Following are excerpts from the works of a few men who helped shape the sea services into what they are today.
Some Ideas about Organization on Board Ship
By Lieutenant Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant King's observations about the Navy's shortcomings in efficient organization, for which he won the Prize Essay Contest for 1909, exemplify what the U.S. Naval Institute has achieved for a century and a quarter: an unparalleled, open forum for the discussion—sometimes controversial—of issues affecting the sea services.
It is universally admitted that the service is in need of reform in the matter of organization, and this is as necessary on board ship as in any other connection. The methods of handling personnel now obtaining in the service are largely due to accretion, combined with the primary disadvantage that there has never been any logical system, founded on principles, on which to base anything. The result is that the Navy personnel have no semblance of organization, other than what exists temporarily; in the matter of personnel the service leads a "hand-to-mouth" existence. It must be conceded that this state of affairs has one advantage, for the personnel can be adjusted to any situation or requirements whatsoever; its lack of system forces on it the qualities of elasticity and adaptability to a degree.
The writer fully realizes the possible opposition, for if there is anything more characteristic of the Navy than its fighting ability, it is the inertia to change, or conservatism, or the clinging to things that are old because they are old. It must be admitted that this characteristic has been in many things a safeguard; it is also true that in quite as many it has been a drag to progress. . . .
The desirability—not to say necessity—of having a standard system of organization must be admitted by every one who has given due consideration to the subject of organization on board ship. The large numbers of men on board our ships and the size and characteristics of the ships themselves preclude the advisability of continuing the methods at present in use. Endeavor has been made in the foregoing "suggestions" to bring forth a system of organization that disturbs established conditions as little as possible in attaining the desired and requisite results as to uniformity, system, and embodiment of the principles of organization and administration. It is believed that consideration of the "requirements" set down as proper and necessary to a standard system of organization will show that each and every one of them is necessary and reasonable. It is further believed that due consideration of the "suggestions" will show that they must meet the "requirements" in a logical and practical manner. The following principal changes are involved:
1. The freeing of the executive officer from an unwieldy mass of detail, while in no way detracting from his proper supervision and control.
2. The increase of the responsibility and authority of the officers commanding divisions.
3. The abolition of the powder-division and establishment of a ship's staff.
4. Definition of the authority and responsibility of officers commanding divisions and of the ship's staff.
5. Standardization of gun-divisions into five classes so that, as nearly as possible, a given class of gun-division will man the same number of guns on any and all ships.
6. The inclusion of the personnel of the ammunition supply in the personnel of all gun-divisions.
The whole gist of the changes will be seen to center in (1) the standardization of gun-divisions as to personnel and manning armament, and (2) the bringing into prominence of the division as the base-group to be dealt with on board ship.
As the changes chiefly concern the gun-divisions and the officers commanding them, there will be set down here a summary of the status of the gun-divisions as intended; they are to:
A. Be composed of men of all ratings (except engineer force and ship's staff) in quotas proportionate to the class of the division.
B. Man and maintain certain assigned guns and accompanying means of ammunition supply, according to class of division as to numbers and caliber of guns.
C. Man and maintain certain assigned portions of the gear used in emergency-drills and exercises.
D. Man and maintain certain assigned boats.
E. Maintain certain assigned portions of the ship structure and its equipment.
F. Furnish a proportionate quota of petty officers and men for the permanent, semi-permanent, special, battle, and temporary details.
G. Be stationed, drilled, instructed, and trained by their own officers in all that relates to their duties as divisions.
H. Be supervised, directed, and controlled by their own officers and petty officers in all division administration and employment.
I. Have each its own particular quarters for berthing, messing, and general living-space.
J. Be organized internally on the basis of the arrangement necessary in action.
In the category of "the more things change, the more they remain the same," Lieutenant King addresses the issue of retention:
The desirability of permanence in the enlisted personnel of the Navy is obvious, and much has been written about ways to keep men in the service; many ideas for the attainment of this desirable state of personnel have been brought forward—aids to contentment, more pay, more liberty, better food, etc. So far as is known, there has never been advanced in this connections a principal aid to efficiency—permanence of association—and its usual consequent—esprit de corps; it is, however, commonly known that many re-enlist to be with comrades in the service, or to remain on a ship where the associations are pleasing or the achievements of the ship a source of pride.
