During the closing weeks of the Pacific war, Lieutenant Lea Booth and the rest of Admiral William Halsey's Dirty Tricks Department faced a daunting task: fool the enemy into thinking that an invasion of southern Japan was underway.
Although many books and articles have been written about radio deception used during World War II, a top-secret hoax carried out on board the USS Tucson (CL-98) remained an untold story for more than 60 years. And to this day, very few Tucson crewmen know the real reason their ship suddenly came about and pulled away from Task Force 38 (TF 38) in the early afternoon of 10 July 1945. In fact, the light cruiser was the centerpiece of a complex operation planned by Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, the Third Fleet's chief of staff. The Sailors on board her who would pull the wool over Japanese eyes (and ears) were members of Admiral William F. Halsey's "Dirty Tricks Department," led by Lieutenant A. Lea Booth, U.S. Naval Reserve.
Building Up to the Ruse
A native of Danville, Virginia, Booth had graduated from the Old Dominion's Washington and Lee University in 1940 before moving to the nation's capital and getting a job with the Department of Agriculture. "A buddy and I stood inside the Capitol building as President Roosevelt gave his speech to the nation on December 8, 1941, and Congress declared war," Booth recalled. "A few hours later, we both stood naked at the Washington Navy Yard waiting for our physicals." After surviving boot camp, receiving a commission, and attending Navy Communications School in Washington, Booth shipped out for the Pacific in December 1942. He ended up in Noumea, New Caledonia, assigned to Communications Security (COMSEC) Unit #41, a small section of Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Force staff, and through the end of the war his primary assignment would remain with the unit.
The section's initial duty was to monitor U.S. Navy frequencies for communication violations that might compromise U.S. codes and ciphers. Unit #41 moved to Munda Point, New Georgia, after its capture by U.S. forces in August 1943, and Booth was later assigned to monitor radio traffic on the beachhead at Bougainville. When the commanding officer of the advanced base there, Captain Oliver O. "Scrappy" Kessing, traced a reprimand from Halsey's headquarters back to the lieutenant, Booth was given 24 hours to get off the island or face a court-martial. He later dryly noted, "The receipt of a communications improvement memorandum was not very popular with commanding officers in the South Pacific." Booth returned to Noumea, but Admiral Carney defended his actions and chastised Kessing. The lieutenant next received a temporary additional duty assignment in Washington. There, he helped manipulate the radio traffic flow between the capital and Allied headquarters outside London so German intelligence would not be able to determine the planned date of the 6 June 1944 D-Day landing by analyzing the expected preinvasion increase of transmissions.
On 7 June, Lieutenant Booth was on his way back to the Pacific where he next set up and ran a radio intercept operation from the Dole pineapple fields on Oahu. He reported his results directly to Admiral Carney. Booth recalled that his team monitored "U.S. Pacific Fleet radio circuits to determine if U.S. Fleet movements and future Fleet operations could be predicted through the study of traffic analysis and direction finding." According to Carney, the snoopers "learned that the Japanese . . . could deduce real information just by analyzing the nature and volume of radio traffic." Moreover, U.S. cryptanalysts who had broken the Japanese codes determined that the enemy was in fact doing exactly that.
After Admiral Carney read Booth's surprisingly accurate reports predicting U.S. ship movements, he directed COMSEC staffers to explore how Japanese knowledge of the radio traffic patterns could be used against the enemy. Orders were soon issued for members of Unit #41—Lea Booth, Lieutenant (junior grade) Leslie Wright, and half a dozen rated radiomen—to form a Dirty Tricks Department attached to Halsey's Third Fleet staff. According to Booth, "We were being assigned for deceptive missions at sea and to mislead Japanese intelligence as to the actual target destinations of Task Force 38."
A Most Curious Assignment
The Tucson did not have much time to make her mark in the war. Commissioned on 3 February 1945, the light cruiser set out for the western Pacific in May with Captain Arthur D. Ayrault in command. Arriving at Leyte on 16 June, she joined the screen for Task Force 38. The powerful striking force of the Third Fleet, TF 38 then included 14 aircraft carriers, 6 light carriers, and 8 battleships and, under the command of Admiral Halsey in the flagship USS Missouri (BB-63), was preparing to undertake a series of raids on the Japanese home islands.
Soon after the Tucson's arrival, Captain Ayrault was summoned to the flag offices of Admiral Carney where he was surprised to learn the details of a planned deception: His cruiser would impersonate the Missouri. Specifically, Booth's Dirty Tricks Department would convince the Japanese that the transmissions it would send from the Tucson were emanating from TF 38. "At first Captain Ayrault was a bit perplexed at this assignment," remembered Booth, "but we could not have carried it out from a better ship. Tucson was bristling with anti-aircraft guns and well equipped to defend itself from air attack."
