'Halsey Knows the Straight Story'
(See A. P. Rems, pp. 40-46, August 2008 Naval History)
Lieutenant Commander Neil G. Carey, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
It was a pleasure to see that Mr. Rems noted the observations of General Merrill Twining, who served as operations officer for two of I Marine Amphibious Corp's first five commanders.
Lieutenant Colonel Twining was Brigadier General Alexander Vandegrift's brilliant operations officer during the battle for Guadalcanal and, after that hard-won victory, was selected to be IMAC's operations officer. He knew too well that victory is rarely achieved without casualties.
Later-General Twining was not one to withhold his professional opinion regardless of how it might disagree with that of his seniors. He told me that more than once he expected to be relieved on the spot because his recommendations differed from the ideas of General Vandegrift and, later, IMAC's Major General Charles Barrett.
During the writing of No Bended Knee (Presidio Press, 1994), General Twining told of his respect for General Barrett and the general's consuming desire to save lives, a laudable one incompatible with formulating the best timely plan of attack based on available men, mat?
riel, information, and the urgent need to continue pushing the Japanese back to their homeland.
The general said: "There was no place or way that we could attack without the likelihood of incurring heavy losses; General Barrett couldn't bring himself to order men to their possible death."
Editor's Note: Commander Carey edited General Twining's World War II memoir, No Bended Knee.
Lieutenant Commander Paul R. Lucas, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The article about Major General Barrett was both enjoyable yet tragic reading. I did note several errors in the article and photographs. The initial picture identifies Admiral Halsey as a vice admiral, yet four stars are shown clearly on his collar. Similarly General Vandegrift was identified as a major general when the three stars of a lieutenant general are also clear. Admiral Halsey's superior Admiral Nimitz was identified as a vice admiral. Nimitz was never a vice admiral, he went directly from two to four stars the day he assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. As a former enlisted yeoman, my wife tells me I nitpick too much, but if an article is to be assumed correct by the reader, it should be completely correct in all matters.
On the other side, outside of the tragic death of General Barrett, the story was clearly on the mark for the type of warfare conducted and the leadership so desperately needed in the early days of the South Pacific Area campaigns.
Keep up the good work!
'Perfect in Every Respect'
(See S. F. Davis Jr., pp. 26-33, August 2008 Naval History)
Strafford Morss
Captain Davis' article is very nearly reflective of its title, but I would like to comment on the photograph's caption about the SG radar antenna.
By World War II standards the antenna was indeed compact, but the term "diminutive" in the 21st century may give an erroneous impression to present day readers, who live in the era of micro circuits and tiny circuit boards.
The first clues in the picture are the access manhole size and the height of the safety rail on the radar platform. As we see it, both the antenna scanner and pedestal casing are cast aluminum. Without the wave guides, the antenna and pedestal assembly weighed 338 pounds. The assembly is nearly four feet tall and the screen width is 49 inches. This is indeed small compared to the contemporaneous SK air-search antenna, approximately 17 feet square and with pedestal weighing around 2,900 pounds.
The SG antennas were mounted as high in the ship as could be reached and on a "heavy" appeared small when about 150 feet off the water.
At least seven of these antennae exist and can be seen in their end-of-the-war locations. Two are on board the Texas (ex-BB-35) at La Porte, two on the Massachusetts (ex-BB-59) in Fall River, two on the North Carolina (ex-BB-55) at Wilmington; and one on the Alabama (ex-BB-60) at Mobile.
The SG series sets were removed around 1960 and replaced, often by the SPS-10, because the SG frequencies were among those assigned to the burgeoning television industry.
'Historic Aircraft'
(See N. Polmar, pp. 14-15, August 2008 Naval History)
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Chuck Berlemann, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Mr. Polmar's description of the TA-3B Skywarrior trainer as having dual controls is in error. Because they were used to train bombardier-navigators, their bomb bays were fitted with a cabin with several repeater scopes, so that while a student or instructor was operating the ASB-1 Bomb Director system in the cockpit, the students in the back could watch and learn from the radar screens in front of them.
The Air Force operated a radar bomb scored range in Spokane, Washington, which predicted bomb hits as a function of the aircraft's position, altitude, and velocity at the electronically signaled bomb release. Those training Skywarriors made many a trip from NAS Whidbey to Spokane to fly the range. Later, after the A-6 Intruder picked up the all-weather bomber mission, at least one of the trainers was modified for service as an executive transport. Fast, with long range and a pressurized cabin, what's not to like?
'To the 1920 Olympics by Cruiser'
(See R. Shenk, pp. 34-39, August 2008 Naval History)
Commander Robert C. Whitten, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
Although the account of the 1920 Olympics was fascinating, I must say that Naval Academy graduates of that era must not have been taught Newton's Law of Motion very well. Motion of the ship could have no effect, except for negligible air resistance, on the shot-put "record" set on board the USS Frederick (CA-8), a fundamental-aspect of "inertial reference frames" that the officers should have known. Indeed, the mechanics of relative motion predated Newton, having been worked out by Galileo many years before.
