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Admiral Hyman G. Rickover Material

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- Adair worked with Undersecretary of the Navy Thomas Gates in the mid-1950s to round up some funds requested by Rickover, 601-602

(RADM Charles Adair)

- Anderson made it clear as CNO that he wouldn't tolerate Rickover's improper interviews of prospective personnel in the nuclear field anymore, 485-487; Anderson wrote a personal note to Rickover before stepping down as CNO in 1963 and received no reply, 598

(ADM George W. Anderson, Jr. , Volume II)

- Attempts in the late 1950s to influence the design of Polaris-armed nuclear submarines, 415-418, 498-499; role in selecting and training two crews per submarine, 418-419; in the early 1950s writer Clay Blair, Jr., mounted a publicity campaign on behalf of flag rank for Rickover, 471-472; selection of submarine commanding officers, 497-498; Trident submarines became too large because of Rickover's influence, 499

(CDR Paul H. Backus)

- Difficulties dealing with the "czar" of the Navy's nuclear power program in the early 1970s, 253-254

(ADM Worth Bagley in Zumwalt Staff Officers, Volume I)

- Rickover was comparable to the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover in his use of publicity and cultivation of Congress, 103-104; very cautious in ensuring that engineering designs didn't get ahead of the state of the art, 323-324

(Hanson W. Baldwin, Volume I)

- Humiliated the commanding officer of the Naval Supply Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, while heading an investigation there in early 1945, 212-213

(RADM George W. Bauernschmidt, SC)

- As head of the nuclear power program Rickover was described as a perfectionist, 26-27; in the early 1950s Time correspondent and Pentagon regular Clay Blair had a continuous curiosity in the fact Captain Rickover was being bypassed for flag officer rank, 454-456; Rickover was reluctant to be interviewed by the news media, 456-458

(RADM Roy S. Benson, Volume I)

- Warned Benson in the early 1960s about being used by subordinates and civilian contractors, 664, 684, 700; briefed Benson before the flag selection board in the early 1960s, 684; shared his philosophies with Benson, 684-686; secrecy during a visit to Pearl Harbor in the early 12960s, 705-706; relationship with Benson, 706-707; handling of the overhaul in the early 1960s of the Swordfish (SSN-579), 694, 710-711; praised by an Atomic Energy Commission official in mid-1961, 714-715; disliked Benson's soliciting ideas for future submarines in 1961, 738

(RADM Roy S. Benson, Volume II)

- Rickover's criticism helped improve the educational standards at the Naval Academy, 35-36; Rickover's efforts to close the shipyard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 64-65; Rickover's early efforts to achieve nuclear-powered submarines included a strong emphasis on protecting information, 190-192; credit must be given to the Nautilus (SSN-571) and the background mentor Rickover for the full acceptance of nuclear power, 314; Rickover pushed nuclear power as exemplified by the Nautilus to the limit, 318; Rickover didn't need any help on nuclear training, 320-321; Beshany's first real interface with Rickover concerned safety criteria and operational criteria, 323-327; Rickover's personality became a detriment to some extent in dealing with fleet commanders' requests and in other countries jumping on the bandwagon to limit the Nautilus's ports of entry, 327-328; Rickover took over all personnel selection, 328-329; problems of retention, 329-330; Rickover's ability to get submarines built when the money was hard to come by, 331-333; Rickover's program was above reproach in imposing limits to ensure an incident didn't occur, 358-359

(VADM Philip A. Beshany, Volume I)

- Rickover was in charge of training nuclear handlers, 498-499, 897; Rickover supported improving the quality of submarine life in the 1960s, 512; Rickover was a key figure in the technical versus operational struggle in the submarine program, 537-538, 553-556, 705-706, 863-865; after approval difficulties Rickover was able to pressure Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius to authorize construction of two turbine-electric drive submarines in 1969, 687-689; Rickover supported the submarine development division's push for a high-speed nuclear attack sub in the late 1960s, 705-707; Beshany's relations with Rickover in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 705-706, 739, 910; Rickover's influence on Admiral Thomas Moorer's 1968 subcommittee to project the Navy's needs in the mid-1970s, 710; Rickover's feelings on moderate submarine improvements regarding the Sturgeon-class (SSN-637), 712-713; Rickover opposed Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze's 1968 proposal to build a small inexpensive sub modeled on the Narwhal (SSN-671), 721-723, 825; Rickover didn't make it apparent in the Navy's handling of the April 1963 loss of the Thresher (SSN-593) that until that time they couldn't test other techniques to join pipes, 727; Rickover fought for a parochial arrangement regarding the submarine program within the CNO's staff, 826-827; Rickover's relationship with CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, 827, 829-830, 854-855; Rickover made apparent his opposition to Zumwalt's choice of Beshany as first Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare (OP-02) in the 1970s, 827-828, 836-837, 840-842; Rickover worked for the improvement of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in the early 1970s, 838-840; the beginning of real relations between Beshany and Rickover after several months, 842-843; the proportion of OP-02 personnel trained by Rickover, 843-844; Rickover worked for a missile-launching submarine in 1971, 852-854; Rickover's refusal to allow foreign vessels to be repaired in U.S. shipyards employing nuclear power led to overcrowding in the non-nuclear yards, 891-892; Rickover was a proponent of a substantial bonus for young submariners versus continuous special pay, 894-895

