the construction of these frigates, the Secretary of War (who at that time administered the affairs of the navy) submitted to the House of Representatives a communication under date of December 29, 1794, in which he states that "the building of the ships has been directed in the several ports of the Union in order, as well to distribute the advantages arising from the operation, as to ascertain at what places they can be executed to the greatest advantage, to wit: One thirty-six at Portsmouth, N.H.; one forty-four at Boston; one forty-four at New York; one forty-four at Philadelphia; one thirty-six at Baltimore, and one forty-four at Norfolk."
The sites on which these vessels were built belonged to private individuals.
Two years after (January 11, 1797), in a letter addressed to the chairman of the House "Committee for inquiring into the state of Naval Equipments," etc, etc., he states that "if Congress perceive advantages in the extension of their marine…it will be proper that authority be given to purchase a site for a navy yard." In compliance with this recommendation the House committee on Naval Affairs on January 25 reported "as their opinion that a sum of money be appropriated for the purpose of purchasing and fitting up a naval yard." This recommendation, however, was not adopted by Congress.
In January, 1798, a committee of the House was appointed "to inquire into the expenditures of the moneys appropriated for a naval armament, and also into the causes of the delay in completing the same." In answer to the inquiries of this committee the Secretary justifies the wisdom of his predecessor in having all the ships built at the same time, and in different places, and adds: "The great delay that has occurred in the present undertaking must always be more or less experienced when heavy ships of war are required to be suddenly built, and the Government not previously possessed of the necessary materials. It is certainly an unfit time to look for these and prepare a navy-yard when the ships are required for actual service…Do not these circumstances point to the expediency of legislative provisions commensurate to so important an object?"
Again on January 17, 1799, a committee of the House recommended that "for the safekeeping and careening of ships-of-war of the United States a dock or docks should be established in one or more places in the United States." But Congress again failed to adopt the recommendation.
Under date of April 25, 1800, the Secretary of the Navy (a department of the navy having, in the meantime, been authorized by law) submitted for the consideration of the President a very strong appeal in favor of the purchase of sites for navy-yards. "No express provision," he remarks, "was made by Congress for establishing navy-yards for building the first six frigates directed by law. But as vessels so large cannot be built without first erecting wharves, or extending wharves before erected, both these things were done, and in every instance on private property; so that the public have now little or no advantage from the expenditure of sums to a considerable amount." Then follows a forcible argument showing the wasteful extravagance of the prevailing system. "In this view of the subject," he continues, "and believing that it is the truest economy to provide at once permanent yards, which shall be the public property, and which will always be worth to the public the money expended thereon, instead of pursuing the system at first adopted, which, with the experience before us, can only be justified on the ground that the ships now ordered are the last to be built by the United States, the Secretary of the Navy has had but little difficulty in making up his opinion that the proper course to be pursued is to make the building yards at Norfolk, Washington, New York and Portsmouth public property, and to commence them on a scale as if they were meant to be permanent; and also the building yards at Philadelphia and at Boston, notwithstanding the high prices which must be given for the ground."
Accompanying this paper is an elaborate report by Mr. Joshua Humphreys, Naval Constructor, and the designer of the new frigates—those of the Constitution class—on the various sites proposed for navy-yards.
In a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the House Naval Committee on the naval establishment and its expenses, under date of January 12, 1801, after quoting the act authorizing the construction of the seventy-fours, he says: "Ground has been purchased at Portsmouth, N.H., Charlestown (near Boston), Philadelphia, Washington and Norfolk, and measures have been taken to procure ground at New York for capacious building and dockyards, and progress in making and preparing docks for receiving timber, and wharfs for building ships."