Sergeant Major Mike R. Vining, U.S. Army (Retired)
Mr. Shenk could have amplified civilian Olympic competitor Charles William Paddock's career with special note of his military connections. In the 1920s he was known as "the world's fastest human."
As an Army lieutenant, Paddock won the 100- and 200-meter dashes at the 1919 Inter-Allied Games held in Paris after World War I. At the 1920 Olympics in Antwerp, he won gold medals in the 100-meter dash and 4x100-meter relay—a world record—and silver in the 200-meter dash. On 3 April 1921, he broke the world record in 100 meters in 10.4 seconds, 200 meters in 21.6 seconds, and 300 meters in 33.8 seconds. In the 1924 Paris Olympics, he took fifth place in the 100-meter dash and a silver medal in the 200-meter dash. He also participated in the 1928 Olympic games held in Amsterdam, Netherlands, but failed to qualify for the finals in the 200-meter dash.
A Marine Corps captain during World War II, Paddock died in a Navy aircraft accident near Sitka, Alaska, on 21 July 1943. In 1976, he was inducted into the USA Track & Field Hall of Fame.
'A British View of the Naval War of 1812'
(See J. Black, pp. 16-23, August 2008 Naval History)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Dr. Black's statement that the U.S. Navy had "better gunners" in the War of 1812 is a myth that needs to be dispelled.
The USS Constitution's crew in the 19 August 1812 battle with the Guerriere had been together less than two months, and never had done more than test fire any guns. The several recorded instances of their "exercising the great guns" all appear to have been dry runs. British Captain Dacres' overconfidence allowed Isaac Hull to bring the Constitution very close where aim was no factor, and so exposed himself to the withering fire of double-shotted 24- and 32-pounders.
In the Constitution's battle with the Java on 29 December 1812, William Bainbridge found himself up against British Captain Henry Lambert, who already had two or three victories over French frigates to his credit and who was commanding the faster ship. That the Britons delivered more accurate fire at long range is a matter of record. (In fact, Bainbridge was shocked to see how bad his "combat-tested" crew was, and wrote about it after the event.) Lambert's mistake was that he permitted Bainbridge to close the range, despite having the weather gauge, and thereby subjected his ship to the full power of the Constitution's heavier batteries while greatly reducing the need for accuracy.
In the Chesapeake-Shannon battle of 1 June 1813, newly promoted James Lawrence took a ship he had commanded for less than a month (in port only) against an adversary who was, one might say, a fanatic about gunnery. And in this instance, even American seamanship was wanting.
'The Truth About Tonkin'
(See P. Cullins, p. 66, June 2008; W. Buehler, p. 6, April 2008; and P. Paterson, pp. 52-59, February 2008 Naval History)
Commander William Buehler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Without reiterating much of my earlier letter, I'd like to respond to Rear Admiral Cullins' comment: "This is not to say that Commander Buehler didn't see what he says he saw. Only he knows what he saw."
During the second night action in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, I was a lieutenant in the USS Maddox (DD-731), the operations officer and officer-of-the-deck with the conn during the two actions. I did not see much of anything, it was very dark, and I was hanging onto the bridge compass in a constant hard turn one way or another. I did not see the torpedo. The director officer and crew visually sighted a torpedo pass close aboard paralleling the new course. The torpedo visual was solid.
I interviewed the officer making the sighting, and he exactly described a steam torpedo wake and apparent relative speed. We both had ASW training and were familiar with training shots. Some authors have said that porpoises could be mistaken for torpedoes, a really stupid opinion by landsmen. We've all seen underwater porpoises, whales, and sonar beams at night; nothing resembles a 45-knot steam torpedo wake. Present-day seamen probably have never seen one. The shallow surface-shot leaves a-pencil-thin, very straight wake and passes at twice the speed of the ship. The torpedoes in the day attack were splashing between waves, quite shallow. From the bridge I could see the markings on the one that passed about eight feet out from the ship's side, paralleling our evasion course.
'Historic Aircraft'
(See M. Dorfman, p. 64, June 2008; and N. Polmar, pp. 14-15, April 2008 Naval History)
Commander Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
The F2H Banshee is definitely the plane in James Michener's The Bridges at Toko-Ri, and is mentioned several times, from the first page. As for the use of Panthers in the same-named movie (it has to be one of the finest aviation films ever made), my understanding has always been that no Banshees were available, but the Navy offered VF-192 and its F9Fs as highly acceptable stand-ins. The carrier Oriskany (CVA-34) was also used for the fictional Savo. The "O-Boat" had made one combat cruise to Korea.
'Dangerous Duty in the North Atlantic'
(See M. G. Walling, pp. 30-36, June 2008 Naval History)
Aviation Electronics Technician 2nd Class John L. Magnon, U.S. Navy (1946-48)
I read this article with a keen interest in the Coast Guard cutter Ingham. My brother-in-law, Chief Radioman Charles W. "Pinky" Osborne, served in her in the Pacific up to the Japanese surrender in 1945. He was my mentor and steered me toward electronics when I joined the Navy in 1946. Perhaps someone will be encouraged to write of the Ingham as an amphibious force flagship.