A principal advantage of permanent organization is in connection with recruiting. There are two general methods of keeping up personnel: (1) by replacing losses in already organized groups by recruits, (2) by allowing organized groups to pass away and replacing them by groups newly formed. All experience goes to show that the first method is in all respects the better; it is the one in almost universal use. Permanence of association and esprit de corps can exert their full influence only in permanent organizations. Recruits joining an old organization speedily learn their duties and take the tone of the experienced men, from whom they acquire, almost unconsciously, a great deal of practical information that is neither taught at drill, learned from books, nor imparted by instruction. They come at once under the command of experienced leaders and can be rounded into shape in the least possible time. They are inspired, too, by the esprit de corps of an organization that has made a name for itself or has gained confidence and ability from experience and long association.
In conclusion, Lieutenant King highlighted the major advantage to on-board reorganization:
It will be noted that with personnel organized in the manner described, mobilization becomes an affair of comparative ease and certainty, either in peace or war.
Lieutenant King rose to the rank of Fleet Admiral and served as the Chief of Naval Operations and President of the Naval Institute during World War II.
Military Value and Tactics of Modern Submarines
By Lieutenant C. Nimitz, U.S. Navy
When Lieutenant Nimitz wrote this analysis of "modern submarines" in December 1912, most of the world's submarines were "modern."
The military value of any vessel designed for war purposes depends largely on the following factors:
A. Communication, or the ability to transmit and receive information or battle orders either before or during contact with an enemy.
B. Mobility, or the ability to move quickly from place to place in all conditions of weather. Under this factor may be included the habitability of the vessel, or its ability to maintain a crew in normal health and fighting power.
C. Invulnerability, or the ability to resist attack.
D. Offensive strength, or the ability to deal a telling blow when in contact with the enemy.
In estimating the military value of the submarine or submersible, as compared with the modern battleship, we find that each has a distinct and separate value. The battleship on account of its mobility as defined above can operate where submarines or submersibles of the present day cannot go, due to their lack of mobility. On the other hand, leaving out the factor of mobility, which for submarine craft of the future will advance more rapidly than for surface craft, we find that submarine craft rank equally well, if not better than surface craft.
Lieutenant Nimitz goes on to discuss communication, mobility (the diesel internal combustion engine), and invulnerability, then begins a comparison of submarines and submersibles.
The hull of the submarine is generally of the spindle form, the cross sections being circles. This form of hull gives greater strength for equal weight of scantling, and is the form best adapted for submerged speed. With the form of hull, however, the maximum surface speed is reached when running at about 15 knots. The reserve buoyancy of the submarine when light is about 20% of the total displacement. The submersible has a "ship-shaped" form of hull, that is, its hull has more nearly the form of a surface torpedo boat. The surface speed of the submersible can easily be made high enough to enable it to accompany a sea-keeping fleet of battleships, whereas its submerged speed will fall about 20% below a submarine of equal size. The submersible having a reserve buoyancy of about 60% is apparently a better sea boat than the submarine. The submersible with its "ship shape" hull cannot be built with the same strength as the submarine, and where submarines are built to stand a submergence of 200 feet with safety, the submersible is guaranteed only to depths of 150 feet. It would seem then in order to obtain groups of sea-keeping submarine craft, it will be necessary to adopt the "submersible" type. . . .
Tactics
For the purpose of tactics submarines may be divided according to their capabilities into three classes, viz., harbor defense, coast defense, and sea-keeping offensive submarines.
Taking into consideration the capabilities of the harbor defense boats, this class should be sent to the Philippines, where the areas of defense around such strategical points as the entrance to Manila or Subig [Subic] bays are comparatively small. Four of this class are now in commission in Manila Bay, two are in commission on the West Coast, and four are in reserve in Charleston, South Carolina. The five new boats of this class are admirably adapted for the defense of either end of the Panama Canal. For the protection of the harbors on the East and West coasts of the United States, there should be a group of five submarines and one suitable tender stationed at each of the harbors and places which are considered worthy of protection for strategical reasons. There are now only 24 submarines available for this purpose, and it is estimated that for the proper protection for the East and West coasts of the United States, there should be a total of 55 submarines on the East Coast, and a total of 45 submarines on the West Coast. . . .
As stated before, there are now 24 submarines built or building, and a total of 100 are required to form a complete chain of defense about the great harbors and cities of our country. No mention has been made of the submarines for the defense of our over-sea possessions, such as Guam, Hawaiian Islands, etc., but it is believed that a mobile tender with a group of five submarines will most effectively prevent the operations of a hostile fleet in these waters.