As nothing in the acts quoted authorized the purchase of sites for navy-yards, it will be seen that the Executive took the initiative Steps for the formation of a permanent naval establishment. This is explained in a communication to the House under date of December 8, 1801. "How far the authority given by the Legislature for procuring and establishing sites for naval purposes has been perfectly understood, and pursued in the execution, admits of some doubt. A statement of the expenses already incurred on that subject shall be laid before you. I have in certain cases suspended or slackened these expenditures, that the Legislature might determine whether so many yards are necessary as have been contemplated." Then follows a statement of:
Expenditures on Account of Navy-Yards, Docks and Wharfs, To 1st Oct., 1801, as follows:
Portsmouth, N. H.—Purchase of ground $5,500
Improvements $26,304
Total $31,804
Boston.—Purchase $40,000
Improvements $3,643
Total $43,643
New York.—Purchase $40,000
Improvements $1,865
Total $41,865
Philadelphia.—Purchase $37,000
Improvements $1,636
Total $38,636
Washington.—Purchase $4,000
Improvements $54,683
Total $58,683
Norfolk.—Purchase $12,000
Improvements $14,275
Total $26,275
Overall Total $240,906
In 1802 a committee of the House to whom was referred "so much of the President's message as related to naval sites" reported that "prior to 4th March, 1801, the sum of $199,030.92 had been expended in purchasing navy-yards and making improvements upon them, without any law authorizing the purchase, or any appropriation of money either for purchase or improvements." But in the body of the report it is stated that "On that day—March 3, 1801—it appears by the act making appropriations for six seventy-four-gun ships, and for completing navy-yards, docks and wharfs, the sum of $500,000 was appropriated."
From this it would appear that Congress had finally recognized the existence of the navy-yards by making an appropriation of money for their maintenance. Hence from this date—March 3, 1801—the six navy-yards named may be considered as part of the permanent naval establishment.
Under date of January 20, 1802, the Secretary of the Navy writes to the chairman of the House Naval Committee: "Since I have been in office I have anxiously sought for all possible information respecting the navy-yards, but no satisfactory opinion has yet been formed with regard to the yards that ought to be sold. There is reason to believe that the site of the navy-yard at Philadelphia ought to be changed. There is an opinion entertained by some that the site of the yard at Portsmouth is not the best; and doubts have been expressed respecting the proper position of the yard at New York…
"With respect to the contemplated improvements of the navy yards…I have only to remark that from the reduced scale of the proposed appropriation the intended improvements must, in a great degree, be suspended…
"If Congress should deem it necessary to sell any of the present navy-yards, or to purchase other situations, and a committee should be appointed to prepare a bill for such a purpose, I will with pleasure contribute my assistance," Thus early in the history of our navy was the question of the sale of navy-yards brought forward.
The doubts here expressed as to the wisdom of the selection of the several sites were reiterated later on. In his annual report of December 2, 1825, the Secretary of the Navy says that "The experience of the Department and personal observation during the last year have entirely satisfied me that the greater part, if not the whole, of our navy-yards are badly located." The Secretary then proceeds to discuss the difficulties presented by the building arrangements at the navy-yards. "They have," he observes, "been improved by temporary expedients, and the buildings erected and arranged with reference only to existing necessities, and without regard to the future and growing wants of our navy. Many and serious evils have resulted; much public money has been unnecessarily expended, many losses sustained by the change, removal and alteration of the several erections; timber exposed to decay; stores requiring immense labor to deposit and preserve them; a much larger number of hands required to perform the work; unpleasant and sometimes injurious delays in fitting out our vessels. It is a mortifying fact, yet there is no doubt of its truth, that one-third of the money expended at our yards has been lost from this cause. The remedy is manifest, and it is earnestly hoped that means may be provided to apply it. A commission of prudent and intelligent officers should be selected to examine minutely and carefully all our navy-yards, and to make a plan for each, suited to its location and the future wants of the service at it, prescribing the buildings which will be required and the location and character of each building, together with such improvements in the ground and form of the yard as will be most beneficial."
It will be seen from the foregoing that the sites of the six yards named were, with the exception of the one at Washington, determined by a process of "natural selection," as it were. That is to say, that having no public shipyards, the government naturally went to those places for setting up their first ships where ship-building formed one of the industries, and where skilled labor and the materials which entered into ship-building mostly abounded. Thus expediency controlled the selection of the sites of the navy-yards, and expediency has controlled their development.
How irregular so ever the manner of doing it, the wisdom of thus early laying the foundation of a permanent naval establishment was soon to be justified. Our extreme weakness, in a military point of view, invited the aggressions which led to the war of 1812. By the superiority of the naval power of Great Britain most of our Atlantic ports were blockaded and a number of our ships-of-war were burnt to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. But however inferior on the ocean, on the lakes we met our adversaries on equal terms. It was there that arose that contest of energy and enterprise in constructing ships out of the "raw material," and skill in fighting them afterwards, that reflected such great credit upon our national marine.
