'Letters to Iwo Jima'
(See A. P. Rems, pp. 44-51, February 2009 Naval History)
Colonel Charles A. Jones, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Since visiting Iwo Jima for the 50th anniversary commemoration in 1995, I have studied the battle exhaustively, including interviewing veterans and accumulating battalion and regimental after-action reports.
The correct title for Lieutenant General H. M. Smith, identified in the article as the "supreme Marine Corps commander in the Pacific," was "Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific." For Iwo it was "Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops."
The article states that Smith's autobiography, Coral and Brass, says "nothing" about Smith's refusal to land the 3d Marines and omits "mentioning his refusal to employ" the regiment. On page 266, Smith does mention his decision: "I put in the entire Third Division, less the 3rd Regiment, which I kept in Reserve." What was omitted was a detailed, satisfactory explanation for his decision.
In his official oral history, 3d Division commander Major General Graves Erskine stated he landed his division but "they wouldn't let me bring the 3rd Marines." When asked why, he said that the "usual answer" received from Smith and Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner was "You got enough Marines on [Iwo] now, there are too damn many here." In effect, he was told to keep quiet. He concluded with "That was that."
The replacement drafts were universally condemned in Iwo combat reports. Replacements
lacking training, experience, and unit cohesion were sent to companies not as small units trained together but as individuals chosen arbitrarily or by first letter of last name. They were disoriented, usually brought to companies at night to join men unknown to them. Lacking situational awareness, they did not know what to do. Veterans had no time or energy to train them. Some lasted a day on the line or less.Replacements caused another problem not generally known: leadership casualties. With replacements unsure what to do, experienced leaders exposed themselves and gestured and pointed to direct them. Such movements indicated a leader to a Japanese sniper. Result? A dead leader.
John R. Osborne
Mr. Rems implies that an atmosphere of callous exclusion existed against replacement troops when a wounded private was probably left behind because he wasn't one of the regular members of the unit. I seriously doubt that he was deliberately ignored under those desperate conditions. A personal experience on Iwo Jima attests to the fact that the Corps spirit existed regardless of whether a Marine in trouble was someone you knew or not.
Late one afternoon a corpsman we didn't know asked for four volunteers to carry a wounded Marine from some other unit across an open area to a safe spot where he could be picked up by an ambulance. Without hesitation, he got four volunteers. We got halfway across the area and started to get mortared. We ducked down around him for a couple of minutes to shield him until the shelling passed. All the while, he kept urging us to leave him and get to cover. He was more concerned about our welfare than his own.
I'm certain this type of incident in which the Marines involved were strangers to one another occurred hundreds of times.
Book Review: A Tale of Two Submarines'
(See B. F. Meyers, pp. 69-70, April 2009 Naval History)
Captain Bob McWethy, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The reviewer writes about Lieutenant Commander John Phillip Cromwell going down with the Sculpin (SS-191). He was a captain at the time (U.S. Naval Academy class of 1924) and was on board as the "wolf pack" commodore. If this "demotion" was an error in the book, it should have been caught by the reviewer or editor.I am sensitive to this because Captain Cromwell was head of my submarine qualification board at Midway Island just a few months before the Sculpin was lost. My classmate, gunnery officer Joe Defrees, was killed by enemy gunfire while manning the sub's deck gun before she went down.
One-Ship Fleet-in-Being'
(See John D. Barnard, pp. 52-55, February 2009 Naval History)
Captain John A. Rodgaard, U.S. Navy
This article addresses a forgotten piece of War of 1812 naval history, and as we approach the war's bicentennial, it will help lay a foundation for what I know will become a considerable body of work to be seen in future Naval History issues.
I hope others will expand on the several points that left me, as a reader, asking for more. One involves Mr. Barnard's exploration of the full extent of the reasons behind the delay in getting the Constellation to sea. The author gives the frigate's commanding officer, Captain Charles Stewart, such short shrift that the reader is left believing that this distinguished officer deliberately failed in his duty to take his command to sea.
Another concerns the captain's conduct after confronting the British blockading squadron at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Stewart coordinated with Brigadier General Robert B. Taylor in the successful defense of Norfolk and its immediate surrounds. His role was to block the main channel of the Elizabeth River and in doing so he converted the "Jewel of the Fleet" into a floating hedgehog supported by a dozen of Mr. Jefferson's gunboats. I wish the author had elaborated about the thoughtful defensive measures undertaken by Stewart and Taylor that ensured Norfolk and the valuable Gosport Naval Yard were preserved. At that point the great ship was no longer a "fleet in being" but a stalwart defense against the British attempt to capture Norfolk.
I compliment Mr. Barnard on his article and encourage him and future contributors who write about the 1812 era and the Constellation to give greater attention to the context of the period and sufficient regard to the honorable service of Captain Charles Stewart. One of the most distinguished experts of the period, retired Navy Commander Tyrone Martin, stated that of the U.S. Navy's fighting captains during the War of 1812, "Charles Stewart was the best of them all."