The tactics of a group of harbor defense submarines are extremely simple. Their limited submerged radius and speed will not enable them to operate far from the entrance of the harbor which they are protecting. The lack of reliable under-water communication makes it impossible to change plans of action once the group is submerged, without giving the enemy a clue as the submarine's whereabouts. The argument might here be made that the enemy must know that certain harbors have submarines for their protection, and that a prudent enemy would not venture to attack such a place, and that the submarines would thus accomplish their object without further effort. That might be true enough, but there are always enough commanders of the "damn the torpedoes and submarines" type who would take the risk, and it is for such kind that arrangements must be made. Any form of under-water signaling device at use in the present time can be accurately located in direction of the enemy. This apparatus for locating the direction of submarine signals is installed on practically every modern ship. So, for this reason alone, must the detailed plans for a group of harbor defense submarines be made explicit enough to cover every phase of an attack by a determined enemy. . . .
Coast Defense Submarines
The distinction between a coast defense and a harbor defense submarine lies in the greater submerged and surface endurance, the greater submerged and surface speed, and the better habitability conditions of the coast defense boat. Considering the most inferior of our present coast defense submarines, we find that they have been making cruises up and down the coast as far south as Norfolk, Virginia, and as far north as Gloucester, Massachusetts.
Our government on account of the general topography of its coast should not build any more strictly "harbor defense" boats. A "coast defense" group will accomplish with greater effect the same duties that are now accomplished by the harbor defense group. Countries in Europe are so close together that smaller submarine craft and more of them are of greater military value than fewer and larger submarines. Our general policy of submarine construction should not be too greatly influenced by the building programs of European nations. Ours is a separate and distinct problem. . . .
Tactics of an Offensive Sea-Keeping Group of Submarines
It is not within the province of this discussion to determine the exact tonnage and horse-power of a "sea-keeping submarine." That information can only be obtained by actual experience in running a group of submarines with a fleet engaged in active war maneuvers. No amount of computation of the number of cubic feet of space necessary for each person on board will suffice. A "sea-keeping offensive" submarine may be defined as a submarine which can keep the sea, ready for duty under all possible conditions of weather for indefinite periods. Such a submarine group could obtain supplies from vessels of the fleet which it accompanies, and be in every respect as mobile as any unit of the fleet.
The tactics of such a submarine group after contact with the enemy will be the same as the tactics already described for harbor defense and coastal defense submarines in contact with the enemy. The problem of maneuvering such a group into contact with the enemy, or to more accurately state the case, the problem of maneuvering the enemy's fleet into the "submarine danger area" must be solved by the commander-in-chief. . . .
Near the end of his essay, Lieutenant Nimitz makes the following unique proposal for deception of the enemy.
A ruse which might assist in forcing the enemy to keep away from certain areas and thus increase the chances of making the enemy cross the submarine danger zone would consist of having the fast scouts of the fleet drop numerous poles, properly weighted, to float upright in the water, and painted to look like a submarine's periscope. These same dummy periscopes floated out of a harbor with an ebb tide or dropped outside by scouts or fishermen may greatly influence the movements of an enemy sighting them. It would be extremely difficult to distinguish between dummy and real periscopes, for it is easy for a submarine to lie submerged and stationary with only a small amount of periscope showing.
Lieutenant Nimitz later rose in rank to Fleet Admiral and served two terms as Chief of Naval Operations and President of the Naval Institute.
The Price of Power
By Captain A. A. Burke, U.S. Navy
Even though it was only a review of a book written by Hanson Baldwin, Captain Burke—who became one of the most influential and respected officers in U.S. naval history—sent a wake-up call to his countrymen in the December 1948 Proceedings.
You will not like what this book says, but you will find it interesting. Mr. Baldwin points out clearly, too clearly for our complacency, that there is no easy road to success for nations. Our national future holds bright promises, but promises which can become realities only by a willing, cooperating people working together for a common purpose and devoted to a common ideal. Hard work, acceptance of responsibility, carefully prepared long-range plans, and upright, courageous leaders are the requirements for our national security. There is no panacea to insure our future. Only by squarely facing our national problems and solving them with hard work and horse sense can the United States retain its power and vitality. . . .