There were three lines of military operations in the north: that near the head of Lake Erie; the one on the Niagara frontier; and the one which had Lake Champlain for its base. On all three lines the successes gained by the American naval forces led to the most important results. As a direct consequence of Perry's victory on Lake Erie, the Northwest was relieved from invasion; Gen. Harrison's army enabled to advance into Canada; the battle of the Thames fought, Tecumseh killed; the last great Indian combination broken up; and Detroit and the Michigan territory recovered. McDonough's victory on Lake Champlain ended the attempted invasion of northern New York and terminated the campaign of the English forces on that line; while Commodore Chauncey's brilliant successes on Lake Ontario caused the British to evacuate the whole Niagara frontier. The operations of war had therefore introduced new strategic points; and to the six navy-yards, at one time deemed an excessive number, there were added at the conclusion of the war of 1812 seven other naval stations, to wit: Whitehall, Lake Champlain; Sacketts Harbor, N.Y.; Erie, Pa.; Charleston, S.C; Baltimore, Md.; Newport, R.I.; New Orleans, La.
In the same way the military operations during the Mexican war brought the navy-yard at Pensacola into active operation, and fully demonstrated the necessity of a naval station on the Gulf frontier; the acquisition of California required a navy-yard in the bay of San Francisco; while, during the late civil war, Port Royal, S.C, Mound City, 111., and Key West, Fla., became, for the time being, the most important naval bases in the possession of the government.
The operations of the war of 1812 forced on the attention of the government the exposed position of some of the navy yards on the Atlantic board. Under date of February 22, 1814, the Secretary of the Navy, in a communication addressed to the Senate, writes: "No further steps have been taken in relation to the dockyard [at New York] than general inquiry and proper deliberation in order to determine upon the best site in a central situation.
"The result has decided in favor of the right bank of the Hudson above the Highlands. The motives to this decision were from considering the contemplated dockyard as the nucleus around which a great naval establishment may be formed, comprising wet and dry docks, forges, foundries, boring, rolling, saw and block mills, blast and smelting furnaces…Here also will be the main arsenal and depot of timber and materials of all kinds, and principal dockyard for constructing and repairing ships-of-war. Such an establishment in any of our seaports accessible to ships of the line, would form so great a temptation to a powerful enemy as to render destruction certain, unless protected by forts and garrisons of the most formidable and expensive nature."
These views were fully confirmed by the report of the mixed commission of 1820, which indicated Murderer's Creek, near Newbergh, N.Y., on the Hudson as the best site for a naval depot.
In compliance with a resolution of the U.S. Senate of February 13, 1817, and while the memories of the war of 1812 were still fresh, the President appointed a commission of army and navy officers to report on the "defense of the maritime frontier and the establishment of naval depots and dockyards." Commodore Bainbridge, one of the commissioners, in a minority report lays down the conditions necessary for the establishment of a "naval depot, rendezvous and dockyard," and then expresses the opinion that Boston "possesses in an eminent degree all the great advantages necessary for a naval establishment," concluding his report with the remark that " so extensive a coast as that of the United States requires at least three considerable naval arsenals. "Geographical situation appears to me to mark decidedly Boston, New York and Norfolk as the proper sites: Boston for the eastern section of the country. New York for the middle, and Norfolk for the southern."
The instructions to the commissioners, it should be observed, required an examination of the ports and harbors east of the Delaware and as far as Portland, Maine.
The majority report, signed by Gen. Swift of the Engineer Corps, U.S. Army, and Captains Evans and Perry of the Navy, states that "the positions presenting the most importance in respect of good harbors, depots and defensible sites, are to be found in the waters of the Chesapeake and Narragansett Bays." They then proceed: "The Commissioners (except one) are of the opinion that Narragansett Bay presents the best site for a naval depot in the Union north of Chesapeake Bay." They give their reasons in full for their preference.
Following this report came one in 1819, one in 1820 and one in 1821, all bearing on the subject of maritime defenses, and all exhibiting careful study of the whole subject from both the military and naval points of view.
The weight of authority unmistakably indicates a position remote from the seaboard as the best site for a great naval depot, as we have seen from the report indicating the upper Hudson in one instance and the recommendation of "Burwell's Bay on the right bank of the James above Day's Point" by the joint commission of February, 1819.