Editor's note: Captain Rodgaard is coauthor with Lieutenant Commander Claude Berube, USN, of A Call to the Sea (Potomac Press, 2005), a biography of Charles Stewart.
Museum Report: A Walking Tour Through the USS Cod (SS214)'
(See R. T. McLaren, p. 72, April 2009 Naval History)
J. T. McDaniel
The author states that the Cod's ice cream machine is in its original location. While true regarding the current machine, it might be noted that a different model ice cream machine was originally installed in the forward torpedo room. At the suggestion of Commander James A. Adkins, this was removed and the current, smaller machine was installed in its present location in the after battery during the Mare Island refit and upgrade between the sub's fifth and sixth patrols.
The Pearl Harbor Warning that Never Was'
(See R. J. Hanyok, pp. 50-53, April 2009 Naval History)
Pam Ribbey
The disinformation in Mr. Hanyok's article is disquieting, especially as my grandfather, Captain Charles H. Maddox, was on board the USS Antares (AKS-3) and first sighted the Japanese midget submarine at the Pearl Harbor entrance 1
hours before the air attack.As Captain Laurance F. Safford stated in a 1945 memorandum: "The reason for my stressing the
Winds Message' so much in my testimony . . . is because we could afford to talk about it . . . without detriment to the war effort. . . . We had the same information at the same time-from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the Winds Set-Up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the Winds Execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised."The "Winds Execute" message was intercepted at around 0800 on 4 December 1941 at the U.S. Navy Station M in Cheltenham, Maryland, by senior radio operator Ralph T. Briggs. He understood the significance of the plain language war warning/code destruct phrase and immediately typed the message and sent it by teletype to Commander Safford's OP-20-G Washington, D.C. office. He then entered the date, time, frequency, lead line of the message, and warning characters on his log sheet. The message was received around 0900 and passed for comments to the head of the Japanese translation section, Lieutenant Alwyn D. Kramer. Safford sent this message by hand to Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, director of naval communications. After composing a war warning to CINCPAC, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, in Hawaii, Safford prepared a destruct dispatch order for all Pacific crypto systems at Wake Island.
The last that Captain Safford personally saw of this message was after the Pearl Harbor attack, while assembling documents on 15 December 1941 for the Roberts Commission hearings. In November 1943, while preparing testimony for further investigations, Safford discovered that it was missing from the files and everything connected with the "Winds Execute" message had "simply evaporated from the face of the earth."
Before the 1945-46 congressional inquiry into Pearl Harbor, Safford located Ralph Briggs who agreed to testify about the message. Briggs' commanding officer, Captain John S. Harper, however, forbade him to appear as a witness at any hearing.
Others heard the Tokyo message weather forecast on 4 December 1941: the British Far East Combined Bureau/Singapore intercept station at Stonecutters Island in Hong Kong, the Royal Australian Navy in Melbourne, and the duty radio operator Kenichi Ogimoto, and the naval attach
, Captain Yuzuru Sanematsu, at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C.Concerning 1941 Pearl Harbor radio intelligence, there is a disturbing pattern as to what documents are missing from archives worldwide. Those of us with personal connections to the Japanese attack are still haunted by 7 December 1941. We wonder where the vaults are that contain this treasure trove.
Twilight of the High Seas Fleet'
(See J. Prados, pp. 42-49, April 2009 Naval History)
Tido Holtkamp
The author defines very well the essence of the German fleet during World War I, but I find some of his conclusions open to question.
Mr. Prados admits that the High Seas Fleet helped defeat Russia, but says about these contributions: "they pale next to the strategic impact of the United States' entry into the conflict." The Germans, however, had known the Russian armies as a huge and immediate threat for years, from their invasion of East Prussia in August 1914 through countless battles and campaigns in the east. For Germany, the defeat of Russia represented a major and immediate victory, while the United States remained a far-away and little-known entity.
He then states: "Trading the High Seas Fleet for a couple of extra corps on the Marne in 1914, in contrast, might actually have decided the outcome of the Great War." We cannot expect the Germans to have realized so early in the war that the fleet was a luxury they could have done without. But by 1918 they must have seen that very clearly. A more valid statement, therefore, would be: If the German army had a couple of extra corps in their last great offensive of March 1918, they might have won the Great War
in spite of America's entry.Among the fleet's activities, Prados might have included the East Asia squadron which won the Battle of Coronel, the first defeat of a British squadron in a hundred years.
What the author does not say is that had the Germans planned and used unrestricted submarine warfare from day one, Germany would have won the war. Then his article would have paid tribute to the High Seas Fleet for protecting the "massive U-Boat pen" in the North Sea from the British.
Elliott Stoffregen III
Why does Mr. Prados use "High Seas Fleet" throughout his article when "High Sea Fleet" is the correct translation of Hochseeflotte, the German word for that country's main surface force in World War I?
I contacted author Michael B. Barrett about his use of "High Sea Fleet" throughout his book, Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands (Indiana University Press, 2007), and verified his information with the head of the German language department at Auburn University. The literal translation of see is singular sea. To be "High Seas Fleet" would require the plural seen and thus Hochseenflotte, a word that doesn't exist in the German language.