[W]e as a nation are just commencing to realize what leadership of the world means. Slowly we are recognizing that the peace and stability of the world are dependent upon what we do and what we plan to do. We are finding that the free peoples of the world expect us to shoulder our enormous responsibilities and exercise the skill and foresight so necessary for any leader. Our course must be charted carefully, for our ship is in the van; and if we pile on the rocks, many who are following in our wake and depending on the accuracy of our course will be wrecked with us. The United States, like the captain of a ship, is also becoming aware of the lonesomeness of leadership, of the need for just decisions in the face of conflicting advice and in spite of pressure. The decisions we make will command respect only if they are sound and timely. They can be sound only if they are based on analysis of all the factors involved. They can be timely only if possible contingencies are foreseen and plans made to meet them. . . .
The strength of the nation is dependent upon the integrity and wisdom of the government, upon the economic stability of the country, and upon the strength of its armed forces. . . . Not all the things that are desirable can be done. There must be balances between military requirements and requirements for the supporting (civilian) economy, between offensive and defensive measures, between military control and civilian control, between centralization and decentralization. There are balances within each of the services. . . . To win a war, or to keep the peace, the United States will require all hands, each with an appointed task, each doing that task well. . . .
Captain Burke rose to the rank of Admiral and served as Chief of Naval Operations and President of the Naval Institute.
Foreword for Midway
By Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Admiral Spruance wrote his foreword for Midway, The Battle That Doomed Japan—The Japanese Navy's Story [published in 1955 by the Naval Institute Press] while en route from the Philippines, where he had served as U.S. ambassador since 1952.
During the Battle of Midway the "fog of war" was fairly thick, in spite of the excellent intelligence which we had prior to it. For instance we were not sure of the fate of the Hiryu until a number of days after her sinking, when our Midway search located and rescued a boatload of survivors from her engine rooms. Similarly, the identity and the fate of the Mikuma were in doubt for some time. The last we knew of the Mikuma was when we photographed her late on the afternoon of 6 June, as she lay disabled and dead in the water, with survivors on her bow and stern. The next morning she had disappeared when one of our submarines investigated the area. The fact that Admiral [Isoroku] Yamamoto with seven battleships, one carrier, cruisers, and destroyers was operating to the northwestward of Midway was not known to us for several months after the battle.
The present volume is a most valuable historical contribution to our knowledge of Japanese naval planning and operations, from the months leading up to the outbreak of war through the first six months of the war itself. . . .
I am more than ever impressed with the part that good or bad fortune sometimes plays in tactical engagements. The authors give us credit, where no credit is due, for being able to choose the exact time for our attack on the Japanese carriers when they were at the greatest disadvantage—flight decks full of aircraft fueled, armed and ready to go. All I can claim credit for, myself, is a very keen sense of the urgent need for surprise and a strong desire to hit the enemy carriers with our full strength as early as we could reach them.
Two other points may be of interest in reading the Japanese account of Midway. One is our retirement to the eastward for some hours during the night of 4-5 June. The situation toward sundown on 4 June was that Admiral [Frank Jack] Fletcher's afternoon search from Yorktown had located and reported Hiryu; then Yorktown had been disabled by two torpedo hits from Hiryu's second attack; and finally Enterprise and Hornet's planes had knocked out Hiryu. After Enterprise and Hornet had recovered aircraft, I decided to retire to the eastward so as to avoid the possibility of a night action with superior forces; but to turn back to the westward during the night, so that at daylight we would be in air supporting distance of Midway, in case the enemy were to attack there. The Japanese did order a night attack.
The second point concerns what occurred on 6 June, the third and last day of the battle. I had desired to chase and to inflict as much damage as possible on the retreating enemy. We knew, however, that the Japanese had strong air forces on Wake waiting to garrison Midway after its capture. I had decided in advance that I would keep outside of the 700 mile circle from Wake to avoid attack by these forces. When the day's action on 6 June was over—one search mission, three attack missions, and one photographic mission—we were short of fuel, and I had a feeling, an intuition perhaps, that we had pushed our luck as far to the westward as was good for us. Accordingly, we turned back to the eastward and headed for the oiler rendezvous which Admiral [Chester] Nimitz had set up for us. Had we continued on to the westward during the night of 6-7 June, we would probably have run foul of Yamamoto and his superior Japanese forces the next morning.
Our success at the Battle of Midway was based primarily on the excellent intelligence which enabled Admiral Nimitz to exercise to the full his talent for bold, courageous, and wise leadership. He recalled Task Forces 16 and 17 from the South Pacific and, with no time to spare, had them lying in wait to the northeast of Midway. He disposed his available submarines to the northwestward of Midway. He strengthened the defenses of Midway itself with Marines, artillery, and aircraft, and instituted air searches over the critical areas. . . .