(VADM Philip A. Beshany, Volume II)

- Rickover's role in the Polaris project was almost entirely restricted to the submarine itself, 214; Colwell had little direct contact with Rickover while in OP-93, 271-272; while Deputy for Operations and Readiness Colwell's relationship with Rickover was one of mutual support as the two agreed on various issues, 350-351; there was a lot of dissatisfaction early on Rickover's control over nuclear qualified personnel, but eventually it was tolerated, 351-352

(VADM John Barr Colwell)

- Severely conserved fuel as an engineer in the USS New Mexico (BB-40) in the mid-1930s to win battle efficiency pennant, 121-122, 522; praised for his handling of the Navy's nuclear power program, 122, 371, 564; attitude towards bureaucracy, 123; Time writer Clay Blair reported Navy's opposition to Rickover in mid-1950s, 369-370s, 373; circumstances of flag rank promotions, 371-373, 460; hypocritical in promoting disarmament in the early 1980s, 373; used obnoxious behavior as a tool to get listeners' attention, 399-401; defended by Cutter's friend, K.G. Schacht, 522; put in a request for Naval Academy athletic tickets for someone else in late 1950s, but was scrupulously honest about it, 588-589

(CAPT Slade D. Cutter, Volumes I and II)

- Proponent of eliminating varsity football at U.S. Naval Academy in the early 1960s in favor of swimming and hiking, 384

(RADM John F. Davidson)

- Rickover had a very good cooperative relationship with the Bureau of Naval Personnel, 476-479; Rickover wouldn't deal with the submarine desk in BuPers because they were all diesel submariners, 477-478; Rickover was extended beyond normal retirement, but he didn't have a sea command, 514

(ADM Charles K. Duncan, Volume I)

- Rickover's efforts to grab every bright scholar he could, 698; Duncan acted as liaison with Rickover for the Bureau of Naval Personnel, 781-849; Duncan explained why he wished to remark on Rickover, 781-782; Duncan's discussion of Rickover's strengths and commendable qualities, 782-783, 786-787, 791, 804-805, 829-830, 849; the submarine force was a close-knit group and was shattered to be effectively governed by an outsider, 783-784; Duncan was warned when he came to his position at BuPers in 1962 that he'd likely be designated the sole contact in the bureau for Rickover, 784-785; President John F. Kennedy's acceleration of the delivery of Polaris submarines constituted a tremendous problem for BuPers, 786; the submariners' outlook was that the sub people controlled their own personnel and included an emphasis on the war record, 787-788; the Navy was still largely diesel in the period 1956-1962, 787-788; Duncan explained the submarine community felt threatened by Rickover's assigning of personnel, 788-789; Rickover perceived his tremendous control and the great leverage he wielded in his Atomic Energy Commission position, 789-791; the high standards Rickover set for men coming into the program, 791-800; Rickover was constantly getting on Duncan for not producing an acceptable flow of men, 791-792; Rickover's exacting standards for personnel in the plant and for officers, 792-793; a concession was won finally when Rickover accepted people from Officer Candidate School, 793-794; Rickover's use of insults during his interviews, 794-795; Duncan found intense loyalty in the personnel to The Program while at the shore installation nuclear prototype in Connecticut, 795-796; Duncan recounted one of his few cases of one-upmanship on Rickover, 795-796; Rickover policed the enlisted by use of agents, 796; small concessions were made in the combining cutting test score Rickover required but never much progress, 796-797; Rickover never permitted a sufficient number of recruits for the nuclear submarines, 797-798; two classes of submariners developed due to Rickover's being unyielding on skippers having to be nuclear-qualified, 798-799; Rickover soon desired only younger officers and set an age cut-off on whom he'd interview, 799-800; the Navy worried about finding a successor since Rickover would eventually die, 800, 802-804; unlike the diesel submariners Duncan could see where Rickover was going with his efforts, 800-801; Rickover's disdain for any of his officers or potential picks being contaminated by work with diesel submarines, 801-802; Rickover had a perfect rapport with Congress and the press loved his anti-establishment outlook, 805; Rickover's continued assignment beyond retirement age, 805-808; the congressional proposal to advance Rickover to four-star rank, 808-809; the submarine community's contempt for Rickover was partially built on his never being qualified for command, 809-810; the early move to have officer recruits not be volunteers led to some being selected who resigned rather than serve under Rickover, 810-812; Duncan had the finest of relationships with the submarine desk at BuPers, 813-814; one of Duncan's functions as liaison officer was to make "treaties" between Rickover and BuPers, 814-815; Rickover was unquestionably one of the most difficult people to deal with, 815-816; Rickover attempted several times to educate Duncan on nuclear power, 816-817; Rickover's great awareness of people sensitivities and his ability to use power, 817-818; Rickover's use of submarine prototypes for training, 818-820, 823-824, 832-833; Duncan disputed Rickover's claims of having the lowest Navy costs for training, 820-822; an example of his way to reduce his costs was to shift some reactor costs from the AEC to the Navy, 822-823; Rickover insisted on continuing to prove his punctual work ethic, 824-825; Rickover's emphasis on safety, 825-827; Rickover strove for perfection but displayed intellectual arrogance, 826-827; nuclear submarines wouldn't have been developed as successfully in the same time frame without a Rickover, 827-828; Rickover's chosen methods weren't the necessary way but they still proved successful, 828-829; Rickover's treatment of the industrial companies wasn't exaggerated, 828-829; because of his political support in Congress not even the CNO could challenge Rickover, 830; analysis and impact of Rickover's training system, 830-831; Rickover grabbed an extremely high proportion of the science/math inclined personnel and it was hard to extract them from the program once in, 831-832; part of Rickover's efforts to prove his training was the least expensive was to refuse sharing of recreation costs for his men at Bainbridge and to ensure no new nuclear-power buildings would be built when moving from Bainbridge, 833-835; Rickover insisted on continuous training and had the power to drop men at will from the program, 835-837; Rickover didn't use existing agencies much in the detailing of his training system, 837-840; Rickover did permit and even promoted those he selected to draw the highest permissible salary, 840-841; after early confrontations Rickover and Duncan became fairly close associates, 841-842; Rickover challenged the Bureau to take over all facets of training in the nuclear program, 842-843; Duncan called on a conference on the subject of taking over full nuclear training which affronted Rickover, 843-845; Rickover had a few trusted agents very loyal to him, 845-846; Rickover's attitude toward office quarters was that they should be unimaginably sparse and austere, 846-847; Duncan's comments on the theory that Rickover was "getting even" with the Navy for earlier discrimination, 846-847; Duncan explained why he and the Navy didn't attempt to confront or buck Rickover, 848-849