The goal of the complex deception was for the Japanese to believe that after TF 38 made a heavy air strike on Tokyo, scheduled for 10 July, it turned south to support a possible invasion of southern Japan. The task force, meanwhile, would actually be heading north under strict radio silence to strike Hokkaido and northern Honshu islands, areas outside the range of B-29 bombers. A planned 11 July strike by U.S. carrier-type, but Okinawa-based, aircraft against Kyushu, southernmost of the four main home islands, would be an additional facet of the hoax that added to the complexity of Booth's assignment. In addition to executing deceptive Morse code communications, his unit was also to broadcast voice communications to make it seem like Task Force 38 was coordinating the attack on Kyushu from its carriers. In theory, this added ruse would help convince the Japanese that a southern invasion of their homeland might be under way.
Late on 30 June 1945, the two officers and six radiomen of Halsey's Dirty Tricks Department along with Radioman Second Class Richard Wethy reported aboard the Tucson, which was still at anchor in Leyte Gulf. A late but key addition to Booth's team, Wethy was a Missouri radioman whose Morse code "fist" was familiar to Japanese signals intelligence analysts. Four officers from the Tucson's wardroom were also recruited to help with the deception.
On 1 July, Task Force 38, including the Tucson, stood out of Leyte and headed northward. Recalling the subsequent voyage toward Japan, Booth said:
We did not get much sleep, and spent days studying all aspects of the deception plan, preparing deceptive dispatches and deceptive voice scripts for combat air operations, and trained our operators to simulate the "fist" and transmission characteristics of the actual operators identified with our Fleet and carrier type commands. All circuits we planned to use for deceptive transmissions were monitored for days prior to commencement of the deception so that we could acquaint our operators with current circuit conditions and traffic loads.
During the morning of 10 July 1945, more than 1,000 TF 38 planes launched strikes against Tokyo and its surrounding airfields. At 1400, after the attacking planes had been recovered, the task force headed northward, as a lone ship, the Tucson, steamed south at high speed. Task Force 38 and the cruiser commenced total radio silence, which was highly significant from the Japanese intelligence standpoint. Enemy analysts had learned that radio silence—a total communications blackout—indicated a U.S. attack was imminent.
Ensign Edward Behm, a 1944 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, was serving on board the Tucson as she set off on her mysterious solo voyage. He recalled that
[T]he Pacific was very calm during our mission, and the days were clear and bright. We would have been in big trouble if kamikazes had come out after us. I also remember that it was our navigation officer that had briefed the wardroom in advance of our mission and told us how we would soon be turning away from the Fleet and heading south, but not why. But the captain informed the crew over the 1MC, and well after we had already pulled away from the Fleet, that we were on a top-secret mission and that we would be without an escort.
The Hoax Begins
Several hours after separating from TF 38, at 1700, the deception began when the "Missouri," still steaming southward, broke the silence by sending the first of several urgent messages. The transmissions were classified as urgent in order not to raise Japanese suspicions about breaking the preattack radio silence. This message was to alert the Pacific Fleet's advanced headquarters on Guam that the flagship had experienced a teletype breakdown and was shifting to manual-keying (Morse code) communications. Receipt confirmation of the feigned equipment casualty report, however, was delayed for three hours due to numerous communications problems, including exceptionally heavy Japanese jamming on the frequencies used. Also, there was continuing interference from call sign "NUBO," later identified as a U.S. submarine. At 2012 the first manual keying between Booth's men and Guam was finally accepted.
After this initial dispatch was cleared, Tucson resumed radio silence as if attempting to cover her night movement. According to Booth, the cruiser again broke the silence "on schedule at 0127 on 11 July, with the transmission of two more urgent dispatches. This was done because we wanted to furnish the enemy a running direction finding track throughout the night."
By that time, a second part of the deception was already underway: the mimicking of normal communications between Task Force 38's carriers and aircraft. The four Tucson officers attached to the Dirty Tricks Department—Lieutenant Johnson, combat information center (CIC) officer; Lieutenant Lillywhite, fighter director officer; Lieutenant (junior grade) McCulley, ship's radio officer; and Ensign Graft, the CIC watch officer—played key roles. They were stationed with radio-control units in separate spaces in the ship: the CIC forward and aft controls, the chart room, and the radio transmitting room. From these different locations, the conversations between the "carriers" and their "planes" took place between 2100 on 10 July and 1800 on the 11th. Separating the "talkers" in spaces with different background noises was essential in order to effectively fake the sound of real transmissions, and the hoaxers used scripts to attain the proper sequence, timing, and content of the conversations.
Reporting on this elaborate aspect of the deception, Lieutenant Booth later wrote:
Peak transmission periods were at 2100-2300 . . . 10 July, and 0500-1200 . . . 11 July, with interim transmissions being made spasmodically. The evening script was concerned chiefly with the stationing of pickets and reporting on same, the assignment of ready deck and VFN [night fighter squadron] duty, radio checks, bogey reports and station keeping. During the time from 2300 . . . 10 July to 0500 . . . 11 July, transmissions were at a bare minimum in accordance with the normal strike day, mid-watch appearance of the Force IFD [inter-fighter director] circuit. Radio checks and contacts with pickets comprised the major portion of traffic in this period. During the peak morning period (0500-1200 . . . 11 July) transmissions dealt mainly with the launching and recovery of three air strikes, bogey contacts, weather reports, position, and radio checks. . . . The afternoon of July 11 was devoted to radio checks, bogey contacts, position reports, and routine messages.