In those days the calculations were based upon attacks made by wooden vessels propelled by the wind, the heaviest guns being 42 pdrs., having an effective range of 1 ½ miles; whereas to-day we must provide against ironclads carrying long-range guns of high power. What may be called the "working gun" of the leading naval powers is assumed to be the 8-inch rifled gun, throwing a projectile of 250 lbs. about eight (8) miles.
A single gun of the heaviest of the European ironclads will throw a greater weight of iron than the entire broadside of a line-of-battle ship of 1812. A seventy-four-gun ship of that period could throw at a broadside 1612 lbs. of metal; a forty-four of the Constitution class, 680 lbs., whereas a single projectile of the Italian Duilio weighs about 2000 lbs.
If, then, some of our navy-yards were, in the days of short-range guns, thought to be in dangerous proximity to the sea, what shall we say of them now when powerful ironclads can, from the open coast, hurl huge masses of iron for a distance of five or six miles or more, according to the elevation obtainable? If to this we add the defenseless state of our principal harbors and the water approaches to our navy-yards, as clearly set forth by our military authorities, their exposed positions may be fully understood.
The reason why the New York navy-yard, taking that as an example, was not sent up the Hudson beyond West Point, to ensure its safety, seems very plain.
As early as 1798 the Secretary of the Navy recommended in an earnest and well argued report the building of 12 line-of-battle ships of 74 guns each, and as many frigates, with 20 or 30 vessels of smaller ratings. This was to establish the outer line of coast defense and furnish the desired security. The frames of 11 line-of-battle ships were actually set up, but the majority of them were permitted to rot away on the stocks. Congress would neither grant the money necessary to complete them, nor the complement of seamen necessary to man those that had been launched. But four of them ever got to sea; that is, in the sense of making a cruise.
Successive administrations finding that, despite the lessons of the war of 1812, Congress was not disposed to augment the navy and coast fortifications to the extent requisite for defensive purposes, felt the necessity of providing for the safety of the navy yards by throwing them back from the coast and beyond the reach of a sudden attack by a hostile force.
But accessibility from the sea to our own ships is one of the most important considerations in determining the relative values of a site for a navy-yard. It was believed, moreover, that in due time the people of the United States would become convinced of the fact, and so express themselves through their representatives in Congress, that the great centres of commerce on our seaboard (and the navy-yards included within their limits), together with our vast coasting trade, demanded the protection which a fleet of line-of-battle ships and forts alone could render. Under the influence of this conviction the navy-yards on the Atlantic coast were allowed to remain where originally located. They must necessarily, it was argued, receive the protection imperatively demanded by the centres of wealth and commerce of which they form part.
The question "How many line-of-battle ships to supplement the maritime defenses should the United States possess, in order to afford this protection?" is only to be determined after careful study of all the conditions, past, present and prospective, of the problem. But if the Secretary of the Navy found good and ample reason in 1798 for recommending 12 line-of-battle ships, a recommendation Congress tacitly adopted, it is not too much to say that in 1898 we should have at least 18 line-of-battle ships; and frigates or cruisers, and other classes of ships, in proportion.
The more precise term line-of-battle ship is used here rather than the modem but indefinite term battle-ship. Any vessel, armed and equipped for fighting, may be called a battle-ship. The Petrel, carrying four small guns, was designed for battle, but she would hardly be admitted as part of a fleet composed of such ships as the Indiana and Iowa, ships representing the highest military value. The same may be predicated of the monitor Puritan. Though possessed of great power as a fighting machine, she is deficient in the maneuvering qualities requisite to fleet evolutions: her role is a restricted one. Hence the naval tactician must arbitrarily assume certain classes of vessels that, with the requisite maneuvering qualities, can stand, with reasonable chances of success, the shock of battle between opposing fleets, and assign them to the force that is to constitute the line of battle. During the sail period it was generally understood that the 60-gun ship should be the smallest vessel admitted to the line of battle. The naval tactician of to-day requires that there shall be a certain measure of homogeneity in the ships that are to compose the main body of the fleet with which he may be called upon to guard our coasts and navy-yards. In other words, his line of battle must be composed of line-of-battle ships.
* From notes taken in the course of preparation of "Report of the Commision on Navy-yards, December 1, 1883."