(ADM Charles K. Duncan, Volume II)

- Rickover was among those who contended that there were too many flag rank officers in the services, 1317-1318

(ADM Charles K. Duncan, Volume III)

- Rickover's treatment of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company when it refused to build any more nuclear aircraft carriers in the 1960s, 1770-1771

(ADM Charles K. Duncan, Volume IV)

- As assistant engineer officer in the battleship New Mexico (BB-40) in the mid-1930s so intimidated enlisted men in his department that he left a legacy of fear, 222-225; tried to go around Edwards in dealing with destroyer matters in BuShips during World War II, 317; difficult to deal with while serving in BuShips in the early 1950s, 368, 370-372; selection for rear admiral in 1953 was politically directed by the Secretary of the Navy, 374-376

(CAPT Frederick A. Edwards, Sr.)

- In the early 1950s Rickover spoke at the Naval War College and spoke in condescending fashion to his audience, 218-219; the Chief of the Bureau of Ships was tearing his hair out over nuclear submarines while Rickover was there 303; Rickover was reluctant to take responsibility and sponsor the North Pole expedition of the Nautilus (SSN-571), 303; people became irritated when Rickover was billed as the father of the nuclear submarine, 303-304; Rickover argued in favor of more nuclear-powered ships based on the erroneous belief that the cost of nuclear power would decrease rapidly, 304

(ADM Harry D. Felt, Volume I)

- Assessed by Apollo Soucek in early 1960s, 212-213

(RADM Francis D. Foley, Volume I)

- Naval War College students angered about secretive attitude of Rickover when he gave address on the Nautilus (SSN-571) in mid-1953, 596-597

(RADM Francis D. Foley, Volume II)

- As OP-03 in the early 1960s, Griffin was the one who had to handle Rickover so that the port entry requests for nuclear-powered ships would no longer be disapproved, 501-503; Griffin secured Rickover's cooperation from that point on, 503; Griffin pushed on CNO Admiral George Anderson to include Rickover in meetings discussing nuclear propulsion, 503; Rickover gained tremendous power and backing in Congress which wasn't paralleled in the Navy, 504-505; Griffin was confident of the calculations that the Enterprise (CVAN-65) would have enough fuel for its round-the-world excursion since Rickover had verified them, 641

(ADM Charles D. Griffin, Volume II)

- In 1945 Hooper had to contend with Rickover's demands while at the Ordnance Fleet Maintenance Office, 130-131; Rickover's order to dispatch supply ships with ordnance to Okinawa was rejected by Hooper, 135-136; in the 1970s Hooper was requested by Rickover to look over The Nuclear Navy 1946-1962 but insisted no one else see it, 175-176; Hooper dealt with Rickover concerning the development of nuclear propulsion, 182-184; Rickover's relations with Hooper as Director of Naval History, 486-487; Rickover planned to recommend to the new Director of Naval History that Hooper work on the volumes of a new series dealing with the Navy in Vietnam, 490-491; Rickover's interest in the story of the sinking of the Maine, 491-492; Hooper's part in getting Rickover's manuscript on the Maine sinking published, 492-494

