For many of the men and women who form the crews of the Navy's warships, the process generally involves going aboard, learning their jobs, and then doing those jobs—without a great deal of knowledge or appreciation of the factors that made each ship the way she is. As a former ship driver myself, I plead guilty. When I was on board, I just sort of accepted a ship's shape, size, and form as givens.
My education on the subject got a boost recently in a conversation with David Byers, a civilian naval architect. He retired a few years ago after a long career with the Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea). Our discussion was almost a clinic in the pragmatic factors that go into ship design. Above all, he emphasized that any given warship is the product of compromise.
To illustrate, he used the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class of guided missile destroyers, because he knows it well. As task leader, he was head of a team that included colleagues John Slager and Roger Schaffer as they developed the ship's hull form. The class honors the late Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations during the Cold War.
Byers, who received his naval architecture training at the University of Michigan, served an apprenticeship during his early years in the civil service. Included were time on the waterfront with ship operators and shipyard personnel and time at sea for firsthand experience of the environment. He recalls a number of factors from the 1970s that had their effects in shaping what has proved to be an enduring ship design.
One was the philosophy of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. As CNO from 1970 to 1974, he sought to modernize the Fleet while conserving dollars. His approach was a "high-low mix" of a few expensive surface combatants, the Virginia (CGN-38)-class cruisers, and a larger number of the more affordable Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates. Another objective was the desire to employ steel superstructures after the devastating fire that melted the aluminum upper works of the cruiser Belknap (CG-26) in 1975. Still another goal was fuel economy in the wake of oil embargoes in 1974 and 1979.
With the Ticonderoga (CG-47) as the high-mix platform for getting the Aegis combat system into the Fleet, the Navy also sought a lower-cost version. Political—that is, non-technical—considerations dictated that the new low-mix guided-missile destroyer be smaller and less capable than the "Tico." She had to be at least 50 feet shorter, have a displacement limit of 8,300 tons, one gun instead of two, smaller missile capacity, reduced radar cross section, and no helicopter hangars. As Aegis program manager, Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer coordinated ship and system design.
The imposed limitations forced compromises. Byers and his team had to produce a hull form on an artificially constrained length and displacement. And the ship had to operate for sustained periods at substantial speed in rough seas. The answer involved creating a hull with a dramatic amount of flare, that is, sloping in sharply from the weather decks downward. That would replace the traditional U-shaped U.S. warship hull with one that is more V-shaped and far bigger than those of World War II destroyers in order to accommodate the combat systems. An inverted-V shape and raked mast comprise the Arleigh Burke's superstructure, joining with the hull shape to reduce radar signature.
The hull team's estimates (aided by computer modeling) told them that the designers really needed more length than was available to optimize the hull shape for the intended speed and sea-keeping characteristics. When the class name was announced, some hydrodynamicists at NavSea nicknamed the new ship shape "Arleigh Brick," which was both mocking and ironic since Burke himself was an aggressive, high-speed destroyerman.
During the process, the ship's four LM-2500 gas turbine engines were eventually upgraded from the originally planned total of 80,000 shaft horsepower to 100,000. This increase compensated for the added length the designers would have preferred. And, as the early ships of the class operated successfully, a variation emerged. The later flight IIA ships of the class—still more of which are now under construction—are slightly longer than the Arleigh Burke and have helo hangars.
Over the years, as with any designer, Byers observed that few naval ship concepts make it all the way to completion. For instance, one item on the table for a while was a nuclear-powered Aegis cruiser. Byers did design work, but high costs scuttled further development. Thus, he received considerable satisfaction in being part of the program while the DDG-51 came to fruition, as she became an entity that one could see and touch. There were many steps along the way as the original idea for the destroyer moved forward through preliminary design, model testing, contract signing, detail design, keel laying, and construction.
Byers was at Bath Iron Works on 16 September 1989 when the hull of the Arleigh Burke was launched in the old-fashioned manner-sliding down inclined shipways and splashing into Maine's Kennebec River. He was also on hand at Norfolk when the ship was commissioned on 4 July 1991. Admiral Burke himself was present for both ceremonies. For Byers, the pleasures, both professional and personal, were substantial.