Admiral Fletcher, Commander Task Force 17, was also in overall command of Task Forces 16 and 17 and played a very important part in the battle. The Yorktown's air group did splendid work as a unit until their ship was disabled, and after that the individual aircraft recovered by Enterprise and Hornet continued in the fight for the following two days. . . .
Admiral Spruance was one of the most successful and popular naval leaders of World War II.
Why the Naval Institute Matters
Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), author of Storm Landings (1997) and Utmost Savagery (1995)—I became a member as an NROTC midshipman at North Carolina in the late 1950s. I had to stop when the cost of baby food and diapers eclipsed the luxury of receiving Proceedings. By the time I resumed membership, I was a field-grade officer and heavily engaged with my naval counterparts in amphibious warfare, sorely in need of cross-pollination. Then and now, Proceedings gives me the edge, as does Naval History. I'll always find others with something meaningful to say to me about our profession of naval arms.
Rear Admiral Charles J. Beers, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—submariner, member of the Naval Institute's Editorial Board from 1992 to 1997. Over the 30-plus years that I have been a member, the Naval Institute has provided me with an insight into the rest of the Navy on issues and viewpoints. We in the Navy, as a result of our narrow career paths, have become focused on the nuts and bolts of our professional sub-specialties. We rarely receive training outside of that necessary to do our jobs in the strictest sense—even the Naval War College tends to be somewhat narrow in focus. No other forum we have as professionals allows such open discussion of unfettered thoughts, free input of ideas, or opportunities for sharing experiences, developments, or frustrations.
Mr. A. D. Baker, III—author of Combat Fleets of the World, 1998-1999. Now retired after 34 years with the Department of the Navy and living in a house stuffed with 40-plus years of Proceedings and Naval History, a high percentage of the output of the Naval Institute Press for the past four decades, and files overflowing with correspondence and photographs generated by my work with Combat Fleets of the World, I am grateful to the Naval Institute for having brought me so much sheer fun—the fun of knowing what is going on in the still huge and always dynamic institution of the U.S. Navy and in its interactions with U.S. and international armed services. The Naval Institute gives its membership—and its even wider readership—a glorious opportunity to inform and to be informed.
Commander Joseph A. Gattuso, Jr., U.S. Navy—Navy strike fighter pilot, frequent Naval Institute panelist. The Naval Institute is an arena for ideas, opinions, reactions; sometimes not all the seats are filled. Yet for those who do battle the lions, it is an opportunity to contribute to a forum where naval professionals sharpen their analytical and writing skills and, in some instances, their moral courage. The price of admission is ordered, well-expressed thoughts, clear and original ideas, and solutions to pressing dilemmas.
Dr. Kenneth J. Hagan—Professor and Museum Director Emeritus, U.S. Naval Academy; lecturer at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. The Naval Institute has "come a long way" since 1873, and in the last 20 years it has bestowed a vigorous new sense of legitimacy on the field of naval history, which too often is treated as a dependent cousin of military history. The Naval Institute's book list constitutes a marvelous academic and intellectual compendium; Proceedings is the preeminent international engine for debate about the present and future of the U.S. Navy; and Naval History publishes path-breaking articles on every conceivable aspect of the field. These offerings are characterized by a remarkable breadth, objectivity, and critical perspective. Rear Admiral Edward J. Hogan, U.S. Navy (Retired)—retired naval aviator and frequent contributor to Proceedings. Like a ship's captain who cannot ignore situations that endanger his command, those of us who worry about the traditions and soul of our Navy can use this forum to express concerns in a responsible fashion. The Naval Institute provides those who care about the naval service an independent forum to express views both to policy-makers and members. The professionalism and integrity of the Naval Institute ensure that the forum will be heard—even views contrary to current political sentiment.
Rear Admiral John T. Natter, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—served on the Naval Institute's Board of Control from 1994 to 1998, acting as Editorial Board Chairman from 1996 to 1998. The Naval Institute is the conscience of our naval profession, obligating us to remain true to our heritage, our traditions, and our commitment to those who have preceded us and to those who will follow. As we celebrate its 125th birthday, we Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen must continue to call on our conscience, searching for and finding the wisdom to remain vigilant yet humble, ready to defend yet eager to build, and knowledgeable yet ready to learn.