(VADM Edwin B. Hooper)

- As director of the Navy's nuclear power program, felt that ships should stay at sea indefinitely, 444-445; interviews with Admiral Rickover for entrance to the nuclear submarine program, 541-543; assessed by Hyland, 543, 546, 548, 550-552; Rickover's view of submariners, 543-544, 550; insisted that all nuclear skippers write to him directly, ignoring the chain of command, 547-548; thoughts on the Naval Academy, 549; strong congressional support, 548, 551; efforts to get rid of him, 550-552; concerned with drug and alcohol abuse within his program, 558

(ADM John J. Hyland, Jr., Volume II)

- Lieutenant Rickover's duty as executive officer aboard the S-48 (SS-159) in Panama, 100-103; Rickover handled a tense situation between the machinist's mate and the captain of the S-48, 105-106; Rickover and aviators worked to bring submarines to the forefront after World War II, 139-140; the difference between the screening process of Irvin and his fellow instructors and Rickover's schooling lay in judgment, 150-151; Irvin felt their screening was a better selection process than Rickover's interviews, 154

(RADM William D. Irvin, Volume I)

- Rickover's testimony before a congressional committee in 1955 led to a senior officer at the Bureau of Ships having to be replaced, 221-222; Rickover received a lot of consideration after Clay Blair's articles suggesting minority repression but he didn't deserve it, 224-226; Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates queried James on his rapport with Rickover as a preliminary to appointment as Chief of BuShips, 273-274; not a fair assessment to credit Rickover with the concept of nuclear-powered ships, 284; Rickover's appearances before Congress were always impatient and boorish, but congressmen was still loved him, 286-287; a distressed Rickover turned on Rear Admiral Robert Moore in a heated exchange, 287-288; James felt Rickover was dishonest about his possible responsibility for the loss of the Thresher (SSN-593), 288-289; Rickover gained his strength from his expertise in nuclear power and the arranged irreversible transfer from the program of anyone gaining prominence over him, 289-290; James observed the attitude of various line officers toward Rickover as childish and silly, 291-293; example of Rickover's exclusion from an important discussion on nuclear-powered ships, 293; Rickover tried to put a submarine officer in command of the Enterprise (CVAN-65), 306-307; the loss of the Thresher, 391-392; Rickover instituted a change in the nuclear plant controls after the loss, 392-394; as a candidate to replace James as Chief of BuShips in 1963 Admiral Bill Brockett had a greater rapport with Rickover than James was capable of achieving, 406

(RADM Ralph Kirk James)

- Rickover was unable to obtain enough volunteers to fill his quota for the nuclear program, 142

(ADM Roy L. Johnson)

- Rickover insisted that nuclear power be the first priority for midshipman service selection in the mid-1960s, 790, 1081; Rickover's opinion was that it was a waste of nuclear personnel's time to take up trivial assignments as company officers, 790; Rickover's reaction to Kauffman's selection as superintendent of the Naval Academy, 1079-1081

(RADM Draper L. Kauffman, Volume II)

- Disliked by Rear Admiral E. W. Grenfell and other officers, 241-242, 358, 367; dealings with the Secretary of the Navy's office in the early 1960s, 358; opposition to academic structure at the Naval Academy, 358-359, 363; criticized for interview for nuclear power candidates, 364; argument with Bureau of Naval Personnel over number of officers needed for nuclear submarine program, 365-367; issue of his extensions for age, 367-369; approves of rehabilitation of commanding officer involved in Permit (SSN-594) collision in early 1960s, 411; potential for criticism after loss of the Thresher (SSN-593) in 1963, 4l2

(Captain Alex A. Kerr)

- Was courteous after Lee accidentally stepped on him on board the submarine Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) in 1961, 294

(LCDR John W. Lee)

- Lee feels it was his academic credentials that first attracted Rickover's attention, 194-195; interview techniques, 297-307; admiration for Vice Admiral James Holloway, Jr., may have influenced Rickover's selection of the admiral's son for the nuclear power program in 1963, 310-311

(VADM Kent L. Lee, Volume I)

- Rickover's personality traits, 362-363, 366-367, 434; invited Lee to join him on the sea trials of the Ray (SSN-653) in March of 1967, 364-367; discussion of his interview style, 369-370; miffed that Lee didn't spend his entire two months as the prospective skipper of the Enterprise (CVAN-65) on board the carrier, 371-372; used information on the speed of Soviet submarines to justify funding a new class of U.S. subs in the late 1960s, 395-397; had a senator put into the Congressional Record a favorable article about Lee and the Enterprise in mid-1968, 445; rift with Lee over minor problem with a steam generator in the Enterprise in January 1969, 453-454, 492-494; inflexible in the case of a lieutenant who wanted out of the nuclear program two months early so he could attend graduate school, 508-509