A glitch in the operation, however, was that Booth's team was not given the exact time of the Kyushu air attacks. According to the lieutenant, with that information his unit could have coordinated "the deceptive transmissions with the actual arrival of planes over the target area and return to bases" and thus created a "much more realistic picture."
When the Tucson tricksters faked the recovery of the planes, the cruiser was some 570 miles south of the actual task force and directly east of Kyushu. The ship's crew was near exhaustion from remaining at heightened general quarters. According to Booth, "from the beginning of the operation to the end, neither my crew, nor I, got a wink of sleep for 50 or more hours." The cruiser's luck had held out during her southward cruise. Sonar and radar contacts were recorded in the deck log, but the lone ship was not attacked. The Tucson now headed northward to reunite with TF 38.
The Unexpected Happens
With their part of the operation completed, Booth and his team listened with head-shaking disbelief to shortwave-radio broadcasts over the next several days that threatened to compromise the entire deception. KGEI-KGEX out of San Francisco reported: "It has been 48 hours since reports were received from the Third Fleet which has been in complete radio silence since the Tokyo raids of Tuesday . . . planes based on Okinawa raided Kyushu yesterday, [11 July] attacking hangars and airfield installations." At 1300 and 1400 on 14 July, Voice of America broadcasts from the same station stated that "The Third Fleet headed north after the Tokyo raids of Tuesday" and Okinawa-based planes attacked Kyushu on 11-12 July.
Booth's immediate fear was that the Japanese would also pick up the broadcasts and conclude that TF 38 was not operating against southern Japan. A few weeks after the war, the lieutenant was greatly relieved when Admiral Carney told him that U.S. naval radio-intelligence units verified that the Japanese did in fact fall for the hoax and "rushed troops to defend themselves against a putative invasion at the southern end of their homeland." Moreover, the real Task Force 38 achieved total surprise when it struck targets in northern Japan.
On the 14th, TF 38 carriers launched 1,391 aerial sorties from about 100 miles off Tsugaru Strait, which separated the Japanese home islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. According to Admiral Carney, "There was no resistance to the strike at all, and we inflicted terrific damage. . . . They were sitting ducks." Area shipping was hardest hit. More air strikes followed on Sunday the 15th. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, the most important result of the attacks was the complete disruption of the railroad-car ferry system that carried coal from mines on Hokkaido across the strait to Honshu. Task Force 38 also turned loose battleship, heavy cruiser, and destroyer task units, which steamed close to shore and bombarded the Japan Iron Company works at Kamaishi and two facilities at Muroran, the Nihon Steel Company and the Wanishi Ironworks.
The Tucson, meanwhile, sighted a friendly ship early on the 15th, the USS McDermut (DD-677). The destroyer formed an antisubmarine screen for the cruiser, which after more than four days out on her own finally had some company. Later in the day the Tucson rejoined TF 38.
That night, the commander of the Third Fleet had a priority uncoded message flashed to the Tucson and Lieutenant Booth: "You were most deceitful and made Nips very unhappy. Well done, Halsey." In just a few short weeks, the USS Tucson had made her special mark in the war. Several weeks later, Admiral Halsey presented his head trickster a commendation in which he noted that Lieutenant Booth's "original contributions to operational technique, good judgment, and efficient execution of the tasks assigned to him were of great value in the successful Third Fleet operations against the Japanese homeland." The admiral was careful not to mention the deception, which would remain a closely guarded secret for decades.
Author's Note: I was first introduced to Lea Booth and his wife, Mary Morris Booth, by Captain Robert Peniston, U.S. Navy (Retired), a former commanding officer of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) and a good friend of Lea's. For me, details of the deception operation first began coming together as 88-year-old Lea's health began to fail. Toward the end, it was only with the special help of Mary Booth that this story could be completed using Lea's wartime papers, and I am very grateful for her kind assistance. After a long illness, Lea Booth died at his home in Lynchburg, Virginia, on 10 May 2006.
Sources:
CAPT Edward Behm, telephone interviews with the author, December 2006 and February 2007.
LT A. Lea Booth, telephone interviews with the author in early 2005; wartime orders, notes, and related papers in the possession of Mary Morris Booth; "Why I Don't Drive a Honda," speech presented to the Sphex Club, Lynchburg, VA, 5 October 1989; "Task Force 38—Dirty Tricks," as told to Tom Helvig, Cryptolog, U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association, Spring 2006, vol. 27, no. 2.
ADM Robert B. Carney, letter, Shipmate, alumni magazine of the U.S. Naval Academy, June 1986; oral history, Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, New York, New York.
History of U.S. Naval Communications 1939–45, declassified study prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Communications, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.
James L. Mooney, ed., Dictionary of American Navy Fighting Ships, vol. VII (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1981).
Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963); Victory in the Pacific, 1945, vol. 14, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).
USS Tucson (CL-98), deck logs, action report, and war diary, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.