(VADM Kent L. Lee, Volume II)

- As assistant engineer officer of the New Mexico (BB-40) in the late 1930s, Lieutenant Rickover's fierce competitive desire to win the engineering E efficiency award was evident during refueling, 43-45; Libby debunked the myth of Rickover's single-handed development of nuclear power over great objections in the Navy, 233-236

(VADM Ruthven E. Libby)

- Degrading job interview with Long in 1959, 180-181; political power, 182; rode on sea trials of nuclear submarines, 186-188, 288-289; had so much talent to choose from that he rejected some capable officers for the nuclear training program, 212-213; liked to keep trained officers as long as he could, 218; relationship with Levering Smith, 227; Long threatened to use Rickover's name during the Zumwalt people programs of the early 1970s, 283; emphasis on formality in submarine communications, 286-287; stormy personality, 288-290

(ADM Robert L. J. Long)

- Loughlin's experiences with Lieutenant Rickover as assistant chief engineer on the New Mexico (BB-40) in the late 1930s, 24-30, 37; Loughlin's favorable impressions of Rickover, 24-25; Loughlin's first meeting with Rickover, 26-27; an example of Rickover's generosity, 27-28; Rickover's strict conservation on the use of the battleship generators, 29; Loughlin felt Mrs. Ruth Masters Rickover was more brilliant than her husband, 30; Loughlin's relations with Rickover in the 1960s as one of his few friends, 30-31; Loughlin's belief that no diesel submarines would be built while Rickover was alive, 160; Loughlin's comparison of Rickover with Admiral Arleigh Burke as both being hard-working, 256; Rickover was able to keep the nuclear submarine safety record clean, 297-298; Rickover wasn't interested in patrol procedures, only the nuclear plants, 302; Loughlin believed credit should be given to Rickover for the quality training and personnel in nuclear submarines, 316-317; Loughlin's prognosis on what would happen when Rickover faded from the scene, 317-318

(RADM Charles Elliott Loughlin)

- Vice Admiral Rickover's attitude in the late 1950s on sending the submarine Nautilus (SSN-571) to the Arctic, 104; only the Chief of Bureau of Ships and Rickover in the bureau organization were aware of the Arctic cruise, 134

(Dr. Waldo Lyon)

- Rickover was a perfectionist, even in his days serving as a ship inspector in the Philippines before World War II, 115; Rickover wasn't satisfied with BuPers only giving him the top 10% of the officers program after the nuclear fleet began to expand, 268-269; Mack's first contact with Rickover went well, and they had a pretty good relationship, 269-270; Secretary of the Navy William Franke was sold on nuclear power and built a strong relationship with Rickover, 308-310; Rickover assisted in promoting the around-the-world cruise of nuclear-powered units, 400

(VADM William Mack, Volume I)

- Rickover's cautious attitude toward revealing information to the press on the loss of the Scorpion (SSN-589) and the Thresher (SSN-593) in the 1960s stemmed from his fear the blame might be quickly pointed at the nuclear propulsion system, 420-421; Rickover was a force unto himself with congressional committees, 473; Mack was aware of inevitable difficulties with Rickover in the 1970s on improving the Naval Academy, 652; Mack agreed with Rickover on strengthening the math and science curriculum, 654; Rickover's ideal for the academy regimen was for the midshipman to be nothing but a student, 658-659; Rickover's method of selecting midshipmen for his program, 659-664; Rickover never changed his annual presentation to the Appropriations Committee on the problems with the academy even though the previous year Mack had refuted all he'd said, 667; Secretary of the Navy John Warner decreed the new engineering laboratory at the Naval Academy would be named Rickover Hall, 668; the ceremony to dedicate the new laboratory, 669-670; additional comments on Rickover's distaste for athletics, 670-673; Mack worked on convincing Rickover of the absence of an honor system in the fleet, 702-704; Mack felt that his successor as superintendent succumbed to pressure from Rickover and beefed up the science/engineering areas of a non-credit lecture seminar series on the professional officer as a human being, 707; Rickover failed to prevail in abolishing oceanography entirely as a major at the academy, 724; Congress was similar to Rickover in not recognizing athletics as a proper function for midshipmen, 755; the back end of a nuclear sub where the engine room and machinery lay was Rickover's province, 786; Rickover's achievements were more well-known and given more publicity than Vice Admiral William Raborn's in the Polaris project, 787-788; Mack responded to Rickover's urgings on getting the "best young brains" into the academy by arranging a summer science seminar, 793-795; Mack's efforts to satisfy those students at the seminar who declined attending the academy based on the lengthy obligation period, 795-796

(VADM William Mack, Volume II)

- McDonald's recounting of the 1964 decision not to put nuclear power on the John F. Kennedy (CVA-67), 356-358; Rickover didn't agree with McDonald's move to stay away from nuclear power and thus acquire a badly needed carrier, McDonald disagreed with Rickover's answer to the money opposition to nuclear carriers, 358

(ADM David L. McDonald)

- In the 1950s selected Frank Ault for the nuclear power program, but Ault chose not to take part, 322; in the early 1960s proposed a civilian academic dean for the Naval Academy, 370, 399; delivered a diatribe to the Naval Academy midshipmen about what he perceived as wrong with the institution, 410; a building at the academy was named in his honor, 410; in the 1950s made an insulting speech to a group of scientists, 411; in the 1970s pushed for a higher percentage of technical majors among Naval Academy midshipmen in order to increase the pool of applicants for the nuclear power program, 569-576, 612-613, 619; Captain Vincent de Poix had to go through a rigorous program in the early 1960s with Rickover in order to qualify for command of the aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65), 574-575

(RADM Robert W. McNitt)

- While superintendent of the Naval Academy, Melson gave Rickover an opportunity to visit the academy and hear about the curriculum, but Rickover came only to lecture on his philosophy of education, 312-314

(VADM Charles L. Melson)

- Rickover's criticism of the quality of education at the academy was part of a great deal of hue and cry on upgrading academic efforts, 198

(CAPT Charles J. Merdinger)

- Minter was not an ardent admirer of Rickover, but believed he had it right in his professed belief on having his people exert their best effort, 9; Rickover was totally opposed to the academy sports program, but most superintendents have shared Minter's view of its vital part in the midshipman's life, 12

(VADM Charles S. Minter, Jr. , Volume I)

- Rickover was strongly opposed to Moorer's suggestions on ship propulsion, but no problems existed between the two of them, 451-452

(ADM Thomas H. Moorer, Volume I)

- Rickover's heavy involvement in shipbuilding cost overruns, 1358; Moorer explained the conditions of the Navy promotion system and stated Rickover's promotion to admiral was affected by the political element's large part in directing promotion, 1569; Moorer's working relations with Rickover, 1573-1574; Moorer's assessment of Rickover, 1574-1579

(ADM Thomas H. Moorer, Volume III)

- After Rickover conducted a tour of Westinghouse plant in Pittsburgh in the late 1950s, he surprised his guests by opening the bar during the plane ride home, 397-8

(RADM Thomas H. Morton)

- In the early 1950s, as an engineering specialist, he needed congressional support to become a four-star admiral, 75, 283-284; favored multiple propellers for nuclear submarines, 120; post-World War II involvement in the development of nuclear power for ships, 128-132, 140, 142; during World War II was involved with the Navy's shipboard electrical requirements, 130, 176; got rid of promising young subordinates, 173-174; recommended Mumma in the mid-1950s to serve as Chief of the Bureau of Ships, 176; had no role in the design of the Skipjack (SSN-585)-class submarine, 188; was stretched by the work in the late 1950s to develop nuclear-powered surface ships, 190-191; because of Rickover's methods, shipbuilding cost overruns increased once Mumma retired in 1959 after being Chief of the Bureau of Ships, 199-200; deliberate melt-down of a prototype nuclear reactor in the early 1950s at Arco, Idaho, 211-212; asked the Bureau of Ships to announce the need in the late 1950s to put a different engine in submarine Seawolf (SSN-575), 217; once he got into the nuclear power program, he was not a broad-gauged flag officer, 240, 249; claimed to be a victim of anti-Semitism within the Navy, 247-249; conflicts with defense contractors, 263; in 1958 attended the keel-laying for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVAN-65), 269

(RADM Albert G. Mumma)

- Rickover didn't send back Niedermair's organization diagram and made decisions on nuclear-powered submarines himself rather than seek the approval of the Bureau of Ships, 267; Chief of BuShips Vice Admiral Earle Mills selected Rickover as liaison between the bureau and the Atomic Energy Commission, 267, 291-292; Rickover balked at being picked as liaison because his resistance allowed him to write his own terms, 267-268; when asking for rides from Niedermair, Rickover imposed conditions on himself rather than his driver, 268-269

(John C. Niedermair)

- Thwarted in effort to get engineers through enlisted education program in mid-1950s, 111; political intervention on his behalf concerning promotion, 163

(CAPT John V. Noel)

- Peet agreed with Rickover's policy of teaching theory rather than specifics, 26-27; Rickover's decisiveness in killing faulty or less efficient programs, 67-68, 205-206; Rickover interviewed Peet for command of the first nuclear-powered destroyer, USS Bainbridge (DLGN-25) in 1959, 163-165; Admiral Elmo Zumwalt routed a debrief of Rickover's interview against Rickover's wishes, 165-166; the final process of deciding where to place Zumwalt and Peet with two nuclear billets open, 166-168; Rickover tried to show the importance of academic standing to officers' future capability, but Peet's analysis didn't tell him what he wanted to hear, 179-180; Rickover had a prototype of the on-board ship reactor installment built ashore so as to test it out and work out the errors, 194; Rickover's interviews with nuclear power candidates and Peet's feelings on their success, 194-196, 199-200; Peet's assessment of Rickover, 196-198, 203-206, 534; Rickover's attitude toward success emphasized toughness, 198; Rickover acted childish in his anger at Peet for letting an officer leave the nuclear program for postgraduate work, 200-202; Rickover argued with Peet over replacing Peet's chief engineer in the Bainbridge, 202-203; Rickover's importance to the U.S. Navy, 204; background to Rickover's involvement in nuclear power, 207; Rear Admiral Robert Speck's dislike for Rickover rubbed off on Peet, 212-213; the problem of stuck rods which ended Rickover's childish anger was the only problem Peet recalled having with the nuclear power plant, 236; Rickover paid a great deal of attention to his operating plants, 236; Rickover expressed great concern over publication of Peet's National War College thesis on the dangers of nuclear-powered ships, 245-247, 529-533; the key to Rickover's success lay in being responsible both for the nuclear-powered ships' design/construction and their safety, 533-534

(VADM Raymond Peet)

- In opposition to the Navy's plan in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear propulsion plant in a large seaplane, 298-9

(VADM Robert Burns Pirie)

- Price's dealings with Rickover's people in selecting officers for nuclear submarines, 289-291

(RADM Arthur W. Price, Jr.)

- Rickover was attending postgraduate school in the late 1920s, the same time as Pyne, 19; Pyne's close work together with Rickover while at the Bureau of Ships, 19; Rickover became the number-two man in the electrical section of BuShips, 135; Pyne worked closely with Rickover on minesweeping equipment, 135-137; Rickover began setting up base on Okinawa in 1945, 277; beginning of Rickover's tenure as assistant to the officer in charge of the BuShips construction desk occurred as atomic energy came to the fore, 330; Rickover wasn't the father of nuclear submarines but the expediter of the components, 330-331; Rickover's controversial nature was necessary in part to act as a catalyst, 332-333

(RADM Schuyler N. Pyne)

- Ramage wasn't involved much with Ramage as they worked on different aspects of the nuclear submarine, 233-234; Rickover put a great deal of time and attention toward training nuclear personnel, 234; Ramage's only entanglement with Rickover was in the contention over the Reactor Safeguard Committee's control over sending nuclear subs to different ports, 334-335; Ramage's part in trying to reason with Rickover about allowing the scheduled entry of the Enterprise (CVAN-65) into Boston, 338-339; extent of Rickover's involvement in personnel selection and the reason for his involvement, 354-357; Rickover experienced no problems getting contractors and shipyards to follow the program as he dictated it since he held sway over the money, 359; Ramage explained his good relationship with Rickover and what Rickover was looking for in building trust, 364-365; Rickover's explanation on the 1963 loss of the Thresher (SSN-593) and evidence for his theory, 371-372; Rickover wouldn't accept any theory beyond a problem with the pipe fittings because he felt anything reflecting on the safety of the nuclear power plant would kill the whole program, 375-377; as OP-03B Ramage was able to prevent personal confrontations between Rickover and Vice Admiral Elton Grenfell by emphasizing clear distinctions between operational matters and material matters, 401-402

(VADM Lawson P. Ramage)

- Debating whether the fact that the Soviet Union maintained a significant number of conventional submarines but the United States saw no capability in them is evidence of Rickover's philosophy prevailing, 412

(VADM Eli T. Reich, Volume I)

- The source of Rickover's political clout was the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 869; description of Rickover's office in Crystal City and account of a February 1974 meeting to discuss shipbuilding issues, 896-901; in 1967, while in the OP-04 organization, Reich tangled with Rickover over the obtaining of "brickbat" priority for materials to be used in the construction of the aircraft carrier Nimitz (CVN-68), 901-905; Rickover's office had no comment on a report Reich issued in 1974 on problems with shipbuilding claims against the Navy, 917-918; the substance of the report's negative allegations concerning Rickover and his views, 919-924; characterization of Rickover as an "evil genius," 924-926; Rickover was kept well informed of developments in the claims issue, 1037; as part of an attempted claims settlement with Newport News Shipbuilding in 1976, Rickover undermined the DoD position reached by Deputy SecDef William Clements, 1037-1046; in 1976 Rickover tried to defeat the effort to invoke Public Law 85-804 as a means of settling shipbuilding claims, 1070-1079; embittered attitude between Rickover and Newport News Shipbuilding in the 1970s, 1086-1088; Newport News officials had a negative view of Rickover in the early 1970s, 1096-1097; Rickover's efforts in 1976 to derail a settlement between the Defense Department and Newport News, 1132-1136, 1140-1141; from 1974 to 1976 Electric Boat's general manager, Joe Pierce, changed his view of Rickover from highly positive to negative, 1149-1150

(VADM Eli T. Reich, Volume II)

- Rickover didn't originate the idea of atomic energy in the Navy and had abundant support for this course of action, 180-182; Rickover's promotion to rear admiral was a special case in that it was one of the few occasions when the selection board for flag officers had specifications, 262-263; the program pushing for gas turbine-driven destroyers was washed out by Rickover's insistence they go nuclear and his backing in Congress, 461-462; Rickover approved of the recommendations made and radical changes enacted in the Naval Academy by the Folsom Board, 469

(ADM Horacio Rivero, Jr.)

- Royar had a close connection with Rickover, 288; Royar's interaction with Rickover over the nuclear submarine officer selection process, 288-290

(VADM Murrey L. Royar)

- As DCNO (Development) in the late 1960s, Ruckner was involved with Rickover on the concern for costs in the Poseidon missile program, 538-542

(RADM Edward A. Ruckner)

- While running the Navy's nuclear power program in the 1950s, was not interested in examining new systems, 195; visits to the submarine tender Fulton (AS-11) in the early 1960s, 222; Schratz believed he lost his opportunity for major command because he published a facetious story in 1963 about Rickover's burial plans, 227-230; Schratz believed the nuclear power program over-emphasized the technical aspects of an officer's career, 268

(CAPT Paul R. Schratz)

- Involvement in the selection in the late 1950s of the commanding officers for the first Polaris submarines, 157-161; description of his interviews, 158-161, 257; involved in the training of prospective Polaris skippers in the late 1950s, 161; inspection of the ballistic missile submarine Patrick Henry (SSBN-599), 176-177; Shear's assessment of, 176-178; involvement in the early 1970s in the Trident program, 177, 250; in the early 1960s did not move quickly enough in selecting and training Polaris submarine skippers, 209-210

(ADM Harold E. Shear)

- The epitome of Lieutenant Rickover's competition for the engineering E while assistant engineer on the battleship New Mexico (BB-40) in the late 1930s came when the Concord (CL-10) came alongside to fuel and a geyser of oil spilled all over the cruiser's quarterdeck, 43-44

(VADM William R. Smedberg III, Volume I)

- Constant source of distress and irritation for Smedberg, as Chief of Naval Personnel in the early 1960s, in trying to deal with Rickover, 714-717; Rickover explained he was playing an amateur psychiatrist in his insulting interviews, but Smedberg told him he'd still wrecked the morale of numerous young officers, 724-725; Rickover was constantly critical of the education at the Naval Academy, 725-727; the Navy provision for a successor to Rickover finally came in SecNav directing him to train a replacement, 728

(VADM William R. Smedberg III, Volume II)

- Rickover jumped into the picture at the Naval Academy uninvited during the process of making changes in the curriculum, 296-298; criticism of the curriculum was part of Rickover's strategy to maintain publicity so as to continue harassing the Navy to get his way, 298-299

(VADM John Victor Smith)

- Smith-Hutton's association with Rickover began when they were ash heavers manning the firerooms of coal-burning battleships in the early 1920s, 6-7

(CAPT Henri Smith-Hutton, Volume I)

- Thach worked very closely with Captain Rickover relating to the first nuclear power plant in Arco, Idaho, 610-612; Thach's feelings about Rickover as a person, 611

(ADM John S. Thach, Volume II)

- Rickover gave up direct control of nuclear power personnel in 1963 but still had a say in selection of captains of nuclear-powered ships, 246-247; Ward's relationship with Rickover while in plans and policy, 247; Ward complimented Rickover's success and explained the factors contributing to it, 247-248; Rickover's relations with fellow naval officers and the Secretary of Defense, 248-249; Rickover was the best as far as relations with Congress, 252

(ADM Alfred G. Ward)

- Was energetic in inter-ship engineering competition held in the fleet in the late 1930s, 57-58; selection of individuals for the nuclear power program in the late 1950s, 358-359; initially cool treatment of Ward when the first Polaris squadron, Submarine Squadron 14, was established in 1958, 367-368; during trials of the early Polaris submarines in 1959-60, 368-370; provided funds for training facility at New London, 371-372; role in selecting skippers for the early SSBNs, 383

(RADM Norvell G. Ward)

- Rickover would have said something unpleasant to Wertheim at his graduation since he felt he hadn't done his best, 26; Rickover was greatly involved in the Navy's trade-off studies in the late 1960s since they concerned nuclear submarines, 301-302; Rickover's obtaining of his stars was unique, 316; Wertheim had very little interaction with Rickover because of the establishment of a project manager for Trident, 326-327

(RADM Robert H. Wertheim)

- Arranged for CNO Arleigh Burke to visit a nuclear power plant in the fall of 1955, 313-314; concern about safety in nuclear operations, 314-315; disdain for excess gadgets in nuclear submarines, 315-316; had a role in the Polaris missile program in the late 1950s because he was providing the nuclear submarines, 355

(VADM Thomas R. Weschler, Volume I)

- Rickover pushed nuclear power for the DX/DXG program in the late 1960s, 638-641

(VADM Thomas R. Weschler, Volume II)

- Withington managed to get along with Rickover without any serious friction, 109-110; when planning a submarine that could fire a missile while submerged, it became obvious the power plant would have to be designed by the Rickover group, 152

(RADM Frederic S. Withington)


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